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There are a few ways in which the subject, scope and the aim of this 
book could be outlined. For one thing, it deals with modes of existence 
of literature and, thus, its main topic might be called ontology of literary 
works. On the other hand, however, out of all the possible modes of this 
existence, the scope of the argument is narrowed down to those that are 
intimately connected to the major areas of contemporary literary stud-
ies. Thus, the book may be said to deal with particular methodologies 
of literary studies that define and delimit and consequently generate the 
very objects they wish to examine.
The three broad modes of existence I posit in what follows are liter-
ature as a “natural” phenomenon, literature as art and literature as a 
cultural artifact. The first mode emerges spontaneously out of everyday 
cognitive-affective processes, such as conceptualization or storytelling 
and whose creation, form and content, as well as experience of which 
is largely dependent on the propensities of the natural human cognitive- 
affective architecture. The second mode involves historical development 
of literature as a consciously designed work of art with growing aesthetic 
autonomy whose appreciation requires knowledge of art-historical con-
texts and attention to the work in question. Finally, literature exists as a 
product of a given culture, carrying its various covert and overt mean-
ings and latent ideologies, tacitly exploring, challenging or transmitting 
dominant norms and values and being one of many manifestations of 
broader cultural processes.
Each of these modes of existence involves a corresponding method of 
research. The research associated with the first mode includes neuro-
scientific and cognitive approaches to art and literature along with its 
empirical studies, whose overall concern is to explore how the mental 
processes associated with everyday cognition are applied to creation and 
experience of literature. The second mode involves historical studies of 
literature and art as well as philosophy of art exploring the nature of 
aesthetic experience, artistic value or interpretation. The third mode is 
associated with contemporary literary theories that tend to see literary 




The three broad research programs rarely come in contact with each 
other and sometimes, when they do, the contact tends to be hostile as 
when analytic philosophers of art accuse literary theorists of follow-
ing a rather illusory and pointless method that unjustly banishes value 
and authors from the domain of literature. Conversely, literary theorists 
sometimes see analytic philosophers of art as conservative and trivial 
scholastics  unable to penetrate into the deeper layers of literature’s work-
ings. On the other side of the spectrum, some neuroscientists and cogni-
tivists tend to marginalize the art-historical and cultural-specific contents 
of literature, studying it as if it were a fully natural phenomena accessible 
via mere exposure. As a response to the above I argue that the three 
corresponding research modes form a hierarchy of continuity and are, in 
fact, three intertwined levels of inquiry into literature where a lower-level 
discipline provides both partial content and a framework for the emer-
gence of  upper-level discipline. For instance, the operations and natural 
tendencies of the human mind provide a general framework for the devel-
opment of art, offering some insight into its forms and content, but fuller 
understanding of art appreciation requires integration of both the natural 
and the historical-institutional components. Likewise, researching liter-
ary works as ideological texts requires proper determination of the nature 
of the  artifact studied as an aesthetic object that, among other things, 
shapes the possible scope of meanings it takes. In what follows, I set 
out to explore these continuities or points of convergence between those 
seemingly disparate levels of inquiry into the functioning of literature.
There has never been, and I suppose there will never be, a simple an-
swer to the question of what constitutes a relevant method for literary 
studies. The field has always been scattered into a myriad of disparate 
types of inquiry. Roughly, the first half of the twentieth century marks 
a transition from romantic, expressionist theories of literature and a de-
velopment of phenomenological, hermeneutic, formalist, Marxist and 
 psychoanalytic approaches. The last three decades of the twentieth cen-
tury were a time when structuralist, post-structuralist and ideological 
theories rose to prominence. Nowadays, the situation is yet again differ-
ent. The approaches that dominated literary studies in the last decades of 
the previous century are in decline and new perspectives appear.
In the typology proposed here, one broad new orientation in literary 
studies is the tendency toward drawing from the sciences and natural-
izing the humanities, which is largely shaped by various modern ap-
proaches to the study of the mind and to cognitive science. It ranges from 
the empirical studies of reader response, through literary Darwinism and 
evolutionary psychology, neuroscience, affective studies, to cognitive 
 linguistics and poetics, embracing a multitude of related tendencies. The 
other relatively new outlook is offered by analytic philosophy, whose aes-
thetic branch has managed to produce an extensive body of writing on 
the  philosophical issues in literature and other arts in the recent decades.
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Both new outlooks often affirm their separateness from the late 
 twentieth-century literary Theory, emphasizing that they offer radically 
new perspectives that have little to do with the typical preoccupations 
of Theory. This is precisely what the following book addresses. Namely, 
it questions the idea that the three broad research orientations are mu-
tually exclusive, and it does so during another state of methodological 
confusion in literary studies where nothing can be taken for granted re-
garding the relation between the three research perspectives as the ques-
tion is relatively new and unexplored.
In order to proceed, it is necessary to clarify my terminological and 
conceptual decisions. First, my understanding of literary theory is 
 limited to how this term is most often used nowadays, that is, it re-
fers to the varieties of post-structuralist and ideological theories that 
adhere to the notion of the “text” or to “cultural text.” Thus, unless 
noted otherwise, every time I use the term “text,” “textualism,” “The-
ory,” or “literary theory,” I refer strictly to its narrow meaning outlined 
above. There are several reasons for that. As I mentioned, this is how 
the term “Theory” is used nowadays, particularly when one thinks of 
debates over the status of literary theory and phrases such as “against 
theory,” “crisis of theory,” “theory’s empire” used by its adversaries, 
which I review in Chapter 1. Although anthologies of, or companions 
to, Theory often encompass any texts about art, language, politics and 
related topics from Plato to Žižek, it would be futile to carry out any 
argument whatsoever regarding such an inflationist account of Theory. 
Moreover, it would surely be interesting to map how the new perspec-
tives on literature which I outlined above relate to hermeneutics, phe-
nomenology, early reader-response theories and other early approaches 
to literary studies, but this would both obliterate the meaning of the 
debate about contemporary status of literary theory, as well as requir-
ing several other book-length explorations. Hence, apart from brief, 
individual discussions of some pre-Theoretical approaches to literary 
studies, this area is not explored in the following chapters. Moreover, 
it is often the case that calling literary theory “post-structuralist” pro-
duces a lot of confusion. In Chapter 1 I argue that there can be a strong 
and weak understanding of post-structuralism, and it is the latter in 
which I am chiefly interested.
Similar provisions need to be made regarding my use of art-related 
terminology. Throughout the first three chapters I use the terms “aes-
thetics,” “literary aesthetics,” “philosophy of art” and “philosophy of 
literature” interchangeably and see them as largely equivalent with the 
type of philosophical aesthetics as carried out in analytic philosophy 
(with the proviso that “literary” and “of literature” refer to specific ar-
eas of the aforementioned broader categories). This is slightly changed 
when I discuss the distinction into the aesthetic and the artistic, and 
introduce the notion of “art behaviors” in Chapter 4, all of which 
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move beyond the narrow institutional understanding of art toward a 
more or less structured sensual experience.
My understanding of cognitive approaches to literary studies is broad, 
reflecting the umbrella-like nature of the term itself. It is composed of 
fragmentary, scattered research orientations and encompasses often 
disparate stances. What I see as common is the assumption that it is 
 necessary to study the mental processes that shape human cognition and 
that these processes are embodied and intertwine with each other in 
all  human activity. It entails that there are not any special autonomous 
mental units responsible for language processing or art understanding. 
To look at one of the processes is to touch upon many others at the same 
time. Further, cognitive approaches stress the necessity of acknowledg-
ing the bio-psychological constitution of human action and creation. In 
other words, it argues against strong cultural constructionism.
All three broad disciplines are largely autonomous and have their own 
research areas, their own aims, methods and conceptual apparatuses, 
but they are not merely independent and separate. Cognitive science 
forms the lowest level of the research hierarchy and studies and models 
those thought processes (among others) which are responsible for the 
human ability to create and to appreciate art. It can tell us what non- 
aesthetic and non-literary phenomena are responsible for the emergence 
of art in general and literature in particular. Apart from operating on its 
own level, cognitive science can also inform higher explanatory levels in 
many ways. It can serve as an adjunct discipline to explain some prob-
lems in philosophical aesthetics, as well as directly addressing multiple 
issues in poetics, narratology, reader response, etc.
Aesthetics is either a philosophical exploration of structured pleasur-
able sensual experiences or a philosophy of art. Its former understand-
ing can be seen as situated at the intersection of cognitive science and 
research into art. In the latter sense, it explores the conditions of use of 
concepts involved in art-related activities. It is here where the proper 
definition of literature emerges along with informed appreciation of art 
where literary critics serve as models of competent readership.
Theory, as textualist-ideological studies, explores literary creation 
with the help of the notion of the cultural text that makes it possible to 
scrutinize the cultural-specific ideological content of art. Even though 
textualism originally emerged in opposition to seeing literature as art, 
rejecting “works” in favor of “texts,” I am convinced that Theory cannot 
produce reliable research results without assuming the aesthetic charac-
ter of art. In other words, Theory’s ultimate aim is not appreciation, but 
it first must properly identify a given literary text as an aesthetic product 
to adequately conceive of its own object of study.
There is another way of accounting for this hierarchy of research 
and explanation, which perhaps alters the tripartite balance outlined 
above. This other way is to affirm the centrality and primacy of art and 
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philosophical aesthetics for any research program exploring literature. 
In other words, it is art as a mode of existence and aesthetics as a disci-
pline illuminating this mode of existence that is the pillar at the center of 
literary studies. As a result, whatever Theory-fueled analyses of literary 
works one produces and whatever empirical, neuroscientific or cognitive 
studies of literature one carries out, one cannot ignore the peculiarities 
of art functioning as art. To put it simply, one cannot have reliable stud-
ies of literature without fully understanding how literature functions as 
art. Again, it is aesthetics at the center with textualist studies on its one 
side, and cognitive or neuroscientific on the other.
My outline of the hierarchy along with the gradual emergence of 
higher-level structures is in no way finite or definite. For instance, Ellen 
Spolsky famously argued that there is a close affinity between cognitive 
approaches to literature with its underlying Darwinian assumptions and 
post-structuralist Theory, as both emphasize fragmentary, incomplete, 
processual and unstable nature of human knowledge, appealing for 
more direct cross-disciplinary cooperation between cognitive and textu-
alist approaches. Mine is only one of the possible configurations of the 
three disciplines, although I see it as the basic one. I elaborate on this 
issue in Chapters 4 and 5.
By writing this book I hope to take modest part in encouraging more 
cross-disciplinary discussions relevant to the issues at the intersection of 
cognitive-aesthetic and aesthetic-textualist research areas. Since poten-
tial readers include virtually everybody working at those borderlines, it 
is unavoidable that throughout the text, the three target readers occa-
sionally switch, as some passages of my book (as well as some termino-
logical decisions) were structured so as to cater to the varying needs of 
the three groups.
One final comment before overviewing the specific chapters of the 
book concerns the general methodological orientation. The problem this 
book explores can be called theoretical, philosophical, methodological, 
meta-theoretical, or it can be said to be located within philosophy of 
literature or perhaps philosophy of science. I consider all the above terms 
to be adequate and I suppose there is no need to decide which one is 
more accurate, as such terminological choices would necessarily be more 
a matter of one’s background and tastes than of anything else.
My method can be called comparative analysis, as I attempt to de-
scribe and define some concepts central to each of the disciplines, then 
see how these concepts are really applied within each discipline and, 
finally, compare the results cross-disciplinarily.
Finally, my broadest philosophical commitment might be called prag-
matist or late-Wittgensteinian as I believe in the primacy of certain prac-
tice over theoretical constructs that attempt at regulating it. To illustrate 
this, I accept that humans engage in art-related behaviors and I set out to 
explore its underlying logical-conceptual structure. I do not believe that 
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we need a Theory or a definition of art first in order to carry on with 
enjoying art. Nor do I believe that if we cannot have a fully coherent and 
clear-cut Theory, then the practice to which it refers is somehow threat-
ened or invalidated. Thus, in the above sense, I am not a Derridean or 
any other follower of Saussurean philosophy of language. Moreover, I 
believe that some concepts only make sense with the emergence of spe-
cific levels of explanation. The Theory-laden notion of the text is hardly 
applicable to analytic aesthetics, and a proper art-related definition of 
literature is only possible on the aesthetic level. That is to say, multiple 
definitions apply at the same time, depending on which level we refer to. 
Likewise, certain concepts are used here only for pragmatic reasons. I 
do not believe in a strong distinction into form and content, just as I do 
not believe in strong distinctions into art and non-art, but it makes sense 
to use such distinctions if only for purely pragmatic reasons, though in 
the latter case this is also a matter of adhering to a particular level of 
explanation.
Chapter 1 elaborates on the definitions of concepts related to Theory 
and aesthetics as used throughout the book. It explains my choices re-
garding the definition of “Theory,” “aesthetics” and some related con-
cepts. It also explores the historical context of Theory’s formation and 
of its contemporary status, including an overview of debates about The-
ory’s role in literary studies provided both by representatives of Theory 
itself, as well as by those who distance themselves from it. The chapter 
begins with reviewing the growing belief in an overwhelming crisis of 
Theory accompanied with a development of several tendencies within 
literary studies that oppose Theoretical explorations of literature. Next, 
it moves to compare Theory with one of the tendencies, as exemplified 
by analytic aesthetics, investigating the role of Theory and the role of 
philosophy of literature in literary studies. What follows is a discussion 
of the status of aesthetics in analytic philosophy. Finally, I discuss the 
notion of the artworld that is essential to most contemporary analytic 
theories of art and move on to describe the institutional definition of 
literature, as exemplified by the works of Olsen and Lamarque, tracing 
its relation to Theory and to some related works on the topic written by 
Fish and Culler.
Chapter 2 begins with a comparison of the institutional account of 
literature to some approaches to literary studies popular before the 
emergence of Theory. The point is to show that the language of art, 
aesthetics, works, authors and intentions need not entail a return to a 
pre- Theoretical world. My main targets are phenomenological theories, 
formalists and New Critics, and I attempt to show some problems and 
inadequacies of their stances that are clear in comparison with the work 
carried out in analytic aesthetics. The two following sections of  Chapter 2 
explore the relationship between Theory and aesthetics in more de-
tail. Specifically, I examine Barthes’ and Foucault’s seminal textualist 
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essays and compare them to analytic understanding of textualism and 
of  Theory in general. I argue that the type of inquiry into literary texts 
typical of Theory cannot really operate without some assumptions about 
the aesthetic nature of the artifact in question.
The final section of the chapter moves to the other end on the spec-
trum of problems discussed by philosophical aesthetics. Namely, it ad-
dresses the status of institutional discourse. If, as its proponents argue, 
appreciation of art is a matter of following certain conventions that gov-
ern interpretation, then what is the status of these conventions based on 
the common definitions of conventions and on our knowledge of human 
cognition? I argue that even though the notion of institution (in the sense 
of rule-governed procedures that regulate our understanding and appre-
ciation of art) should be kept for pragmatic reasons, how we understand 
and evaluate art is not, strictly speaking, a convention, as how we come 
to cognize art is not fundamentally different from our cognition of other 
objects, products of culture, minds, etc.
Chapter 3 moves beyond the debates about Theory and aesthetics and 
explores the final point of the preceding chapter, focusing on human 
cognition. It first reviews selected areas of cognitive linguistics and spec-
ulates how they might address some questions posed by Theory and 
aesthetics. It then moves to demonstrate how cognitive science can con-
vincingly show the inseparability of human conceptualization, figurative 
language, storytelling and art, pointing to a continuity between ordi-
nary thought processes and the contents of art. Later, it reviews several 
advances in cognitive poetics that seem problematic in how they ap-
proach aesthetics and formalism. Further explorations into the roots of 
the forms and contents of art, along with an investigation into the basis 
of human experience of art include the role of mindreading, empathy 
and emotions in appreciation of artworks. Another important develop-
ment discussed in Chapter 3 is the notion of literary universals that are 
understood as cross-cultural regularities in both the form and the con-
tent of literary narratives. The existence of cross-cultural patterns in art 
that are unaccountable purely in terms of traditions or cultural trans-
mission is a serious argument against strong cultural constructionism in 
the humanities. The final section of the chapter investigates several para-
digms within cognitive science regarding human information processing 
showing both their relevance and their shortcomings when applied to 
literary studies.
After discussing some aspects of human cognitive-emotive architec-
ture in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 attempts at a more direct engagement be-
tween cognitive, aesthetic and Theoretical tendencies in literary studies. 
The first section discusses the question of the beginning of art and places 
it in the context of debates about aesthetic experience, understood as 
a structured sensual experience, being closer to Deweyan rather than 
to Kantian aesthetics. Still, the idea of pleasurable sensual/imaginative 
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experience is not equivalent to the experience of art, whose value often 
surpasses direct sensual/imaginative pleasure and requires considerable 
degree of competence to be conferred. Thus, the second section discusses 
the continuity between the aesthetic and the artistic and explores several 
types of value associated with art. My argument then moves to tracing 
the continuity between spontaneous, untutored responses to art, whose 
domain is closer to cognitive literary studies, and competent judgments 
of art critics whose description is the domain of philosophy of art. The 
concepts most helpful in exploring the issue are taken from cognitive 
science and include simulation, grounded cognition and degrees of acti-
vation within the mental lexicon.
Chapter 5 draws from philosophy of science on the issues of inter-
disciplinary relations and hierarchies, emergent structures, tacit knowl-
edge and complex systems and outlines the disciplinary hierarchy with 
 relation to types of experience and explanation in art with cognitive ap-
proaches providing the basis, aesthetics forming a higher-level emergent 
structure and Theory-driven readings constituting another  higher-level 
emergent structure. I then proceed to commenting on a related project 
involving psycho-historical framework for art appreciation and discuss 
levels of interpretation as explored by Arthur Danto in analytic aesthet-
ics. Finally, I give examples of flawed analysis in literary studies that 
 either reduces art to perceptual-psychological responses typical of the 
first level of art experience or imposes theoretical frameworks on art-
works to the point where their artistic value is overlooked.
Again, Theory
In the introduction to the 2005 collection of essays entitled Theory’s 
Empire: An Anthology of Dissent, Daphne Patai and Will H. Corrall, 
the editors of the volume, write:
This anthology appears at a moment when not only have theoreti-
cal discussions of literature become stagnant but articles and books 
are published in defense of the conceptual stalemates that have led 
to this very immobility. In the early years of the new millennium, 
theorists are busily writing about the impasse in which theory finds 
itself, discoursing on the alternatives as portentously as they once 
wrote about the death of the novel and the author.
(Patai and Corrall 2005, 1)
Indeed, judging by the growing number of books whose titles contain 
references to a sense of an end either of the theoretical project or the 
post-structuralist paradigm,1 one might get an impression that after 
pronouncing the death of the author, or the novel, the next important 
achievement of literary theory is the death of the Theorist. Although 
the end or the death of Theory has been pronounced quite often since 
its inception,2 this time the difference is that the sense of malaise is ex-
pressed by literary theorists themselves and, more importantly, several 
new approaches to literary research emerged, which claim to have little 
in common with the methods of what we have come to understand as 
literary theories.
In analytic philosophy of art, the claims about Theory’s necessary 
demise go back at least to Olsen’s 1987 The End of Literary The-
ory. Even though it contains well-grounded philosophical arguments 
against some literary theories which are perhaps not able to success-
fully explain the nature of literary aesthetics, it is not exactly clear why 
it should indicate that literary theory has in any sense ended. Olsen’s 
assumption that literary theories need to successfully explain the aes-
thetic dimension of literature, otherwise they will fail at producing a 
1 Theories and Institutions
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comprehensive philosophy of literature, seems to be misguided to the 
extent that it is precisely the rejection of research in aesthetics, and 
what Barthes called the passive reception of a literary work, that has 
laid at the foundation of literary theory from the end of 1960s onwards. 
But if one starts with a premise, as Olsen does, that the very concept 
of literature is logically embedded in broader considerations on art 
and aesthetics, then, predictably, all theories from post- structuralism, 
through deconstruction, feminism, post-colonialism and to new histor-
icism must be considered as failures in their insistence on studying lit-
erature by means of various methodologies and not merely aesthetically 
appreciating it. Perhaps, then, they do fail at producing comprehensive 
philosophies of literature per se, but if that was not their aim in the first 
place, wouldn’t Olsen’s criticism be rather far-fetched? After all, why 
would post-colonial theories require strict definitions of concepts such 
as fiction, aesthetic experience or a literary work of art in the types of 
research they usually encourage?
Neither is it entirely clear what many other Theory’s adversaries have 
in mind when they speak of both Theory and its failure. The aforemen-
tioned collection edited by Patai and Corrall contains numerous essays 
authored by scholars from both the humanities and the sciences attack-
ing what they call literary theory in almost every conceivable way. The 
criticism ranges from purely philosophical and technical, through po-
litical, pragmatic, ethical and often contains charges of poor research, 
manipulation and ideological bias. The target of criticism is almost 
everything that has been happening in the humanities from the 1960s 
onwards, a category in itself so broad that it can clearly be accused of 
anything. As it often happens, the reports of Theory’s death have been 
greatly exaggerated, although one can clearly notice a certain flight from 
theorizing and a growing aversion to its methods. It would be all too 
naïve to put the blame for it on some hypothetical failures of specific 
research programs in terms of integrity of their philosophical founda-
tions. It is a trivial fact that popularity of certain intellectual movements 
is not necessarily connected with their, more or less imaginary, philo-
sophical success. Apart from pointing to contingent fads and fashions 
as reasons why some intellectual trends come and go, one cannot ig-
nore the broader socioeconomic context in which the groves of academe 
function. It is hardly disputable that most of those research programs 
in the humanities developed after structuralism have been intertwined 
with the leftist political agenda. Thus, one can at least accept as a cred-
ible hypothesis that perhaps with a gradual demise of leftist politics in 
the West in favor of right-wing neoliberalism, a substantial part of the 
momentum behind the humanities was lost. After all, the highly technol-
ogized turbo- capitalism, with its typically myopic attitude toward that 
which cannot be easily and quickly capitalized, has little interest in what 
goes on in the human sciences.
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In academic circles, a serious blow at contemporary humanities was 
struck in the mid-90s with the infamous Sokal affair that attempted 
to demonstrate the supposed systematic abuse of science and a lack of 
credible research results in humanities. In the following years one could 
observe the emergence of various movements in literary studies which 
attempted to distance themselves from the type of research carried out 
by celebrated literary theorists, and which promoted a revival of interest 
in a technical, systematized study of literature, and a return to concepts 
such as human universals. Neo-Darwinists have tried to apply evolu-
tionary psychology to produce a quasi-naturalistic theory of literature 
as a human adaptive tool. Developments of cognitive sciences have led 
to a resurge of interest in poetics and narratology, as well as to the study 
of reader response, including the role of emotions and memory in the 
consumption of literature. Finally, one can observe that in recent years 
various post- or anti-theoretical attitudes have emerged, along with a re-
newed interest in broadly conceived aesthetics. Thus, if we were to con-
ceive of “the crisis of theory,” without the socioeconomic context and 
in terms of a purely intellectual phenomenon, it would at most involve a 
certain sense of stagnation and a lack of progress of theoretical thinking 
that resulted in the emergence of the aforementioned methodologies that 
emphasize their separateness from what is standardly called Theory.
Some of the new approaches to literary studies acknowledge that The-
ory is in a state of crisis and emphasize their fundamental separateness 
from Theory’s aims and methods. As one of the key figures in contempo-
rary literary aesthetics, Peter Lamarque claims, “[i]t is widely assumed, 
even among its strongest supporters, that the heyday of Theory is past” 
(Lamarque 2009, 10). Literary studies have definitely reached an inter-
esting state, since the supposedly miserable status of Theory has been ac-
knowledged even by many of its famous representatives, as one can read 
in the preface to the 2003 Critical Inquiry Symposium entitled “The 
future of criticism” during which the luminaries of literary theory, such 
as Stanley Fish, W.J.T. Mitchell, Homi Bhabha, Wayne Booth, Fredric 
Jameson and J. Hillis Miller debated over the uncertain future of the 
journal, literary studies and the humanities in general. Some of the sug-
gestions for the participants’ papers included ideas such as the end of 
“the great era of theory” which now enters “a period of timidity, back-
filling, and (at best) empirical accumulation,” backing off “from earlier 
sociopolitical engagements and the sense of revolutionary possibility,” 
and turning to aesthetics, as well as some new challenges to human-
ities that “go well beyond the resources of structuralism and poststruc-
turalism” (Mitchell 2004, 330–331). If this appears to be a brute fact, 
acknowledged even by Theory’s key figures, the next step should be to 
look for some possible causes and, perhaps, for some alternatives that 
might revitalize literary studies. Of course, the crisis of Theory, assum-
ing it is justified to declare it at all, is definitely a tremendously complex 
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phenomenon, whose causes and manifestations go well beyond any kind 
of intellectual speculations about the value of specific theories. Neverthe-
less, since the whole project may be put into question, it seems to be an 
appropriate moment to look back and evaluate particular programs for 
literature, and compare them with what the newly emerging approaches 
can offer to literary studies and how the latter refer to the research as-
sociated with literary theory. Although scholars working both in an-
alytic philosophy of literature and in the emerging bio- psychological 
areas of the study of arts, often refer (mostly critically) to the work of 
literary theorists, one can hardly say the same about the latter. This par-
ticular cross-paradigmatic exchange has been rather scant so far, with 
one notable exception of Terry Eagleton’s recent book (Eagleton 2012), 
where, on the one hand, he shares the analytic aesthetician’s interest 
in the foundational questions of literary studies, such as the definition 
of literature, or the nature of fiction, and on the other hand, he retains 
his  theoretical-continental philosophical background, pointing out to a 
potentially fertile area of intellectual cooperation. In any case, the emer-
gence of new research programs, intellectual exchange and a dialogue 
between the old and the new are nothing extraordinary. Establishing the 
nature of relations between, broadly understood, literary theory and the 
newer approaches seems thus well-grounded and desirable.
There are, of course, different suggestions as to what exactly should 
literary studies look like after the collapse of the “Theory’s empire.” 
They range from Eagleton’s plea for finding new topics and continuing 
the theoretical project, Harold Bloom’s replacement of theoretical read-
ing with aesthetic appreciation, Knapp and Michaels’ insistence on the 
very practice of reading, to the literary Darwinists’ fight for a paradigm 
change, to cognitive scientists’ suggestion of embracing interdisciplinary, 
psychological studies and the analytic aestheticians’ reclaiming of the 
concepts of the artistic work and of literature. This book will avoid any 
revolutionary claims as to the future shape of literary studies, focusing 
mostly on the last two areas from the above list, as they seem to be the 
most rapidly growing and the most promising areas of research. They 
both share the conviction that there exists a specific practice of reading 
texts as literature, which tended to be neglected in the heyday of literary 
theory. In Peter Lamarque’s words, “the decline of Theory marks the 
revitalization of literature” (Lamarque 2009, 10). Hence, the following 
discussion of some of the developments in analytic aesthetics and cogni-
tive literary studies will emphasize the need to get back to the practice, 
to reclaim the institution of literature as literature. It will attempt at crit-
icizing some aspects of contemporary literary theory, but not in the sense 
of abandoning the theoretical project altogether, or trying to return to 
some mythical, pristine, pre-theoretical world. Theory has certainly had 
its failures and deserves a fair share of criticism, but it would be naïve to 
claim that in an area such as literary studies, one might posit a ban on 
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some specific critical or theoretical approaches, deeming them simply in-
valid.3 This question will be elaborated upon later on, as it definitely re-
quires further clarification. I find it uncontroversial that literary theory 
has also had its merits, and has enabled a tremendous step forward for 
literary studies. Concepts sdeath of the author,” or “the text” irrevers-
ibly changed the mode of thinking about literature. Any attempt at intel-
lectually revitalizing literary studies should then be a step forward, that 
is, an attempt to expand and incorporate new approaches, rather than 
abandoning the attainments of Theory and dreaming of getting back to, 
say, nineteenth-century naïve, romantic vision of art. Here, acknowledg-
ing the role of aesthetics and turning toward the practice of reading will, 
thus, distance itself both from the aestheticist approach of, say, Harold 
Bloom and from the typically neo-pragmatist anti- theoretical, embrace-
ment of literary practices and institutions.
Theories and Theorrhea
Before trying to sketch how contemporary aesthetics can be relevant 
for literary studies, it is essential to specify how literary theory is un-
derstood here, and what aspect of theory is going to be the target of 
criticism. Given the staggeringly wide variety of contemporary literary 
theories, to which one critic referred as “theorrhea” (Merquior 2005, 
234) as well as the palpable differences in the programs for studying 
literature that they offer, it is obviously difficult to give an all-embracing 
account of the different approaches. Hence, rather than following such 
a grandiose plan, I am going to attempt to distinguish those features of 
Theory that are most important for the discussion of aesthetics.
To begin, in his Philosophy of Literature, Peter Lamarque, an analytic 
philosopher of art, gives a brief, perhaps uncontroversial description of 
how to conceive of literary theory, which can serve as a good starting 
point for the following discussion:
Literary Theory, as a heterogeneous collection of “isms,” flour-
ished in literary studies roughly between the late 1960’s and the late 
1990s. A standard list of such theories would include: structuralism, 
feminism, Marxism, reader-response theory, psychoanalysis, decon-
struction, post-structuralism, postmodernism, new historicism, and 
post colonialism […]. Generalizations in this area are fraught with 
danger but it doesn’t seem too cavalier to claim that a feature of The- 
ory, as a whole, was that it rejected the notion of literature as art […].
(Lamarque 2009, 9)
The last comment concerning the alleged rejection of literature as art 
is perhaps not uncontroversial, and will be elaborated upon later, as 
at least at this point one might ask: rejected in what sense? It would 
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be altogether different if one claimed that literary theory rejected the 
possibility or the necessity of formulating such a Theory for literature in 
general, and if one stated that it rejected the notion of literature as art 
being relevant for Theory’s research ambitions. Although possibly quite 
subtle, bearing in mind such a distinction is crucial for determining the 
relation between Theory and aesthetics, as, without a certain degree of 
clarity on the matter, one could not tell whether Theory and aesthetics 
are disparate, whether they compete or whether they might be called 
complementary.
Lamarque then quotes from the introduction to Theory’s Empire, 
agreeing with its authors that what those specific theories had in common 
was both “turning away from literature as literature and an eagerness 
to transmogrify it into a cultural artifact (or ‘signifying practice’) […]” 
(Patai and Corrall 2005, 8) and he adds his own further comment:
It is a curious consequence of this stance that Literary Theory be-
came increasingly remote from literature as such. Admittedly, this 
was not entirely unintended as Theory self-consciously adopted 
both an anti-essentialist and a reductive view of literature. The very 
concept of literature was thought to reside in a discredited “liberal 
humanist” ideology and in its place was substituted with the more 
neutral and supposedly value-free notion of “text” or undifferenti-
ated writing (ecriture).
(Lamarque 2009, 9)
The notion of the “text,” which indirectly inspired most of the research 
programs in literary theory, ultimately goes back, via the concept of the 
sign, to Ferdinand de Saussure’s pioneering work in linguistics, and it 
is precisely at his work that one has to look in order to understand the 
central premises underlying textually-driven Theory. One example of a 
disillusioned literary scholar struggling with Saussure’s specter haunting 
his own discipline can be seen in Valentine Cunningham’s essay “The-
ory, What Theory?” (Cunningham 2005, 24–41). Cunningham persua-
sively demonstrates how Saussurean linguistics directly influenced and 
still influences the textually-driven mode of thinking of many literary 
scholars, even if the textual project lost its positivist, scientific ambi-
tions somewhere halfway through the twentieth century. Cunningham 
shows how literary theory, by introducing its fundamental notion of a 
text, liberated the literary work from the constraints of discovering and 
celebrating authors and their intentions, and made it possible to investi-
gate texts as battlefields of various paradigms and ideologies that were 
to be unmasked using specific theoretical approaches. This was clearly 
inspired by Saussure’s insistence that language is a system of signs quite 
autonomous from its use by actual speakers and their intentions. What 
was of utmost importance in the Saussurean paradigm was to study 
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language as a closed system of binary opposites with little interest in ref-
erences. For de Saussure, the fact that people use it for communication 
was merely incidental and irrelevant for the actual study of language. Al-
though the relation between the signifier and the signified was of a rather 
static nature for de Saussure, most literary appropriations of his views 
ran against that claim, focusing the arbitrary nature of this relation, and 
consequently, on the signifier exclusively. Thus, the idea of the arbitrari-
ness of the signifier, though as Cunningham points out, this was not a 
Saussurean concept, as for him “it was always the arbitrariness of the 
sign” (Cunningham 2005, 29) became an idée fixe of post- Saussurean 
literary theory. If the point of focus is the internal difference, with a 
suspension of reference, than the predictable conclusion is “the endless 
inward-looking deferrals of meaning, mise en abyme” (Cunningham 
2005, 29).
The result was the emergence of a myriad of post-structuralist schools 
of criticism with a tendency to point out internal aporias and infinite 
deferrals of meaning that were supposed to indicate the failures and in-
ternal inconsistencies of discourses and artworks. Truth be told, such 
claims often boiled down to claiming that concepts used within them 
have fuzzy edges and are never entirely definite (Derrida 1988, 123–124); 
an observation quite unilluminating if one recalls the 100-year-old essay 
by Bertrand Russell, where he compellingly argues that vagueness of 
meaning is ubiquitous in language, but it does not mean that all com-
munication is necessarily unsuccessful (Russell 1923, 84–92). In his 
 famous exchange with Derrida, John Searle remarked that to see grave 
philosophical implications in the fact that concepts do not have strict 
boundaries or that meaning is deferred in deconstructionist sense is to 
ignore the whole Wittgensteinian tradition and to repeat the mistake of a 
classical metaphysician, who thought that strong foundations are needed 
to ground concepts such as “knowledge” or “perception” in order for 
philosophy to do its own work (Searle 1994, 639).
Somehow contrary to Cunningham’s claims, some Saussurean-like 
assumptions about language and textuality can be also traced in other, 
pre-Sassurean approaches to language and literature. It might be as-
sumed that textualist thinking in literary studies embraces, apart from 
structuralist and the varieties of post-structuralist thought quoted above 
from Lamarque, also some earlier methodologies, such as New Criticism 
and Russian Formalism, as all of them share similar concerns about the 
necessity to study texts as objects separated from their authors, and the 
context of their creation, focusing on their linguistic or ideological con-
tent. It is precisely this separateness that makes them textual. Such claim 
might be controversial due to the extreme vagueness of the concept of 
literary theory as such. If one looks at the contents of typical antholo-
gies of literary theory, one finds all sorts of considerations on literature 
juxtaposed together: not only Saussure-inspired French Theory, but also 
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hermeneutics, reader-response theories, phenomenology, and various 
texts on arts and poetics going back to Aristotle. If literary theory is 
all of the above, then criticizing it or claiming that one is against theory 
seems pointless, as one possibly claims to be against any intellectual ac-
tivity whatsoever. The ultimate vacuity of such an all-encompassing con-
cept makes it useless in a reasonable philosophical discussion. All in all, 
the view that any philosophical position or any approach to the study 
of literary works comes under the category of Theory is too inclusive 
and problematic for theoretical debates to carry on. My understanding 
of Theory throughout the book is, consequently, limited to textualist 
and ideological approaches, as they are most representative of the field 
nowadays.
There are sound reasons for rejecting, as it might be called, the in-
flationist theory of literature. For one thing, even among academic 
circles, the term literary theory hardly ever refers to Aristotle, or, say, 
Roman Ingarden, and its use is, in fact, narrower. Moreover, reading 
recent criticisms of literary theory, such as those by literary Darwin-
ists, analytic philosophers or some cognitivists, one gets the impression 
that what they criticize is usually the textualist French Theory, or any 
other methodology that bears affinity with post-structuralist thought or 
is characterized by explicit political motivation in its research. On the 
other hand, to generalize about the whole heterogeneous field of Theory 
regarding any issue, including the degree to which literary theory might 
be called “post-structuralist,” is a risky undertaking. Within each par-
ticular literary theory one can certainly find scholars that would be more 
textualist4 in the sense of a “strong” interpretation of Barthes, Foucault 
or Derrida, but this is not enough to generalize. Standard theoretical 
explorations of, say, putative unconscious conflicts of characters, gender 
representation or the work’s ideological stance do not typically require 
commitment to a strong reading of post-structuralist philosophy. The 
problem can be elaborated upon by investigating how it approaches the 
following two issues. First, what it really means that literary theory is 
post-structuralist and second, how theoretical claims relate to the actual 
practice of literary analysis. Regarding the former, post-structuralist 
theory can be understood as strictly based on a set of assumptions such 
as the “instability of meaning,” “death of the author,” “text” which are 
construed in its strong form. This is how it is interpreted by most of 
Theory’s attackers, including some analytic aestheticians (see Chapter 2 
for more details). But it is clear that Theory-driven analyses of literary 
works are far from customarily celebrating occult renditions of Sauss-
urrean linguistics. Instead, post-structuralism in its more diluted form 
can be understood as rejection of the scientist ambitions of structuralism 
and of its conviction about uncovering single, true method of literary 
analysis along with an attack on pre-structuralist theories of naïve inten-
tionalism, and accepting multiplicity of theoretical frameworks that may 
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be applied for analysis of literary works, but retaining particular interest 
in literary works as repositories of ideology. This is, indeed, the under-
standing of textualism that I am chiefly interested in throughout this 
book. Following that, I use the term “literary theory” in the abovemen-
tioned sense of contemporary Theories unless specified otherwise. This 
does not mean that phenomenological or reader-response research pro-
grams are of no interest, as they will be referred to separately throughout 
the book. They simply have little in common with the numerous move-
ments within textualist and ideological Theory, which suggests that they 
require a separate treatment.
Apart from these preliminary remarks concerning the historical and 
ideological aspects of literary theory, it is essential to assess its broad, 
philosophical status. This leads to the second question, the one that cov-
ers the relation of theory to practice. I believe that much of the hos-
tility toward Theory coming from science and analytic philosophy is 
due to different approach to language use. Analytic philosophers typ-
ically take notions such as “text” or “death of the author” as strict 
propositions, fleshing them out and offering potential interpretations 
of these claims. But the philosophical differences which result in the 
 continentally-shaped mind of the theoretician being more attracted to 
Jakobson’s poetic function of language rather than to strict logical anal-
ysis, lead to frequent light-hearted treatment of language on the former’s 
side. This, along with Theory’s peculiar relation to practice leads me to 
claim that assessment of literary theory’s value must include references 
to the actions theoreticians take when attending to a literary work and 
not just a construal of their propositions. In other words, it is a matter 
of juxtaposing what literary theorists actually do with what they think 
they do and what words they use to describe it.
The relation between literary theory and, so to speak, literary practice 
is a problematic one, as it does not quite reflect the typical distinctions 
of philosophy that clarifies the assumptions of certain practice or sci-
ence. Is Theory a body of knowledge not unlike that of a set of theorems 
and laws? Do different theories constitute different paradigms? Is the 
relation between literary theory and literature similar to that of, say, 
philosophy of science and science? Literary theory is partly all of the 
above, but never just one of them. The uniqueness of Theory among 
the disciplines of human knowledge is often emphasized by the typical 
pragmatist accusation (Knapp and Michaels 1985, 11–31) of it being a 
body of abstract, theoretical maxims that are separate from the prac-
tice of reading and which attempt to control it, as if from the outside. 
This seems to be partly congruent with Lamarque’s observation that 
Theory refuses to treat literature as literature, but it does not bring us 
any closer to determining what Theory is. Perhaps at least some of the 
controversies and current concerns about Theory result from this vague-
ness of Theory’s status and its relation to literature. For the needs of this 
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book, it would be helpful to start with a distinction between two general 
methods of how Theory can be, and is, used, and to show some possible 
inadequacies of one of these uses.
This basic distinction in the relation of theory to practice in literary 
studies concerns their normative and descriptive aspects and the degree 
to which literary theory is a blend of particular methodologies that urge 
certain practices and underlying descriptive assumptions, as in the stan-
dard understanding of philosophy of a discipline/practice. The norma-
tive is usually conceived of as the set principles that ought to be used in 
the critical enterprise (even when this seems to be in discord with the 
very practice), and whose establishment is necessary for the practice of 
literature, such as the Intentional Fallacy and the Heresy of the Para-
phrase. It follows that one can extend the idea of the normative, perhaps 
in a slightly pragmatist spirit, to any specific research program, or to 
any specific literary theory, that sets its own goals as to the nature of its 
inquiry into literary texts, its goals and its methods, as well as its own 
definition of what a literary text is. To avoid the essentialist parlance, 
one might say that a given theory offers its own description of the aspect 
of the text that it deems of interest to its research program. This exten-
sion seems only natural, as any new theory, or any new research pro-
gram in literature, attempts at focusing on, or emphasizing, a different 
aspect of the studied text. Thus, this function of literary theory might 
be called, with some reservations, the philosophy of literary criticism(s), 
or the metacriticism.
The descriptive aspect of literary theory would not be that of trying 
to lay down specific rules needed for the reading of texts, but rather to 
investigate the “foundational issues” (Lamarque 2009, 5) of the liter-
ary studies itself, and of the concept of literature as such, as well as its 
“methods, aims, presuppositions, modes of argument or evidence of rea-
soning, the status of its central claims and its basic concepts”  (Lamarque 
2009, 5), being thus closer to what might be called philosophy of litera-
ture. This logically implies that underlying all the diversity of approaches 
to studying literature there is a unity and agreement about at least some 
of literature’s crucial and defining concepts. This point also emphasizes 
the gap dividing the descriptive from the normative approach, since the 
latter would entail that formulating rules and principles precedes any 
valid critical practice, whereas the former would imply that some form 
of practice, or inquiry, already exists, and theory’s role is only to ponder 
upon its foundations (or lack thereof).
The distinction between the normative and the descriptive is, of course, 
not that clean-cut, i.e., analytic aesthetics might be said to contain both 
normative principles and descriptive content. This is a result of how the 
notion of analysis is typically understood in this philosophical tradi-
tion.5 The objective of analysis is to unveil the logical structure behind 
the concepts we use. This is achieved by means of breaking them down 
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into smaller units in order to determine the necessary and sufficient con-
ditions of their application. In other words, to apply a certain concept 
to an object correctly means to ascribe it to a relevant category. In the 
famous Russellian example, the necessary and sufficient conditions to 
successfully apply the concept of a bachelor are manhood and unmar-
riedness, and in order to be classified as a member of this category, a 
candidate has to meet both of them. Similarly, analytic work in aesthet-
ics focuses on determining the logical structure behind the concepts that 
are used with reference to art. This, obviously, includes the concept of 
art itself, and virtually all the jargon used when discussing art, ranging 
from artworks, interpretation, aesthetic intentions, aesthetic properties, 
fiction, taste, evaluation, etc. On the whole, however, on the axis of 
descriptive vs. normative, philosophy of art scores definitely higher in 
the direction of the former and literary theory more in the direction of 
the latter.
As it was mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, there exist many 
applications of a concept such as “literary theory.” The same might be 
said of “aesthetics.” One of the standard meanings of it might be some-
thing akin to artistic principles, program or artistic forms used in a spe-
cific genre or by a specific artist, as when talking about “the aesthetics 
of camp” or “the aesthetics of Sarah Kane.” Another common use of 
the term refers to beauty and its perception in general. These meanings, 
however, are of little importance for the main argument of the book due 
to their overwhelmingly broad scope. The more general understanding 
of “aesthetics,” along with its relation to aesthetic experience and value, 
and to the notion of the “artistic” are explored in Chapter 4. Unless 
stated differently, throughout the book “aesthetics” is going to be used 
as an equivalent to “philosophy of art” in the sense of an inquiry into the 
foundations of the practices surrounding art which aims to clarify the 
use of certain concepts applied in the practice, as well as to investigate 
the logical structure behind them. Of course, there is also a narrower 
meaning of “aesthetics,” such as in “aesthetic experience,” “aesthetic 
attitude” or “aesthetic properties.” As Noël Carroll suggests (Carroll 
1999, 156–159), these refer to the audience-related aspects of art. In this 
sense, “philosophy of art” might be said to be object-oriented, while 
“aesthetics” is receiver-oriented. Overall, following the use of these con-
cepts by analytic philosophers, “philosophy of art” and “aesthetics” will 
be used interchangeably, while “aesthetic experience,” etc. will be used 
with reference to audience-oriented aspects of art.
Even with this succinct summary of my assumptions about art-related 
terminology, one can easily envisage the scope of work done in ana-
lytic aesthetics, as well as its strengths and weaknesses. First of all, an-
alytic aesthetics cannot be called a methodology of studying art in the 
sense that Marxism or feminism can. That is to say, aestheticians are 
not interested in studying the contents of art through the lens of specific 
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theories and methodologies per se. Nor can aesthetics in this sense be 
equivalent to the normative aestheticism that urges scholars, readers or 
critics to enjoy the type of art for art’s sake attitude. The program of 
merely clarifying and ordering the concepts that are normally employed 
in specific discourses is obviously modest in comparison with literary 
theories’ ambitions that usually aim at using specific, pre-established 
body of claims to explain and to study art outside of its basic, tangible 
context. These ambitions are sometimes muddled with something akin 
to the analytic program, as doubtlessly movements such as hermeneu-
tics, formalism, structuralism or deconstruction definitely both contain 
analytically based claims about literature’s foundations and sometimes 
encourage very specific reading strategies and broad research programs.
Taking these differences into consideration, analytic aesthetics clearly 
cannot have the ambition to replace literary theory; it can, however, 
prove to be useful regarding the basics, or what contemporary literary 
theorists often reluctantly call the essential questions of literature. One 
frequent way of criticizing literary theory is pointing out the lack of 
consensus about the most rudimentary concepts and issues surrounding 
literature. Discussions concerning meaning, interpretation or intention 
have often been too vague, with Theorists jumping to hasty conclusions, 
and considering the debates closed far too early, as some critics point out 
(Hogan 1996, 1–11). This is precisely the area where literary analytic 
aesthetics might possibly come in handy.
One more important issue which will be elaborated upon later on, 
but which perhaps needs to be at least indicated at this stage, is the rela-
tion between philosophy, as a body of abstract knowledge and practice, 
as understood in aesthetics. Whereas most literary theories have often 
called for some alteration of the way works of literature are standardly 
read and interpreted by common readers (most readers hardly ever 
read with Marxist or feminist theoretical frameworks in mind), often 
being wary of acknowledging and studying the tangible practices and 
institutions that we normally take to be part of appreciation of litera-
ture, analytic philosophy of literature might be called rather conserva-
tive. If the literary theorist is suspicious of any allegedly “normal” and 
 established principles governing what is acceptable in interpretation and 
appreciation, or in other words, suspicious of the possibility that a non- 
theoretical, non-ideological practice can exist, the aesthetician, in a way, 
reverses this relation, acknowledging the existence of a certain social 
and material set of practices which are privileged over any set of theory. 
Thus, the philosopher’s job is merely to demonstrate in what ways the 
concepts employed in these practices are logically interconnected.
A suspicious literary theorist might wonder whether the aesthetician 
is not in the grip of bourgeois ideology, unaware of the sociohistorical 
constitution of both art and the practices that surround it. Isn’t their 
insistence on appreciating the work of art, or celebrating the artist’s 
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creativity a step back in the intellectual history, returning to some pris-
tine, pre-theoretical, pre-Barthesian world, where one is a passive recip-
ient of the pleasures of the work, unaware of the indeterminate nature 
of the text? For one thing, it is true that analysis, as understood by the 
aesthetician, is embedded in the set of practices and conventions deeply 
rooted in the modern sociohistorical reality. It is also a fact that certain 
modes of appreciating art have developed historically and are chiefly 
characteristic of modern Western societies. The same might be said 
about the social institutions that make up the artworld, such as galler-
ies, museums, universities, publishing houses, as well as critics, and, of 
course, artists. Analytic aestheticians are well aware of the fact that ana-
lyzing the artworld is necessarily local. The most dominating theories of 
art in the analytic tradition are those that stress the impossibility of an 
ahistorical definition of art. But the fact that certain practices developed 
along with the birth of the bourgeois society does not necessarily put the 
whole business into question for the aesthetician, as she is interested in 
merely describing the conditions that are necessary for actual humans in 
contemporary context to enjoy art aesthetically. This is a typically West-
ern bourgeois preoccupation, but so is that of a student, of a professor, 
of a French intellectual or of an author of a PhD thesis. The fact is not 
directly relevant to the logical analysis of the use of language. This insis-
tence on analyzing language in terms of its actual use in a social context 
is clearly the merit of late Wittgenstein’s philosophy which favored the 
idea of language as a game, and meaning as use, over the positivist vision 
of language as a mirror image of the world, whose logical structure can 
be studied autonomously.
Similarly, restoring the concept of the work to literary studies need not 
entail any return to biographical studies, or to some nineteenth-century 
upper-class aestheticism. As this will be elaborated upon in the follow-
ing chapters, I will only mention that one of the most outspoken crit-
ics of Barthes’ textualism among the aestheticians, Paisley Livingston, 
claims that he is not advocating a “return to the kind of literary schol-
arship Barthes and others wished to replace” (Livingston 1993, 91) and 
the attempts to show “ways in which some of the textualist’s intuitions 
may be reframed in a reasonable and constructive manner” (Livingston 
1993, 91), simply because it is altogether “very difficult and costly” 
(Livingston 1993, 91) to reject the notion of the work in its entirety. This 
overall anti-metaphysical bent, the unwillingness to remove philosoph-
ical debate from tangible human action, to some extent typical of all 
analytic philosophy, can be appealing; nevertheless, at least one major 
possible threat to the felicity of the whole project can be indicated, and 
that is, predictably, the notion of practice, or institution. Some literary 
theorists, most notably Stanley Fish, have encouraged their own versions 
of the theory that literature is an institutional, or rule-governed practice, 
but their definitions of the concept appear to be problematic.
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The cornerstone of Fish’s institutionalism, the notion of interpretive 
communities that govern and delimit the range of possible interpreta-
tions, or uses, of literary works seems dangerously close to framework 
relativism, typical of, e.g., Kuhn’s scientific communities, or Sapir-Whorf 
linguistic relativity. To summarize Fish’s argument briefly, interpreta-
tions are always already predetermined by reader’s own assumptions 
and expectations concerning possible meanings. In his account, tex-
tual meaning is not discovered, it is always created by the readers, or 
produced by their assumptions, and interpretations are always self- 
confirming, that is, readers’ assumptions always produce what they in 
advance aimed to produce. This does not mean, however, that inter-
pretations are unconstrained in the “anything goes” type of attitude. 
The range of possible interpretations is always regulated by the profes-
sional communities of readers who share similar reading strategies. On 
the other hand, it is more accurate to say that they think they share 
these strategies, for according to Fish, we can never break free from 
our pre-established beliefs, whether they refer to textual interpretation, 
or ascribing intentional states to other minds. So powerful are our as-
sumptions and beliefs that we can never really understand or assume 
the role of a member of a different community. As we can only proj-
ect our meanings, different communities become, in fact, impenetrable 
and autonomous. Donald Davidson’s famous attack on Kuhn’s notion of 
scientific communities and Sapir-Whorf thesis on linguistic relativity, a 
view which he calls conceptual relativism where “reality itself is relative 
to a scheme: what counts as real in one system may not in another” 
(Davidson 1973, 5), seems to apply to Fish’s theory, too. As Davidson 
argues, the very fact that proponents of framework relativism talk about 
disparate frameworks and paradigms proves that one is able to recognize 
a set of ideas as different and separate from one’s own. If we were pris-
oners of our own assumptions, we would not even be able to recognize 
the existence of other frameworks. A staunch defender might say that 
other frameworks are acknowledged as separate in some sense because 
our own framework permits labeling them like that in the first place. 
But then, the notion of the framework, or the community, is vacuous, 
as positing its existence makes no difference for a theory of meaning. 
Consequently, although Fish’s basic observations about the role of social 
institutions and pre- established conventions that govern the creation and 
reception of art seem plausible, his overall institutional account seems to 
be severely flawed.6
One can expect that the validity of the concept of institution, or other 
art-related concepts, would be debatable in the work of analytic aesthe-
ticians. After all, it is deceptively easy to determine the necessary and 
sufficient conditions behind concepts such as “bachelor,” as the practice/
institution governing its use relies almost solely on the everyday commu-
nication of speakers of English, and as such remains uncontroversial. It 
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is an entirely different business, however, to provide the necessary and 
sufficient conditions of concepts such as “art” or “artwork” and to de-
termine the rules and the nature of institutions regulating the creation 
and reception of art, finally pointing out what exactly is this privileged 
practice whose logical structure the philosopher only clarifies.
Getting back to the distinction into normative and descriptive, the 
point of logical analysis is to eventually formulate a set of normative 
definitions and principles that help to clarify and regulate the practices 
surrounding the aesthetic appreciation of literature. This normativity, 
however, refers to an entirely different aspect of literature, than that 
of, say, Marxism, for it does not necessarily encourage reading through 
the lens of a very specific body of theories that elucidate given aspects 
of literary works. It is mostly concerned with the rules and procedures 
involved in appreciating a work as art, rather than to explore its contents 
with specific ideological issues in mind.
This last observation is essential, as it points to the fact that the most 
prominent aspect of literary theory is precisely its insistence on seeing 
literature not as literature in the aesthetic sense, that is to say, not as an 
object or a form of inquiry that is already established in some conven-
tion, or, broadly speaking, an institution, but as an area that constantly 
needs to be redefined, re-studied, challenged and re-discovered, using 
various theoretical and critical tools. At the same time, it would be naïve 
to suppose that a given literary theory is able to distance itself from 
the descriptive dimension and refrain from making general claims about 
literature in the aesthetic sense. A lack of proper distinction between 
the arbitrarily established research program and a mere inquiry into the 
philosophical foundations of literature as art might lead to serious con-
fusions and basic misunderstandings in the relation between literature 
and Theory. Thus, to clarify the nature of my own inquiry, I want to 
stress that any objections to literary theory’s claims will only refer to its 
descriptive aspect, or its attempt at formulating a philosophy of litera-
ture which would be coherent and congruent with the actual practice of 
reading (regardless of whether it refers to ordinary readers or to com-
petent literary critics) in order to be rewarded with a properly defined 
aesthetic pleasure.
To reiterate, conceiving of literary theory as simply philosophy of lit-
erature would be highly problematic, perhaps even paradoxical, for it is 
precisely the concept of literature as an aesthetic category that most con-
temporary literary theories rejected. The cornerstone of literary theories 
probably from structuralism onward has been the supposed liberation of 
art from the constrains of aesthetics, such as reading for appreciation. 
Thus instead of talking about “works,” literary theory has introduced 
the allegedly value-free notion of the “text,” which, supposedly being 
a neutral, non-ideological concept, enabled literary scholars to con-
duct various types of researches. To the majority of literary theorists, 
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this meant studying literary works as linguistic, or, broadly speaking, 
 cultural artifacts, in the sense of a repository of certain beliefs which can 
be unearthed using specific theories.
Such approach might encourage a reductionist view of literature in 
which there really is no difference between literary works and shop-
ping lists, as, being merely “texts” or cultural artifacts, both are equally 
subject to a theoretical reading. Nothing need be wrong with such a 
research program unless it simultaneously tries to produce a compre-
hensive, reductive philosophy of literature. In a hypothetical situation, 
a reductionist philosopher might attempt to explain the contents, and 
the workings of literature exclusively within an arbitrarily established 
framework, e.g., literature as a special use of language, as a semiotic 
code, as a free play of signifiers, as a semantic-syntagmatic structure 
and as a reflection of certain social forces and ideologies, but in real-
ity one can hardly ever entirely dispose of the constituents of the logi-
cal structure behind the application of the concept of “literature.” Any 
Theory-fueled reading of a literary work will always contain at least 
minimal considerations about possible meanings, intentions, functions 
of a given element of a work, about the context of its creation, about 
it being a success, or a failure; all that makes up the aesthetic concept 
of literature. In this respect, a radical, reductionist literary theorist can 
only pretend to entirely abolish the concept of literature, which might 
simply be buried deep underneath a given theoretical framework. By 
replacing the concept of “literature” with that of the “text,” and thus, by 
trying to dispose of the putative object of their own description, a radi-
cal reductionist initiates a paradox of rejecting the existence of literature 
prior to formulating some normative principles about it. Claiming that 
J.G. Ballard’s novels and J.G. Ballard’s phonebook are the same type of 
value-free text, and equal objects of literary studies is illusory, as the 
latter could never provide enough material for elaborate research. As a 
result, the paradox, or confusion concerning the fundamental questions 
of literature is often the consequence of Theorists making pronounce-
ments about the “nature” of literature, at the same time contesting the 
very concept of literature, mixing their claims about “works” and about 
the theoretically and arbitrarily determined “texts.” This schizophrenic 
attitude is probably at least partly responsible for much of the confusion 
and misunderstandings that arose in theoretical debates.
The idea of re-including the notion of a literary work of art into theo-
retical debate, and the following explorations into aesthetics will, thus, 
refer directly to the need of re-establishing a systematic philosophy of 
literature that will acknowledge the existence of literature as a certain 
rule-governed institution and practice. As it was indicated, specific the-
ories, understood as separate research programs for literary texts, will 
not be targets of any criticism. This is motivated by a basic observation 
concerning the general idea of textual meaning. Since literary texts are 
Theories and Institutions 25
not natural objects whose properties are directly, observably accessible, 
there cannot be any single, natural approach to textual analysis. In fact, 
investigating textual meaning is always a stipulative activity, whose aims 
and methods need to be established in advance before it is even possible 
to talk about meaning. There cannot be “the meaning” of a text, as that 
would imply some ontological necessity resulting from seeing texts as 
natural kinds. In this sense, I am entirely in agreement with Patrick C. 
Hogan who writes that
it makes no sense to argue about what meaning really is. The ques-
tion of “meaning” is merely a question of stipulation, in the sense 
that “meaning” is simply what one stipulates it to be – authorial 
grammatical intent, readers” associative response, or whatever.
(Hogan 1996, 3)
No such assertions can be said to constitute the “real meaning” of a 
work, as “it makes no sense to speak of ‘the meaning’ of a given work. 
Rather, it only makes sense to speak of some particular sort of mean-
ing of that work—for example, conscious authorial moral aim” (Hogan 
1996, 4). This does not mean, however, as pragmatists such as Rorty or 
Fish would make us believe, that any inquiry into literary meaning is 
purely arbitrary, or without any limitations. As it will be argued later, 
there are many conditions under which one can conduct an inquiry into 
literary texts as literary texts, just as there are some conditions regarding 
determining general meaning in language. For example, as Hogan and 
others have persuasively argued, it is impossible to determine meaning in 
language which would be entirely non-intentional and which would pre-
suppose some form of linguistic autonomy (Davidson 2005a, 89–109; 
Davidson 2005b, 143–159; Grice 1989, 213–223; Hogan 1996, 43–94; 
Knapp and Michaels 1985, 11–31).
This is yet another important point grounded in the posited division 
into (normative) literary theory and into (descriptive) philosophy of liter-
ature. An inquiry into literary texts where scholars attempt to describe 
and identify the interplay of certain ideologies or where they use the tex-
tual material to illustrate certain concepts (as in Marxist, psychoanalytic, 
gender, feminist, etc. theory) is perhaps the hallmark of textually-driven 
literary theory but it is not necessarily connected with philosophy of 
literature. In other words, these types of inquiry do not primarily in-
vestigate literature in the aesthetic sense, and their findings (in the sense 
of specific research outcomes or specific interpretations) are, therefore, 
usually of little interest to scholars attempting to establish a systematic 
philosophy of literature. The findings of these types of research might be 
(and indeed, often are) tremendously important for cultural studies, but 
they are not constitutive of the concept of literature per se (Lamarque 
2009, 10–11). This does not mean that such approaches restrain from 
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making claims or judgments on the, so-called, essential questions of art, 
and this is precisely the level where a hypothetical polemics or agreement 
between the Theorist and the aesthetician is possible.
To sum up this part, since meaning is stipulative, it is always up to 
the scholar to determine the aims and methods of their inquiry, thus 
expounding some type of meaning (aspect) of the analyzed text that 
they want to emphasize. This does not mean, however, that stipulation 
is limitless. There are simply certain institutional rules that set the lim-
its and the framework for interpretation of both literature as literature 
and literature as a cultural artifact (text). Outlining the former is going 
to be the main point of the rest of this chapter, as the latter constitutes 
a different type of inquiry that is not directly relevant for discussion of 
literary aesthetics.
Analyzing literature as a cultural artifact has been the chief preoccupa-
tion of literary studies since the advent of normative, textual literary the-
ory. It is obviously a valid and important form of inquiry, but it has also 
certainly led to the marginalization of seeing literature in its primary, 
artistic, function, and has become increasingly remote from the typical 
reading experiences, eliciting accusations of it being a  cookie-cutter the-
ory that only cuts any demanded shape cut of the literary texts’ dough. 
These accusations come from many diverse sources (Graff and Di Leo 
2000, 113–128; Livingston 1991, 11; Swirski 2008, 298) and others. 
The literature-as-literature and the literature-as- cultural-artifact ap-
proaches need not be in opposition, though, as they are simply consti-
tuted by different stipulations of meaning pursued in their distinct types 
of inquiry. As it was mentioned earlier, analytic philosophy of literature 
describes, by analyzing the critical practice, the underlying, unifying 
concepts or the necessary conditions of considering a text literary, in the 
sense of it being highly valued artistically (and not, for example, literary 
in the formalist sense of “literariness”). Hence, the connection between 
the two is parallel, rather than that of opposite paradigms. One might 
say that in some respects, the relation is hierarchical as, for the aestheti-
cian, the notion of a literary work is logically prior to that of a text that 
is subject to theoretical investigation. But this is not always the case. 
Some contemporary theories (e.g., feminist or post-colonial ones) seem 
to be closer to appropriating some elements of the concept of a work, 
that is taking interest in its selected extratextual constituents, such as the 
sociohistorical context of its creation or the person of the author. Other 
theories favor looking at works exclusively as impersonal texts/artifacts 
of a given culture trying to analyze how they relate to the dominant dis-
courses within that culture. If they set their research goals in a way that 
makes little use of the artistic qualities of literary works, treating them 
on equal with hairstyles, leaflets or TV commercials, one cannot say that 
they are in any sense secondary to aesthetics. Thus, my point is simply 
that the cultural concept of literature has been unjustly overemphasized, 
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and the artistic concept of literature, unjustly marginalized, even though 
this marginalized aspect is precisely the most fundamental and consti-
tutive of literature.
Finally, one might ask whether any preoccupation with (descrip-
tive) philosophy of literature can actually benefit the practical side of 
literary studies, or perhaps such activity would be superfluous. After 
all, if, as it was provisioned earlier, considerations in philosophy of 
literature leave most of the theoretical projects virtually intact, then 
why bother? Perhaps the answer is deceptively simple. The role of spe-
cialized branches of philosophy standing behind specific types of in-
quiry or activities (e.g., philosophy of mathematics, art or science) is 
always to clarify the discipline’s assumptions, central questions, prob-
lems, aims and methods. And although literary theories have always 
attempted to ask and answer questions in these areas, their underlying 
textualist assumptions impeded giving satisfactory answers. Outlining 
what such answers might look like, according to contemporary ana-
lytic philosophy of art and literature, is going to be the main point of 
the rest of this chapter.
Analytic Philosophy of Art?
At first glance, the juxtaposition of literature with analytic philosophy 
might look absurd. After all, how can a school of rather specialized, tech-
nical philosophy which focuses mostly on logic, mathematics and the 
hard sciences, and embraces scientific naturalism and a positivist pro-
gram, contribute anything interesting to the realm of humanities? Inter-
action between literary studies and various areas of analytic philosophy 
has, indeed, been rather scant and highly selective (Swirski 2010, 11–13). 
Apart from some, mostly critical, appropriations of J.L. Austin or H. 
Paul Grice’s work in philosophy of language (Fish 1980, 1989; Hirsch 
1976; Petrey 1990), there was only some limited interest in the works of 
Thomas Kuhn, and one volume of essays on Donald Davidson (Dasen-
brock 1993). In fact, most literary scholars would probably agree with 
Jacques Derrida who resolutely stated that “analytic philosophy has little 
to do with the humanities” (Derrida 2002, 29). Curiously, though, ana-
lytic philosophy has seen a blossoming of interest in literature, as more 
and more books and articles devoted to philosophical problems of litera-
ture were published in the last two decades or so. Analytic philosophy of 
literature has expanded immensely and there does not seem to be a reason 
why departments of literature should ignore it altogether, especially in the 
days of rather uncertain status of literary theory. I believe, thus, that both 
the conviction about analytic philosophy being irrelevant and the under-
lying assumptions about its positivist and scientist nature are erroneous, 
and they probably stem from a gross misunderstanding of how analytic 
philosophy developed and changed throughout the twentieth century.
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To begin with, the very idea that analytic philosophy endorses a sci-
entist program and is chiefly preoccupied with issues in logic and in the 
hard sciences can in no way refer to school of thought in its entirety. 
Such labels would be appropriate, perhaps, for the early twentieth- 
century ambitions of philosophers such as Russell, early Wittgenstein, 
A.J. Ayer and the members of the Vienna Circle who pursued the related 
programs of logical atomism and logical positivism, trying to establish 
secure foundations for reliable, scientific knowledge, and reach the ba-
sic, logical facts that constitute the world. These philosophers indeed 
claimed that the only reliable source of knowledge comes from the nat-
ural sciences, and any claims that cannot be broken down into simpler, 
verifiable, observational sentences refer to nothing in particular in the 
empirical world, and are thus meaningless. Their chief method of phil-
osophical investigations, logical analysis, was supposed to be a tool for 
dissecting natural languages in order to uncover the underlying logical 
structure of either scientific statements, or everyday expressions, and to 
clarify and discipline our use of language, as well as to determine the 
fundamental, empirical facts about the world.
This, obviously, limited the area of interest of early analytic philoso-
phy, as such programs frequently led to condemnation of entire areas and 
activities central to human concerns. Explorations in religion, art, ethics 
and in the whole realm of humanities were considered meaningless, as 
there was no possibility to reduce them to simpler, objectively verifiable 
empirical statements. For example, Rudolf Carnap of the Vienna Circle 
infamously deemed Heidegger, and supposedly, most of the continental 
tradition of thought, meaningless in his aptly called essay “The Elimi-
nation of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language,” and A.J. 
Ayer formulated an emotivist approach to ethics, theology and aesthetics 
(Ayer 1936; Goodrich 1983), according to which all statements concern-
ing human conduct, the religious experience and beliefs, as well as any 
comments on art do not relate to any objective, verifiable reality but 
only express the current emotional attitude of the speaker. As a result, 
humanities could, at best, pretend to be meaningful, but, in fact, they 
were always referring to non-existent objects.
Even though such an approach might have been typical of the early 
analytic philosophy, in the post-war era the intellectual mood changed 
dramatically due to a devastating criticism that came, as if simultane-
ously, from various sources internal to the Anglo-American tradition of 
thought. The logical positivist project has since been largely abandoned 
mostly owing to the work of would-be famous philosophers, especially 
by Karl Popper, who rejected the possibility of verification of scientific 
hypotheses, by the later Wittgenstein who, among other things, ques-
tioned both the Cartesian subjectivity inherent in most of empiricist 
philosophy and the metaphor of language as a mirror of reality, and 
by Willard Quine who launched a pragmatist attack on the so-called 
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dogmas of empiricism, by which he meant the possibility of reducing all 
statements to that of immediate, empirical experience, and the distinc-
tion between analytic (a priori) and synthetic (empirical) propositions. 
These criticisms had a tremendous impact on analytic philosophy, lead-
ing to the rejection of many of its early assumptions, including the very 
possibility of analyzing language in order to reach the most fundamental, 
atomic facts about the world. Not only has this changed the overall ap-
proach to central philosophical questions, but it has also finally opened 
those areas of inquiry which used to be either marginal or ignored alto-
gether, such as politics, religion, ethics and aesthetics. Of course, such a 
paradigm shift posed new questions about the nature and the definition 
of post-positivist analytic philosophy that have never been satisfactorily 
answered. Thus, some of the continental philosophers prefer to talk, in 
a typically historicist manner, about post-analytic philosophy, and even 
analytic philosophers themselves seem to be certain that “it is not possi-
ble to define analytic philosophy in terms of some specific set of logical, 
metaphysical or scientific ideas or concerns” (Macarthur 2014, 8), since 
those who are usually put under this label no longer share any specific 
program, aims or suppositions. It is also not uncommon to claim that 
analytic philosophy is “simply a matter of a certain style of writing dis-
playing an overriding concern for argument, drawing distinctions and 
clarity of exposition” (Macarthur 2014, 8), although such claim is still 
far from being uncontroversial.
At any rate, if the above considerations decisively prove anything, it 
is probably the fact that at least some of the literary theorists’ prejudice 
against analytic philosophy seems to be groundless.
From Wittgenstein to Indiscernibles
It is perhaps true that, as Macarthur indicated, there is no single, unifying 
principle, or a set of assumptions that would characterize contemporary 
analytic philosophy, especially after the analytic appropriations of such, 
supposedly non-analytical philosophers as Hegel (by a variety of ana-
lytic scholars, including Arthur Danto, Peter Singer or Robert Brandom), 
Heidegger (by Ernst Tugendhat), Marx (by the so-called Analytic 
 Marxists) or Freud (Richard Wollheim). But the  Anglo-American tradi-
tion has not developed in an intellectual vacuum, and its own history of 
ideas definitely influences the prevalence of some philosophical stances 
over others. For example, on the one hand, contemporary analytic aes-
thetics retains the anti-idealist character of early analytic philosophy, 
but it also accepts the anti- empiricist and anti-positivist assumptions 
that have dominated the analytic tradition since the demise of neopos-
itivism. It would be almost impossible to find some followers of R.G. 
Collingwood’s idealism, or A.J. Ayer’s positivist emotivism among ana-
lytic philosophers of art today. Neither do analytic aestheticians endorse 
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the  views of symbolic, textual autonomism or indeterminacy that are 
typical of broadly understood continental aesthetics. Perhaps the only 
significant analytic philosopher who wrote on aesthetics and held a 
stance similar to continental textual autonomism was Nelson Good-
man, but his influence on contemporary aesthetics was rather scant.
The general approach to art, and thus, literature, which seems to be 
the most prominent in analytic aesthetics, and the one which is endorsed 
in this book is perhaps ultimately rooted in Wittgenstein’s later philoso-
phy or/and in pragmatism, as they both have had a significant, and often 
indistinguishable, influence on contemporary Anglo-American thought. 
This might sound controversial or far-fetched, as neither Wittgenstein 
nor pragmatist aestheticians seem to be particularly revered in analytic 
philosophy of art. Indeed, Wittgenstein never developed a systematic 
program for aesthetics, and other aspects of his work (especially the fam-
ily resemblance theory) is often criticized as problematic, at least when 
applied to art (Carroll 1999, 206–224). The purely  Wittgensteinian, 
 anti-essentialist position in aesthetics, put forward by Morris Weitz, who 
endorsed the view of art as an open object based on family resemblance, 
used to be fashionable in the 1950s but has long been in decline. Nor do 
any of the major pragmatist philosophers writing on art, such as Dewey, 
or Rorty appear to be extensively discussed. Richard Shusterman, whose 
early work was leaning toward analytic philosophy, but who later be-
came more involved in pragmatist aesthetics, is present mostly through 
his earlier work on art. The above applies mostly to discussions of art 
in the narrow institutional sense. Dewey’s aesthetics is much more than 
that but it is not fundamentally in opposition to analytic aesthetics and 
his works tend to be discussed when analytic aestheticians take up the 
broad sense of aesthetic as sensual experience. It is more a matter of an-
alytic philosophy of art being more focused on philosophical aesthetics 
concerned with art in the narrow sense.
Assuming that there is, then, any affinity between Wittgenstein, prag-
matism and contemporary analytic aesthetics, it has to be of a more com-
plex, indirect nature. If it was not Wittgenstein’s work on aesthetics, it 
was possibly the general mood of post-war philosophy that abandoned 
both positivism and the search for ideal language. It is this turning to-
ward the practice of using language, toward social institutions and to-
ward seeing language as a social practice, a game (perhaps being the 
analytic analogy to Bakhtin’s speech genres), brought about either by 
later Wittgenstein, or by pragmatism, which immensely influenced the 
post-war Anglo-American philosophy, and consequently shaped the gen-
eral orientation of its branch devoted to the study of art. Contrary to 
continental aesthetics, analytic aesthetics is not focused on emphasizing 
the fragmentary, destabilized character of the artistic work (text), nor 
does it aim at unveiling hidden rhetorical aspects of texts, or subvert-
ing its ideological frameworks. Analytic philosophy of art is different 
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from continental explorations of art in its concern with the surface-like 
(Danto 1986, 23–69) tangible practice of creation and reception of the 
works of art by and through social institutions. This does not entail that 
all analytic philosophers necessarily literally subscribe to, say, George 
Dickie’s Institutional Theory of Art, but in comparison to the continental 
tradition, this shift toward actual practice and social institutions is clear.
Analytic aesthetics is not an area of inquiry that is entirely separate 
from considerations in other areas of philosophy. Indeed, some elements 
of analytic philosophy of language, such as speech act theory, questions 
of meaning, intention and interpretation permeate aesthetics. The same 
holds for the philosophy of mind, science or history. Such a systematic and 
interdisciplinary approach to art, typical of analytic philosophy, implies 
a certain hierarchy of research. Thus, philosophy of art in general would 
be focused on problems common to all branches of art, such as questions 
of the role of intention, the broad definition of an artistic work and the 
nature of the aesthetic experience. Under this broad umbrella term come, 
yet again in a typical analytic fashion, more specialized branches of aes-
thetics devoted to different arts, such as philosophy of literature, music, 
film and visual arts. Of course, these “branches” are not entirely separate 
as they always necessarily share some related philosophical questions.
As it was already mentioned, aesthetics has always been present in 
some form in the analytic tradition, albeit marginally. The demise of 
positivism was followed by an extraordinary flourishing of those ar-
eas of philosophy that had previously been dismissed by analytic phi-
losophers. The post-Wittgensteinian, pragmatic, institutional nature 
of aesthetics is clearly seen in the work of one of the major, and the 
earliest figures in its post-war period, namely Arthur Danto. Danto 
tried to approach both the problem of the works of art not being nat-
ural objects, and the issue of indiscernibles, that is, objects which are 
indistinguishable in visual, or empirical terms, but of which one is a 
work of art, and the other is not. An example might be Marcel Du-
champ’s famous sculpture “Fountain” which consists of an ordinary 
urinal. If the work of art cannot be distinguished from an ordinary 
object, then, perhaps it is impossible to develop a theory of art that 
would define an artistic work in purely observable, or intrinsic fea-
tures. As an alternative, Danto introduced the notion of the artworld, 
that is to say, an institution embracing both the social practices of cre-
ating, displaying and perceiving art, and the knowledge of artistic the-
ories, history and conventions. Hence, as Lamarque puts it, following 
this line of thinking, works of art can only “become art – and acquire 
their art-related properties – in virtue of their embeddedness in some 
kind of social institution” (Lamarque 2009, 58). In yet other words, 
art cannot be defined without reference to social practices, contexts 
and history. Danto’s own example of an indiscernible was Andy War-
hol’s display of Brillo soap boxes, and he commented on it saying:
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What in the end makes the difference between a Brillo box and a 
work of art consisting of a Brillo Box is a certain theory of art […] 
without the theory, one is unlikely to see it as art, and in order to 
see it as part of the artworld, one must have mastered a good deal 
of artistic theory as well as a considerable amount of the history 
of recent New York painting [….] It is the role of artistic theories, 
these days as always, to make the artworld, and art, possible.
(Danto 1964, 581)
Danto’s artworld anticipated the later institutional theory of art which 
was put forward by George Dickie. In one of its many variations, the 
theory stated:
A work of art in the classificatory sense is (1) an artifact (2) a set of 
the aspects of which has had conferred upon it the status of candi-
date for appreciation by some person or persons acting on behalf of 
a certain social institution (the artworld).
(Dickie 1974, 34)
Dickie’s theory is far from being universally accepted among analytic 
aestheticians. It has drawn a lot of criticism (Carroll 1999, 224–240), 
and has also been in decline, yielding its dominant position to var-
ious historical definitions. Institutional and other theories of art, 
with emphasis on literature, will be discussed later on, but for now it 
will suffice to say that even though the institutional theory does not 
dominate the analytic philosophy of art, most analytic aestheticians 
are still chiefly preoccupied with analyzing the actual functioning of 
art among various social institutions, following the Wittgensteinian 
primacy of use/practice. Again, perhaps this preoccupation is worth 
emphasizing only when contrasting analytic and continental aesthet-
ics; otherwise, calling the whole approach as having an “institutional 
bent” would be, at most, confusing. The institutional theory of art/
literature, as developed by analytic philosophy, is not the same as, say, 
sociological idea of institution. It is definitely closer to Stanley Fish’s 
notion of rules and conventions to which he alluded in his later works. 
In Peter Lamarque’s words:
The claim of one version of institutional accounts of literature is 
that the very being and nature of literary works depend on an “in-
stitution” in a manner analogous to that in which a chess piece or 
an item of currency depends on a corresponding game or practice. 
Certain consequences follow immediately. One is that there would 
be no literary works without the institution; literary works are not 
“natural kinds,” just finely wrought stretches of language inde-
pendent of specific purposes and actions. They are “institutional 
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objects.” Thus, secondly, the existence of literary works depends on 
a set of conventions concerning how they are created, appreciated, 
and evaluated; in other words, on attitudes, expectations, and re-
sponses found in authors and readers. A third point arises directly 
from the chess/currency examples. It is a feature of chess and cur-
rencies that there are multiple ways of instantiating the formal roles 
of the pieces in each case […]. The institutional account of literature 
places no restrictions on the form that literary works can take […]. 
To participate it is enough to know and conform to the conventions.
(Lamarque 2009, 61–2)
Even if the views presented here do not fit the institutional theories exactly, 
one can definitely say that the perspective presented has at least some “in-
stitutional bent,” in the sense that it acknowledges that aesthetic appre-
ciation of literature, which includes interpreting and evaluating, is a skill 
to be mastered and displayed in specific conditions, rather than naturally 
or arbitrarily, and that a proper philosophy of literature cannot exhort 
to radically alter the conventional practices, or to make pronouncements 
about the nature of art which would deny some activities or some works 
the status of art, contrary to how these concepts are applied in practice.
Institutional Account of Literature
Probably the earliest monograph on philosophy of literature written in 
the analytic tradition was Stein Haugom Olsen’s 1978 The Structure 
of Literary Understanding (Olsen 1978). Deeply rooted in the Oxford 
philosophy of language of the time, it encourages the view that, contrary 
to the formalist, or structuralist claims, literature cannot be conceived 
of as an object, but rather as an act, an utterance embedded in social 
practice. The book is at times a little outdated, as it devotes a substan-
tial amount of space to criticizing the long-abandoned quasi- romanticist 
expressivist theories of art. Nevertheless, it immensely influenced the 
work in analytic literary aesthetics, sketched some key concepts and 
ideas that inform research in aesthetics, as well as developed and applied 
the institutional approach to art to literature. Perhaps in an attempt to 
demonstrate the distinctness of the analytic aesthetics, half of the book 
is devoted to rebutting formalist, structuralist, expressive and cognitive 
(in the general sense) theories of art, all of them being rather popular and 
relevant at the time of the book’s publication.
The first theory that Olsen rejects is what he calls semantic theory of 
literature, and what possibly could also be called formalist theory, ac-
cording to which, what makes literature distinct from other discourses 
is a special use of language. Olsen calls this feature semantic thickness, 
or suggestiveness, and his description of it bears some similarities to 
concepts such as literariness, or Jakobson’s poetic function of language. 
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According to Olsen’s rendition of the semantic theory, the difference be-
tween literary and ordinary use of language is that in the latter language 
serves a non-linguistic purpose, pointing beyond itself and drawing 
reader’s attention to something essentially non-linguistic. In the former, 
as Olsen states, what makes the literary use of language dense is its self- 
directedness, “[i]n literature language draws attention to itself and not 
to something beyond to which it directs attention” (Olsen 1978, 12). Just 
as with any formalist approach, although it is undeniable that the bulk 
of literary works demand that their readers be highly focused on their 
formal aspects, formalism as a general theory of literature must fail, 
or as Olsen puts it in the analytic jargon, “semantic density is neither 
a sufficient, nor a necessary condition for something being a literary 
work” (Olsen 1978, 13). Indeed, if one takes the opening sentences of 
a work such as Hemingway’s The Sun Also Rises, “Robert Cohn was 
once middleweight boxing champion of Princeton. Do not think that I 
am very much impressed by that as a boxing title, but it meant a lot to 
Cohn,” they do not contain, as Olsen compellingly argues, “any partic-
ular semantic density, paradox, irony, ambiguity or whatever one wants 
to call it” (Olsen 1978, 13). Yet, not only is the style widespread in liter-
ature, but this particular passage is a part of a highly celebrated literary 
work of art in spite of the fact that it does not manifest any poetic, or 
semantically dense features whatsoever. Ambiguity or self- directedness 
of the language does not constitute the purpose of interpretation and ap-
preciation in themselves, but, as the above example demonstrates, serve 
broader, artistic functions, and actually do point beyond language.
Moreover, all of the aforementioned semantically dense elements may 
and do appear in ordinary language use no less frequently than in liter-
ature. As such, the concept of semantic density cannot form a basis for 
a distinction between literature and non-literature. One can only make 
a judgment on the existence or non-existence of a semantically dense 
element by a prior knowledge of the context of an utterance. It cannot, 
in Olsen’s words, “turn a passage into a literary work, or guarantee that 
it is part of one” (Olsen 1978, 13). Finally, semantic density is unable 
to account for some structural features of a literary work, such as the 
multiple relatedness of characters, events and objects that clearly have 
little to do with linguistic features, but they still constitute bulk of the 
aesthetic qualities of given works.
Olsen claims that the underlying formalist fallacy is akin to treating 
works of literature as objects, just like in the concept of the verbal icon, 
which will unveil its own contents to anyone willing to apply to it a close 
reading method. As Olsen correctly observes, this can only be done if 
the reader knows in advance how to approach an artistic work, what to 
look for, what to expect, how to place specific passages in broader ar-
tistic context and how to construe the interconnectedness of the work’s 
elements. In his words,
Theories and Institutions 35
the literary work supplies the material on which he bases his judg-
ment, but what is given in the work is given only for the reader who 
looks for it and has the right categories at his command in dealing 
with literary works.
(Olsen 1978, 16)
Similar is Olsen’s attack on the structuralist theories of Todorov and 
early Barthes. The structuralist idea that literary work is analogous to 
a sentence in the sense that one can “see it as a hierarchy of semantic 
units the meaning of which is a function of lower-level semantic units 
and their interrelation” (Olsen 1978, 18) is doomed to fail precisely 
because it rejects the institutional basis of literature and confuses the 
social practice of everyday use of language with the social practice of 
creation and reception of literature. If members of a linguistic commu-
nity have “clear and reliable intuitions” (Olsen 1978, 19) concerning the 
meaningfulness of a sentence and about the function of its constituents, 
readers and critics do not have a clear, immediate idea of the constitu-
ents of a literary work. The nature of linguistic communication makes it 
possible for the linguist to systematize the speakers’ intuitions “by help 
of a set of minimal units […] and combination rules” (Olsen 1978, 19) 
to make the knowledge possessed by ordinary speakers explicit. How-
ever, expectations of competent readers analogous to that of language 
users cannot exist in the consumption of literature, for there are no 
regularities in the form of structure of literary works akin to that of a 
sentence. When one approaches a poem or a novel, one cannot observe 
predictable structural/semantic units larger than a sentence, at least not 
such that would have a phrase- or word-like repeatability between in-
dividual works similar to that in sentences, and consequently, as Olsen 
states, the sentence analogy is “diluted to a vanishing point” (Olsen 
1978, 20).
Olsen only briefly mentions semiotic theories and does not consider 
them fundamentally different from the structuralist ones; in fact, he calls 
structuralism a “branch of the much-heralded science of  semiology” 
(Olsen 1978, 19). He quotes Barthes’ analogy of a critic’s beginning an 
analysis of a new, unknown literary work to that of a linguist begin-
ning to decode an unknown language (Olsen 1978, 20). The analogy, 
 however, according to Olsen, does not hold, as the linguist knows in 
advance that they are “studying a system of structural units” (Olsen 
1978, 20) where structural differences actually underlie differences in 
meaning. This is continuously confirmed during the observation of the 
language users and by interacting with them, as language is used to refer 
to tangible objects in the material world. But to claim that the same as-
sumptions about meaning are relevant for literary studies and thus that 
they inform literary research cannot be proven. The argument is clearly 
circular.
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But perhaps a supporter of structuralism might argue that one should 
not understand the sentence analogy literally, but more generally, as an 
indication that structuralist theory encourages systematic research, rig-
orous, technical terminology and a search for regularities in and across 
literary works. Unfortunately, one cannot call it a weaker version of 
structuralism, for there is nothing distinctly structuralist about it. Look-
ing for regularities and structures is a cornerstone of any research, and 
literary studies have known it at least since the times of Aristotle. Unless 
one shares very specific assumptions about language with structuralist 
linguistics, one cannot be called a structuralist.
Olsen sees the failure of structuralist theory in reifying the concept of 
a literary work to the extent that a structuralist sees it as an object with 
inherent qualities that can be objectively studied from the outside. This 
cannot be done, as Olsen suggests, because an inquiry into establishing 
the structure of a work will always yield arbitrary results. Comment-
ing on Jakobson’s and Levi-Strauss’ famous analysis of Baudelaire’s Les 
Chats, he writes that “[i]n any text, one can always describe an indefi-
nite number of structures both concerning language and content” (Olsen 
1978, 22). The whole work of the critic is to make a judgment on which 
of these structures might be relevant for the artistic dimension of the 
work, which requires from them an aesthetic competence. Where there 
are no firm intuitions (contrary to the ordinary language use) “as to the 
relevance and meaning of the structures” (Olsen 1978, 22) the structur-
alist approach produces arbitrary results.
There is, however, at least one variety of structuralist theory, the one 
propagated by Jonathan Culler, which, by stressing the importance of 
literary competence, seems to be closer to Olsen’s institutional theory. 
Culler’s Structuralist Poetics (1975) was published around the time of 
Olsen’s work and, consequently, is not discussed by the latter. Still, it 
might be possible to reconstruct Olsen’s hypothetical stance on Culler’s 
theory. There are passages that might be called convergent with Olsen’s 
theory, where Culler alludes that linguistic competence is not sufficient 
for understanding literary texts and that their proper interpretation re-
quires extra-linguistic knowledge:
both author and reader bring to the text more than a knowledge of lan-
guage and this additional experience – expectations about the forms 
of literary organization, implicit models of literary structures, prac-
tice in forming and testing hypotheses about literary works – is what 
guides one in the perception and construction of relevant patterns.
(Culler 1975, 111)
One of his objectives also seems close to the anti-metaphysical approach 
of analytic philosophers who insist on studying the tangible actions in-
volved in appreciating art:
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One need not struggle, as other theorists must, to find some objec-
tive property of language which distinguishes the literary from the 
non-literary but may simply start from the fact that we can read 
texts as literature and then inquire what operations that involves.
(Culler 150)
Unfortunately, the very fact that Culler uses notions such as “literary 
competence” or “literary institutions” seems to be the only similarity, 
for how he understands them and what use he makes of them, differs 
radically from Olsen’s approach. As a follower of structuralist theories, 
Culler is chiefly interested in the abstract, depersonalized structures 
that, in his account, make up the institution of literature. What is im-
portant in interpreting individual works is only their contribution to 
understanding universal reading strategies. In his account, literary com-
petence is equivalent to the reader’s familiarity with historical genre con-
ventions: the literary langue that enables the generation of new readings. 
For Culler, to read a text as literature means to naturalize it, that is, to 
determine how it relates to historical genre conventions, to decode it and 
to ascribe it a place in the abstract literary structure. His idea of poetics 
is, thus, to map all the historical genre conventions, or reading strate-
gies, so as to have a comprehensive, scientific account of the institution. 
Interestingly enough, by indicating that to be called literary, a text must 
necessarily refer to what has already, historically, been accepted as a 
literary text, it might be said that Culler attempts to combine historical 
and institutional theories, both of which are present in contemporary 
analytic philosophy of art, and whose relation will be discussed in the 
following chapters. For now, it suffices to say that perhaps it is Culler’s 
structuralist framework that makes his account flawed and incongruent 
with the tangible practices he wishes to study.
Culler’s insistence that literary works refer exclusively to abstract, 
historical structure, puts it at risk of an infinite regress. For one thing, 
naturalizing a chain, a sequence of conventions cannot be infinite, and 
the final level of naturalizations that, for Culler, is invulnerable to fur-
ther naturalizing, is irony, which distorts the standard meaning gener-
ation of conventions and refuses any definite closure. The claim seems 
far-fetched, but its biggest flaw is perhaps that, by eschewing a final 
closure, it subverts the idea of determining a stable, certain map of 
conventions, as they turn out to be quite fluid. Similar problems might 
be observed on the other end of the chain of conventions. If, as he quite 
correctly observes, conventions can be operative, in the sense that they 
can actually help to familiarize that which is unknown only if they stay 
unnoticed, then creating a comprehensive map defuses their workings. 
It is as if the historical process of naturalization accelerates so that new 
conventions and ways of naturalization are expected to emerge. The 
project would, thus, be infinite on its way forward, as any emergence of 
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new conventions changes the relations within the historical structure. 
Moreover, the very act of naturalizing conventions is always already an 
act of thematizing them. By doing so we do not innocently describe con-
ventions, but we defuse them. This implies that by merely being aware 
of conventions we are transported to the level of irony where the very 
idea of structures, differences, references and codes is thematized and, 
thus, put into question. Such an act always marks a reshuffling of any 
current structure of conventional relations. As a result, the structuralist 
synchronic ideal of a stable structure becomes elusive and seems to go 
against Culler’s original project, perhaps lapsing into post- structuralist 
flux of meaning. Culler alludes to that when he writes, “the study of 
any set of semiotic conventions will be partially invalidated by the 
knowledge which results from that study (the more aware we are of 
conventions the easier it is to attempt to change them)” (Culler 1975, 
293). Although this seems to be a serious flaw regarding his original 
aims, Culler does not acknowledge it as such. It seems clear, however, 
that, contrary to what his theory promises, Culler cannot provide us 
with a purely descriptive and finite account of the conventions that con-
stitute the institution of literature.
To develop this critique in the spirit of analytic aesthetics, it might be 
said that, even though Culler is perhaps right to insist on the necessity 
of ascribing works to certain traditions and conventions, if they are sup-
posed to be called literary, or artistic, in the first place, this condition 
is not sufficient to accurately describe literary appreciation. His struc-
turalist perspective underestimates the role of individual works, but it is 
precisely individual works that serve as the basis of enjoying and appre-
ciating art. Determining conventions and localizing some form of a his-
torical context are not aims in themselves, but they only serve as means 
to read a text aesthetically. Of course, untutored readers (or trained 
readers, for that matter, depending on the aims they set for themselves) 
might approach texts looking for all types of information, or gratifica-
tion, but if one looks at those readings (e.g., those of literary critics) that 
emphasize artistic evaluation and the judgment concerning the quality 
of a work, then recognizing conventions is only part of the whole en-
terprise. Moreover, one can wonder whether a knowledge of strictly de-
personalized, extracted conventions can sufficiently benefit one’s ability 
to judge on a work’s quality. Perhaps, when comparing depersonalized 
structures, it cannot. My own illustration of this claim is indebted to 
Danto’s discussion of indiscernibles: suppose that a competent reader 
is presented with a text that, upon reading it, appears to challenge a 
known literary convention. One would not be able to properly evaluate 
its quality without knowing the context of its creation and ascribing it to 
a proper author. If the text was plagiarized, it clearly would not consti-
tute a successful candidate for appreciation. Similarly, if one decides to 
publish Ulysses under one’s own name, it would be merely a fraud, and 
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not a separate, genuine work of literary art. Although the “creation” 
would have the same textual structure and the same references to histor-
ical conventions, the structure itself is not sufficient to properly evaluate 
and locate it within the artworld. Such an object might be, of course, put 
on a display in a gallery, and then actually constitute a unique work of 
art, but it definitely would not be a literary work.
All in all, I believe that the analytic notion of competence is superior 
to Fish’s and Culler’s, as it avoids the confusions of both rival theories. 
In the analytic account, competence would be equivalent to being intro-
duced to the procedures, rules and conventions that make up the literary 
institution. In order to become a competent reader, one need not be a lit-
erary critic, or a professor, but one must follow certain procedures, one 
must acquire the skill, along with a relevant art-historical knowledge to 
be able to appreciate something as art.
Olsen’s insistence that it is impossible to construe a universal grammar 
of literature that would account for all the conventions, procedures and 
the scope of literary meanings, suggests that the procedures that constitute 
the literary institution can only be quite general in nature. But before elab-
orating on that, it is important to clarify the difference between two ways 
of how the notion of institution is used with reference to art. On the one 
hand, this means the procedures involved in understanding and appreci-
ating art. On the other hand, it refers to institutions in the social sense. 
Within the network of artistic social institutions, a literary work would 
be understood as a purposeful linguistic creation which the author dis-
plays as a candidate for appreciation in front of the informed audience (or 
which the informed audience appropriates this way), i.e., the artworld: the 
critic, the scholar, the competent reader and other institutions that deal 
with the evaluation of art. When thinking of a literary institution in the 
non-social sense, it refers to the body of procedures and conventions that 
lead to a work being aesthetically appreciated or not, remembering that 
such procedures are rather general and cannot guarantee the generation of 
an extensive literary grammar beyond the level of individual works.
The abovementioned purposefulness of literary creation, largely ig-
nored by structuralist theories, is the cornerstone of the analytic institu-
tional theory. Olsen is ready to admit that a literary work, in its unity, is 
“a molecular structure of meaningful or artistically significant elements” 
(Olsen 1978, 164), on the condition that the structure, or its underly-
ing grammar, can rarely go beyond specific works. The existence of the 
structure is only posited in the dynamics of reflexive intentions by “the 
reader’s assumption that the producer’s intention was that it should be so 
construed” (Olsen 1978, 164). The precise ontology of these intentions, 
that is, whether they can be considered actual, hypothetical, partial, etc. 
is not important here, as the point is that all of them are determined con-
ventionally by a community of readers. The competent reader who wishes 
to read aesthetically, begins with a simple supposition that the work was 
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designed as a unity, where every element, every passage, should serve 
some aesthetic function, or, relate in a coherent way to other elements of 
the work. The reader begins by segmenting a work in a process which, 
in Olsen’s words, “ideally […] is exhaustive” (Olsen 1978, 83), that is, 
in ideal conditions no element of a work should be “outside the struc-
ture which the reader tries to impose on it” (Olsen 1978, 83). As an 
example, Olsen proposes four categories according to which one might 
describe the functions of specific passages when the segmentation is ini-
tiated: their subject, tone (as in an attitude toward specific topics), sta-
tus (concerning their attribution to characters or narrators) and  stylistic 
features, though, as he admits, “it is not always possible in practice to 
separate these four aspects of passages, and it is very rarely necessary 
in actual analysis” (Olsen 1978, 84). Deciding what function a specific 
passage serves, e.g., claiming that it illustrates the imaginative nature of 
a character in the story, must be further integrated into overall expla-
nation of the whole work which would emphasize the multiple interre-
latedness of its constituent elements, unified with a postulated common 
theme. For interpretations to be plausible, the institutional constraints 
require that both on the level of analyzing individual passages and on 
the  higher-order interpretation of the whole work, the reader is able to 
account for the segments’ status, taking into consideration specific crite-
ria. These include completeness (showing how the aforementioned four 
 aspects of a segment function in it, and how they can contribute to a 
higher-level description), correct recognition of the aspects of a given 
passage (determined by the knowledge of conventions, or by the con-
ventionally attributed intentions), comprehensiveness and consistency 
 (leaving as little as possible resistant to interpretation) and discrimina-
tion (the ability to ascribe multiple artistic functions to a segment).
Evaluation is a second-order procedure to which one is committed 
after making specific interpretive judgments, a distinction that perhaps 
distantly echoes traditional hermeneutic notions of “subtilitas intelli-
gendi” and “subtilitas explicandi,” or Hirsch’s “meaning” and “signif-
icance.” The difference would be that in the hermeneutic tradition, one 
does not merge meaning with the reader’s purpose, thus its focus is not 
on the aesthetic merit of the text. Again, in practice, interpretation and 
evaluation are hardly ever separate, but logically they are bound in a 
hierarchy. The value judgments that Olsen suggests are present in the 
procedure include deciding on the precision of the posited artistic signif-
icance of given passages, as well as their coherence, relevance to  posited 
(interpreted) theme, their complexity and interest, in the sense that it 
can contribute something to the convention to which it is ascribed, as 
well as that it can be said to communicate something which is of general 
human interest. This also means that evaluation and value judgments in 
an artistic sense permeate the practice of interpretation even at the most 
basic level of interacting with a text. Whatever segment of a work one 
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comes to read and interpret, the action entails speculating about its pos-
sible artistic function and about its success or failure in communicating 
something in the context of the whole work and other works. More-
over, value judgments refer to whole works but also to its specific ele-
ments. The reader evaluates the work not only in how it succeeds at this 
 internal level, but also according to their cultural background, knowl-
edge of the world, knowledge of the historical context of its creation, 
and the knowledge of how it relates to other works and conventions. 
Their individual judgment as to the artistic merit of the work is not finite 
in any sense, as its status is further dependent on the judgments of other 
members of the artworld, and is subject to historical reassessments.
The ultimate goal of aesthetic reading is to experience aesthetic  pleasure, 
which the adherents of institutional theories consider non- reductive, in 
the sense that the very fact that one can successfully  apply the institu-
tional procedures, that one can successfully impose such a structure on 
a candidate for appreciation, and that the work actually responds to it, 
or rewards it, is an end in itself. But just like with the  descriptions of 
specific passages, a fully autonomous aesthetic  enjoyment, in the fashion 
of Kant’s disinterestedness, could only be an ideal model at most. In re-
ality, aesthetic judgments and the pleasure derived by a competent reader 
would perhaps always be muddled with all kinds of transient personal 
preferences or contingent facts about the actual way the work was read, 
and, of course, the vague and unmeasurable level of literary competence.
What is striking here is perhaps the fact that analytic aestheticians, 
contrary to many followers of the formalist-structuralist tradition, mar-
ginalize the widely discussed notion of the meaning of a text. For the 
analytic aesthetician, meaning is intimately tied to the interpreter’s aims, 
and there cannot exist a single meaning, or an underlying structure, sepa-
rate from human interaction; an observation which is perhaps congruent 
(although in a different vocabulary) with Barthesian post- structuralist 
insight about texts and works. To reject the abovementioned approach 
to a work of art merely means not to read it aesthetically, that is, with 
a purpose of ultimately experiencing aesthetic pleasure, but with a dif-
ferent objective. In other words, for analytic aestheticians, textualist 
literary theories privilege semantics over aesthetics. They focus on inter-
pretations and meaning, rather than on appreciation.
I suppose that Olsen’s idea of appreciation, which he sees as something 
that literary critics and competent readers do, is not particularly revolu-
tionary. After all, the investigation into what literary critics do has been 
around at least since the times of David Hume and I take it that there is a 
basic consensus regarding what competent readers do, how they produce 
interpretations and evaluations. In this respect, Olsen’s work is not partic-
ularly original: one might see it as bearing some resemblance to, say, New 
Criticism. There are, however, several important differences. I will have 
more to say about the relation between New Critics, analytic aesthetics 
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and textualism in the next chapter, but for now, it suffices to say that 
New Critics face the same problems that semantic/formalist theories do, 
by overemphasizing the role of the text and textual conventions. More-
over, New Critics do not place their discussion in aesthetics proper, which 
leaves them removed from discussing related philosophical issues in other 
arts. They do not make use of a notion such as “artworld,” which is in-
dispensable for understanding contemporary art. Finally, they do not dis-
tinguish between reading, research, interpretation and appreciation when 
it comes to art, which leaves the status of their analysis rather confusing.
Likewise, I have some doubts about the institutional theory itself, 
which I am going to explore throughout the book. I do not believe aes-
thetic appreciation is entirely a matter of following conventions, that 
it is an activity composed of entirely arbitrary procedures as in chess 
rule-book. Nor do I believe one can easily separate understanding and 
evaluation, as evaluative judgments seem to be tightly related to even 
simplest construal of meanings. I am convinced, however, that Olsen’s 
institutional theory is a good starting point for further discussion as it 
is clear and coherent, and a good example of an analytic outlook on art, 
acknowledging the importance of the aesthetic level of experience and 
research of artworks.
The above is, of course, only a starting point, a brief summary of 
the literary institution; and in the following chapters the notion will re- 
appear and will be updated and revised, when discussing specific issues 
in aesthetics, their relation to post-structuralist theories, the historical 
development of art as well as the relation between literature and some 
developments of cognitive sciences. The analytic notion of the institution 
is of course a narrow one, and in order to describe the literary institution 
as a practice in the broader sense, one cannot ignore the fact that nar-
rowly defined institutions and the logical structures behind language use 
do not exist in a vacuum, but are located both in certain sociohistorical 
contexts and are consumed by human minds which function within a 
framework of embodied cognition.
Notes
 1 For example: Stein Haugom Olsen, The End of Literary Theory (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987); Colin Davies, After Poststructuralism: 
Reading, Stories, Theory (London: Routledge, 2003); Nancy Easterlin and 
 Barbara Riebling (ed.), After Post-Structuralism: Interdisciplinarity and Lit-
erary Theory (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1993); Terry 
 Eagleton, After Theory (London: Penguin, 2004); Wendell Harris (ed.),  Beyond 
Poststructuralism: The Speculations of Theory and the Experience of Reading 
(University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996), and many others.
 2 One might think of not only conservative literary critics that have always re-
jected the developments of structuralist theories, but also of neopragmatists 
who heralded the end of theory in the early 1980s.
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 3 This tendency to purge literary studies seems to be typical of many scholars 
associated with Darwinian Literary Studies.
 4 This question is elaborated upon in Chapter 2.
 5 The following part of the paragraph uses arguments from Noël Carroll’s 
Philosophy of Art.
 6 More elaborate critical discussions of Fish’s institutional theory can be 
found in: Reed Way Dasenbrock, “Do We Write the Text We Read?,” in Lit-
erary Theory after Davidson, ed. Reed Way Dasenbrock (University Park: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), 18–37.
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Before Theory
Before moving on to discuss in detail some tenets of the analytic phi-
losophy of literature, one crucial point has to be addressed, namely the 
relation of analytic aesthetics to those “literary theories” which do not 
fit the definition of Theory which I laid down in the preceding chapter. 
Specifically, those that predate the emergence of post-structuralist and 
of some ideological approaches to literature. To recapitulate briefly, the 
need to delimit the understanding of the concept of Theory was moti-
vated by the fact that when it is used, discussed or criticized nowadays, 
the concept hardly ever refers to, say, the work of George Poulet or Rene 
Wellek, but precisely to Theory in its contemporary forms of various 
post-structuralist and ideological approaches.
Moreover, when Theory is used by scholars of those provenances that 
often resolutely distance themselves from literary theories (e.g., analytic 
aestheticians, cognitive critics, Darwinian literary critics), they mean 
precisely ideological and post-Sausserean approaches to literature. The 
idea that the hallmark of literary theories is their rejection of the literary 
aesthetic dimension, as expressed in Lamarque’s words in a quotation 
in Chapter 1, is clearly representative of the analytic perspective on lit-
erary theories. But even if we accept the distinction into aesthetics and 
Theory, one can easily notice that a number of scholars elude simple 
classification: New Critics, formalists, phenomenological critics are all 
standardly included in Theory anthologies, but in their research into the 
nature and into the workings of literature they acknowledge the need to 
study its artistic character. One of the bones of contention is, of course, 
a disparate understanding of what art is and how to study it.
As it was indicated, the aims and the scope of research conducted by 
analytic philosophy of art is rather narrow and cannot be easily said to 
challenge or compete with literary theories. The reservation that phi-
losophy of literature is concerned with the study of the logical struc-
ture underlying our use of concepts and that it primarily addresses the 
essential questions about the nature of the concept of art and serves 
a function only subsidiary to the actual practices of the artworld: the 
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critics, the authors, the academics, the competent readers, the publish-
ers, etc., means that its inquiry can never actually explain or illuminate 
the meaning and value of specific works, that is, it is not equivalent to 
literary criticism. Nor can it be particularly appreciative of seeing lit-
erary works as meaning generation machines, necessarily encouraging 
multiple and fragmentary forms of research into their actual content, 
hidden ideological commitments or their existence as cultural text, all 
of which is commonly accepted in contemporary literary theories. The 
analytic aesthetician narrows the scope of their research by claiming 
that in the logical order of our use of concepts, literature is an artis-
tic category, a linguistic artifact to which a specific artistic value is 
attributed. Their research is to determine the conditions under which 
 literature and concepts related to its reception and appreciation are 
used. Thus, analytic aesthetics and literary theory can serve, at least 
to some extent, complementary functions. Analytic philosophers of 
literature tend to emphasize that one of the key tenets of textualism is 
rejection of aesthetics and conversely, some textualists see aesthetics as 
an unilluminating and naïve celebration of an author. Whereas I argue 
that neither need be true, it is important for the sake of the argument 
to cross-examine some central ideas of analytic philosophy of art with 
those approaches to literature that sprung before the age of Theory, 
so as to show that analytic philosophy of art can more effectively deal 
with some philosophical challenges and does not mark a return to 
some quaint idea of aesthetics.
We cannot forget, however, that the name “literary theory” is often 
attributed to some approaches that intended to study the workings of 
literature as art, and which in most cases, predate the post-Sausserean 
and ideological approaches. Hence, if analytic aesthetics can be said 
to contribute something to contemporary literary theory, it has to be 
shown as distinct and more productive than those, crudely speaking, 
pre- theoretical aesthetics. Otherwise, the call to re-include aesthetic cat-
egories in literary studies will be merely a naïve dream of returning to 
the pristine, pre-theoretical world of art. In what follows I shall briefly 
comment on some problems of the phenomenological, hermeneutical 
and New Critical theories of art.
Phenomenological Art Theories
In the early forms of phenomenological criticism, as represented by 
 Poulet and the Geneva School, what was perhaps considered the chief 
value of literary art was that it enabled encountering and merging with a 
different consciousness. If, as phenomenologists observed, consciousness 
is always already directed at something and presupposes the existence of 
a subject and an object in a unified act, then art, and especially literary 
art, constitutes the space which is created both by the consciousness of 
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its author and of its reader. As Poulet suggested in his “Phenomenology 
of Reading,” to read literature is to experience the other consciousness 
in oneself. To identify it one has to look for its traces, to find that, as 
one critic observed, one’s own consciousness becomes, in another critic’s 
words, “filled with objects that are at once dependent upon it, i.e., clearly 
the result of its own intention, and yet recognized to be the thoughts of 
another” (Ray 1984, 10).
In congruence with the principles of phenomenological reduction, one 
investigates only the phenomena appearing in one’s consciousness, ig-
noring all sources of information about the empirical author, biography 
or historical context. Nor can the work be equivalent to an autonomous 
verbal structure. It is rather an event during which the reader animates 
it, being absorbed in a different consciousness which leads one to a state 
where “a work of literature becomes (at the expense of a reader whose 
own life it suspends) a sort of human being, a mind conscious of itself 
and constituting itself in me as the subject of its own objects” (Poulet 
1969, 59).
The problems with such aesthetic theory are severe. To claim a pos-
sibility of objectively constructing other consciousness from scratch by 
identifying its traces is essentially expressive of a belief in Cartesian sub-
jectivity and as such prone to falling into the pit of solipsism. After all, 
the consciousness experienced by the reader seems to be an artificial 
construct that does not exist apart from a single act. As some critics 
noticed, such form of analysis “is inevitably self-referential” (Ray 1984, 
57–59), as the original consciousness, in fact, never appears in its de-
scribed configuration outside of the imaginative act of reading Poulet 
postulates. As a result of accepting such Cartesian assumptions, it is 
never possible to differentiate between the actual authorial conscious-
ness and that of whatever the reader intends it to be, and there is no way 
to distinguish the reader-author dialogue from the reader’s imaginative 
monologue.
Moreover, the idea that literary works or whole artistic oeuvres can 
be unified by positing a stable authorial consciousness whose private 
inner experiences can be accessed through the language of the text is 
hopelessly naïve and goes against the grain of the greatest achievements 
of the twentieth-century philosophy of language, be it continental, as in 
the case of the followers of de Saussure or Bakhtin, or analytic as with 
Wittgenstein. Their greatest merit was to notice that language is nec-
essarily public and autonomous and cannot be said to express strictly 
private mental states of individual Cartesian subjects.
Finally, phenomenological criticism is blind to most aspects of the ac-
tual reader’s (be it expert or naïve) practice and artistic appreciation. 
Ascribing value, enjoying the form, placing the work in the artistic tra-
dition and acknowledging its unique character is nowhere to be found 
in Poulet’s theory (Lawall 1968, 74–135). Similarly, the hunt for the 
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consciousness of the other does not seem to be the chief preoccupa-
tion either of the trained readers or the ordinary consumers of popular 
literature.
A much more sophisticated theory of phenomenological literary 
aesthetics was put forward by Roman Ingarden, although some of its 
central claims also remain objectionable. Contrary to Poulet, Ingarden 
acknowledges that the literary work exists as a relatively autonomous 
skeletal structure, so to say, which the reader animates by filling its spots 
of indeterminacy, by concretizing it in the act of reading. As Eagleton 
spitefully commented “rather in the manner of those children’s picture 
books which you colour in according to the manufacturer’s instruc-
tions” (Eagleton 2008, 70).
The relation between the reader’s imaginative, creative reading and 
the intended form of concretization (which should be controlled by the 
structure of the work) is, however, again paradoxical. As Ingarden him-
self admits, “the first reading provides the reader with just that suppos-
edly intuitive aesthetic concretization of the work and provides him with 
guidelines for what can and should be sought in an analytical investiga-
tion of the work” (Ingarden 1973, 283). So, specific concretizations are 
simultaneously given to the reader and at the same time bring the literary 
work into givenness. Individual concretizations of the work are, then, at 
the same time the reader’s own creation. In the end, it seems impossible 
to distinguish the creation of the imaginative critic from the recreation 
of the work itself. One the one hand, the realization of the aesthetic 
object requires active participation of the reader who can supply the aes-
thetic factor “independently of the work of art, but he can also be moved 
to supply it by certain qualities of the work of art” (Ingarden 1973, 295). 
If, however, the work fails to do it, and the reader delivers it on her own, 
then it is “a pure creation of the observer, however much it may appear 
in the aesthetic object” (Ingarden 1973, 283). The question how to dis-
cern the two seems to be left without any answers, leading one critic to 
claim that Ingarden’s theory of reading “may be as much a tribute to the 
reader, as to the work” (Ray 1984, 45).
Another intentionality-related problem with Ingarden’s ontology 
of art is his discussion of aesthetic experience and aesthetic object in 
“Aesthetic Experience and Aesthetic Object” (Ingarden 1961). Briefly, 
Ingarden claims that the object of aesthetic experience is not identical 
with the physical object that we might intuitively call the artwork, e.g., 
a sculpture or a painting. In his famous example, Ingarden says that 
Venus of Milo can be regarded as an aesthetic object which evokes aes-
thetic experience thanks to it having (among other aesthetic properties) 
a property of being “uniformly colored” (Ingarden 1963, 293), or as a 
physical object which evokes purely sensual experiences such as observ-
ing “a dark stain on the nose” (Ingarden 1963, 292), a property which 
we deem aesthetically irrelevant. According to the intentionality thesis, 
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every type of experience has a separate object, and consequently, the two 
aforementioned attributes do not belong to the same object as they are 
tied to different experiences.
But such a distinction turns out to be either false or uninformative. 
If such an intentional ontology is not easily falsified by cases of illu-
sion or imagination (does the experience of thinking about unicorns 
entail their existence in any interesting sense of the word?), then how 
can it enrich our understanding of the ontology of art? To point to 
an entirely separate mode of existence of aesthetic objects is clearly 
to multiply unnecessary entities. Paradoxically, Ingarden’s ontology 
might be more appropriate when discussing other arts and the prob-
lem might be the case of his bad choice of example. The identification 
of the sensory-experienced objects with the aesthetic objects is neces-
sarily strong in most cases of traditional painting and sculpture and 
the artworld has always been particularly sensitive about detecting 
art forgery as well as distinguishing between copies, replicas, repro-
ductions or pastiches, emphasizing the unique status of the original 
object.
The case is not the same, however, with literature, film, performance 
and contemporary visual arts. It is clear that when we talk about the 
work of literature or a film we do not mean a unique physical object. 
We experience and appreciate these works regardless of their form; a 
literary work might be printed, spoken and recorded or it might be a 
hypertext or an e-book. A film can be recorded on celluloid, on VHS 
tape or digitalized in multiple data storage formats. These types of art 
may, then, indicate that Ingarden is right to posit the existence of onto-
logically separate entities: the aesthetic objects. But his theory becomes 
again highly problematic when it comes to contemporary art and the 
indiscernibles mentioned in the first chapter. If a urinal or a box of soap 
is absolutely indistinguishable from ordinary objects we encounter in a 
lavatory or in a store, but still we consider them valuable art when they 
are placed in a network of art-related institutions, then Ingarden’s ontol-
ogy can in no way account for this fact, as it would have to paradoxically 
claim that there exist ontologically separate objects whose physical and 
aesthetic properties are indistinguishable. As a side note, indicating this 
problem with theories of art was perhaps partly the point of the famous 
comment about the contemporary status of art made by Benjamin in 
his “Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” (Benjamin 
2007, 217–253). Benjamin claimed that due to technological progress, 
artworks have lost their aura of uniqueness and authenticity and that 
art would, thus, become liberated from the ritualized institutions that 
used to govern it and become open to politics. But in reality, no radical 
change in our  approach to art, authenticity and creativity has appeared. 
Not every urinal is a work of art. Similarly, suppose someone were to 
replace the original closing credits in a film with one’s own name and 
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then distribute it. One would obviously not create a work with a status 
equal to the original, but rather commit plagiarism.
The above also applies to literary works, as the famous example of 
Borges Pierre Menard story indicates (Borges 1964). In short, Menard 
is a fictional twentieth-century author who composes a work which is 
identical with Cervantes’ original but which can elicit a different type of 
interpretation and critical commentary. This can perhaps lead to con-
struing Borges’ point as a rather banal claim about language: a particu-
lar token of a sentence type can have different meanings depending on 
the context. The real point is, however, more nuanced and more relevant 
to aesthetics. We would not see Menard’s work as having the same qual-
ities as the original, since informed appreciation depends on a proper 
identification of the object in question. The original Don Quixote and 
Menard’s creation share the same textual-linguistic tissue, but they con-
stitute entirely different works, precisely because a body of linguistic 
tokens is not equivalent to the notion of the work. The latter must in-
clude extra-linguistic elements, chief of them being the work’s relation 
to the artistic tradition. It is precisely the work, and not the text, that 
is the object of informed appreciation, and consequently, Menard’s and 
Cervantes’ works cannot have equal artistic value.
Perhaps a staunch defender of traditional, pre-Duchamp art might ar-
gue that indiscernibles and most contemporary art is not real art. But 
that would mean presupposing in advance a theory of art that ignores 
the actual practice surrounding artworks and institutions and margin-
alizes a large portion of what has become generally accepted as art since 
the twentieth century. As opposed to institutional theories, Ingarden’s 
ontology simply cannot successfully account for most art.
The problems of Ingarden’s overall theory should not, however, over-
shadow the merits of his work. As Iseminger, an analytic philosopher of 
art, correctly observed (Iseminger 1973), Ingarden is entirely right both 
to posit a distinct type of experience, the aesthetic, and to distinguish 
between aesthetically relevant and irrelevant properties. It is also per-
fectly understandable that we use the notion of the “aesthetic object,” 
but it is not always valid to claim its separateness from physical objects. 
Ingarden distinguished between mere physical objects, artworks and 
aesthetic objects. Artworks potentially have aesthetic qualities, but they 
can be truly manifested only in the aesthetic object which is the concret-
ized artwork. However, this distinction still leaves us with the problem 
of the aesthetic value of indiscernibles or Borges’ Menard story. The 
notion of an institutional object, as presented in the previous  chapter, 
seems to offer a more comprehensive solution. On the other hand, 
 Ingarden’s discussion of the ontology of the literary work and its strata is 
well worth exploring through the analytical lens, and one can definitely 
find multiple  common grounds with analytic aestheticians in this area. 
One of the reasons that Ingarden’s work has not been widely discussed 
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in Anglo-American aesthetics and that it lacks a proper historical recog-
nition is clearly due to the rather late translations of his works.  Although 
written in 1930s, The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art and The 
Literary Work of Art were first published in English in 1973 and in 
1979, many years after the emergence of both Wittgenstein-inspired 
anti-essentialist aesthetics and the institutional theories of art. Sadly, a 
serious discussion of how his work could inform or interact, or in some 
cases, be translated into analytic jargon would clearly require an entirely 
separate book.
Wellek and Warren
One important “pre-Theoretical” theory of art I wish to briefly discuss is 
the one laid down by Wellek and Warren in their Theory of Literature. 
Although the publication of their work probably marks the first use of 
the phrase “literary theory,” which they, nevertheless, sometimes under-
stand as “poetics” (Wellek and Warren 1949, 7), both the aims and the 
method of their research differ significantly from what “Theory” has 
been engaged with for the last couple of decades. Still, their objectives, 
that is, to unite poetics, criticism and history of literature in a coherent 
system of principles and procedures that inform the practice of literary 
studies do not seem to be very different, at least at first glance, from 
those of, say, Lamarque and other analytic aestheticians. Their method 
and their objectives are obviously closer to those of analytic philosophy 
of art than any of the other aesthetic theories that are sometimes in-
cluded in the umbrella term of “literary theory.” Wellek and Warren’s 
work is apparently under the influence of the structuralist linguistics of 
the Prague School and the Russian formalists, though phenomenology 
remains another important predecessor (Creed 1983). Even though the 
ambition to lay down the principles for a systematic, rigorous, scien-
tific study of literature is also indebted to the early twentieth-century 
formalist and structuralist theories, Wallek and Warren remain critical 
of purely formalist, language-internal definitions of literature and their 
remarks at times parallel those of Olsen (as quoted in the previous chap-
ter). Nonetheless, there are reasons, though, to think that Wellek and 
Warren ultimately offer a narrow theory of literary aesthetics which, 
contrary to analytic aesthetics, is incompatible with bulk of the research 
carried out by literary theorists from 1970s onward.
A systematic study requires, according to Wellek and Warren, a meth-
odology entirely separate from those of other disciplines, a methodology 
which is literature-specific (Wellek and Warren 1949, 8). Thus, in order 
to carry out systematic, scientific literary studies one has to formulate 
and clarify all the principles and norms that enable it, by analyzing po-
etics, literary criticism and literary history, three constituents of liter-
ary studies that remain in mutual interdependence. In congruence with 
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the formalist theories, they claim that the study of literature must be 
“ super-personal” (Wellek and Warren 1949, 8–10) and go beyond the 
study of the idiosyncratic, of the individual response (as in the affective 
fallacy), and that it cannot focus on the psychology or the biography 
of the author (as in the intentional fallacy). The literary work itself is 
the sole object of scientific study. Unfortunately, Wellek’s and Warren’s 
scientific ambitions are fraught with serious difficulties from the very 
beginning, starting with their definition of literature.
Wellek and Warren criticize those definitions of literature that they 
deem too narrow, such as an aestheticist belles-lettres definition, or too 
inclusive, such as a definition that would encompass the whole of the 
written language. Instead, they propose that a proper definition is that 
of “imaginative literature” (Wellek and Warren 1949, 11–14), that is, a 
category which includes, say, fiction and poetry, but does not limit itself 
only to the established canon of the classics. Though it might sound intu-
itive and commonsensical, the definition is far from clear and, as they do 
not elaborate on it in the introductory part, but return to it throughout 
their book, it becomes more confusing.
In some passages they are clearly reifying literary text, stating that 
literary works simply possess certain objective features, such as beauty 
and the ability to evoke aesthetic pleasure (Wellek and Warren 1949, 
241), and when they claim that literary works are artifacts in “which the 
aesthetic function is dominant” (Wellek and Warren 1949, 15). In other 
passages their claims resemble evaluative definitions of literature, where 
the concept is reserved for the works characterized by “complexity and 
coherence” (Wellek and Warren 1949, 122). Sometimes, they write as if 
they believed that literature is characterized by special use of language, 
which again resembles the formalist theories of Jakobson’s poetic func-
tion and the concept of literature as density of certain stylistic features. 
Literary language, for them
abounds in ambiguities; it is, like every other historical language, full 
of homonyms, arbitrary or irrational categories such as  grammatical 
gender; it is permeated with historical accidents, memories, and as-
sociations. In a word, it is highly “connotative.” Moreover, literary 
language is far from merely referential. It has its expressive side; it 
conveys the tone and attitude of the speaker or writer.
(Wellek and Warren 1949, 12)
As I indicated in the previous chapter, linguistic definitions cannot ac-
count for the fact that we do appreciate minimalist literature and treat 
its choice of linguistic features as a conscious artistic design. Moreover, 
at times, Wellek and Warren seem to be criticizing the shortcomings of 
a purely formalist theory of meaning in a way that resembles Olsen’s 
institutional account, stating that certain stylistic and aesthetic features 
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can only be accessible to trained readers (Wellek and Warren 1949, 249). 
Some passages suggest that stylistic features are not enough to judge a 
work valuable and they are only relevant “in terms of their aesthetic 
function and meaning. Only if this aesthetic interest is central will sty-
listics be a part of literary scholarship” (Wellek and Warren 1949, 183). 
Regrettably, they do not clarify the relation between literary competence 
and the features of “literary language,” so the reader is left to accept two 
incompatible positions about the nature of literary art.
The cornerstone of Wellek’s and Warren’s outline of the systematic 
study of literature is their distinction into the extrinsic and intrinsic 
study of literature. The latter forms the core of literary studies and en-
compasses all the procedures applied to the work itself by the scholar. 
The former, consisting of all the extratextual aspects of research, is only 
germane to literary studies in a very limited sense, as in establishing 
proper historical context, searching for source texts, authenticating 
manuscripts and compiling bibliography. Apart from that, any research 
that encourages reading a literary work through the perspective of the 
author’s biography, putative psychology, social conditions that might 
have shaped it or by focusing on the philosophical ideas it expresses or 
on the propositional content is strictly forbidden, as it necessarily derails 
the discussion of the actual work and extorts the use of methodologies 
alien to literary studies.
Following Ingarden, Wellek and Warren claim that the intrinsic ap-
proach consists of analyzing the five strata constituting the literary work, 
from the sound stratum, through the fictional world of the narrative, to 
the metaphysical, in order to find a coherent theme that would help to 
unify all the elements of the work in an aesthetically pleasing way. The 
stages of the activity of the scholar are description, interpretation and 
evaluation. The former two involve focusing on the stylistic features of 
the work, as well as on the images, metaphors and symbols that the 
work might be said to contain. Then, the scholar analyzes the fictional 
world of the work, its tone, setting, characters, narrative structure, etc., 
and ascribes the work to a relevant genre. The overall evaluation of the 
work should, again, be concerned only with the work itself, disregarding 
any extratextual factors. Although they reject the formalist’s criteria of 
aesthetic quality, such as defamiliarization, the novelty of artistic means 
and perspectives that the work offers, what they offer is quite similar: 
good work of literature is able to evoke aesthetic pleasure owing to its 
internal complexity. As they say, “the value of the poem rises in direct 
ratio to the diversity of its materials” (Wellek and Warren 1949, 254).
Regrettably, Warren and Wellek’s outline of the systematic literary 
study does not become clearer, as their argument is developed on rather 
vague assumptions. As one critic correctly observed, just like the con-
cept of the literary works and their mode of existence, some of the key 
concepts regarding their theory of literary art, such as “beauty,” “value” 
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and “aesthetic pleasure” remain vague and unexplained throughout their 
book (van Rees 1984, 523). Inspired by Ingarden’s work, they claim that 
specific readings are only concretizations of the works which exist as 
sets of highly specific norms and conventions that control and guide the 
reader. Not only are they fraught with the same difficulties as Ingarden’s 
theory discussed above, but also their discussion becomes even more 
vague, taking into account various remarks of formalist or institutional 
flavor scattered throughout their text. Nowhere can the reader find out 
about the source and the nature of the norms that make up the liter-
ary work, or the sensitivities and connoisseurship required of competent 
readers and critics.
The sharp distinction into the external and internal approaches to 
studying literature is also disputable, as the existence, understanding 
and evaluation of literary works evidently requires some extratextual 
knowledge. This is of course the hallmark of later post-structuralist 
theories that indicated the impossibility of locking literary works in a 
definite, autonomous structure. Such conclusion of Warren and Wellek’s 
discussion is inevitable, but it is something they are unwilling to admit.
Taking into consideration all the reservations and problems with defi-
nitions that Warren and Wellek have, it would be naïve to think that their 
work serves only a modest descriptive purpose of the actual procedures 
applied in literary studies. What they offer is a normative approach that 
unsuccessfully attempts to envisage a rather arbitrary idea of literary 
studies. Their problems result from a misguided idea of the object of 
a systematic study. As Warren’s and Wellek’s discussion demonstrates, 
the concept of “literature” is not consistently used with a single, unified 
underlying definition. This trivial observation entails the somewhat ar-
bitrary nature of any definition and a research program built around it, 
a conclusion overlooked by Wellek and Warren. Clearly, as the concept 
of “literature” is and always has been applied to a variety of phenomena, 
one has to specify which of the uses and why one is interested in explor-
ing. Wellek’s and Warren’s use of the concept, that is, the one used by a 
professional academic readers in the first half of the twentieth century, 
is inevitably limited to a local perspective of a contemporary, Western, 
middle-class academic. This already hints at the fact that the definition 
they are after would primarily refer to the concept of “literature” as used 
by the institutions of the artworld that have developed in the Western 
world and not to, say, how literature is understood and consumed by 
average readers of popular romance or how myth and storytelling used 
to function in ancient or primitive cultures. Such perspective is, roughly 
speaking, implied in the analytic institutional definitions of art, but it 
is not explicitly verbalized and carried to its conclusion by Wellek and 
Warren. This is not a trivial point, as Wellek and Warren’s work is am-
biguous about the relation between the academic, professional reading 
and ordinary reader experience. Institutional theories are clear about the 
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need to include the concept of the artworld in the network of procedures 
involved in appreciating art where an informed experience of a literary 
work requires something more than just knowing the language in which 
it was written. It is not spontaneously, directly accessible. In other words, 
it is altogether unclear in Wellek’s and Warren’s work whether what they 
offer is an artificial, academic construct, a naturalizable phenomenon 
or something altogether different. The status of what they present is 
unclear and this mirrors the conceptual confusion over “reading” and 
“research” present in their work.
Consequently, if one analyzes the logical structure behind the  actions 
and the procedures of the artworld, it does not take much to discover 
that “literature” is part of art, that it is an aesthetic category. But 
then,  aesthetics, understood either as a normative theory of beauty or 
as a  philosophical analysis of the conventions and procedures of the 
 artworld, can in no way be called an exact science. Reading, interpret-
ing and appreciating art is an activity people engage in. One can study 
their actions and the content they communicate to each other with the 
help of psychology, sociology, history, anthropology, cultural studies 
and so on. But when one outlines and clarifies their use of concepts, 
such as “ artwork” and “value,” one refers specifically to philosophy and 
its methods and not to a vaguely defined “research” or science. After 
all, if the aim of Wellek’s and Warren’s literary theory is to outline and 
to clarify what professional readers already do, then their work is that 
of a philosopher of literature. It is altogether unclear how their outline 
of a systematic study of literature differs from the work of a literary 
critic or a competent reader, both of whom are, ideally, acquainted with 
 artistic tradition and with the conventions of reading. Similarly, one is 
not sure what the aim of their systematic study is. If the task of a liter-
ary critic is to formulate judgments regarding the work’s value and its 
success at evoking aesthetic pleasure, using their knowledge of traditions 
and conventions, then it seems to be indistinguishable from Wellek’s and 
 Warren’s description of the work of the scholar. If the two are equivalent, 
then, it leads to a claim that the aim of study is evaluating, commenting 
upon works which is entirely motivated by a drive toward experiencing 
aesthetic pleasure and not just accumulating knowledge. The difference 
between a scholar, a critic and a competent reader is, thus, obliterated 
to the point of them being indistinguishable and redundant, leading to 
 further questions about the status of the research they outline. This is, 
however, quite a predictable conclusion if one, perhaps unwittingly, 
 limits the definition of literature to its solely aesthetic function, to a 
practice of professional critics and audience whose primary aim is to 
experience a specific form of enjoyment through art and not to conduct 
a systematic research for its own sake.
To do justice to Wellek and Warren, one might say that many of their 
remarks about the nature of art are potentially very valuable insights, 
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even if in their particular discussion they prove to be vague. Some of 
them include: their insistence on the need to focus one’s reading on the 
actual work; their distinction into the intrinsic/extrinsic approaches as 
primary and subsidiary operations contributing to a proper appreciation 
of art; their insistence on appreciation being a skill to be mastered; or 
when they write that meaning and value of works is shaped by the his-
tory of their criticism. On the whole, if one rejects their plea for a rigor-
ous, perhaps scientific study of literature and their aesthetic absolutism 
which suggests that reading for aesthetic pleasure is the only acceptable 
approach to literary art, then one might say that their work is an early 
attempt at exploring philosophy of literature, as it is understood in an-
alytic tradition.
To sum up and to clarify some of the points I have made so far: surely, 
“literature” is a concept that historically has denoted various phenom-
ena; similarly, “to read and to enjoy literature” can refer to a variety of 
strategies and experiences of readers. If one is, however, to investigate, 
using the analytic methods, the logical structure behind the contempo-
rary use of art-related concepts, one discovers that they relate to the 
actions of the persons representing the institutions of the artworld. Lit-
erature is, then, considered as a branch of art, and the logical primary 
function of art (if we accept that there is something that distinguishes 
the concept from others) is to evoke specific type of enjoyment when ap-
propriate procedures are applied to it. Such understanding of literature 
is necessarily the one that has developed in the last few centuries in the 
Western world. The aesthetic is the logically primary understanding of 
literature, if we are to hold that there is something that actually makes it 
different from, say, jokes, political speeches or stories told when meeting 
friends.
But if literature per se is simply regulated by conventions of reading, 
one cannot have an entirely separate science that studies it in its aesthetic 
sense, as Wellek and Warren imagined, any more than one can have a 
science that studies the conventions of chess. To study the structure of 
concepts and procedures behind a given activity is the role of philosophy. 
Thus, to study what literature in the aesthetic sense is, as it has devel-
oped in the Western world, one needs to turn to philosophy of literature, 
i.e., to literary aesthetics in the narrow sense.
However, if literature serves multiple functions, historically, socially, 
psychologically and politically, one needs to move beyond the narrow 
aesthetic sense of literature as a body of revered works to understand 
them. This is, of course, the major achievement of post-structuralist the-
ories: the ultimate acknowledgment of the multifunctional and multi-
level existence of literature as a space open for a variety of discourses. 
Despite the existence of rather commonly accepted differences between 
the continental and the analytic traditions of thinking about art, in what 
follows, I will try to demonstrate how analytic aesthetics can intertwine 
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with more contemporary literary theories and their beyond-aesthetics 
approach, and to suggest that eventually that it is not entirely easy for 
literary theories to completely dispose of some art-related concepts and 
practices.
Works and Texts
As I indicated in the previous chapter, many analytic aestheticians share 
the contention that the one common denominator of contemporary lit-
erary theories is the rejection of aesthetics. One way in which this is 
allegedly reflected is the fact that literary theorists often tend to read lit-
erature as cultural texts, that is, as value-free products of a given culture 
which they analyze in terms of certain beliefs or values, cultural prac-
tices and institutions which the texts manifest or challenge. Literature is, 
then, put in a broader framework of a cultural product, no different than 
an advertisement, a music video or a TV political debate, which is stud-
ied by means of a variety of ideologically-oriented methodologies, such 
as Marxism, feminism, post-colonialism, new historicism and queer 
theory. Alternatively, for some theories, the study of literature might 
not necessarily consist in using methodologies with strong ideological 
investments, but which, still, according to many analytic aestheticians, 
tend to ignore exploring aesthetics in their research while applying meth-
odologies from other disciplines, e.g., structuralism and semiotics.
The claim that literary theories reject aesthetic considerations is, how-
ever, dubious and requires some clarification. One of the meanings of the 
concept of “aesthetics,” as used by analytic philosophers, is the philo-
sophical investigation into the nature of art, and as such, it is not equiva-
lent to the type of research carried out by literary theories. The question 
that remains, then, is to determine the relation of literary theories to the 
philosophical investigations into the nature of literature. For one thing, 
the aforementioned theories clearly employ methodologies taken from 
other disciplines, but to claim that they at the same time reject any phil-
osophical claims as to the nature of literature leads to a clearly absurd 
conclusion that they carry out their researches without any assumptions 
as to what literature is. There is one sense in which the literary theorist’s 
approach to philosophy of literature appears deficient, and that is the 
attempt to define literature purely in Theory-internal terms, as it is most 
apparent in the formalist-structuralist tradition which sees literature as 
a specific use of language. As it was claimed in the previous chapter, the 
concept of literature, that is to say the aesthetic category, is not reducible 
to other phenomena. This is why the aforementioned theories fail to 
explain literature as a deviation of language or code use, as simple em-
pirical evidence suggests that some highly valued literary works tend not 
to deviate significantly from ordinary language. Similarly, one is bound 
to fail if one attempts to define literature as an expression of the ideology 
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produced by the dominant social class (how to differentiate it from other 
manifestations of ideology?), etc. The failure to define literature does not 
mean, however, that the literary theorist fails in their overall research or 
that they do not make use of the aesthetic understanding of art at all.
The analytic aesthetician’s contention that the theorist’s research is 
not, ultimately, oriented at studying the artistic nature of literature is 
then true, but it tacitly assumes that the theorist does not make use of 
the artistic understanding of literature at all, which is not necessarily the 
case. To explore this issue, it is prerequisite to have a closer look at the 
fundamental concepts of literary theories and analytic aesthetics: the text 
and the work.
The most famous elucidation of the notion of the text, which at the 
same time marks the transition from the scientist ambitions of formalism 
and structuralism to post-structuralism and ideologically-oriented stud-
ies is, doubtlessly, the one laid down by Roland Barthes in his “From 
Work to Text” (Barthes 1977b, 155–165), one of the essays that serve as 
the cornerstone of post-structuralist literary theories.
To summarize what I take to be well-established facts, for Barthes, the 
notion of the work is inevitably tied to most forms of literary research 
carried out before the emergence of post-structuralism, and, as such, it is 
severely deficient and outdated in relation to post-Sausserean linguistics. 
He sees works as static, closed and strictly related to individual authors 
whose genius they allegedly manifest. They are easily classified, have 
stable identities and meanings, and induce pleasures of merely passive 
consumption.
The text is its precise opposite. It eludes simple taxonomies, its mean-
ing is paradoxical and infinitely deferred. It is not a static object, but a 
dynamic process with no clear beginning or end. It has a plural meaning 
and is not tied to any particular agents or institutions; it belongs to the 
sphere of intertextuality, where texts always refer to one another and are 
composed of other texts, as never-ending strings of citations.
Unfortunately, Barthes is fundamentally unclear about the status of 
his discussion. Is it just a description of what literary studies look like, 
or started to look like in 1971? Or is it an altogether normative claim, 
a plea that there are serious reasons to transform literary studies in the 
fashion Barthes invites? For one thing, neither academic literary studies, 
nor the everyday practices that constitute the production and consump-
tion of literature, seem to be significantly informed by purely textualist, 
agency and context-free approach. The essay does not leave us a clear 
clue as to which of the two he might be leaning, as, on the one hand, 
Barthes admits that the work-oriented criticism had dominated literary 
studies, a state which surely should be altered, but on the other hand, 
the possibility of the work-oriented criticism is in itself an illusion, as it 
is invalidated by contemporary knowledge about language,1 and thus, 
his discussion might be called purely descriptive. But on the other hand, 
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by acknowledging the existence of a rift between the nature of language 
and what literary critics actually do, he appears to be formulating a 
normative claim.
In the opening sentence of another seminal essay, the “Death of the 
Author” Barthes writes that “over the last few years a certain change has 
taken place (or is taking place) in our conception of language,” (Barthes 
1977a, 142), a change which, by blurring the strict boundaries between 
disciplines, invites interdisciplinary research, and, thus, a dynamic ap-
proach to literary studies. The change to which Barthes alludes is clearly 
the insight of structuralist linguistics without its early scientist ambi-
tions: language exists as a structure autonomous of its actual users and 
their putative intentions; it is a closed, self-referential system of infinite 
deferral of signifiers and uncontrollable, open-ended action. If this is the 
true nature of language, then the type of criticism proposed by structur-
alists or New Critics is impossible, it is an illusion. Language is uncon-
trollable and the only thing we can do is to acknowledge that by making 
a transition into post-structuralist criticism.
But if we were to accept that this is the philosophy of language that 
Barthes really urges, and whatever readings he invites to produce, they 
are unrelated to historical contexts and actual actions of authors and 
audiences, then such approach must produce arbitrary research results 
and yield literary studies problematic. Such is the claim voiced by Paisley 
Livingston, an analytical philosopher of art, in his aptly called “From 
Text to Work.”
Livingston correctly observes that if we were to take Barthes’ deper-
sonalized vision of texts literally, then it is hard to imagine any consis-
tent or perhaps any intelligible practice concerning their use. Suppose 
one would actually attempt at radically depersonalizing and decontex-
tualizing all the literary works that exist, turning them into an anony-
mous string of textuality. The result would be incomprehensible babble, 
impossible to understand even at a rudimentary level of linguistic, dic-
tionary meaning. Moreover, for it to be really revolutionary, the type of 
intertextual interaction that Livingston takes as Barthes’ stance prom-
ising “maximum semiotic freedom” (Livingston 1993, 92) seems to 
be resting on a rather trivial assertion which Livingston construes as 
“every textual item X is ‘somehow related to’ every other textual item 
Y’” (Livingston 1993, 93). Surely, as Livingston points out, such con-
strual demonstrates that Barthes’ intertextuality thesis is “trivially true 
and totally uninformative” (Livingston 1993, 93). After all, any item 
in the universe can be said to be somehow related to any other item in 
an infinite amount of ways. There would be no point in arguing that 
texts are somehow special in this respect. Though such reading renders 
Barthes’ thesis trivial, I suppose it is not altogether unjustified. Barthes’ 
discussion is not exactly a paragon of clarity: claims that “the Text is 
always paradoxical,” (Barthes 1977b, 158) or that the key feature of the 
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signifier is its infinity (Barthes 1977b, 158), or that textuality is met-
onymic in nature and entails “the activity of associations, contiguities 
[and] carryings-over” (Barthes 1977b, 158) that coincide “with a liber-
ation of symbolic energy” (Barthes 1977b, 158) are all quite vague and 
not thoroughly explained.
Livingston’s subsequent discussion leads to pointing out problems that 
seem to be left unsolved by the textualist stance as described above. Some 
of the questions to which answers remain unclear would include the fol-
lowing. How would one actually parse the strings of language to remove 
all the extratextual elements? We are still left with the old problems of 
whether to remove footnotes, author’s directions or introductions. And 
how to merge the texts in one string? How to actually identify the string 
of intertextual quotations if all the historical contexts and indicators 
of agency have been removed? How to posit that what appears to be a 
string of linguistic signs is meaningful if we have deliberately removed 
all of its contextual markings? What units should one choose to begin 
the intertextual investigation? Should one split the texts into sentences, 
paragraphs and then look for similarities? What would be the meaning 
produced in such a procedure apart from completely arbitatry decisions 
made by readers? (Livingston 1993, 95–98).
If such a strong version of textualism puts into question the very pos-
sibility of reading and analyzing literature (or any other cultural artifact, 
for that matter), then perhaps what Barthes might have been suggesting 
was a weaker formulation of its tenets? After all, there is nothing con-
troversial in observing that texts are created in reference to other texts, 
that they borrow and quote and remain in dialogue with one another, or 
that sometimes one can notice striking similarities between quite distant 
texts. The really important question, then, would concern the purpose of 
encouraging such activities. One can surely choose some passages from 
Hegel and juxtapose them at random with pop music lyrics, but in most 
cases this can be treated either as mere fun or some transgressive artistic 
performance. It cannot, on principle, always tell us something interest-
ing about Hegel or pop music. Moreover, the very fact that one enjoys 
the intertextual whirl of signifiers in the manner described above already 
presupposes that there is a mode of distinct existence of Hegel’s works 
and other objects. The segments selected for comparison indicate that 
some form of indexicality was applied and a given segment of a work 
was identified as separate from others. Unless, of course, the whole point 
is still a metonymic play with random associations as in the stronger in-
terpretation of Barthes’ textualism, but such activities are, as  Livingston 
correctly points out “ill-suited to teach us anything about either the aes-
thetic or the sociopolitical issues that lead us to take an interest in texts 
in the first place” (Livingston 1993, 93). I believe, thus, that an intelli-
gible version of textuality is not really a self-referential system of signi-
fiers, as it clearly refers to historical contexts. But if so, there would be 
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nothing that much revolutionary about Barthes’ intertextuality. It would 
be just a new term for an old claim that works are created in relation to 
history and tradition and that authors draw heavily from the work of 
other authors. As Livingston aptly summarizes it, “the revolution is in 
actual practice more terminological than conceptual” (Livingston 1993, 
93). In the end, it is obvious that Barthes’ essay contains multiple refer-
ences to authors, filiations, periods, etc.
To have an intelligible discourse at all, it is altogether impossible to 
entirely dispose of indexation, creation context and some assumptions 
about agency, all of which are associated with works and not with Bar-
thesian texts. The pre-Barthesian static work of art that manifests the 
genius of the individual is surely an illusion, but so is the radical textu-
alist position that Barthes might have encouraged. Still, it goes with-
out saying that both Barthes and other literary theorists have produced 
analyses of art of considerable insight while placing themselves in the 
textualist tradition.
Barthes’ textualism, along with his death-of-the-author thesis, are 
clearly related to his broader semiologist outlook which proposes to 
study cultural artifacts as arbitrary sign systems organized according to 
the principle of the binary opposition of meaning, forming a structure 
which is not immediately perceptible and largely autonomous in respect 
to the intentions of the individual agents operating within it. Needless to 
say, applying this approach to the study of the sign systems of wrestling, 
cooking, fashion and many other cultural phenomena has proven suc-
cessful, illuminating the workings of a larger structure hidden beyond 
the seemingly individual decisions and actions. What is objectionable 
in Barthes’ approach is his insistent claim that sign systems remain al-
ways entirely arbitrary and can never have any relation to, say, natural 
human predispositions. Indeed, any talk of “human nature” is rejected 
by structuralist discourse, as it tends to reduce all cultural phenomena 
to arbitrary cultural constructs. This produces a rather strong stance 
which I believe requires reconsideration in light of the progress made by 
cognitive linguistics (and consequently, other cognitive sciences) which 
stresses the embodied character of language and cognition in general.
As I argued in Chapter 1, following Olsen, applying Barthes’ semi-
ology to literary studies is, however, more difficult than applying it to 
the study of, say, popular culture or myth, as the latter phenomena are 
abundant in easily perceptible repeatable patterns and schemas and tan-
gible interactions between parties within the sign system. But, as I sug-
gested in my discussion of Olsen, there can be no such simple code for 
art, no universal grammar that would successfully encompass all litera-
ture and explain why certain works are valued more than others. Thus, 
to posit the existence of such a structure and to identify its minimal units 
in a given work is often doomed to produce purely arbitrary results. As it 
seems regarding his quarrel with Raymond Picard, Barthes himself was 
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not entirely immune to this ailment, producing a similar type of analysis 
in his famous treatment of the works of Pierre Racine.
To summarize the well-known facts, Racine remains one of the central 
figures of French literary canon and is celebrated by more traditional liter-
ary scholars, such as Picard, for his mastery of the conventions of the neo-
classical drama, observing the rules of the unity of time and space, and 
writing his works in prose and later transcribing them into Alexandrine 
twelve syllable rhyming couplets. All of that, along with the common 
view that Racine’s tragedies touch upon the topics of universal human 
concern, such as love and jealousy and are influenced by his austere Jan-
senist theology are completely irrelevant for Barthes. To uncover the real 
meaning of his works, that is, its unconscious structure, he proposes to 
see them as expressions of conflicts related to the murder of the father 
in the Freudian primal horde, summarizing the main crux of Racinian 
tragedy in the following way, “the catastrophic alternative of the Racin-
ian theatre; either the son kills the Father, or the Father destroys the son: 
in Racine, infanticides are as numerous as parricides” (Greenberg 2010, 
262). Although Barthes considers his outlook to be semiological, as in 
his famous formula describing the fundamental type of relationship in 
Racine, “A has all power over B. A loves B, who does not love A” (one 
might wonder, though, whether there is anything particularly semiotic 
in the above formula) (quoted in: Davies 2004, 13), his analysis seems to 
be largely psychoanalytic and anthropological. It might indicate that in 
this case semiotics makes, again, more of a terminological rather than a 
conceptual difference or that it just indicates a very broad attitude with 
little bearing on particular literary analyses.
One important point that Barthes makes is that we cannot say that 
Racine’s works are really consciously designed, as he was only able to jot 
down the images hidden deep in the human unconscious. Obviously, one 
may point out that even if the putative Oedipal conflicts in the uncon-
scious were really the material, the fabric for Racine’s work, it cannot in 
any sense explain why this particular rendition of them remains valued 
higher than others. Neither can it invalidate the whole conscious artistic 
design of the form and content of his works or answer why this partic-
ular theory is the best to explain Racine. Perhaps a staunch defender 
of structuralist Marxism could argue that Racine’s work expresses the 
beliefs of a privileged social class and that is why it is valued highly 
(though, in fact, Jansenists were always in a position of an oppressed 
group). Of course, it remains to be demonstrated how Jansenism in-
forms the beliefs of contemporary privileged classes, as Racine is still 
considered an esteemed writer, or how the circulation of his works was 
correlated with, say, the development of capitalism, etc., though I doubt 
one can convincingly demonstrate any of the above.
On the other hand, Barthes’ work on Racine continues to be discussed 
by very diverse Racine scholars that acknowledge its merits (Greenberg 
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2010; Hogan 2013). I do not feel to be in a position to assess the value 
of Barthes’ essays in relation to the history of Racinian criticism, but 
it goes without saying that psychoanalytic-anthropological analysis of 
cultural artifacts itself constitutes a well-established practice which is 
able to produce informative results. This does not mean, however, that 
it cannot fall victim to misuse. I have already mentioned one problem 
regarding Barthes’ analysis and that is his attempt at rather crude re-
ductionism of aesthetic creation and appreciation to the language of 
psychoanalysis. This is reflected in his own comment on Racine where 
he states that
it is that about which there is nothing to say and about which there 
is the most to say. It is then, definitively, his very transparency which 
makes Racine a commonplace in our literature, a sort of degree zero 
of the critical object, an empty place, but one which is eternally of-
fered up to meaning.
(quoted in Davies 2004, 15)
The above might indicate that Barthes follows the stronger interpretation 
of the textualist thesis where it is literally claimed not only that aesthetic 
considerations are irrelevant, but also that the text itself is completely 
blank unless filled in with a given Theory. I find it hard to imagine, nev-
ertheless, how Barthes’ analysis could have proceeded without assump-
tions concerning indexicality and agency, without positing symbolic 
and metaphorical dimension to Racine’s plays, without establishing the 
relation between form and content, without identifying meaningful seg-
ments within the text, without some form of discrimination and evalu-
ation regarding meaning of a given segment, and finally, without trying 
to elucidate a theme that unifies Racine’s works, all of which are signs of 
understanding and interpreting a text on an aesthetic level.
Another problem with Barthes’ analysis seems, unfortunately, again 
related to the stronger interpretation of textualism and brings into mind 
his remarks about the metonymic and associative nature of textualist 
research. This is visible in Picard’s attack on Barthes where the latter is 
accused of rather careless language use, obscurity and unwillingness to 
provide any definitions for the concepts he applies (Davies 2004, 10). 
Specifically, Picard pinpoints Barthes’ pointless abuse of language:
no one has the right to see an evocation of water in the formula to 
return to port, nor a precise allusion to respiratory mechanisms in 
the expression to breathe at your feet… no one has the right to say 
either that Titus… is acting and making theatre… because he says to 
Paulin: ‘I propose a more noble theatre’: the term theatre has noth-
ing to do here with the idea of a dramatic representation.
(Davies 2004, 16–17)
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I can only concur here with both Picard and Livingston who empha-
size that apart from having purely humoristic or transgressive dimen-
sion, such associative juxtapositions where any textual, or linguistic, 
unit is somehow related to any other textual/linguistic unit are quite 
unilluminating.
Interestingly enough, several scholars looked at Racine’s works from 
a psychoanalytical or Marxist perspective before Barthes, most notably 
Charles Mauron (1957) and Lucien Goldmann (1964). The latter’s work 
is of particular interest here, as I consider it to be superior to Barthes’ 
when it comes to the declared methodology and the account of the rela-
tion of aesthetics to, what we might call today, literary theory-motivated 
research that Goldmann offers. As a Marxist scholar, Goldmann studies 
the underlying material conditions of the seventeenth-century France, 
which he thought shaped the Jansenist tragic vision of the world that 
was verbalized by Pascal and Racine, claiming that Jansenism had a 
particular appeal to a social class of legal nobility who saw their socio-
political position reduced and felt powerless in their relationship with 
the king, in a manner quite analogous to the Jansenist powerlessness of 
individuals in their relationship to God (Cohen 1994, 3–11).
Contrary to Barthes, Goldman’s subtle, interdisciplinary analysis does 
not declare aesthetics non-existent or irrelevant. He openly claims that 
his theory of the world vision which he develops in relation to Jansenist 
theology, “obviously cannot replace either textual analysis, general aes-
thetic appreciation or historical research” (Goldmann 1964, 313). He 
adds that sociological analysis of literary texts goes along aesthetic, 
textual and other considerations (Goldmann 1964, 313). Goldman en-
visions the ways in which his sociological analysis2 can contribute to 
aesthetic appreciation of art by means of a detailed analysis of:
the different world visions that prevailed at a particular time, throw 
light upon both the content and the meaning of the literary works 
that were then being written. The task of what one might call a 
“sociological aesthetic” would then be to bring out the relationship 
between one of the world visions and the universe of characters and 
things created in a particular work.
(Goldmann 1964, 313)
In contrast, aesthetic analysis focuses on the relationship between the 
constructed universe and the specific artistic devices that the writer uses 
(Goldmann 1964, 316). Although Goldmann’s sketch of these levels of 
analysis and their relation is rather concise, he insists that both types 
of analysis are complementary and, more importantly, he sees them as 
levels of explanation within the larger, overarching general aesthetic 
analysis (Goldmann 1964, 316). I consider Goldmann’s vision of an 
informed, literary-theoretical analysis where rejection of aesthetics is 
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neither desirable, nor possible, as essentially correct and in tune with 
my own considerations on this topic. I will return to this issue later on 
throughout the chapter.
Barthes’ semiology can, though, clearly have another application in 
literary studies, albeit slightly less grandiose than the one he envisioned 
for himself when studying Racine. In other words, it is possible to use 
Barthes’ semiology in literary studies without necessarily producing arbi-
trary results that tend to ignore the aesthetic character of literature, e.g., 
the relation between form and content or historical context, while re-
taining some of the ideological motivations that often inform his works. 
One approach to semiology which might help us to illuminate literary 
works without ignoring their aesthetic nature can be to analyze the un-
derlying sign systems within a fictional narrative, provided that a given 
work actually rewards such an approach, that is, one cannot on principle 
claim that every work will yield non-arbitrary and interesting results 
from using this method. One neat illustration of applying semiotics in a 
way that illuminates the broader meaning of a work or an oeuvre might 
be an analysis of the alimentary practices in Eudora Welty’s fiction. The 
hallmark of Welty’s work is the portrayal of the communities of women 
in the antebellum Mississippi whose identity is largely constituted by the 
practices surrounding preparation and consumption of food. What un-
derlies the food-related norms, conventions and traditions is a semiotic 
system based on identity oppositions, rules of exclusions and rituals not 
unlike the one proposed by Barthes. If we accept that what is central to 
Welty’s stories is the description of the dynamics concerning the consti-
tution of one’s identity and excluding otherness inside the community 
in terms largely dependent on the alimentary sign system, then conse-
quently, a detailed exposition of its workings definitely elucidates the 
aesthetically significant theme of Welty’s fiction.
The alleged paradox of textualist literary theory being able to produce 
valuable analyses of literature and other phenomena might be resolved 
by indicating that most contemporary literary theories do not necessarily 
mean the text literally as a self-referential and infinitely deferred set of sig-
nifiers, but rather make use of the notion of the cultural text, or the cul-
tural product, which may be said to cover all the meaningful artifacts of 
culture. Such approach does neither entirely reject assumptions of agency 
or establishing contexts of creation, nor does it favor unconstrained indi-
vidual interpretations of cultural artifacts, as only those readings that fall 
into some of the methodologies considered germane to cultural studies 
are accepted. Needless to say, it is prerequisite that Marxist, feminist or 
post-colonial theories acknowledge individual cultural texts as placed in 
proper contexts and associated with specific agencies. All of that might 
suggest that Peter Lamarque is entirely wrong in his claim that literary 
theories reject studying art as art, that is, that they reject aesthetics. But 
the suggestion surely requires further elucidation.
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For one thing, if the primary function of consuming literary works is 
to induce aesthetic pleasure in an informed audience, then literary theo-
ries surely reject aesthetics, as their preoccupation is not just consump-
tion but studying art in specific frameworks. Literary theorists do not 
just read for pleasure or do not ponder upon the nature of such pleasure, 
but study the cultural role of literature with appropriate methodologies. 
Nor is literary theory equivalent to analytic aesthetics as the latter’s sole 
aim is to investigate the conditions under which art-related concepts are 
used. But it is still something altogether different to claim that literary 
theories promote an entirely value-free approach to the study of cultural 
artifacts. It is in the nature of cultural studies to be equally interested in 
the products of sophisticated art as in the popular culture or everyday 
practices, but, as it was suggested in the above discussion of Barthes’ 
textuality, to treat culture as a uniform, undifferentiated text, a dough 
out of which the scholar cookie-cuts whatever she wants is an illusion. 
Identifying contexts, agency and distinguishing between artifacts is a 
necessary condition for establishing an intelligible discourse. Thus, to 
study literature as a cultural text is to study the work of art in a given 
network of cultural practices. This implies that although literary theory 
and aesthetics remain distinct, literary theory does, more or less tac-
itly, make use of some aesthetic categories. Aesthetics lies at Theory’s 
foundations and some of the procedures involved in theoretically driven 
research rely heavily on the former. Yet, there is a point in which Theory 
and aesthetics diverge and the former moves beyond the narrow under-
standing of literature into the study of culture.
If the relation between Theory and aesthetics is more complex than 
that of just being entirely separate, then Lamarque’s simple assertion 
that theories are unrelated to aesthetics is wrong. To demonstrate how 
aesthetics informs the theoretically driven research both on the general 
level of outlining aims and methods of such a study, and on a particular 
level of understanding and interpreting individual artifacts, I will refer 
to what I find a representative description of the aims and methods of the 
study of cultural texts, as reflected in Richard Hoggart’s “Literature and 
Society,” and later juxtapose it with Olsen’s outline of the conventions 
of aesthetic reading mentioned in Chapter 1. Richard Hoggart is one of 
the earliest advocates of cultural studies who has emphasized the need 
for literary studies to move beyond the narrow area of classics or high-
brow art and embrace popular culture as a legitimate field of academic 
inquiry. Although at times criticized precisely for accepting the notion of 
value as crucial to cultural studies (Owen 2008), his position today as a 
founding figure of Marxist-inspired British cultural studies (along with 
Raymond Williams and Stuart Hall) is uncontested.
In his essay concerning the relation of literary studies to the study of 
culture Hoggart makes two central assertions. One is that it is not possi-
ble to fully understand the functioning of society “without appreciating 
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good literature” (Hoggart 1966, 225), the other is that the type of anal-
ysis specific for literary criticism can be used to help understand many 
other cultural artifacts which do not belong to the established canon of 
high art.
The first assertion acknowledges the aesthetic function of art as some-
thing essentially different from mere historical documents or statistical 
data which is of interest to social scientists. Instead, good literature, 
according to Hoggart, can be a source of a separate, intuitive or poetic 
knowledge which enables us to re-experience or recreate the actualities 
of life in say, different societies, social groups or epochs, and to study 
minds, attitudes and behaviors of individuals belonging to given societ-
ies. Good literature can depict the social dynamics in a unique way, as 
it recreates the experience of life as a whole, “of the life of emotions, the 
life of the mind, the individual life and the object-laden world” (Hoggart 
1966, 226). Good literature portrays the immediacy and complexity of 
life and the “sense of a texture of life as it is lived” (Hoggart 1966, 
233). Although Hoggart’s remarks clearly do not exhaust the definition 
of good literature, they do hint at his acknowledgment of, say, literary 
canon and its value for the type of research carried out in cultural stud-
ies. So, it would not be, I believe, far-fetched to extend Hoggart’s thesis 
and claim the position of the canonical, of the good art in cultural stud-
ies should be retained because in some respects it might serve as a richer 
study material without which the understanding of social life would be 
incomplete.
The other assertion is that the methods of literary criticism are ap-
plicable to cultural studies. It is important to emphasize here that lit-
erary criticism is predominantly interested in the aesthetic analysis of 
a work, that is, in formulating judgments about its value, its merits or 
flaws, its originality (in relation to literary tradition), evaluating the rela-
tion between form and content and so on. For Hoggart, transposing the 
methods of literary criticism to the study of popular culture is twofold. 
First, it can provide a detailed analysis of the rhetoric and the form of 
a cultural text, that is, the qualities of its style, the tone, the manner 
of addressing the audience. Second, it can help us to understand larger 
meanings, “to make content-analysis more subtle” (Hoggart 1966, 242), 
to identify the structures that tend to re-appear and repeat themselves 
in various cultural texts, “myth, archetype, pattern, theme” (Hoggart 
1966, 240). Only literary criticism can help us draw attention to “in-
dividual words and images, to syntax, to stress, to the movement of 
each passage” (Hoggart 1966, 243), and consequently lead us to form 
some assumptions about authors, audiences, art and social class, etc. By 
accepting the autonomous character of art and the importance of iden-
tifying the intrinsic qualities of a work, Hoggart concludes that the aes-
thetic literary criticism is “an essential adjunct” (Hoggart 1966, 242) to 
social scientific analysis of popular culture, and thus, to cultural studies 
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as a whole, and, as we might add, to most contemporary literary theory 
motivated research.
Accepting Hoggart’s assertions makes it, however, even more prob-
lematic to agree with analytic philosophers in their claim about literary 
theory’s rejection of aesthetics. To elaborate on the problem, let us turn 
again to the outline of the literary institutions presented by Olsen and 
Lamarque which I discussed in Chapter 1. I suggest that both the aes-
thetic analysis, or the reading of a competent reader, and the analysis 
motivated by a given literary theory proceed along the same rules up to 
a point where those interested in experiencing the aesthetic pleasure or 
evaluating the artistic qualities end their treatment of the work and the 
literary theorist proceeds further. This is a view which both Olsen and 
Lamarque are apparently opposed to, but I will try to demonstrate its 
validity using their own discussions.
According to the proponents of the institutional definition of litera-
ture, there is no intrinsic difference between an ordinary and a literary 
use of language. Classifying an utterance as literary or non-literary is a 
matter of decision regarding the utterance’s purpose and the expecta-
tions it might reward when specific procedures are applied to it. But if 
understanding and interpreting an utterance will always already “rest 
on evaluative factors” (Lamarque 2009, 145) that is, the decision con-
cerning the meaning of a given passage will be intertwined with ascrib-
ing it an artistic significance within the whole work, then how can the 
allegedly value-free textualist interpret a work at all? One might, surely, 
liken it to some mechanical cookie-cutter procedure where a literary 
theory is arbitrarily superimposed on a purely linguistic tissue, but it 
might occur to be either caricature, as it perhaps is in Barthes’ treatment 
of Racine, or blatantly impossible, as Livingston’s discussion of textu-
ality suggests. If, however, literary theorists, as I tried to show, do not 
necessarily treat literary texts in a way which might sound like a radical 
understanding of textuality, then evaluative judgments must also inform 
their construals of meaning.
One of Olsen’s examples illustrating the role of expectations is that of 
the fog in Dickens’ Bleak House. If, as Olsen claims, we were to assume 
that Dickens was writing a historical book on the weather in some parts 
of England, our perception of the descriptions of fog would be different 
than if we assumed it was a novel. In the latter case, if a competent 
reader or a literary critic wants to approach the text aesthetically she 
attempts to link the fog to other thematic and structural aspects of the 
whole text and to look for its possible symbolic meaning (Olsen 1978, 
46). But why would such a procedure be alien to the work of a literary 
theorist? Surely, Dickens’ works tend to invite the type of socially ori-
ented literary theories, e.g., the Marxist ones. But in order to proceed 
into a detailed, Marxist-oriented analysis, one has to first construe the 
proper, artistic meaning of the text, including its themes and symbols, 
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otherwise there would be nothing in particular to study. When Terry 
 Eagleton writes that “the figure of the oppressed child [in Dickens’ 
works] is the most powerful indictment one can imagine of society’s 
heartlessness”  (Eagleton 2012) he is clearly demonstrating a proper, 
aesthetic knowledge of the themes and symbols that permeate Dickens’ 
oeuvre; he knows what is artistically important in the work. Only after, 
implicitly, as it often happens, interpreting the work in its aesthetic sense 
is Eagleton able to carry on with his Marxist theory motivations and put 
the work in a broader framework, claiming for instance that “Dickens 
is famous for denouncing the evils of industrial capitalism, but his the-
atrical, flamboyant prose also reflects the energy of a middle class that is 
still riding high” (Eagleton 2012).
In another passage, Olsen compares two critical commentaries on 
Dora’s death in David Copperfield. One of the cited critics sees her 
death as serving no artistic purpose in the work and, thus, as a flaw 
in the novel. Another critic, however, notices that Dora’s death was a 
result of an ill-fated pregnancy and “an illustration of her failure to 
comply with the requirements imposed upon her by the adult world,” 
(Olsen 1978, 147) interpreting it as a part of a broader theme of the 
story that seems to successfully account for the deaths and miseries of 
other characters. For Olsen, the latter interpretation is better as it is 
able to persuasively and intelligibly account for the function of more 
segments in the work and resonates well with the posited theme of 
the whole work. But what is most important here is the tacit indica-
tion that value judgments are bound up with meaning construal and 
interpretation. The latter interpretation might perhaps invite another 
Marxist commentary in the long run, but it has to be compatible with 
the basic aesthetic interpretation so as not to produce arbitrary results. 
The former interpretation of Dora’s death is given no aesthetic func-
tion and deemed a random, irrelevant event and consequently it cannot 
serve as a basis for an in-depth theory-motivated analysis. Without 
aesthetics, the type of research carried out by literary theories is not 
possible.
Similarly, Lamarque is entirely correct to assume that there is a dif-
ference between purely textual meaning and work meaning, but he is 
mistaken in his claim that the literary theorist’s use of the word “text” is 
on principle equivalent to his own. He illustrates the text meaning/work 
meaning distinction quoting, after Monroe Beardsley, the famous lines 
from Mark Akenside’s poem written in 1744:
Yet by immense benignity inclin’d
To spread around him that primæval joy
Which fill’d himself, he rais’d his plastic arm
(quoted in Lamarque 2009, 153)
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Contemporary textual meaning of the passage might suggest that the 
word “plastic” refers to a synthetic material, while if we remain in the 
sphere of the work and acknowledge the historical context of the poem’s 
creation, then “plastic” will be equivalent to “strong.” But again, the 
extent to which Lamarque’s textual meaning is representative of how 
the notion of the text is used in literary theory is unclear. Surely, to 
read “plastic” in the twenty-first century meaning of the word might 
be symptomatic of the work of some deconstructive or broadly post- 
structuralist critics, but it is hardly a defining feature of the “cultural 
text” approach I outlined above, as it is doubtful that such “analysis” 
can be productive in any sense.
Surprisingly, and somewhat contrary to his claims about anti-aesthetic 
nature of literary theories, Lamarque discusses three distinct interpreta-
tions of Macbeth, King Lear and Othello, calling one of them “tradi-
tional humanistic” (Lamarque 2009, 150), and the others “materialist 
reading, and feminist criticism” (Lamarque 2009, 150). Lamarque ac-
knowledges all of them as legitimate aesthetic analyses that “have much 
in common” (Lamarque 2009, 150) including identifying general themes 
of the works, formulating interpretive statements supported by cited 
passages and making an overall attempt to “generalize across the work 
as a whole, to draw together aspects of the work under broad unifying 
concepts” (Lamarque 2009, 150). The paradox is that by acknowledg-
ing the aesthetic dimension of feminist or materialist readings, which 
are normally associated with the research typical of literary theories, 
 Lamarque undermines his own insistence that such forms of criticism 
reject aesthetics. Again, this foregrounds the problem of Theory and 
practice to which I alluded in the previous chapter.
When one looks at post-structuralism’s seminal texts, it is not hard 
to get the impression that they urge a radical break from the estab-
lished practices of attending to literary works. But when one looks at 
theorists’ publications that are supposed to explain their practice in a 
non-extravagant way, as in guides and introductions to Theory, things 
get trickier. Take Jonathan Culler’s Literary Theory: A Very Short In-
troduction (Culler 2000). Not only does Culler insist that literature has 
a natural aesthetic function (Culler 2000, 32–33) and that proper ex-
perience of literature involves both the effects of properties of language 
and of special attention to a work (thus opposing both formalist and 
 reader-oriented reductionism) (Culler 2000, 55), but he also acknowl-
edges the importance of rhetorical figures, genre conventions and canon 
for understanding literature. He concludes that literature “is a speech act 
or textual event that elicits certain kinds of attention” (Culler 2000, 24). 
When it comes to the role of contexts and institutions, he says “[m]ost 
of the time what leads readers to treat something as literature is that 
they find it in a context that identifies it as literature” (Culler 2000, 24). 
There is clearly a textualist flavor to what Culler claims, but overall 
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there seems to be a lot of space here for constructive exchange between, 
at least some, literary theorists and philosophers of literature.
A similar case is Lois Tyson’s Critical Theory Today: A User Friendly 
Guide. Instead of voicing bombastic claims about textualism or authors, 
Tyson actually claims acquaintance with literary theory “increases (…) 
appreciation of literature” (Tyson 2006, 4). In what follows, apart from 
outlining the theories themselves, she offers readings of Great Gatsby 
through the lens of each Theory. Her psychoanalytic reading empha-
sizes the fear of intimacy and unconscious repetition of harmful patterns 
of behavior among the novel’s characters; her Marxist illustrations ex-
amines commodification in Gatsby’s world; her feminist analysis pre-
dictably explores women’s place in relation to ideology, violence and 
patriarchy; post-colonial reading highlights the construction of other-
ness within the story and so on. There is no need to quote the exam-
ples at length, as it is fairly clear that Tyson’s readings rest on proper 
recognition of the literary work in question as a literary work with full 
understanding of its art-historical context, the themes, plot and char-
acters it develops, etc. In other words, Tyson’s Theory-fueled readings 
are higher-level detailed explorations of particular aspects of the novel 
which rest on a lower-level recognition of the novel’s aesthetic dimension 
and its recognition as a work of art.
To sum up what I have been arguing in this section, there are at least 
two broad ways of assessing the status of the foundational texts of 
post-structuralism, that is, the foundational texts of contemporary liter-
ary theories. One way, which I shall call the strictly analytic method, is 
to treat those texts as putting forward very specific propositions which 
are then supported by rigorous and clear argumentation. What this ap-
proach proves (as in Livingston’s example above or in Lamarque’s ex-
ample which I am discussing in the next section) is that the very idiom 
of post-structuralist writing necessitates that at least a few hypotheses 
about the content of the posited proposition be made. Simply speaking, 
the peculiarity of much of the French Theory’s style of writing does not 
easily submit to the dry language of analytic philosophers. Such analysis 
clearly demonstrates that, say, Barthes’ arguments rely on sweeping gen-
eralization and remain unclear on some crucial issues, suggesting that 
most of the postulated propositions are themselves severely flawed and 
do not stand up to close scrutiny.
The other way is to emphasize how these texts have actually been 
appropriated by literary scholars and what type of studies they inspired. 
This perspective is clearly more charitable and some of the examples I 
cited throughout the chapter suggest that the textuality thesis, or the 
death-of-the-author thesis, should be treated metaphorically. If what lit-
erary theories suggest, then, is that authors have no final word on the 
meaning and value of their creations, as both are determined institution-
ally by competent readers and scholars, and that what they communicate 
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is always established with reference to other works, or that inasmuch 
as by creating a work they express their individual intentions it is also 
the language, the culture, the social-class background, the commonly 
shared beliefs and ideologies of a society that speak through them, then 
none of the above should be hard to swallow for the analytic aestheti-
cians. In fact, most of it is what the institutional or historical definitions 
of art openly claim, which goes against the claim that literary theories 
and analytic aesthetics are incompatible. As I argued, some aesthetic 
assumptions must inform the literary-theoretical research for it to be 
intelligible and productive in the first place.
But discussions over the content of the propositions put forward by 
Barthes or, as I am going to demonstrate in what follows, by Foucault 
and Derrida, do not end with a claim that what divides literary theories 
and analytic aesthetics is just a matter of idiom. The problem runs much 
deeper. The ambiguity of the propositions one puts forward and a lack 
of clarity regarding the argument that supports it is clearly an obstacle 
when it comes to thoroughly exploring the status of the foundations, the 
aims and the methods of the discipline. The lack of a commonly held 
idiom regarding the basic concepts underlying literary studies makes 
it difficult to determine, say, whether Barthes’ “ecriture” is similar to 
 Foucault’s “author function,” or whether the “scriptor” is equivalent to 
a hypothetical, or maybe implied author or simply to an institutionally 
determined meaning of a text. And even if some of the answers were 
“yes,” then there is no point in using a variety of concepts strongly tied 
to the individual authors’ idiosyncratic style (which is somewhat ironic 
in post-structuralist context), rather than establishing a common idiom. 
The lack of a commonly shared idiom regarding the basic concepts one 
uses in literary studies is perhaps one of the reasons why debates over 
the discipline’s foundations have become rather stale. Moreover, both 
the lack of uniform conceptual standards regarding the discipline’s bases 
and the apparent disparity between the often bombastic and provocative 
claims and the actual practice of the literary research is what has drawn 
a lot of both internal and external criticism toward the discipline itself.
Surely, there was an important theoretical debate over the role of 
intentions and the discipline’s foundations inspired in the 1980s by 
the neo-pragmatists. Then, there was a famous engagement between 
Umberto Eco, Jonathan Culler and Richard Rorty in the early 1990s 
 (Collini 1992). But what was its outcome? Did these discussions in-
spire any further cooperation? Have any subsequent generations of 
scholars managed to thrive on them, to develop the propositions and 
arguments in any productive sense? I reckon that the questions remain 
open but what the aforementioned debates definitely demonstrated is 
their participants’ lack of agreement over the most basic concepts used 
in  literary studies. Perhaps this is one of the most plausible interpreta-
tions of  Lamarque’s thesis that literary theory rejects aesthetics: that 
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debates over the aesthetic foundations of the discipline, such as defining 
a literary work, distinguishing between various types of intentions, de-
termining the actual role of authorial biography in understanding and 
evaluating the work, discussing the nature of value, etc., have become 
marginalized or outright impossible.
As I have argued, there is no easy escape from the aesthetic founda-
tions of literary research and analytic aesthetics can help to clarify their 
nature and the nature of the concepts and the procedures involved in 
aesthetic interpretation and evaluation of a work. The type of research 
inspired by contemporary literary theories is what develops from the 
basic aesthetic understanding of the work when one decides to carry 
on with one’s research by placing the work, as a cultural text, in an-
other methodological framework, e.g., one accepted by cultural stud-
ies. This is what marks the transition from a literary critic to a literary 
 theory-motivated researcher. What it implies is that literary theories and 
aesthetics form a hierarchy with the former being its top element, and 
consequently, that the underlying aesthetic assumptions may somewhat 
limit the scope of a theoretical research: one cannot, on principle, say 
that applying any literary theory whatsoever over any given literary 
text will always yield interesting results. This alleged arbitrariness of 
theories is the main point of the “cookie-cutter” argument sometimes 
raised against literary theory (Graff and Di Leo 2000, 113–128). But 
if a literary theorist has to first determine the basic aesthetic meaning 
of a text, it means that some texts will more naturally encourage and 
reward applying only specific literary theories, e.g., realist novel may en-
courage some Marxist-oriented theories, Angela Carter may encourage 
feminist readings, Conan, the Barbarian might be interesting when read 
through a Darwinian lens, but there is no guarantee that any Theory 
applied to Conan will produce informative analysis of the work. Liter-
ary theories are prone to arbitrary readings or bad readings which may, 
for example, leave out large portions of the text unexplained, but this 
might be equally true of any reading whatsoever and cannot be a valid 
argument against theories in general. The conclusion is that informative 
use of literary theories in analyses is an instrumental approach that ac-
knowledges the aesthetic basis of a work, which constrains the possible 
arbitrariness of literary analysis. Literary works will simply not reward 
applying just any Theory one wishes to apply to them.
Authors, Scriptors, Intentions
When discussing the relation between works and texts, it is inevitable 
that one has to take a stance on the role of authors and their inten-
tions in the critical practice. Ignoring or marginalizing empirical au-
thors, their lives and their intentions is considered a staple of much 
of the  formalist-structuralist tradition, including also New Criticism, 
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semiotics, post-structuralism and the more recent ideological approaches 
to literature. There is, however, a substantial diversity in the approach 
to authorship within the formalist-structuralist tradition itself. Whereas 
the earlier approaches sought to eliminate the author precisely in order 
to establish the literary work as an autonomous object of study, be it 
Wimsatt’s and Beardsley’s verbal icon or Levi-Strauss’ crystal structure 
of the text, with the advent of post-structuralism, literary theory has 
both accepted the author’s irrelevance and questioned the stability and 
autonomy of the text. Such a move has, of course, stirred a lot of con-
troversy over literary theory’s status, some of which I mentioned in the 
first chapter. As with the debate over works and texts, analytic philoso-
phers of art place themselves vis-a-vis post-structuralism when it comes 
to establishing the role of authorial intentions, but as it was evident in 
the aforementioned debate, one should be suspicious of the existence 
of such dramatic binary oppositions, especially when the two opposing 
camps voice their claims in their own tradition-specific jargons which 
without detailed analysis appear largely incongruent with each other. As 
post-structuralist anti-intentionalism is a counterpart to the textualism 
outlined earlier in this chapter, it implies that many of the arguments 
used in the work-text debate will be applicable here, too. Nevertheless, I 
will attempt to focus only on what might be added or elaborated upon, 
rather than repeat what has been said.
Historically, and on a charitable reading, the biggest merit of post- 
structuralism was to plea to move beyond narrow aesthetic consider-
ations (or perhaps beyond aestheticism) in literary studies and pursue 
more politically-motivated type of research concerning literature and 
culture. But if the case was merely for promoting a given type of re-
search, it would be of little interest for philosophy of literature, as one 
might encourage whatever research one wants for whatever reasons 
one voices. What merits philosophical attention is the fact that post- 
structuralism has been promoting specific approaches to literature using 
philosophical arguments and not just issuing appeals.
As with the work-text issue, the banishment of the author seems to 
be a move necessitated by language itself, or to be more specific, by 
the Saussurean understanding of language. According to both structur-
alists and post-structuralists, if what we are presented with in a text 
is an autonomous linguistic structure which operates beyond the will 
of individual agents, then clearly authors are irrelevant for its analysis. 
Put in this way, the claim is surely counterintuitive and appears para-
doxical, especially when the most outspoken proponents of the view, 
Barthes in his “Death of the Author,” (1977a) and Foucault in “What 
is an Author” (1979) constantly refer to, say, Mallarme, the author, 
 Saussure, the author or Balzac, the author. This of course indicates that 
identifying a certain amount of historical context and even researching 
some relevant biographical information is, in the end, indispensable in 
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literary studies, but it would be naïve to think this is a simple fact that 
invalidates  Foucault’s and Barthes’ works and that they overlooked it. 
 Barthes’ and Foucalt’s discussions are, of course, subtler, granted that 
one is determined to plough through the demanding and at times ob-
scure jargon they both use. A valuable example of post-structuralist 
thought being reformulated in analytic parlance and then critically dis-
cussed is the meticulous analysis of Barthes and Foucault in Lamarque’s 
“Death of the Author: an Analytical Autopsy” (1990). Lamarque’s essay 
is an excellent example of how analytic aesthetics sees its own relation to 
literary theories. At the same time, it accurately points out the strengths 
and weaknesses of post-structuralism’s cornerstone essays, implicitly 
suggesting that literary theory occasionally has a tendency to operate on 
many discursive levels at the same time, exploring philosophy of liter-
ature, descriptions, prescriptions, politics and positing specific reading 
strategies in a way which may occur to be unclear or confusing.
In his discussion, Lamarque extracts from Barthes and Foucault 
what he finds to be their most prominent claims and juxtaposes them 
together to put forward four general theses that he suggests make up 
their argument: the historicist thesis, the death thesis, the author func-
tion thesis and ecriture thesis. For each thesis Lamarque elaborates a 
couple of plausible interpretations which he then carefully discusses. 
The historicist thesis refers to the claim that authors are modern 
 figures, products of contemporary society. Lamarque notes that there 
are at least three plausible interpretations of the thesis. The first would 
roughly imply that a certain conception of author, in the social sense 
of having a “legal and social status” (Lamarque 1990, 320) is modern 
and is inevitably connected with the development of bourgeouis soci-
ety in the Western world. As such, it is a historical claim which may 
or may not “stand up to close scrutiny” (Lamarque 1990, 320) and 
which by making a sweeping generalization, remains silent over the 
social status of authors in different cultures and different times. One 
useful distinction it introduces is the recognition that not everything 
written is authored, e.g., there is hardly any need to call one’s scribbling 
on paper authored, but otherwise this interpretation has in itself little 
philosophical implication.
Another interpretation of the historicist thesis implies that a certain 
concept of criticism is a modern creation; namely, the author-focused 
criticism that allegedly came to power only after the formation of bour-
geois society. Surely, literary critics’ interest in authors’ personal lives 
and their individual genius varied from epoch to epoch, but as with 
the previous interpretation, this does not necessarily lead to interesting 
philosophical implications. Contemporary literary criticism is definitely 
beyond biographical analysis. Moreover, one can easily imagine purely 
formalist criticism existing even when authors do have certain legal 
rights over texts.
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The most interesting and the most problematic interpretation of the 
historicist thesis is that the modern invention of authorship was followed 
by a radical alteration of critical practice. This formulation of the thesis 
moves from the personal understanding of authorship to claim that a 
change in how texts were understood took place. Texts were no longer 
anonymous, but authored, which means that they were ascribed deter-
minate meaning, unity, value, purpose, etc. By being tied to authors, they 
became constrained and limited (Lamarque 1990, 320). This is perhaps 
again a sweeping generalization, debatable, to say the least. If texts ac-
quired unity, meaning and value at a given time, is it then really datable 
historically? When was the time that they did not possess these features? 
What is important is that both Foucault and Barthes seem to be leaning 
toward this interpretation of the historicist thesis, judging by how they 
develop their argument into what Lamarque calls the death thesis.
The interpretations of death thesis mirror those of the historicist the-
sis. Thus, the first one implies that the social role of authors either is or 
should be rejected, but yet again, it would be an ethical, political issue 
independent of philosophical arguments about literature. The second in-
terpretation holds that it is the author-based criticism that either is or 
should be rejected. But if this is read as a voice against crude biographical 
criticism, then there is nothing revolutionary about it since it is nowadays 
commonly accepted that works of fiction should not be read through au-
thors’ biographies. The most daring interpretation of the death thesis is 
obviously the one related to the historicist understanding of the authored 
text. It implies that the notion of the authored text either is or should be 
rejected. The descriptive horn of the dilemma is easily falsifiable as one 
can hardly find a type of literary criticism that would ignore value, coher-
ence, unity and at least some degree of determinacy of meaning, as they 
are bound up with the concept of literature itself. In this sense, the death 
thesis should be read prescriptively: that it is the concept of the authored 
text that should be rejected. It is important here to emphasize again that 
for Foucault the authored text is entirely impersonal, that is, meaning, 
value, unity, etc. are ascribed to texts without necessarily bearing any 
relation to actual authors. But if the authored text is a modern inven-
tion, an ideological construct superimposed on a linguistic tissue, then 
Lamarque’s straightforward assertion that Foucault’s thesis is normative 
requires further qualification. Foucault seems to be suggesting that the 
arbitrary nature of the authored text is what makes contemporary lit-
erary criticism a delusion. Attributing value, meaning and coherence to 
texts is a highly artificial procedure which selectively constraints a liter-
ary text; it is a procedure which, in Foucault’s words, represses the nat-
ural “principle of thrift in the proliferation of meaning” (Foucault 1979, 
159). To reject the authored text is to finally admit its illusory character 
and to accept that texts and languages exist as unconstrained, unstable 
structures without a single meaning or purpose.
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The stronger version of the death thesis is further supported both by 
the depersonalized understanding of texts and what Foucault calls the 
“author function.” Author function is a property of certain types of 
discourse, which, obviously implies something more about the nature 
of texts than just stating that they are produced by agents. Lamarque 
identifies a few components of the thesis that help to clarify it. The first 
of them is the basic assertion that author function is different from the 
author-as-person. As Lamarque correctly observes, this is not to be con-
strued as a notion similar to that of, say, implied author that is tied to 
an individual text and posited as yet another fictional voice within a 
narrative. The author function is something that may bind many works 
into a whole oeuvre or it can help to determine the nature of the work 
itself (Lamarque 1990, 325). An argument that, according to Foucault, 
should support the distinction into authors as persons and authors as 
function is that we tend to conceive of authors-persons as sources and 
proliferators of meaning, but we consider authored texts as highly con-
strained in this respect. But this is just an assertion behind which there is 
virtually no argument; as such, there is no reason to believe that we do 
not expect an “inexhaustible signification” (Lamarque 1990, 326) from 
a work, if we expect it from its author.
According to Lamarque, a more promising view of the thesis is to 
read it as suggesting that “having an author” is not a relational pred-
icate which tells us something about the relation between a work and 
its author, but a monadic predicate characterizing a certain work. The 
thesis would thus signal a shift from “X has Y as an author” to “X is 
Y-authored” (Lamarque 1990, 326). The importance of such a move is 
easily demonstrable when one thinks of how a predicate like “Shake-
spearean” is not really referential (as a reference to Shakespeare, the 
person), in the same sense as the predicate “by Shakespeare,” but it 
also serves classificatory functions. Contrary to the latter, the former 
predicate is non-extensional, that is, if it occurs that Shakespeare, the 
man, was really Bacon, it does not necessarily follow that the predicate 
is invalid. The observation is important but what it does indicate, as 
Lamarque correctly observes, is that the move itself is not necessary, as 
the relational predicates normally function as non-extensional, classifi-
catory and fully extensional (Lamarque 1990, 327). Foucault’s mistake 
is to assume that if authors’ names serve classificatory functions, their 
referentiality is automatically eliminated.
Nevertheless, this appears enough for Foucault to posit the ultimate 
rejection of the author function, or the authored texts and embrace the 
unconstrained textualism a la Barthes. But the fundamental problem 
with the move is that in spite of the whole of Foucault’s argument he 
still seems to be thinking about author function being really tied to the 
person of the author. This seems surprising as some of Foucault’s earlier 
observations clearly, and quite correctly, suggested that author function 
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is entirely a matter of institutional decisions. To define a work as hav-
ing certain value, meaning and coherence is a decision of the competent 
readers and critics, the artworld; a decision absolutely independent of 
any actual author’s will. As Lamarque writes, “strictly speaking, authors 
have nothing to do with it; the authored-text, so-called, at least in its 
most obvious manifestation, is a literary work, defined institutionally” 
(Lamarque 1990, 328). What is more puzzling is perhaps Foucault’s 
own insistence that literary analysis is still somewhat institutionally con-
strained despite the fact that his discussion of the author function clearly 
suggests that it is precisely the institutional constraint that has nothing 
to do with the will of individual authors or with a critical obsession with 
their lives and thoughts:
the author function will disappear, and in such a manner that fic-
tion and its polysemous texts will once again function according to 
another mode, but still with a system of constraint – one that will 
no longer be the author but will have to be determined or, perhaps, 
experienced.
(Foucault 1979, 160)
This fundamental ambiguity makes it difficult to establish what Foucault 
really proposes. A sympathetic interpretation of his argument might sug-
gest that Foucault is simply pointing out the institutional nature of lit-
erary analysis; an analysis that is not constrained by author’s will but 
by the communal decisions of the members of the artworld. If this is 
how Foucault’s and Barthes’ theses are to be understood, there is hardly 
anything revolutionary about them, especially when one compares them 
with the often pompous idiom in which the propositions themselves are 
put. A non-charitable reading will claim that what Foucault and Barthes 
are after is really the type of textualism discredited by, e.g., Livingston’s 
discussion cited above.
Regardless of the validity of the proposition itself, one has to consider 
its practical dimension. In other words, looking back at the development 
of literary studies, and in accordance with the charitable understanding 
of Barthes and Foucault, it is crucial to see how the literary institutions 
actually appropriated their theories, regardless of what, say, Barthes, 
the author might have intended. Surely, Foucault and Barthes had a 
huge influence on literary theory and terms such as “text,” “ecriture,” 
“ author-function” have become part of theories’ standard idiom, but I 
find it doubtful that behind the provocative rhetoric of textualism, one 
can always find the type of research which really bears no relation to 
agency, history or contexts and is virtually without any constraints in its 
wallowing in the infinite play of signifiers, as in the “God’s plastic arm” 
example. This might be just a symptom of literary scholars’ being more 
naturally drawn to poetic language, rather than to the dry, technical 
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argumentation of analytic philosophy. But, as I tried to show, the choice 
of perhaps excessively poetic language in philosophy of literature can 
lead to major confusions regarding the content of a given proposition. 
The lack of a clear, commonly accepted idiom regarding the fundamen-
tal questions in literary studies is an obstacle to the discipline’s develop-
ment, as its basic concepts, aims and the status of its research become 
vague.
The idiom of literary theories can sometimes run the risk of produc-
ing sweeping generalizations and false dilemmas. For instance, many 
scholars of the formalist-structuralist provenance seem to suggest that 
literary meaning can only be discussed in terms of the autonomous lin-
guistic form and in terms of intentions that must necessarily be mental 
states of the real author. As the latter is obviously inaccessible, the only 
possible path of research is that of the structure. But the dilemma itself 
is false as it does not recognize the possibility of intentions and linguistic 
conventions existing in a relation other than that of binary oppositions. 
One example of insisting on the binary opposition of certain concepts 
which results in a confusing argument is evident on Derrida’s side in 
his engagement with John Searle over speech-act theory (Derrida 1988, 
123–124).
Derrida begins his attack on Austin by claiming that the very fact 
that written communication is possible in the absence of authors must 
be due to the fact that intentions are somewhat irrelevant to it. Instead, 
he proposes that communication is possible because of iterability, the re-
peatability of linguistic elements. Clearly, repeatability, or instantiations 
of token of specific types, is prerequisite for rule-governed systems of 
representation. But, as Searle suggests, it is perhaps better to think about 
texts in terms of their permanence rather than being instantiated, “the 
same text (token) can be read by many different readers long after the 
death of the author” (Searle 1977, 200). To claim that there is always a 
discrepancy between the verbal structure and the utterer’s illocutionary 
intention is to think of intentions as lying behind the signs and animat-
ing them (Searle 1977, 202). This does not imply that intentions must 
be conscious or successful but it does imply that a sentence such as “on 
the twentieth September 1793 I set out on a journey from London to 
Oxford” (Searle 1977, 201) can only be meaningful in any sense as a 
possibility of an intentional speech act, “to understand it, it is necessary 
to know that anyone who said it and meant it would be performing that 
speech act according to the rules of the languages that give the sentence 
its meaning in the first place” (Searle 1977, 202). The sentence, thus, 
can mean absolutely anything in a given context, but its meaning is then 
still dependent, among other things, on the intentions (which might be 
successful or not) of the utterer.
Nevertheless, Derrida elaborates his argument stating that Austin’s 
speech-acts must necessarily be unstable, as it is impossible that one has 
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a total command over a given speech-act, or that one can determine the 
strict contextual borders of a context that regulates the act’s meaning. 
Consequently, all speech-acts are always already infelicitous as they are 
prone to change their meanings and elude determinacy when they be-
come iterated, cited or used in a different context. This, according to 
Derrida, goes against the grain of Austin’s contention that speech-acts 
can be serious or parasitic (as in fiction, lying, jokes, etc.), when they are 
not meant as actual speech-acts. If, then, what characterizes language is 
its iterability and citationality, then its inherent feature must be parasit-
ism. Austin’s distinction then must collapse.
On a sympathetic reading, one might interpret Derrida’s words as an 
indication that parasitisim and fictionality are natural phenomena in a 
language and that speech-acts can be successful only when they refer to 
a conventional code. But this can in no way overturn the role of inten-
tions in written communication. On a non-charitable reading, however, 
Derrida can be said to have committed a fundamental logical mistake, 
in the sense that fiction can be said to be a parasite of non- fiction in 
the same sense as rational numbers parasite on natural numbers (Searle 
1977, 205–206). The former is simply defined in terms of the latter. It 
is a logical relation and not an ethical judgments, and hardly anything 
follows from it. The non-charitable understanding is however reinforced 
in Derrida’s further reply to Searle where he explicitly states that Sear-
le’s and Austin’s distinctions cannot hold in any sense, as if there are 
no absolutely rigorous distinctions between concepts (say, fiction and 
non-fiction), then there really is no distinction whatsoever, and the 
whole business of elaborating on them is pointless:
what philosopher ever since there were philosophers, what logician 
ever since there were logicians, what theoretician ever renounced 
this axiom: in the order of concepts (for we are speaking of concepts 
and not of the colors of clouds or the taste of certain chewing gums), 
when a distinction cannot be rigorous or precise, it is not a distinc-
tion at all. If Searle declares explicitly, seriously, literally that this 
axiom must be renounced, that he renounces it (and I will wait for 
him to do it, a phrase in a newspaper is not enough), then, short of 
practicing deconstruction with some consistency and of submitting 
the very rules and regulations of his project to an explicit reworking, 
his entire philosophical discourse on speech acts will collapse even 
more rapidly.
(Derrida 1988, 123–124)
Derrida’s claims are rather puzzling and seem to contradict the entire 
Wittgensteinian intuition that the lack of precise, definite borders be-
tween concepts is in fact of little philosophical importance. The insis-
tence that distinctions must necessarily be rigorous in some absolute, 
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universal sense makes Derrida closer to traditional metaphysicians 
rather than to contemporary analytic philosophy.
The above applies to deconstruction in the broader sense of philosoph-
ical movement, or just to the assumption deconstructionists make, but 
deconstruction as a method of reading texts might, similarly, be closer 
to strict structuralist approach than to the ideological or “cultural text” 
approaches in literary studies I mentioned earlier. In fact, deconstruc-
tion does not seem to be a radical break with structuralism (Olsen 1987, 
206), as it also acknowledges that meaning is constituted according to 
the principle of binary oppositions and that language is totally auton-
omous from speakers and their intentions. The difference is that at the 
same time, deconstruction accepts that such definition of language must 
lead to positing meaning as always arbitrary and uncontrollable, but 
does not see it as a flaw of the theory. The aim of deconstructive readings 
is, then, to point out the internal inconsistencies and demonstrate how 
the underlying binary oppositions collapse into each other. It is obviously 
possible to apply this method to the study of various cultural texts where 
one assumes that they are all underwritten by internally inconsistent 
conceptual hierarchies and one ventures to demonstrate the fact. I do not 
wish to deny that such an approach might produce valuable results, but 
as with structuralism, it is at a significant risk of producing results that 
are purely arbitrary, demonstrating nothing more than an endless repe-
tition of deconstructionist assumptions. This is apparent, as Knapp and 
Michaels observed (Knapp and Michaels 1982, 733–734), in de Man’s 
analysis of Rousseau’s Confessions. Rousseau mentions that while work-
ing as a servant he stole a ribbon from his employers and when asked 
whether he knew the identity of the thief he said “Marion,” the name of 
his fellow servant. Rousseau insists he was not accusing her, just mak-
ing a random noise that came into his head. According to de Man the 
particular significance of the passage is that it demonstrates the ultimate 
arbitrariness of language. Similarly, Derrida notes that  Rousseau uses 
the term “supplement” in reference to reading and to masturbation, as 
supplement to speech and to sex, respectively. As a result, he claims, 
writing and onanism collapse into a one concept  (Derrida 1976, 165). 
There is, of course, a possibility that “arbitrariness of language” is pos-
ited as a theme of a given literary work and then exploring it might be 
worthwhile, but to read all works as demonstrating this very fact is an 
altogether arbitrary and largely uninformative procedure.
As a digression, one might add that even if there is a risk that de-
constructive textual analysis is fraught with arbitrariness, there is an 
undeniable positive historical role that it played in the development of 
literary and cultural studies. As Eagleton correctly observes, the ulti-
mate motivations of deconstruction are political and its ultimate aim 
is to bring into light and dismantle the internal logic, the internal con-
ceptual mechanism of thought systems, political structures and social 
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institutions (Eagleton 2008, 128). There is a sense, then, in which de-
construction and post-structuralism have managed to draw attention to 
the voice of those underprivileged or oppressed in the dominant ideolog-
ical discourse of our culture and to help rethink the established views 
in humanities on what is valuable, serious or legitimate as an object of 
study. This has of course not only influenced the world of politics but 
also facilitated a change of perspective within the study of culture which 
has moved beyond the narrow aestheticism of contemplating the magnif-
icent beauty of canonical masterpieces of art or other cultural artifacts 
deemed serious and respectful, and more or less acknowledged that, say, 
Ezra Pound’s cantos might be as legitimate an object of study as TV 
series, reality shows, commercials, lifestyle magazines, female writing, 
minority writing, etc.
Getting back to the main theme of this section, many other discus-
sions of meaning and intention in literary theory tended to be unclear 
because of its idiom or due to making rather strong statements without 
adequate philosophical argumentation. In a fashion similar to Derrida, 
the neo-pragmatists Knapp and Michaels, as well as Stanley Fish, as-
serted that intentionality is not really compatible with claiming that there 
can be literal or conventional meanings in language, an observation that 
startled some philosophers of language (Wilson 1992), although, con-
trary to Derrida, the neo-pragmatist conclusion was that textual mean-
ing is necessarily identical with the author’s intention. But what we take 
to be linguistic meaning of an utterance is what we in advance consider 
to be the meaning intended by speakers of a language with significant 
regularity; it does not imply say, that every token of the type “slumber” 
must always mean “sleep.” The token may mean nothing or may mean 
something completely different depending on a context, but this does 
not mean that the type itself does not or cannot have an expected con-
ventional meaning based on the frequency of its intended use.
The false dilemma which results from insisting on a strong distinc-
tion between intentional and conventional meaning is also typical of 
Umberto Eco’s discussion of interpretation. At the heart of his theory 
of interpretation, Eco places what he calls “the intention of the work,” 
the meaning of the text itself, distinct from the intention of the author 
and from the reader’s intention, which guides the reader in construing 
its correct understanding. But, as some scholars noted (Hogan 1996, 
1–8), Eco is fundamentally unclear about what the intention of the work 
really is. Does it acquire its meaning just from linguistic conventions? 
Is it literal meaning? If the text regulates, contrains and imposes cer-
tain contexts does that not point to some extratextual reality to which 
the work is tied? After all, Eco himself judged Derrida’s interpretation 
of Peirce according to whether Peirce would have been satisfied with it 
(Eco 1990, 35). It will not suffice to say that the author, the text and the 
reader constitute a dynamic process of meaning production, for apart 
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from stating something rather obvious, such a process does not take 
into consideration the institutional framework of literature, or the type 
of competence required, and says nothing about the type of aesthetic 
meaning which is of interest to literary interpretation. To say that it is a 
textual meaning in a historical context is not enough.
On the other hand, neither strong intentionalism nor strong textual-
ism looms in the art-related discussions of meaning and intentions in an-
alytic philosophy, as to understand the former literally would be to hold 
a position similar to that of Humpty-Dumpty, and to understand the 
latter literally would be to fall into the caricature of the incomprehensi-
ble string of text. Analytic aestheticians accept that the type of meaning 
germane to literature falls somewhere between the two and that perhaps 
it is altogether clearer to use the term “authorial intentions.” Although 
almost every analytic philosopher can be identified as adhering to some 
form of intentionalism, there is no one, uniform theory of what those 
intentions really are. The proponents of hypothetical intentionalism will 
claim that attributing intentions to authors is entirely a matter of insti-
tutional decisions of the artworld and actual authors have nothing to do 
with it. As Livingston puts it:
the central thesis of which is that utterance meaning is determined 
by an intention that a member of the intended audience would be 
justified in attributing to the author on the basis of evidence that 
defines membership in the intended audience.
(Livingston 2010, 408)
Livingston enumerates other types of intentionalism: actualist, condi-
tionalist, factionalist, partial or modest, none of which is at odds with 
Institutional Theory of Art and none of which claims that a work’s mean-
ing is controlled by actual authors and their wills. All of them seem to be 
compatible with the type of research encouraged by Hoggart, Eagleton 
or other literary theorists who proceed from proper understanding and 
evaluation of literary works in their aesthetic sense to conducting more 
detailed studies in terms of the theoretical framework they choose. Hy-
pothetical intentionalism, for instance, seems to be close to some of the 
propositions put forward by Barthes, Foucault and even Eco, but it is im-
possible to make a definite judgment on this matter due to the ambiguity 
of their works discussed earlier in this chapter.
Foucault ends his essay by enumerating a list of questions that 
scholars will finally be able to ask when they manage to move beyond 
 author-based criticism (granted, of course that we are able to tell what 
he ultimately means by that):
What are the modes of existence of this discourse? Where has it been 
used, how can it circulate, and who can appropriate it for himself? 
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What are the places in it where there is room for possible subjects? 
Who can assume these various subject functions? And behind all 
these questions, we would hear hardly anything but the stirring of 
an indifference: What difference does it make who is speaking?
(Foucault 1979, 160)
Except for the last one, all of the questions seem valid and they definitely 
hint at contemporary literary theory’s preoccupation with politics, sub-
jectivity, power, subversion, etc. What I am suggesting is that literary 
theory has clearly managed to ask and answer these questions, but what 
it also proved is that it is not altogether easy to confidently claim, as the 
last question suggests, that it makes no difference who is speaking. The 
lesson from analytic aesthetics is that the issue is more complex than 
Barthes or Foucault may have been suggesting. The case is not just that 
literary theories can carry out their preferred type of research without 
entirely killing off the author, but that perhaps some presence of the au-
thor is prerequisite for the research to be really informative.
As a final point, and since I have been mostly referring to institutional 
theories of art, I would like to briefly address Foucault’s ideas on the 
workings of institutions themselves. Though he was not particularly out-
spoken concerning the institutions of the artworld, focusing on the po-
litical, penal, educational or medical ones, some important points arise 
that should be commented on.
Roughly, Foucault’s key points were that relations of power and dom-
inance are not (or not only) centralized, formed top-down and existing 
along the lines of intentions of those subjects striving to gain or retain 
their privileged position (as in traditional Marxist theories), but it’s quite 
the opposite: power is mostly decentralized, dispersed, enacted materi-
ally and discursively (rather than just wielded or enforced) and it plays 
a crucial role in establishing subjects rather than the other way around. 
Moreover, power permeates all social institutions and is entangled with 
knowledge. Where does Foucault stand, then, in relation to the insti-
tutions of the artworld? Perhaps the question about the application of 
 Foucault’s theory to the artworld could be divided into two separate 
issues. First, does the theory hold true for the artworld? If yes, then 
second, does it pose a challenge to the very existence of the artworld or 
does it call for some alteration in its actual form?
Regarding the first issue, if Foucault’s assumption about the relation 
of power and institutions is somewhere near the one concisely outlined 
above, then it is simply true according to his theory, as it merely makes 
a rather sweeping generalization about all social institutions, art appre-
ciation being no exception. On the other hand, even without making a 
strong commitment to Foucault’s theory it is certainly possible to see 
artworld this way. There is clearly a crucial power-knowledge aspect to 
an art critic or to a competent consumer of art. There is a very material 
Literature and Art 85
form of power embedded in art galleries and museums. Then, there is 
bottom-up power influence that artists have on the other two, constantly 
looking for new forms of artistic expression. There is a strongly exclu-
sionary quality to practices of evaluation and canon-formation, particu-
larly regarding the judgments of average consumers. And the whole thing 
might be seen as just perpetuating itself in Bourdieu’s fashion: requiring 
a significant degree of cultural capital (or knowledge/power) to partici-
pate in it, it does nothing apart from reproducing the distinction-laden 
cultural capital for a particular social group. Finally, participation in the 
artworld typically goes along with some formal training obtained via ed-
ucation and the latter is very obviously a disciplining agency distributing 
power. All of that is surely pervaded with art-competent power that the 
artworld holds over what is within and outside of it.
We should, however, keep in mind, Lamarque’s point that appreciation 
of literature is not an institution in the social sense but a practice and it 
is this very practice that I am particularly concerned with in my argu-
ment. One does not need to hold a particular social function (art critic, 
curator, professor of literature) in order to participate in the artworld. I 
should stress again that my choice for focusing on the institutional the-
ories of art is purely heuristic: I suppose that for a continentally shaped 
literary theorist they are the most distinguishable in their approach to 
artworks within the body of the whole of analytic aesthetics which fo-
cuses exclusively on the tangible practices (institutions) involved in at-
tending to art. Then there is a quality to any social institution or practice 
which perhaps might be called gravity. It is one thing to examine the 
fluidity and ubiquity of power relations in political, educational, medical 
or penal institutions or their whole discourses and another thing to look 
for it in the practices of appreciation of literature or, to use Lamaque’s 
example again, in the rules of a game of chess. It might be an interesting 
mental exercise but not necessarily a very rewarding one. To trace power 
relations or historical arbitrariness and discontinuities along with sets of 
fossilized micro-practices that led to the formation of these institutions 
might be a valuable and progressive Foucauldian enterprise. But it would 
not necessarily affect the practice of appreciation unless, one assumes a 
strongly historicist stance toward its existence, reducing it to random 
outcome of social power relations shaped historically. This would have 
the potential to call for subversion or alteration of the practices of appre-
ciation. I suspect, however, that such a strongly historicist thesis is false. 
Partly for the reasons outlined in this chapter and partly due to the part 
of my argument developed in Chapter 4. There is just too much affinity 
between the way we appreciate and understand art and other artifacts, 
narratives, verbal utterances and human behavior as a whole to see it all 
as wholly determined historically without any naturalist underpinnings. 
I will return to this point in Chapter 4, when discussing contingency 
of value.
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Finally, and regarding the second issue I raised, does Foucault call for 
some alteration of the practice involving appreciation of art? Foucauld-
ian genealogy of literature clearly shifts its attention from the artistic 
value of literature toward an analysis of mechanisms that historically 
led to sacralization of literature and “exposes the means by which sa-
cralized literature, literary criticism, and literary theory fortify a power/
knowledge formation that justifies hierarchy, commits violence in the 
name of morality and truth, and defuses possibilities for social change” 
(Quinby 1995, xii). Yet the project is not supposed to “kill off literature” 
(Quinby 1995, xii) and there are reasons to believe that the answer to 
the above question might be negative, though the material to support 
it is rather scant. One case which supports my view is Gary Shapiro’s 
discussion of Danto’s and Foucault’s respective approaches to Warhol’s 
art (Shapiro 2012, 199–214). For the sake of brevity I will not quote the 
essay at length, but re-phrase its main points. Both Foucault and Danto 
see Warhol as a breakthrough artist whose work signifies a dramatic 
shift in our understanding of art. There are, however, major differences 
in how both philosophers perceive his work. Danto is particularly inter-
ested in the problem of indiscernibles which Warhol explores, whereas 
for Foucault, the significance of Warhol lies in his extensive use of repeti-
tion, seriality, simulacrum and multiplicity. These differences arise from 
contrasting visions of art history. Danto sees art history in a Hegelian 
fashion where art gradually becomes philosophy, a process that ends in 
twentieth century with artists such as Warhol producing indiscernibles. 
Foucault offers a different periodization of Western culture and its dom-
inant ideas; one that is marked by discontinuities, breaks and revolution-
ary changes. On the basis of that, Shapiro speculates about Foucauldian 
art history consisting of Renaissance emphasis on resemblance and anal-
ogy, classical era foregrounding representation, modernist explorations 
of self-knowledge and, finally, postmodernism with its removal of the 
human subject.
Clearly, such overarching periodizations are problematic and often 
do not stand up to close scrutiny but I will leave this matter to art 
historians to settle. For one thing, I suppose that such categorization 
of art history cannot be rejected a priori, on principle, as it recognizes 
all major trends within Western art from the Renaissance to postmo-
dernity, albeit highlighting different aspects of them than, say, phi-
losophers of art such as Danto. It is clear that Foucault’s comments 
on Warhol do show his clear understanding of the themes the latter 
explores along with recognition of his position in art history which, 
consequently, shows that Foucault attends to Warhol with proper 
art-historical attitude.
In an interview about the nature of literature, Foucault explores the 
tenets of desacralization, trying to undermine the use of literature as an 
overarching discourse, saying:
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people wrote the history of what was said in the eighteenth 
 century, via Fontenelle, or Voltaire, or Diderot, or La Nouvelle 
 Heloise, and so forth. Or they regard these texts as the expression 
of something that, ultimately, could not be formulated at a more 
everyday level
(Foucault 1995, 4)
At another point, he admits he is not interested in studying literature in 
“its internal structures” (Foucault 1995, 6), but rather how, in a pro-
cess of “selection, sacralization, and institutional validation” (Foucault 
1995, 4) a discourse becomes literature. Looming here is, again, the rad-
ical thesis that rejects any artistic quality to literature apart from it be-
ing merely sacralized by appropriate institutions for power- reinforcing 
reasons. This might follow from Foucault’s words, but, actually, noth-
ing necessitates it. In fact, when straightforwardly asked whether the 
criteria for elevating a piece of discourse to the level of literature are 
a matter of sacralization or are internal to the texts, Foucault openly 
says “I don’t know” (Foucault 1995, 5). The genealogical project calls 
for a shift of attention from “great works, period, and genre courses” 
(Quinby 1995, xv) toward critical reading, but it is precisely a shift, 
not necessarily a denial of artistic value. It does not seek to reject art 
canon, “examining the ways that a canon of great works is deployed 
to construct a dominant regime of truth” (Quinby 1995, xv) and does 
not aim at “formulating countercanons or expanding the existing 
canon,” (Quinby 1995, xv) which displays concern for how art is used 
for non-artistic purposes, presupposing the existence of an aesthetic di-
mension to art. The focal point of Foucauldian genealogy is the social 
validation of literature which may or may not go along with its artistic 
appreciation. The project does not even address issues of philosophy 
of art/literature, but presupposes their existence. Definitely, Foucault is 
interested in what contributes to social recognition of a literary work 
and not what is involved in the actual practices of readers attending to 
a work. Any project that makes us more sensitive to latent political and 
ideological content of art is valuable in itself, but it does not necessarily 
deny the existence of aesthetic level. To restate my general thesis here, it 
aims at a different level of analysis which at times makes use of literary 
texts, presupposing and taking for granted their artistic dimension and 
not automatically questioning it.
I take it that institutional theories of art highlight a certain skill in-
volved in attending to a work and not on authoritarian position of a 
critic. The skill itself might be used to produce various interpretations 
and this is where, paradoxically, the dominant, controlling position of 
the author is replaced by that of a competent reader in a move that is 
congruent with Foucault’s suspicion about author’s role and with his 
plea for proliferation of literary meaning.
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Moderately Naturalist Perspective on the Artistic 
Conventions
So far, I have attempted to keep my argument congruent with the Insti-
tutional Theory of Art as applied to literature. The theory, however, is 
not without flaws and serious objections against it have been raised. In 
what follows I shall address some of the major arguments against it and 
attempt to revise and update it.
The theory states that an artwork is whatever is considered an artwork 
by a member of the institutions related to art, the artworld. An artist 
creates an artifact as a candidate for appreciation with the intention that 
it be recognized as valuable and meaningful by a competent audience. 
Perhaps the most serious doubt raised against this brief formulation is 
that the theory is circular and not really informative. It tells us nothing 
about the reasons a member of the artworld might have for calling some-
thing an artwork and what the value and meaning might actually refer 
to. If the theory suggests that the members of the artworld have no rea-
sons and no logic supporting their decisions, then why should a category 
such as art be of any interest to anyone? Moreover, it is not altogether 
clear who exactly is a member of the artworld and how and when they 
can legitimately confer the artwork status on an object. Finally, what is 
exactly the status of artifacts created within a culture that seems to have 
no artworld institutions? Can a solitary “artist” create genuine art?
Such objections have led some philosophers to formulate various his-
torical definitions of art. Jerrold Levinson suggested that to be called 
an artwork, an object must be said to have some relation to what has 
already been acknowledged historically as art, “whether something is 
art now depends, and ineliminably, on what has been art in the past” 
(Levinson 2002, 367). Noël Carroll proposed what is called historical 
narrativism, where in order to identify something as an artwork, a rele-
vant expert has to propose a narrative in which a given artifact is placed 
in an art-historical context (Carroll 1999, 249–265), that is, one can 
only judge something as an artwork against the background of artistic 
tradition and the artifact’s relation to it.
The above formulations of historical definitions of art are not dra-
matically distant from institutional theories. They both acknowledge 
the importance, the necessity of the institution’s operations for the ex-
istence of art categories as we understand them nowadays, but they add 
that the notion of the institution is itself insufficient in determining the 
meaning and value of art. Historical definitions, along with one more 
recent formulation of Institutional Theory which emphasizes the lack 
of a trans-historical criterion of art and the need to constantly reinvent 
the past meanings of art (Matravers 2000, 242–250) seem to be close 
to Gadamer’s historicism which stresses that making sense of art is a 
constant dialogue with the past that results in a fusion of the horizons of 
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expectations of authors and audiences. The difference is perhaps that 
 Gadamer tended to be exclusively focused on the works of the classics, the 
canonical art, whereas analytic aestheticians make no such reservations.
It seems that for philosophy of art, the most interesting problems that 
lead to revisions of institutional and historical definitions of art arise 
out of contemporary visual arts where it is certainly true that any object 
can be put on display as a candidate for appreciation. While the major 
problems that stem out of contemporary art are of primary importance 
for those who attempt to formulate a general theory of art encompassing 
all of its types, the situation seems to be less dramatic in those branches 
of art that are by definition limited to a specific form, as is the case with 
the linguistic form of literature. This means that it is precisely the insti-
tutional theory, with its emphasis on analyzing the procedures and con-
ventions of interpreting and evaluating a work, that is most relevant to 
a further analysis of literary works after the candidate has been granted 
the status of an artwork. If there are fewer problems with classifying a 
candidate for appreciation as literature, as its relation to past artistic 
forms is limited to variants of poetry, drama and prose, a literary critic 
simply hass less to do when it comes to establishing a historical narrative 
that would answer why a given artifact should be considered literature 
at all. Another reason why the institutional, the procedural aspect of lit-
erature, should be highlighted is literature’s frequent formal complexity. 
There is often much more content to construe, link and evaluate in, say, 
a literary narrative than in a painting.
According to the theory I have been arguing for, following Olsen and 
others, to interpret a work aesthetically one has to submit it under spe-
cific reading conventions. A competent reader or a literary critic uses 
their relevant background knowledge and begins reading with a set of 
expectations, identifying the work’s relation to artistic conventions and 
tradition. The core element of the procedure, as Olsen claimed, is to di-
vide the work into segments (whole passages, a sentence or part of a sen-
tence) (Olsen 1978, 82) into units of meaning which then might be said 
to serve certain artistic functions in relation to other segments and, thus, 
in the context of the whole work. A segment can be attributed a subject, 
tone, attitude, status and style. Simultaneously, one looks for metaphors, 
images, symbols and recurrent motifs so as to unify the segments with 
a recurring overall theme. A work might be deemed valuable if a signif-
icant portion of the artworld agrees that applying the abovementioned 
procedure on it is rewarding, that is, it rewards the expectations as to 
the functionality and coherence of its overall theme and, thus, evokes 
aesthetic pleasure. The institutional theorist only hints at the fact, but 
it is clear that to be valuable in this sense, a work must also touch upon 
themes which are of general human concern, or rather, its rendition must 
somehow resonate with some contemporary aspect of general human 
concerns. For instance, when reading Dante’s Divine Comedy we tend 
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to appreciate its role in the history of literary conventions as well as, for 
example, Dante’s mastery of poetic forms. But of equal importance is the 
work’s ability to comprehensively reflect the worldview of its times; its 
general concerns and topics of major interest. However, it is clear that 
if someone were to compose a similar work nowadays, and by similar I 
mean both the form and a thorough discussion of Thomistic philosophy 
as if one lived in the fourteenth century, the work would be considered 
unoriginal and uninteresting when set against the background of the 
whole Western artistic tradition, as it would not reflect contemporary 
concerns.
Although I have no quarrel with the basic understanding of the aes-
thetic approach to art as outlined by Olsen and others, what I find un-
clear about it is the status of the conventions themselves. Are they purely 
arbitrary? Are they a matter of a special type of attitude, aesthetic atti-
tude that we take on when approaching art? The fact that their status 
is not explicitly stated in the institutional theorist’s writing need not 
necessarily be the theory’s flaw. After all, the philosopher works on his 
“segment” of discourse and need not worry about its external status. To 
think about these conventions as purely institutionally is enough for the 
philosophical discussion, and it is someone else’s job to determine the 
status of the conventions.
One brief passage where Peter Lamarque discusses his understanding 
of institutional objects as opposed to natural objects is that the former 
need not be tied to a specific physical form; they acquire their meaning 
when placed in a network of practices. A given text or a given utterance 
may become a literary work when a rule-governed procedure is applied 
to it and when it yields rewarding results. Lamarque compares the pro-
cedures that constitute interpreting and appreciating literary works to 
chess. Apart from indicating that literary works, like chess, can take 
any physical form whatsoever, the analogy implicitly suggests that the 
literary conventions are fully arbitrary. Just as there can be an infinite 
number of board games with an infinite number of rules that govern 
them, there can be an infinite number of artworlds that argue for their 
own arbitrarily established reading procedures and their own criteria of 
value.
However, I believe there are sound reasons to reject the thesis that the 
rules and procedures that underlie the practices of the artworld are en-
tirely arbitrary, and one of the reasons for holding such a belief follows 
from determining what conventions really are. One famous definition of 
conventions was offered by David Lewis (Lewis 1969). Lewis claimed 
that conventions are in fact solutions to problems of coordination within 
a population. In order to be a proper convention, the solution must be a 
preferred choice in relation to at least one other, equally good solution. 
Moreover, it must be a choice to which members of the population ad-
here to in new instances because it has already been adopted on some 
Literature and Art 91
preceding occasions. Placing Lewis’ discussion of conventions in a lit-
erary context, Brian Baxter adds that at least two salient points follow. 
First, the claim that whatever people commonly agree to or whatever 
precedent-governed activity there is, we need to call it a convention, is 
an uninteresting understanding of the concept due to its excessive inclu-
siveness. Another thing is that if there is a history of established practice 
within a population, but the practice is clearly the best solution, then it is 
better to call it tradition and not a convention per se, “not all traditions 
are conventions, even if all conventions are (part of) traditions” (Baxter 
1984, 223). This might be illustrated by Baxter’s own simple example 
regarding the use of a drill and the colors of wires. The marking of wires 
in the drill is of course conventional and whoever wishes to use the tool 
has to master the convention. On the other hand, understanding “what 
the drill is for and how it achieves its aims” (Baxter 1984, 221) is not 
conventional in the sense outlined above. Surely, one might imagine a 
culture which has its own local set of magical beliefs as to how a drill 
functions and the beliefs might even be useful, or at least they might not 
interfere with the drill’s primary use, but such a local set of beliefs will 
be proven wrong when, say, trying to repair a defect in a damaged drill. 
In fact, the arbitrariness of colors is also limited. There are infinite ways 
of conventionally dividing the spectrum of colors, but it will not be a 
convention that colors still “show certain relationships to each other” 
(Baxter 1984, 222): that some of them clash or harmonize or that some 
are aggressive, or that some colors can be produced by mixing other 
colors, etc.
The above entails at least two important claims regarding the sta-
tus of literature. If literature, or art in general, is purely arbitrary, then 
one must find other activities which serve literature’s functions equally 
well. One might argue that obviously there are such activities and they 
might encompass anything from mountain hiking, through computer 
games to pornography, but what is at stake here is the aesthetic use of 
literature. By definition, there can be no institution other than art that 
serves the artistic purpose. Such explanation is, however, uninformative 
as it merely shifts the point of concern from artworks to the artistic 
purpose which might itself be arbitrary. The only way to defend the 
non- arbitrary nature of art is, then, to argue that the aesthetic experi-
ence of art is not arbitrary. Paradoxically, institutional theorists such 
as Olsen and Lamarque emphasize the unique character of art and the 
pleasure it affords, implying that there is no other institution that would 
serve the function equally well. What they restrain from, however, is to 
explicitly state that the human interest in what constitutes the  varieties 
of aesthetic experience: the delights of visual creations, the enjoyment 
of stories, sounds and films, is not altogether conventional; it is not 
that people simply choose to have these “forms of interest and delight” 
 (Baxter 1984, 223). That they take part in creating art and enjoying it in 
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a specific way is a brutal natural fact. What this implies, as Baxter cor-
rectly observes, is that understanding and enjoying art is dependent not 
only on culturally specific conventions, but also on the ability to grasp 
the “natural facts about people, facts which are not necessary truths, but 
which form the basis of mutual understanding” (Baxter 1984, 223). So, 
to understand and to appreciate art aesthetically one must proceed with 
“shared strategies of interpretation” (Baxter 1984, 223) which rest on 
assumptions about shared human nature and experience.
Baxter is entirely right in pinpointing these tacit and overlooked as-
sumptions lurking behind the institutional theories of literature. Culler’s 
institutional theory is based on his claim that humans are governed by 
a semiological imperative of trying “to make sense of things” (Culler 
1976, 21–22), but such an imperative must itself refer to a natural fact 
about humans.3 This means that an intelligible institutional theory can-
not produce a coherent account of literature without reference to natu-
ral facts about humans; it cannot be construed on purely conventional, 
linguistic or textual grounds. Similarly, Olsen acknowledges that valu-
able literary works must touch upon the questions of human concern 
but never elaborates on the topic. On the contrary, just like Lamarque, 
he openly claims that literary works cannot pretend to the role of stat-
ing actual truths about the human condition, although to acknowledge 
some reference to human nature4 is the only way to save institutional 
theories from the paradoxes of arbitrariness.
The above discussion hints at a necessity of a link between art and 
human experience in the thematic sense, but the interest in the solely 
thematic aspect of art is of minor importance within the Institutional 
Theory. A much more important question is the one regarding the status 
of the procedures that lead to aesthetic appreciation of art, such as the 
segmentation discussed by Olsen. When it comes to explaining the mo-
tivation behind a competent reader’s decision to establish a segment of 
a work as artistically meaningful, possessing certain stylistic features or 
being metaphorical or symbolic, the institutional theorists suggest that 
it is a matter of training regarding the conventional expectations that is 
able to ascribe artistic functions to segments of works. This is perhaps 
true, but there are at least two related issues that need to be clarified. 
First, are the specific reading conventions arbitrary? Second, how does 
one acquire literary or aesthetic competence?
The notion of “aesthetic attitude” is sometimes put forward to back 
up an affirmative answer to the first question. The proponents of the 
notion of aesthetic attitude suggest that there is a special, unique type of 
attitude that competent consumers of art take on to enjoy it aesthetically. 
Aesthetic attitude is responsible for disinterested perception of art as 
well as for the expectations and the conventions of aesthetic interpreta-
tion that might guide the consumer as to what they should pay attention 
to in a work. There are however sound reasons to reject the claim that 
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there is a special mode of attention reserved for art. George Dickie has 
famously argued that if one were to establish what the opposite, the in-
terested attention, consists of, one invariably arrives at examples of mere 
inattention. Suppose that during a performance of Othello one specta-
tor becomes increasingly suspicious of his wife’s infidelity as the action 
of the play proceeds, or a moralist spectator who contemplates what 
moral effects might the play’s performance have on the audience (Dickie 
1964, 56–65). In both cases, the interested attention is mere inattention 
and one cannot say that the aesthetic disinterested attitude is in any 
sense different from the ordinary ability to pay attention closely. Con-
sequently, when explaining the nature of the rules and procedures that 
govern aesthetic interpretation, it is not enough to refer to conventions 
of specific types of attitude required. If there is no difference between 
aesthetic attitude and being focused on a work, it means that the ability 
to locate metaphors, symbols and the general procedure of segmenting 
a work and ascribe those segments an artistic function must in the end 
also rest on some natural thought processes.
The second question I posed already suggests that there is no estab-
lished way of acquiring aesthetic competence. There is no threshold 
above which one can claim to be literary competent. Acquiring a de-
gree of literary competence is always intertwined with acquiring other 
cultural competences, or, it is always part of a general acculturation. 
This implies that there can be no separate category of literary com-
petence which one might acquire, and that consequently, understand-
ing and enjoying art and having expectations about it will always be 
intertwined with understanding other cultural practices, understand-
ing other minds and with assuming a certain degree of commonality 
of human experience and human nature. Literary competence, just as 
cultural competence, can only exist as an open-ended spectrum with 
totally illiterate, non-acculturated and non-socialized individuals on its 
one end from which infinite degrees of competence spring. By suggest-
ing that there can be no fundamental qualitative, only a quantitative, 
difference between understanding art and understanding other cultural 
artifacts, I am already hinting at the direction of my argument in the 
next chapter.
What I have argued throughout this chapter is that the initially claimed 
binary opposition between (analytic) aesthetics and literary theory does 
not hold. It is impossible that the two approaches are in opposition, in 
the sense of competing over their role in literary studies, as they tend to 
focus on different aspects of literary research. In reality, they are bound 
in a hierarchy where a valuable and informative research within a given 
literary-theoretical framework is possible only when a prior proper aes-
thetic understanding of a work has been achieved. My aim was, then, to 
trace the breaks and continuities between both approaches and outline 
how one can follow from the other.
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Apart from that, I have tried to demonstrate that institutional theories 
of art have to explicitly include both the history of art and some appeals 
to natural facts, to human nature, so as to avoid the problems of arbi-
trariness, faced by, say, structuralist or post-structuralist theories (at least 
on some readings of the latter). An appeal to human nature is, of course, 
dangerous both in the political sense and in a sense of producing oversim-
plified, reductive accounts of human action both in the sciences and in hu-
manities. What I will try to demonstrate in the third chapter is that just as 
one is able to trace a continuity between aesthetics and literary theories, 
one can outline the continuity between the procedures and conventions 
that regulate the creation and the reception of art and the processes of the 
ordinary human cognition, without falling into reductive accounts of the 
former. After all, there is no way to explain naturalistically the history 
and the cultural locality of the artworld, or, say, the universally acknowl-
edged reputation of Shakespeare among literary critics. But if, according 
to the principles of embodied cognition embraced by cognitive scientists, 
“there is no difference in kind between the practices of literature and 
those of ordinary thought” (Hogan 2003, 87), or as Lakoff and Johnson 
(1980) suggested, metaphors are neither reserved to literature nor to or-
dinary language, but are central to the development of thought as such, 
then there must be a way to non-reductively outline the transition from 
everyday cognition to the aesthetic cognition of a work of art.
Notes
 1 My understanding of Barthes’ argument would be that since it is established 
that language is an uncontrollable, autonomous and fluent structure of sig-
nifiers, any attempts to make it static and determinate (as with ascribing 
works to authorial intentions) are illusory. They serve certain pre-existing 
power relations in society, but they do not reflect what really happens with 
language.
 2 I am inclined to replace his “sociological analysis” with “Marxist literary 
theory” or any literary theory, for that matter.
 3 These natural facts can either refer to human biological constitution or to 
mere established observations about humans. Baxter’s own examples of nat-
ural facts about humans include human interest in colors, sounds, words, 
etc. (pp. 122–123).
 4 I am well aware of the systematic abuse of the concept and its dangerous po-
litical implications. Here, I refer to human biological constitution, keeping 
in mind that whatever the bio-psychological component, humans also exist 
in specific cultural-historical localities which remain largely autonomous 
from the biological sphere.
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The main focus of the preceding chapters was to discuss the nature of 
the relation between contemporary literary theories (understood chiefly 
as variants of post-structuralism and cultural studies) and philosophical 
aesthetics (principally in the analytic tradition). As I argued, although 
representatives of both traditions tend to marginalize or reject the sig-
nificance of each other’s work, both areas of research seem to be bound 
up in a structure of hierarchical continuity. In other words, neither of 
the traditions can successfully claim to solely provide the paradigm for 
literary studies (or the comprehensive account of the nature of art/litera-
ture/text, etc.) as each of them relies on layers of assumptions taken from 
lower-level disciplines that influence the nature of claims and the scope 
of research of the higher-level disciplines in a non-trivial way, that is to 
say, not just acknowledging that there exist different disciplines but that 
they relate to each other in some form of dependence.
A closer analysis of the seminal post-structuralist essays on the notion 
of the “text” (such as Barthes’ and Foucault’s) reveals its close connec-
tion with the notion of the “work” as it has been developed in contem-
porary analytic aesthetics. Institutionally or conventionally determined 
intentions, meaning and indexicality, assuming a notion of a designed 
text and chronology, are all essential features of the notion of the work, 
but, more importantly, they are also prerequisite for the “text” to be 
comprehensible at all. Similarly, Richard Hoggart’s discussion of the 
cultural text points to the necessity of using the tools of (aesthetic) lit-
erary criticism in cultural studies. Consequently, the success of the type 
of research carried out by textualist literary theories must depend on 
their application of basic aesthetic considerations so as to yield fruitful, 
non-arbitrary results. Aesthetics and textualist theories are not mutually 
exclusive, competing research paradigms, but form a continuous body 
where the former serves as a lower-order discipline providing founda-
tions for the latter.
The multilevel nature of research in literary studies sheds some light 
on the possibility of formulating a single, general theory of literature. In 
the tradition that ranges from Saussurean linguistics, through formal-
ism, structuralism, to post-structuralism, it was commonly assumed that 
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linguistics can provide us with an adequate paradigm for literary stud-
ies. Although post-structuralism denied that literary studies can take 
the form of one systematic and rigorous body of research, it still shared 
many of the textualist assumptions of its predecessors, most important 
of which was the belief that the study of language and literature and, 
consequently, the study of culture as such, can be absolutely autonomous 
from any considerations about humans, human action, human nature 
and human biology. Such research orientation was not only reminiscent 
of the nineteenth-century Diltheyan distinction into natural sciences and 
to so-called Geistesswissenschaften and C.P. Snow’s discussion of two 
cultures, but it also claimed that culture does not form a continuous 
body with nature in a non-trivial way. To study artifacts of culture, it 
was claimed, we do not need to adhere to any notions of humans as 
biological organisms, as culture is a self-contained and self-referential 
entity that operates without any direct connection to nature and the 
material in biological sense.
Contemporary discussions in analytic aesthetics put some of these 
claims into doubt. First, it is extremely problematic to study literature in 
a way that is parallel to the type of research done in linguistics. The no-
tion of a “work” does not have a simple equivalent in linguistics. More-
over, concepts such as rules of grammar or minimal units of meaning are 
hardly possible to identify with a high degree of regularity in each work. 
Understanding and appreciating a literary work requires making use of 
sets of assumptions that are not merely linguistic. A general theory of 
literature that posits the concept of literariness, understood as deviation 
from ordinary language use, must encounter problems related to the fact 
that many of the established and celebrated literary works do not neces-
sarily seem to be deviated from ordinary language, or particularly rich 
in linguistic or artistic devices.
Although analytic aesthetics can provide foundations for the type 
of textualist research often carried out by contemporary literary the-
orists, neither aesthetics itself, nor a continuous body of aesthetics 
and  textualism can produce a comprehensive account of literature that 
would include something more than accounts of how literature func-
tions as a cultural discourse, or that would explore the philosophical 
problems around the questions of literary art. For what is then left un-
explained is the question why and how humans use literature and what 
are its sources. Analytic aesthetics explores this really only partly as it 
emphasizes the need to study art in relation to human action and human 
institutions. The fundamental idea of research in analytic philosophy 
is to describe the necessary and sufficient conditions of use of certain 
concepts, which already implies a deep connection between this type of 
inquiry and observable or measurable human behavior. However, the 
most influential theories of art, as developed in analytic aesthetics (the 
institutional or the historical ones), tend to overemphasize the locality 
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and conventionality of art. The assumptions that procedures involved in 
appreciating art are purely conventional skills to be mastered, or that art 
cannot exist beyond the institutions of the artworld, are rather strong 
claims that tend to run parallel to the Saussurean project of studying 
language, and later also literature, as entities that exist independently of 
nature, and independently of other disciplines, or human biology.
As I argued in the previous chapter, the study of art behaviors must 
necessarily rely and depend on certain natural facts. Art cannot be said 
to be simply conventional in the sense that traffic organization is con-
ventional, as people engage in art-related behaviors spontaneously and 
naturally. It is not a matter of choice that people decide to enjoy music or 
stories. Similarly, understanding what art conveys and what stylistic fea-
tures it applies seems to be impossible without placing it in the context 
of human interests and of human predispositions. In this light, it seems 
unlikely that the process of cognizing and appreciating art is merely a 
local and arbitrary convention. If this is true, as I am convinced it is, 
then to understand literature more fully one needs to posit the existence 
of yet another level in the research hierarchy that I have been outlining 
here. If aesthetics relies on a lower-order research into human cognition, 
then aesthetics in the institutional sense is not entirely discontinuous 
with  everyday human behaviors. Determining the nature of this continu-
ity, or, in other words, the connection between the research into human 
mind and the research into art is the focus of this chapter.
Language and Cognition
In Chapters 1 and 2 I insisted that Saussurean linguistics has had a 
 considerable influence on various literary theories and that contempo-
rary approaches to Theory largely stem from post-structuralist reinter-
pretation of Saussure. As I firmly believe that it would not be too cavalier 
to state that some of the central concepts of Saussurean linguistics are 
quite outdated and mostly rejected by contemporary linguistic scientific 
community, I attempted to show how, in spite of this fact, the type of 
research into literature and culture espoused by post-structuralism- 
inspired theories is far from being discredited or inadequate. Never-
theless, Saussurean linguistics remains highly problematic as a general 
theory of language, mostly due to its conviction about the independence 
of  language from all types of human action that normally make use of 
language: communication, expressing intentions, having expectations 
or thinking. Instead, for Saussure and his followers, language is seen 
as a closed, independent structure with entirely arbitrary connection to 
 nature and to the world. Its actual use and its links to human activity 
were seen as accidental and irrelevant for the study of language. How-
ever, the above stance has been rejected almost universally by subse-
quent generations of linguists. Starting with the late 1950s, generative 
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linguistics has asserted linguistic nativism: that the ability to produce 
and understand language and complex syntactic structures is largely 
innate, that there exist cross-cultural linguistic universals, and that 
there exists a separate, autonomous faculty of the mind that deals with 
language processing. But an even more radical break with de Saussure 
came with the advent of cognitive linguistics in late 1970s and 1980s. 
Cognitivists, largely inspired by research in psychology, argued against 
the generativist claim that there can exist a special, autonomous module 
in the mind used solely for language processing. Instead, and this was 
congruent with relevant research in psychology, they claimed that lin-
guistic ability is not separable from other cognitive processes. To under-
stand how language functions it is necessary to frame it in the context 
of general human cognition: language and mind cannot be separated. 
This constitutes a radical break with generativism and, moreover, places 
cognitive linguistics even further from Saussure’s rather simplistic vision 
of language as an arbitrary, dictionary-like structure where meaning is 
constituted solely on the basis of minimal phonetic differences.
The following paragraph is a summary of Fauconnier’s (Fauconnier 
1999) and Croft’s/Cruse’s (Croft and Cruse 2004) discussion of the 
fundamental claims of cognitive linguistics in a form relevant for my 
research. One central claim that Fauconnier makes is that language’s 
primary function is “constructing and communicating meaning” 
 (Fauconnier 1999, 96) emphasizing the central role of semantics, rather 
than, for example, syntax, in the study of language. To this Croft and 
Cruse add that linguistic knowledge is essentially conceptual (Croft and 
Cruse 2004, 1). This includes not only basic semantic representation but 
also syntax, morphology and phonology, as they all require comprehen-
sion and production as input and output cognitive processes. What im-
mediately follows is that language processing involves the use of deeper 
mental structures that are correlated or “associated with their linguistic 
manifestations” (Fauconnier 1999, 96). Language itself carries relatively 
little information and involves what Fauconnier calls “backstage cog-
nition,” (Fauconnier 1999, 96) drawing on “vast cognitive resources,” 
(Fauconnier 1999, 96) models, frames, connections, mappings, etc. 
Studying language, thus, must imply something more than just produc-
ing a self-contained “account of the internal properties of languages” 
(Fauconnier 1999, 102) but is indispensable in understanding “general 
aspects of human cognition” (Fauconnier 1999, 102). If there is no spe-
cial faculty of the mind responsible for language use, then the latter 
is “in principle the same as other cognitive abilities” (Croft and Cruse 
2004, 2). Croft elaborates on this point, adding that there is no signif-
icant difference in the organization and retrieval of linguistic and any 
other knowledge (Croft and Cruse 2004, 2). Similarly, using language is 
not significantly different from other cognitive tasks such as “visual per-
ception, reasoning or motor activity” (Croft and Cruse 2004, 2). Surely, 
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language is a distinct ability that makes use of a unique configuration of 
cognitive abilities, but the set of these abilities is not unique to language.
The central claim of this chapter will be analogous to the claims of 
cognitive scientists. I believe that on a certain rudimentary level human 
art behaviors including production, understanding and enjoying art in-
volve cognitive abilities that are in no way unique to art or literature. To 
a certain extent, art behaviors are not significantly different from other 
cognitive tasks. Art, thus, cannot be said to be easily separable from 
human interests, human minds, human rationality and general cognitive 
processes. This is not equivalent to saying that what the contemporary 
artworld deems valuable art is a matter of easily naturalized cognitive 
process, as I do not believe that philosophical aesthetics or the study 
of connoisseur art appreciation can be reduced to neuroscience, but it 
points to some foundations and conditions of how such decisions can 
be made. The following section deals with a research area that is at the 
intersection of linguistics, cognitive science, aesthetics and literary stud-
ies and which proves to be fundamental to understanding the relation 
between literature and cognition, that is, metaphor.
Metaphors and Poetics
In the recent decades, there has been a tremendous change in how we 
understand the role of metaphors. Metaphor has always been an import-
ant part of research into linguistics, literature, rhetoric or philosophy of 
language. In literary studies and rhetoric, metaphor has often been con-
sidered an ornament, an artistic device that is the staple of truly poetic 
language whose main function is to convey emotional experience and 
evoke a sense of aesthetic pleasure in readers. On the other hand, some 
idea of the cognitive aspect of metaphor was present from the beginning 
of poetics, as is the case with Aristotle. A proto-cognitivist account of 
metaphor was put forward by I.A. Richards in his The Philosophy of 
Rhetoric (1936). Richards adhered to a theory of art that saw metaphor 
as a medium of transferring emotional experience between minds. For 
this sort of communication to be successful it is crucial to use certain 
poetic or rhetorical instruments of which metaphor is the supreme agent. 
In this view, metaphor is definitely important in terms of its influence on 
the receivers of emotionally charged content and thus is essential to suc-
cessful poetic language as it helps to conceptualize human experience. 
The point is, however, that before cognitive linguistics, the cognitive 
aspect of metaphor was not accounted for in a systematic, coherent way.
Likewise, metaphors have always attracted a significant amount of 
interest in philosophy. In both continental and analytic philosophy 
what seemed to be most interesting to philosophers was their ambiguity. 
 Nietzsche (2000) famously called truth “a marching army of metaphors” 
thus pointing to a lack of any direct correspondence between  reality 
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and human conceptual schemes. Post-structuralist philosophers found 
metaphors fascinating in how they challenge the concept of literal or 
fixed meanings in language (Derrida 1982). In quite a similar fashion 
analytic philosophers have tended to explore the significance of met-
aphors for truth conditional semantics. In other words, metaphorical 
expressions are typically false when one attempts to ascribe truth value 
to their literal meanings. Nevertheless, people normally use and under-
stand metaphors as meaningful, but it is not entirely clear how to con-
ceive of this meaning. Max Black (1954) and Donald Davidson (1984) 
famously argued that metaphors cannot have a referential function and, 
consequently, cannot have truth conditions. Instead, metaphors inspire 
the type of insight that enables us to perceive one thing in terms of an-
other thing in a way that cannot be reduced to a series of propositions 
that have truth value.
Cognitive linguistics has taken the study of metaphor to a yet another 
level. In the foundational work for cognitive theories of metaphor,  Lakoff 
and Johnson persuasively argued that far from being a mere stylistic 
 ornament, or simply part of rhetoric or poetry, metaphor is essential to 
human cognition. It is through metaphors that we conceptualize com-
plex phenomena or abstract concepts. Moreover, the basis for conceptu-
alizing what is abstract appears to lie in basic perception of space, body 
and in directly lived experiences. Metaphor, thus, goes beyond not only 
poetry but also language as such and appears to be central to human 
thought and action. One simple example that Lakoff and Johnson men-
tion in the beginning of their book is the “argument is war” metaphor. 
The fact that argument is commonly conceptualized in terms of war is 
reflected in the following phrases (all taken from Lakoff and Johnson):
Your claims are indefensible.
He attacked every weak point in my argument.
His criticisms were right on target.
I demolished his argument.
I’ve never won an argument with him.
You disagree? Okay, shoot!
If you use that strategy, he’ll wipe you out.
He shot down all of my arguments.
(Lakoff and Johnson 2003, 4)
In the above examples, the source domain (war, struggle) can serve its 
function precisely because it is more tangible, more primary for human 
experience. Examples of even more fundamental conceptual metaphors 
are clear when investigating how humans conceptualize categories such 
as up or down. Roughly speaking, whatever is conceptualized as a pro-
cess moving upward, is simultaneously understood as positive. The for-
mula good is up is realized in expressions such as “he was over the moon 
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about it” or “I feel on top of the world.” Conversely, the formula bad is 
down underlies phrases like “I feel so low” or “this is really the pits.”
The idea that what was traditionally considered an ornamental poetic 
or rhetorical device lies, in fact, at the heart of the human propensity to 
conceptualize was later developed by Mark Turner in his theory of the 
literary mind. The point that Turner makes is already looming in the 
work of other cognitive linguists, such as Lakoff, Langacker or Fauco-
nnier, but it is Turner who synthesizes some of their observations into 
a comprehensive theory of the literary mind. The literary mind theory 
implies that it is not just metaphor and metonymy that underlie human 
thought processes: they are but one instance of how human propensity 
to conceptualize is manifested in language. The relationship between lit-
erature, language and the mind are much deeper: a vast array of the de-
vices and mechanisms by which literary creations operate are yet again 
manifestations of human thought processes.
Although Turner’s chief focus is narrative, most of his observations 
apply equally to other literary forms. By using the example of the classic 
tales of Scheherazade, Turner claims that storytelling, narrative imag-
ining, is an essential thought instrument on which rational capacities 
depend, “it is our chief means of looking into future, of predicting, of 
planning, and of explaining” (Turner 1998, 4–5). The type of narrative 
which Turner considers especially illuminating about the nature of hu-
man thought is parable, which he defines broadly as a projection of story 
onto another story (Turner 1998, 7); it includes not only the vizier’s tale 
about the ox and donkey told to Scheherazade in order to give her advice 
or in, say, The Rime of the Ancient Mariner, but also in expressions 
such as “when the cat’s away, the mice will play” or “a poor workman 
blames his tools.” Parables, then, as most narratives, tend to employ, as 
in simulation or imagination, the human capacity to predict, evaluate, 
plan and explain (Turner 1998, 9). Moreover, comprehension of stories 
must entail the recognition that they include objects, agents and events, 
but again, the ability to discern and apply the three categories is by no 
means limited to literary narratives or to stories in any narrow sense, but 
is clearly central to human cognitive processes as such.
Other concepts that indicate the close interconnectedness of literary 
forms and cognitive processes that Turner mentions include emblems, 
or prototypes (e.g., the visier and Scheherazade are instances of parent 
and child prototypes), image schemas, or scripts, the “skeletal patterns 
that recur in our sensory and motor experience” (Turner 1998, 16), and 
which serve as a basis, a preliminary system of expectations through 
which comprehension of narratives is initiated (‘motion along a path, 
bounded interior, balance, symmetry […], container’)” (Turner 1998, 
16), actions such as “pushing, pulling, resting, yielding” (Turner 1998, 
16). Other processes include constructing and connecting mental spaces 
(e.g., having a mental model of the present state of affairs, producing 
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a mental space of a hypothetical future and blending them) or concep-
tual blending (e.g., blending of talking people with animals common in 
folk tales). Finally, being entirely in tune with the findings of cognitive 
science, Turner makes the point that the structure of language as such, 
or, to be more specific, the structure of grammar and syntax, does not 
constitute an autonomous, self-contained human faculty, but reflects 
the more primary human predispositions to establish causality, agency, 
and to categorize into objects, actors and events. In the end, complex 
rules of grammar come from parable (Turner 1998, 118) and simple sen-
tences such as “John broke the stick” or “the train left while I was in the 
shower” can be seen as primitive stories. The latter’s past tense reflects 
the fact that the point of focus precedes the point of view. Conceptual-
izing observable phenomena in terms of agency and causality of events 
(as in constructing narratives) is primary in relation to more complex 
grammar rules. Both are, however, manifestations of deeper cognitive 
structures.
In a project called Paleopoetics, which brings together cognitive lin-
guistics, literary studies, archeology, anthropology and neuroscience, 
Christopher Collins traces the emergence of language, imagination and 
early literary forms out of cognitive skills that predate both language and 
writing. Collins begins his argument by reviewing Dual-Process Theory 
that posits bipartite functioning of the human brain with one cognitive 
system being intuitive and the other deliberate. Both systems are com-
plementary and are not only central to information processing, where 
they include parallel and serial processing, but are also modes of per-
ception and action producing figure-ground distinctions and  handling 
multitasking (Collins 2013, 19). The dual pattern they constitute is 
also manifest in types of broad and narrow attention and in numer-
ous functions “from bimanual coordination to episodic  memory  […], 
gestural communication, protolanguage, full language, and, ultimately, 
verbal artifacts” (Collins 2013, 20). Later, Collins goes on to elaborate 
on the development of play, instrumentality and visuality as “presym-
bolic functions preadaptive to language” (Collins 2013, 20), where the 
former involves performing actions inside frames with a semiotic shift 
(actions such as chasing that normally signifies X, now signifies Y) and 
leads to development of yet another dyadic mental pattern: that of in-
dexical and iconic signs, detaching natural signs from their ordinary 
semiotic contexts and adding to them intentional dimension. Instru-
mentality is “the use of an object as a tool to enhance human action” 
(Collins 2013, 21) which also includes cultural behaviors such as “tool 
making, tool use, dances and songs” (Collins 2013, 21).  Visuality is 
another domain where serial and parallel processing cooperate, produc-
ing integrated visual field and imagination in the sense of simulation 
of visual perception. This is highly important for creation of and re-
sponding to literature as Collins sees verbal artifact as “an instrument 
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the brain uses to play visual mental images” (Collins 2013, 22). The 
form of prelinguistic communication and conceptualization that existed 
before the emergence of language was based on “gesture and noncom-
positional vocalization” (Collins 2013, 23). After discussing the emer-
gence of language, Collins elaborates on the development of human 
communicative code based on symbol growing out of index and icon 
and on a shift from gesture to voice, and traces how prelinguistic func-
tions gained prominence with the development of full language, as with 
rhetorical and poetical functions of pronouns, metaphor and metonymy 
being rooted in play behavior and visual roots of syntax. He concludes 
that language is a medium of visual representation that enables us to 
simulate “the perception of identifiable objects based on image sche-
mas” (Collins 2013, 168) and the “sense of acting upon those objects 
based upon motor schemas” (Collins 2013, 168). Moreover, language is 
bound with the acts of eye-hand coordination and with “step-by-step se-
riality of tool making and tool use” (Collins 2013, 168). Finally, Collins 
speculates on the emergence of earliest kinds of poetry out of life event 
rituals and food production cycles.
Whatever rhetoric features are to be found in language, they move 
us as they are able to “tap into our brain’s prelinguistic strata” (Collins 
2013, 12). Narrative includes anecdotes and exempla utilizes episodic 
memory which is central to our organization of the autobiographical 
past. Figurative devices such as metaphor, metonymy, personalization, 
hyperbole and others “evoke powers of mental imaging and dream” 
(Collins 2013, 12). Metaphor and metonymy, he argues following Jakob-
son, are based on two complementary ways of forming thoughts, that of 
similarity and contiguity, which correspond to “pre-symbolic sign types, 
icon and index” (Collins 2013, 171) that, in turn, stem from visuomotor 
systems. Delivery uses gestures and other paralinguistic means to affect 
us, though written verbal artifacts also contain such stylistic features. 
Collins’ argument also uses a model of gradual emergence of levels of 
phenomena along with disciplines that explore them. In his account po-
etics proves to explore “the next level of language-mediated complexity, 
that of closed, unitized verbal systems” (Collins 2013, 12).
If the cognitive linguistic account of the literary character of the hu-
man mind promoted by Turner, Collins and other cognitive-oriented lin-
guists and literary scholars seems compelling, at least in a very general 
sense, then it leads us directly to investigate the status of poetics. Cogni-
tive poetics is a field that has greatly flourished in recent decades thanks 
to the advances in cognitive science. For the purposes of the book, cogni-
tive poetics might be conceived of as enriching traditional poetics in the 
sense of formalism or New Criticism with both the conceptual apparatus 
and the methodological orientation of cognitive science. In the following 
discussion of cognitive poetics I will chiefly refer to Peter Stockwell’s 
handbook on the topic (Stockwell 2002), as it concisely synthesizes the 
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relevant research in various areas of cognitive science and provides the 
reader with literary analyses typical of contemporary poetics.
On the one hand, it might be indicated that the aims and methods of 
cognitive poetics are quite predictable: analyzing literary texts in terms 
of their stylistic content and describing how literary creations employ 
figures, grounds, schemas, scripts, metaphors, deixis, mental spaces, etc. 
On the other hand, however, Stockwell envisions cognitive poetics to 
have much more potential. It would be a grave mistake to treat literature 
in purely linguistic terms as just another set of data (Stockwell 2002, 5). 
With the help of cognitive linguistics, such a purely linguistic inquiry into 
literary texts would clearly illuminate the nature of the relation between 
“literary readings and readings of non-literary encounters” (Stockwell 
2002, 5), but on its own, it would tell us nothing about value, status, 
historical contexts, etc., all of which need to be taken into consideration 
for carrying out valid research within cognitive poetics. In accord with 
the basic premises of cognitive science, and quite contrary to his earlier 
considerations about the role of specific type of knowledge prerequisite 
for appreciation of literary art, Stockwell maintains that there is noth-
ing inherently different in the form of literary language and any other 
language use (Stockwell 2002, 1–13), as any given poetic devices and 
creative uses of language are widespread in everyday discourse, and that 
this is precisely the reason why “it is reasonable and safe to investigate 
the language of literature using approaches generated in the language 
system in general” (Stockwell 2002, 7). Consequently, although Stock-
well admits that a proper study of literature requires having a certain 
idea of literature and knowing relevant contexts, he happily embraces 
a typically linguistic analysis of literature, as is evident in his literary 
analyses that will be mentioned further on and in his claims about the 
need to incorporate cognitive linguistics into stylistics so that the lat-
ter can “reassess its exploration of the workings of literary language” 
(Stockwell 2002, 5).
Regarding the status of research typical of cognitive poetics, Stock-
well claims that the discipline operates on a scale whose one end is ex-
planation of how readers arrived at specific readings (in this mode it 
has no predictive powers and cannot produce its own interpretations), 
and whose other end is uncovering patterns and processes that might 
operate subconsciously or remain unnoticed (Stockwell 2002, 7). The 
latter is especially interesting, as it tends to complicate the status of re-
search in cognitive poetics a little more. Stockwell admits that when he 
points out the possibility of the latter mode leading to a claim that “some 
interpretations are only available to analysts who have knowledge of 
cognitive poetics” (Stockwell 2002, 7). Although he claims the problem 
might be resolved by distinguishing between interpretation (whatever 
readers happen to do while reading texts) and reading (arriving at a 
final meaning of a text that is considered acceptable), both of which 
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involve individual and communal effects of “language and experience” 
(Stockwell 2002, 8) that are covered by cognitive poetics, he does not 
elaborate on that or demonstrate how such levels of analysis function 
in his own work. The solution is, thus, unclear and the problem of the 
status of cognitive poetics remains, to use one of the discipline’s favorite 
concepts, foregrounded.1
Stockwell’s analysis of Ted Hughes’ “Hill-stone was content” could 
serve as a good illustration of the problems of cognitive poetics. Stock-
well begins by saying that what grasps readers’ attention is the person-
ification of hill-stone that runs through the title and the first stanzas. 
Whereas the stone is personified and active, humans are unnamed 
agents described “in passive grammatical form” (Stockwell 2002, 21) 
inducing a reversal of expectations. What is even more striking in the 
poem, according to Stockwell, is the presence of stylistically deviant 
metaphors such as “guerilla patience.” Next, he jumps into a discus-
sion of syntax and prepositional phrases to explain how the poem re-
lies on reversing the ordinary understandings of what constitutes a 
ground and a figure.
Stockwell insists that any kind of analysis carried out in cognitive 
poetics will always be a mixture of extratextual knowledge, purely 
linguistic analysis and interpretation. In the case of Hughes, Stockwell 
emphasizes that the interpretation he outlines is purely his own. This 
is however highly unclear. For instance, if we were to evaluate the ad-
equacy of his interpretation, we would have to acknowledge his famil-
iarity with the art-historical context, his general education and so on. 
In other words, we would have to acknowledge his competence. Stock-
well’s analysis of Hughes clearly demonstrates his familiarity with the 
necessary background of artistic conventions. His analysis would not 
be typical of random readers, as it is not clear why we should assume 
that ordinary readers would really notice the passive voice-reversal 
and judge it the way Stockwell does. They would need much more than 
just standard linguistic skills. In other words, when looking at analyses 
typical of cognitive poetics, it is not immediately clear as to who the 
reader might be. Stockwell insists that cognitive poetics describes that 
which often is subconscious or unnoticed. Again, unnoticed by whom? 
Everybody except the cognitive linguist? We might wonder whether 
competent literary critics or competent readers who appreciate the 
poem artistically really take into consideration all the uses of preposi-
tional phrases, deviant metaphors or the complexity of syntax in order 
to appreciate the work of art. Cognitive poetics is not equivalent to 
the empirical study of literary response and, thus, it should perhaps be 
seen as constructing model readings. Stockwell insists that his reading 
is definitely affected by his background and experience and is only one 
of the many readings possible within the sphere of cognitive poetics. 
But if it should be considered as more than just impressionism, than 
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it means positing model readings. But the question remains: models 
of what kind of reading? For, if we were to take seriously Stockwell’s 
claim that literary readings require some contextual knowledge, that 
readers need to have certain idea of what literature is, then we would 
have to assume that cognitive poetics provides models for aesthetic 
appreciation.
The above claim does not, unfortunately, resolve the problem of read-
ing status, as Stockwell does in fact fall into the trap of formalist liter-
ariness, where what is interesting in a poem is the latter’s deviational 
character: in Hughes’ case, the deviation is the reversal of expectations 
regarding agency. The problem with such a stance is twofold. One, de-
viation from everyday experience when it comes to artistic form is in no 
way correlated with the work’s artistic value, as I argued in the preceding 
chapters. Two, it is altogether not clear whose expectations are reversed. 
An ordinary person with little knowledge of poetry and literature might 
indeed find it deviational, but would it still be surprising for a competent 
reader? Clearly not, and, paradoxically, it seems that it is the competent 
reader, the reader that has a fair amount of contextual knowledge, that 
is of interest to Stockwell.
If the case is that the identity of the reader who might read in Stock-
well’s fashion is unclear and we do not know how such an analy-
sis is connected with artistic value and aesthetics, then a conclusion 
would be that cognitive poetics produces rather artificial constructs 
in the guise of illuminating the natural mental processes involved in 
reading. In his short comment about Browning’s “The Lost Leader,” 
a poem that refers to William Wordsworth’s transformation from a 
revolutionary to an arch-conservative, Stockwell gives a more prom-
ising example of how linguistic analysis and contextual knowledge 
can produce fruitful results (Stockwell 2002, 3–4). It would clearly 
be wrong to claim that the decline of a revolutionary is about Tony 
Blair, as we do need some contextual knowledge to understand part 
of the poem’s meaning. On the other hand, Stockwell claims that even 
without historical contexts, we can experience some qualities of the 
poem, such as sound and metrics. He goes on to say that reading it 
loud makes one feel the metrics of dactylic tetrameter. Further, as he 
puts it:
the subsequent lines introduce minor irregularities to disrupt the 
pattern: omitting the last two unaccented syllables at the end of lines 
two and four in order to place heavy emphasis on “eye” and “die”; 
or twice omitting one of the unaccented syllables in the third line to 
create a heavy pause in the middle of the line. The emphases of the 
word-meaning can be created and confirmed by these metrical pat-
terns, and illustrate the expert craftsmanship in the poem.
(Stockwell 2002, 3)
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I could not agree more with Stockwell’s brief analysis of the poem. 
However, I doubt ordinary readers who follow the purely textual/lin-
guistic analysis (which Stockwell sees as radically separate from the art- 
historical context) would be able to experience, much less to verbalize it.
Following my slight bias toward institutional theories of art, it is not 
altogether clear why and how ordinary language users would know that 
there is an additional syllable that disrupts the metrical pattern, or an 
emphasis in the middle. Perhaps they would not be able to notice any 
pattern at all. Moreover, it is unlikely that one can have a strict separa-
tion of the historical and the textual, or linguistic, where the latter elicits 
a more or less spontaneous response based on everyday experience of 
language use. On the contrary, I believe the two remain bound together 
and it is naïve to claim that one can have an instinctive, spontaneous 
response to a linguistic passage having no historical knowledge that one 
applies to it. It is, of course, a matter of degree how relevant or how 
much knowledge one possesses, but one cannot occupy a space where 
one responds purely in terms of an ahistorical mental disposition.
Stockwell acknowledges that the historical and textual can work to-
gether, but his account of the relation is different than the one I outlined 
above. He claims that, in the case of Browning’s poem, contextual back-
ground can shed some light on the poem’s change in metrics. If one re-
calls that traditionally heroic poetry tended to be written in Alexandrine 
hexameter, then Browning’s “disruptions of the dactyl and reduction of 
the repetitions from six to four in the line” (Stockwell 2002, 3) might 
be read as in tune with the topic of the demise of the hero, of Word-
sworth’s fall. But what this shows us is that proper knowledge of art is 
primary to any effect that deviation of the language use might have on 
its recipients. After all, the aesthetically relevant observations about the 
relation of form and content in Browning’s poem would be inaccessible 
to people unfamiliar with art history and artistic conventions, and the 
poem might have virtually no effect, in a purely naturalistic sense, on 
random readers. Interestingly enough, Stockwell’s short commentary 
about Browning is more promising than his analysis of Hughes, as in 
the latter case he seems to be indicating that the value of a poem lies 
in its deviation of language use and disrupting expectations, whereas 
his remark about Browning indicates that there is no direct connection 
between the natural processes of the mind and the appreciation of art, 
the latter point being in accordance with institutional theories of art as 
developed in analytic aesthetics.
Stockwell’s more recent work is equally oblivious to philosophical lit-
erary aesthetics and the ways in which it could potentially inform some 
questions about research in cognitive poetics. For instance, Stockwell 
sets out to produce a cognitive framework for discussing ethical posi-
tioning of reader regarding a literary text and begins his discussion by 
laying down a dubious distinction into “natural reading” (Stockwell 
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2013, 265) and “reflecting analytically on the activity” (Stockwell 2013, 
265). The latter, he claims, along with the close reading type of attention 
to detail is unnatural and typical of the work of literary critics and av-
erage readers. Apart from that, Stockwell gives little explanation about 
the features of both modes. I will return to this point in more detail in 
the next chapter, but for now it will suffice to say that there cannot be 
a uniform and useful category of natural reading, but rather a grada-
tion of competence among all readers which is rooted in our natural 
cognitive-emotive capacities and further reinforced both by training in 
literary reading and increasing one’s knowledge about literature and by 
acquaintance with arts and other intentional artifacts. A model, ideal 
literary critic occupies one end of such a spectrum, but there cannot be a 
strong distinction into their activities and that of average readers. Insti-
tutional Theory of Art appears to be strict in laying down who, and in 
what conditions, would be able to appreciate artworks but what it does 
in fact is account for conventional practices that are largely fossilized 
and perhaps enhanced standard cognitive procedures pertaining to arti-
fact cognition and responding to intentional creations. In tune with the 
above, one cannot say that there is a natural approach to literature pe-
culiar to the common man and an artificial one promoted by the literary 
critic. Artworks require knowledge and understanding of their respec-
tive categories and nature to be properly interpreted and appreciated. If 
this is not established, then cognitive poetics has little more to say about 
literary works than about other linguistic utterances and, consequently, 
the status and effects of what cognitive poetics studies is unclear. Stock-
well also insists that “most literary works have an encoded, text-driven 
preferred response” (Stockwell 2013, 269), though this boils down to 
“easy-to-follow plot and easily discernible theme or point” (Stockwell 
2013, 269) which help readers position themselves ethically. There are 
obviously piles of assumptions here that would benefit if consulted with 
some research carried out by literary theorists or philosophers of art. 
Stockwell’s sweeping generalizations about literature overlook the fact 
that preferred responses might fail or diverge dramatically among read-
ers. It will not suffice to just state that even when there are differences 
in response, readers do not ascribe “polyvalent intention” to authors. It 
is certainly not something we can take for granted. The question about 
the source of those preferred responses is not innocent, either. Are they 
guided by actual authors or they are hypothetical constructs? Perhaps 
they are effects of an attempt to maximize the value of the work read 
in the fashion of Stephen Davies’ theory (Davies 2006)? If Stockwell 
focuses on average readers, how is his idea of positioning affected by 
highly subjective, personal and idiosyncratic readings? The notion of 
ambiguity, which for Stockwell is a key indicator of artistic value, for 
literary critics also requires much more attention than the glossing over 
he offers. He seems to be suggesting it is something akin to multiplicity 
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of meaning. Either way, it is clearly not a defining component of artistic 
value. But the real problem here is that it might be difficult to distinguish 
between what Stockwell means by ambiguity and rather direct effects 
of sufficient complexity of a work. Ambiguity need not be a grand term 
referring to overall assessment of a work, but typically contributes to 
it, appearing at levels of smaller segments of a work, like evaluating a 
character or significance of a particular scene. This does not refer to 
the canon of high art exclusively. Whether one takes the most popular 
works of young adult fantasy, such as Harry Potter, or drama TV shows 
such as Breaking Bad or The Wire or classic gangster films, they are full 
of ambiguous characters whose actions contribute to the overall com-
plexity of a final evaluation of these works and to possible multiplicity 
of meaning. Stockwell’s own example of Lolita is a case in point: it will 
not do to just claim that divergences in responses are never polyvalent 
in attributing intentions. There are clearly many aspects of Stockwell’s 
argument that would benefit from consulting debates about meaning, 
value and intentions in literary theory and philosophy of art.
Similar problems pervade other works in cognitive poetics. In the in-
troduction to the collection of essays entitled Cognitive Poetics in Prac-
tice (Steen and Gavins 2003), the authors claim that thanks to its being 
founded on cognitive science, cognitive poetics gives us an insight into 
universal features of human perception and how they are exploited by 
literature (Steen and Gavins 2003, 1–13). As a result, they hold, cogni-
tive poetics does not produce elitist readings (as opposed to, say, nor-
mative literary theories) but gives the sense of the natural processes of 
the mind shared by all humans. It can, thus, explain what devices and 
techniques used in literary works produce certain effects on humans. It 
would be able, thus, to tell us something about ordinary readers rather 
than professional, competent ones. The other important feature of cog-
nitive poetics is seen in the authors’ claim that the discipline has really 
been a continuation of the work done by Russian formalists and struc-
turalists. This is not entirely unexpected as the research of literariness 
and defamiliarization appears to be quite akin to some of the claims of 
cognitive poeticians, and I have tried to show that both concepts were al-
ready tacitly looming in Stockwell’s work. Essentially, thus, the authors 
claim that cognitive poetics is an extension of formalist and structural-
ists poetics updated with contemporary theories of the mind and with 
contemporary research into language processing and text processing 
that was lacking in the 1960s and 1970s.
All of the above demonstrates that cognitive poetics is trapped in a 
paradox. It claims to be able to explore how and why readers are drawn 
to literary works, but it seems to rely heavily on assumptions similar to 
those from formalist and structuralists theories and encounters similar 
problems. Stockwell’s discussion of Browning shows that rather than ex-
plaining how certain linguistic utterances become an appealing literary 
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work, one needs to first have a certain degree of relevant knowledge 
about art. In other words, one needs first to know in advance what is 
valuable and only then can cognitive poetics begin to explore the reasons 
why a certain artifact has become valuable. This, however, runs con-
trary to the original claim about cognitive poetics being anti-elitist and 
able to place literature within natural processes of the mind.
Even though cognitive science offers quite a promising perspective on 
merging or bridging mind, language, literature and other arts, cognitive 
poetics seems to be quite problematic as a result of its reliance on formal-
ist and structuralist ideas. In particular, cognitive poetics is unable to 
establish the status of its own research: does it produce testable hypoth-
eses about meaning construal? Does it outline possible model readings? 
In the latter case, to be meaningful, cognitive poetics would have to 
include rudimentary aesthetic assumptions about the analyzed work in 
order to account for its artistic value. Unfortunately, the tendency often 
appears to be to treat literary texts not as works of art but as mere lin-
guistic utterances whose understanding and appreciation depends solely 
on applying linguistic methods. There are problems with establishing 
the identity of readers involved in the type of analysis outlined by cog-
nitive poetics. One can assume that what they produce refers to some 
idealized, abstract model of a mind that responds to the poetic devices, 
but then again, it is not clear how to apply such a model, if appreciation 
of art as art requires some degree of literary and cultural competence.
Overall, I see cognitive poetics as offering two ways in which its type 
of research can illuminate understanding of the relation between litera-
ture and mind. First, as stylistics, it can elaborate on the models offered 
by cognitive linguistics and study the intersection of literature and or-
dinary language, on the condition that one does not assume that a full 
understanding of a work can be offered by stylistics. Second, it can be 
an adjunct discipline that is at the disposal of competent readers and 
critics, which helps them to verbalize and conceptualize certain types of 
aesthetic experiences, interpretations and can facilitate one’s skills in un-
derstanding art. The above means that cognitive poetics can offer some 
form of connection between the mind, language and aesthetics, but on 
its own it is unable to account for literary value. Its failure indicates that 
while belonging to a lower-level discipline connected to the study of the 
mind, it cannot fully explain the higher-aesthetic level of verbal art, as 
the latter is governed by its own emergent laws and concepts.
In spite of the criticism voiced above, I regard cognitive poetics (as 
well as any other applications of cognitive science to literary studies) as 
highly valuable in two respects. First, by means of cognitive linguistics 
and psychology it does point to the fact that art, mind and language are 
interconnected, and that creating and consuming literature is insepa-
rable from the existence of human rationality as such: they both draw 
heavily from the same resources. In other words, cognitive poetics has 
114 Literature and Minds
the potential to set the conditions for art creation and reception. The 
problem is, however, that quite frequently cognitive poeticians ignore 
the need to refer to aesthetic considerations about literature and are, as 
a result, left with either reducing literary studies to linguistics willy-nilly 
or implicitly indicating that appreciation of literature is a matter of con-
textual and conventional knowledge, hence moving further away from 
grounding art behaviors in natural mental processes. As I argued in the 
previous chapter, the latter is clearly the same problem that institutional 
theories face: the inability to account for how art develops from natural 
human predispositions. In spite of its own problems regarding the emer-
gence and the relation of value in literary texts, cognitive poetics does 
bring us one step closer to understanding how established and canonical 
art is related to less developed art behaviors and non-evidently aesthetic 
processes: it demonstrates that poetic devices are not only widespread in 
ordinary language use, but also that we use them and understand them 
without special training even when they are structured in a way that is 
not different from their use in artworks.
Empathy and Emotions
One of the points of the discussion in the preceding section was to il-
lustrate that cognitive poetics at times displays a tendency toward cor-
relating literary value linguistic properties, which makes the approach 
vulnerable to the same type of criticism that applied to formalist and 
structuralist literary theories. It also makes it difficult to place literature 
in relation to research into other arts. But the principal lesson of cog-
nitive science is that, regardless of its form, art makes use of the same 
mental processes that are present both in language use and in non-art-
related behaviors. One of the most famous cognitive poeticians, Reuven 
Tsur, summarized the point in the following words:
One major assumption of cognitive poetics is that poetry exploits, 
for aesthetic purposes, cognitive (including linguistic) processes that 
were initially evolved for non-aesthetic purposes, just as in evolving 
linguistic ability, old cognitive and physiological mechanisms were 
turned to new ends. Such an assumption is more parsimonious than 
postulating independent aesthetic and/or linguistic mechanisms. 
The reading of poetry involves the modification (or, sometimes, the 
deformation) of cognitive processes, and their adaptation for pur-
poses for which they were not originally “devised”.
(Tsur 2002a, 281)
There are, I believe, some problems with Tsur’s claims. Even though he 
ascribes to the cognitive principles of the inseparability of language, mind 
and art behaviors, he does indicate that the original purpose of certain 
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mental processes had nothing to do with art (in this case: poetry). Apart 
from a possibly dubious teleology underlying the claim, Tsur seems to 
be suggesting that art behaviors are a by-product, a derivative of mental 
processes. Surprisingly, such a claim would go against cognitive claims 
regarding the non-autonomous character of language and other human 
behaviors. In other words, nowhere is it logically implied that art is 
a by-product. Such a claim is a hypothesis that would require specific 
evidence. Nobody has been able, however, to convincingly demonstrate 
that art is a by-product, and to achieve that seems unlikely. What we can 
safely assume, and what I find much more convincing, is that art behav-
iors are not separable from human rationality, thought, making sense of 
the world, understanding other minds and communicating. If such is the 
case, then the exploration of conditions that underlie the emergence of 
art must also refer to phenomena other than language.
In the preceding section I discussed Mark Turner and his explorations 
of how narrative, language and conceptualization are interconnected. But 
to address art in general, one needs to say something more about human 
cognition. In their book Philosophy in the Flesh (Lakoff and Johnson 
1999), Lakoff and Johnson place research into human cognition in the 
broad context of Western philosophy. They set out to determine how 
cognitive science can address a wide array of philosophical issues con-
cerning minds, subjectivity, epistemology, philosophy of science, philos-
ophy of language, etc. They summarize what they consider as the three 
major findings of cognitive science that can help to answer or revise 
some central philosophical questions as follows. First, the mind is inher-
ently embodied. Second, thought is mostly unconscious. Third, abstract 
concepts are largely metaphorical. Since I have already elaborated upon 
the latter to the extent that it is relevant to my own book, I shall now say 
a little more about the first two of the findings.
The first claim goes against a highly influential tradition in Western 
philosophy that sees rationality as something entirely disconnected from 
human body. In a long tradition ranging from Descartes, Kant, phenom-
enology and the early Fregean analytic philosophy, it has been assumed 
that mind is separate and independent from the body; that it is transcen-
dent, self-transparent and radically free. But the findings of cognitive sci-
ence have plausibly demonstrated that “reason is not disembodied […] 
but arises from the nature of our brains, bodies and bodily experience” 
(Lakoff and Johnson 1999, 4). The same mechanisms that enable us to 
perceive and move in space are responsible for the creation of conceptual 
systems and modes of reason. Its embodiment entails that the mind is to 
a large extent shaped evolutionarily, and its development followed the 
biological evolution of organisms. It is not transparent but mostly un-
conscious, it is not transcendent but is commonly shared by all human 
beings; it is not literal, but imaginative and metaphorical. Finally, it is not 
“dispassionate, but emotionally engaged” (Lakoff and Johnson 1999, 4).
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All of the above has significant bearing not only on the human cog-
nition of the world, or language use, but also on the creation and the 
consumption of art, as all of these forms of human activity remain in-
separable. To comment on the second finding of cognitive science men-
tioned above, consider how the claim that thought is mostly unconscious 
is reflected in language use and art behaviors. As early as 1923 Bertrand 
Russell noticed that language is always vague and imprecise, and com-
munication operates with the use of certain background information 
that are impossible to be contained in the literal meaning of an utter-
ance (Russell 1923, 84–92). Inherent vagueness of meaning in language 
would clearly be in tune with post-structuralist claims, but Russell and 
his followers go a step further and, to use an anachronism, rather than 
insisting on the fact that communication is always already unsuccess-
ful, they maintain that vagueness is, in fact, necessary for humans to 
engage in communication in the first place. Concepts such as redness or 
baldness are essentially vague and can be specified in a variety of ways. 
Utterances such as “it is cold here” can have multiple meanings depend-
ing on the context, as several Oxford School philosophers of language 
(most notable J.L. Austin, 1962) convincingly demonstrated. As John 
Searle observed:
The utterance of any sentence at all, from the most humble sentences 
of ordinary life to the most complex sentences of theoretical physics, 
can only be understood given a set of Background abilities that are 
not themselves part of the semantic content of the sentence.
(Searle 1994, 640)
Those abilities, in turn, will include attributing mental states to speak-
ers, or agents in general, and assuming a high degree of commonality 
regarding our own mental processes and those of other minds, an ability 
which psychologists call theory of mind (Zunshine 2006). Quite pre-
dictably, theory of mind is indispensable in establishing causality of 
events in the surrounding world, but it also constitutes a part of the 
background necessary for communication, and finally, it is one of the 
necessary conditions for human understanding and enjoying of art. 
Empirical research has convincingly demonstrated that people who suf-
fered from brain damage or display symptoms associated with autism 
spectrum have problems attributing mental states to humans and fic-
tional characters, have problems processing figurative language (cannot 
understand or use metaphors), and their idea of meta-representation (a 
concept related to the theory of mind, which, roughly speaking, refers 
to a skill of tracking the causal chain multilevel mental representations, 
the layers of information, as well as to being able to distinguish between 
fiction and reality) is severely impaired (Zunshine 2006, 54–65). As a 
consequence, they are largely unable to understand, much less to enjoy, 
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fiction. Recognizing agency behind a given artifact is crucial for both 
identifying it, locating it chronologically and also acknowledging it as 
designed in specific ways, all of which are prerequisite of making sense 
of art. As I argued in the previous chapters, assuming some degree of 
agency and design behind a candidate for a work of art is essential not 
only for engaging in aesthetic appreciation of art, but also for carrying 
out the type of investigation characteristic of contemporary literary the-
ories and cultural studies. Moreover, theory of mind makes it possible to 
understand the contents of a work of art, at least initially: grasping the 
motivation and the feelings of a character in a story, evaluating their ac-
tions and speculating on their outcomes. Finally, it gives one the ability 
to relive the experiences of given characters, to identify with them or to 
condemn them. Theory of mind is, hence, intimately related to empathy 
and emotions.
The study of emotions in relation to various cognitive approaches, 
neuroscience and other empirical disciplines is a vast, multi-perspective 
area that addresses emotions at different levels of explanation. Hence, I 
will only be able to select a very limited number of scholars and stances 
applicable to my research.
One popular theory of emotions within cognitive framework is the 
appraisal theory. It claims that some emotional reactions are triggered 
as a result of evaluation of the implications of a specific situation for 
oneself, where one implicitly, that is outside of any focal awareness, 
weighs its consequence in terms of the likelihood and degree of pos-
itive or negative consequence, and by analogy emotional reaction to 
past events depends “on evaluations of what has happened in relation 
to the person’s goals and beliefs” (Oatley 1992, 19). Emotions are, 
then, not the opposite of thought (as we might intuitively suppose), but 
are “intimately bound up with thought” (Hogan 2003a, 140), as they 
play an important role in everyday cognition of the world. In Keith 
Oatley’s words, “emotions are part of a solution to problems of orga-
nizing knowledge and action in the world that is imperfectly known, 
and in which we have limited resources” (Oatley 1992, 3). This form 
of appraisal theory emphasizes, then, the relevance of human agency, 
human aims and plans to eliciting emotions. To give a simple exam-
ple, fear is the emotion evoked “when a particular type of goal, self- 
preservation goal, is threatened. Sadness occurs with a complete loss 
of a major goal. Anger results from the frustration of a plan that is 
currently active” (Hogan 2003a, 145). As Hogan and Oatley noticed, 
although some of the basic human plans are quite egocentric, that 
is, concerned mostly with the individuals’ goals of self-preservation, 
many of them involve more complex social or joint plans shared with 
other people. As Hogan puts it, “the most intense and consequential 
instances of most emotions bear not on individual plans, but on joint 
plans” (Hogan 2003a, 146).
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One might say that the above account of emotions is perhaps plausible 
for explaining real-life situations, but it seems to have little to do with 
engaging in fiction, where no real plans and no real goals are present. 
But, obviously, human emotional reactions are not limited to those of 
personal, or even shared, plans and goals. Emotional triggers might be 
more direct and immediate, as we all know, since we are all capable of 
recognizing the feelings of others and responding to or sharing their 
emotional concerns without being involved in any actual plan. Apart 
from the aforementioned theory of mind, another source of engaging in 
fiction is, as Norman Holland recently pointed out, the functioning of 
mirror neurons which are activated both in the very moment of perform-
ing an action, or while observing that action being performed by oth-
ers (Holland 2009, 94–97). So, in fact, emotional preoccupation with 
fiction does not seem to be removed from our ability to emotionally 
respond to the events, plans and feelings of others. The seeming paradox 
of being engaged and responding to fictional events can be resolved by 
pointing out that emotional response is prior to any judgments concern-
ing reality or fictionality, which may or may not override the emotional 
mechanism. Deciding whether the stimulus comes from real or fictional 
worlds is often secondary to emotional experience. Emotionally loaded 
stories, thus, engage and manipulate our natural empathic abilities.
In accord with the above considerations, we might say that at least 
one major reason why stories can become interesting is the development 
of plans and goals set by the characters, as all humans have a tendency 
to ascribe intentions and mental states not unlike their own to fictional 
characters, and to share, or imagine, the fictional emotional response to 
the course of events. So it follows naturally, as Patrick Hogan and oth-
ers have noticed, that emotional response often depends on the causal 
sequence of events; that it is always already embedded in complex nar-
rative structures, rather than being related only to an individual event. 
On the most fundamental level, stories can be, in fact, conceived of as 
elaborate developments of goals and plans. It does not mean that the 
proper way of understanding and appreciating fiction is to see it as if 
fictional characters were psychologically identical to real people. Yet, it 
does point to the simple fact that understanding fiction cannot proceed 
without understanding reality and that exploring the former does rest 
on assumptions about the latter. This last claim was often voiced by 
 reader-response scholars from Iser to Eco, but thanks to cognitive sci-
ence it has been placed in a coherent, unifying framework.
Following the famous neuroscientist Joseph LeDoux, Patrick Hogan 
writes that there are two broad ways in which emotional response can be 
triggered as a result of arousal of specific areas of the brain (the amyg-
dala in particular), both of which are highly relevant to understand-
ing how art works (Hogan 2003a, 175). “The low road” means direct 
stimulation by means of single triggers that activate the largely innate, 
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wired responses. Simple examples of how the “low road” works in real 
life might include hearing certain sounds (e.g., loud shrieks) that make 
us feel fearful or images that immediately evoke repulsive feelings, or, 
conversely, sexual desires. Direct stimulation operates more or less in 
the same fashion in art. Horror films notoriously make use of sound, 
lighting or monster creation in a way that immediately activates evo-
lutionarily based emotional responses. Other visual arts obviously rely 
on similar patterns of the “low road” activation and so is music with 
its quasi- mimetic associations (sad music is slow, tense music involves 
“short, repetitive notes” (Hogan 2003a, 178) while comic music “of-
ten has with quick tempi” (Hogan 2003a, 178). “High road” activation 
is more complex as it consists of indirect stimulation through cortex, 
and, thus, includes appraisal, memory and imagination. In this case, 
emotional response can be triggered by, for example, being called to a 
meeting by one’s boss. The response is triggered by the ability to imagine 
the possible outcomes of such a meeting, which, in turn, depends on the 
type of memories about similar events stored in one’s mind. These can 
be both representational (accessible as remembered past events: images 
or scenes) or implicit. In the latter case, the reason why certain stimuli 
evoke emotional response might not be self-evident. Of course, emo-
tional response might also be a hypertrophy of an innate disposition (as 
in certain phobias) or be a mixture of direct and indirect stimulation.
Some scholars also suggested that affect plays a crucial role in the 
process of comprehending a story. In his project of empirical literary 
studies, David S. Miall argued that it is affective response that precedes 
the formation of a broader schemata according to which a story is fur-
ther comprehended. In the process of reading, it is the affect that guides 
readers regarding the possible construction of schemata (Miall 1989). If 
this is the case, then the process of comprehension and appreciation of 
art must involve some emotion-related components, rather than being a 
tedious and self-reflective process of matching one’s competent expecta-
tions with the tissue of the work, as it was suggested in Olsen’s model 
which I discussed earlier. Finally, emotions seem to be crucial for the 
formation of value judgments in aesthetics, a topic to which I will return 
later.
Apart from the theory of mind, mirror neurons and human empathic 
abilities, Zunshine and Holland mention several other natural mental 
processes involved in consuming fiction. One important concept, directly 
related to theory of mind that Zunshine discusses, is  meta- representation: 
the ability to index the streams of information incoming via theory of 
mind. This includes the ability to evaluate them in terms of truthful-
ness and reliability of the fictional characters’ behavior and so to under-
stand and organize the fictional world (Zunshine 2006, 60–61). Norman 
 Holland mentions absorption and transportation,  processes that mark be-
ing immersed in a fictional world (and which are normally correlated with 
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its positive evaluation) which stem from standard “task-oriented focusing 
of attention” (Holland 2009, 58). Holland also quotes Jaak Panksepp’s 
notion of seeking, which is a basic emotional system which leads humans 
and animals to constantly seek and be alert for signals in the environ-
ment that are important for survival and well-being. In a distant sense, 
it is responsible for the natural propensity for exploration or curiosity, as 
well as expecting some form of enjoyment from approaching art or even 
having expectations as to what we might encounter or what we wish 
to encounter in a work in general. Holland goes even further, claiming 
that “it is seeking that drives us to interpret the metaphors and symbols 
of poetry and to make sense of the plots and characters of dramas and 
narratives” (Holland 2009, 87).
Jenefer Robinson authored another influential volume on the role of 
emotions in engaging with art. Like Hogan, Robinson follows a version 
of appraisal theory of emotions which is indebted to psychological the-
ories of Richard Lazarus and sees what we ordinarily call emotions as 
divided into two components: some physiological arousal which leads 
to affective appraisal, a subconscious and quick feeling which, in turn, 
triggers cognitive evaluation when we consciously assess something as 
disgusting or scary. Devoting substantial amount of her discussion to 
literature, she explores how our emotional capacities are prerequisite to 
understand behavior of fictional characters, and thus, longer narrative 
structures, how they enable us to fill the phenomenological gaps within a 
work. Further, she claims, our engagement with literary works resembles 
psychological coping mechanisms that allow us to work through diffi-
cult and complex emotional states and arrive at rewarding feelings even 
when dealing with painful material.
All the above claims about the importance of emotions in ordinary 
responses to literature are, I think, uncontentious, as they would be 
when talking about responses to other forms of art, but also to real-life 
events, biographical stories told by friends, admiring landscapes, food 
and so on. In other words, it is obvious that our emotional architecture 
regulates our enjoyment of art and non-art. The crucial philosophical 
question is, however, whether actual emotional response is prerequisite 
for appreciation of (literary) art as art. Robinson seems to be claiming 
that the answer is positive. Not only does she state that by responding 
emotionally we are “better able to appreciate” (Robinson 2005, 125) the 
skillfulness with which authors depict scenes, build suspense or induce 
and guide reader’s affects and that “emotional involvement is necessary 
for liking or for appreciating a work” (Robinson 2005, 125) but she 
also holds that responding emotionally is a form of understanding which 
informs reflective interpretations of literature, being one of the crucial 
components of overall understanding of art. This is a contentious issue 
in philosophy of art and although it is a problem far too complex than 
to dismiss it with a simple “no,” on the whole I think Robinson is wrong 
Literature and Minds 121
here and I will return to this matter in Chapter 4 when discussing Susan 
Feagin’s attack on Institutional Theory of Literature.
The above are just examples of the contemporary body of writing re-
garding the relation of various forms of neuroscience to art, including 
literature, which has already become quite vast. I could not aim at dis-
cussing it all in this book; my modest point was to mention some of the 
most important concepts that this type of research applies, as relevant 
to my argument that art, both in terms of artistic forms and in how art 
is understood and appreciated, has natural underpinnings. There are a 
variety of issues in aesthetics that could be illuminated or expanded by 
recourse to work in cognitive science, pertaining to the role of emotions 
and expressivity both in creation and in responding to art, along with re-
lated concerns about intentions and cognition of art or art’s beginnings. 
Likewise, as I hope to show throughout this book, there is a myriad of 
issues in empirical, cognitive or neuroscientific approaches to literature 
and arts that would be clarified and rectified by paying more attention 
to philosophical aesthetics.
Researching Universals
If one accepts the broad premises underlying cognitive science that I 
outlined in the preceding sections: the embodied character of the human 
mind, the lack of an autonomous faculty for processing language, the in-
terconnectedness of rationality, emotions and other mental faculties, the 
“literary” quality of how humans conceptualize and cognize the world, 
and finally, that the above features are shared by all humans, then one 
can expect, regarding literature, that some of its features as well as cer-
tain aspects of its creation and consumption should be shared by hu-
mans cross-culturally. The topic is not uncontroversial and since the rise 
of post-structuralism, humanities have been reluctant to explore it. On 
the one hand, as it is often claimed, talking about universals is always at 
risk of absolutizing local beliefs, phenomena and prejudices, at the same 
time marginalizing what is seen as not fitting to this local-universalized 
perspective. This is a legitimate concern that any research program in 
the humanities must take into consideration. Later in this section I will 
try to demonstrate how the theory of universals I subscribe to is able to 
greatly reduce such a risk.
On the other hand, many celebrated scholars in the humanities have 
tended to reject the possibility of both formulating reliable programs 
exploring cross-cultural phenomena and even carrying out systematic 
research as such. In his “From Work to Text,” Roland Barthes argued 
that systematic literary studies (represented by its reliance on the no-
tion of a “work”) is an illusion in the same sense in which Newtonian 
physics has been proved to be an illusion owing to Einstein’s relativity 
(Barthes 1977, 155–156). Not only is Barthes entirely wrong in his claim 
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about physics, but also it remains a mystery how and why such analogies 
should be applicable to literature. Even if this is just a metaphor, it is 
rather unclear2 and not much argument follows to support the idea. Bar-
thes is, unfortunately, not alone in questioning the possibility of system-
atic research in humanities by means of making dubious assertions. At 
times the two opposing stances run parallel to the analytic-continental 
divide in philosophy, but the commonsensical suspiciousness regarding 
the possibility of finding universal patterns in humanities research can 
sometimes lead to quite preposterous claims as in the case when two re-
nowned continental philosophers, allegedly following Rorty and Badiou 
(Davis and Zabala 2013), quite openly and seriously claim in a short 
on-line article that what they see as the tenets of analytic philosophy (ap-
parently: carrying out systematic research using logical argumentation 
and careful use of language) indicate that the whole tradition is anal- 
retentive and has a secret death wish.
One of the most famous expositions of such doubts in the progress 
and the possibilities of science that is often taken up by scholars in the 
humanities was voiced by Lyotard in his The Postmodern Condition 
(1980). What puts into question science’s ambition of producing a coher-
ent and reliable body of universal knowledge (a grand narrative) are the 
little narratives, scattered findings of science itself: Godel’s incomplete-
ness theorem, quantum physics, fractals and catastrophe theory. The 
claim was, however, famously rebutted by Alan Sokal (Sokal and Bric-
mont 1998), and though it is clear that the vision of science promoted by 
positivists and neopositivists is hopelessly naïve, there is no connection 
whatsoever between incompleteness theorem and an impossibility of 
valid, systematic research. There is no reason to suppose that research-
ing local, small-scale or marginal phenomena (which post-structuralist 
literary theorists happily embrace in their research) is incompatible with 
larger-scale projects. The two do, in fact, go together as isolating regu-
larities in the studied phenomena is germane to every type of research. 
I take it that abandoning the latter in favor of the former is to a large 
extent a matter of fashion.
Before I finally move to discuss literary universals themselves, one 
more issue needs to be addressed: namely, how the cognitively based 
program of universals research is related to older attempts at finding 
cross-cultural patterns in literary studies: archetypal criticism and struc-
turalism. Although in my discussion of literary universals I am chiefly 
following the work of Patrick C. Hogan, who at one point acknowledges 
Northrop Frye as his teacher (Hogan 2003b, 13), the work itself con-
tains no references to Frye, Jung or other authors associated with arche-
typal criticism. Moreover, although the work on literary universals does 
include the study of myths, it uses various approaches associated with 
cognitive science as its chief methodology (apart from quantitative stud-
ies, of course) and contains little references to Jungian, or any other type 
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of psychoanalysis. It is true that archetypal criticism, the study of myth 
and religion, has produced valuable results that can be broadly incorpo-
rated into cognitively based research of cross-cultural literary or artistic 
universals, but the Jungian approach is much more limited in compari-
son to cognitive approaches, as it focuses on images, character-functions 
and themes that permeate stories, having little to offer regarding, say, 
universals related to form or the practice of literary behaviors. If there is 
a connection, then, it is that of a general spirit of looking for regularities 
across cultures.
The case is similar when it comes to structuralism. It cannot be said 
that cognitive approaches to literary studies mark a return or a continu-
ation of structuralism, unless one assumes that looking for patterns and 
regularities already entails it, a claim that I have argued is entirely wrong, 
as adhering to structuralism would require following strictly structural-
ist methodology in the likes of Levi-Strauss or de Saussure. I indicated 
some problems with structuralist approaches to literary studies in the 
preceding chapters and my remarks are entirely in tune with cognitively 
based literary research. Finally, and similarly as with archetypal criti-
cism, structuralism produced a valuable body of writing, particularly 
in the study of narrative, some of which can be easily incorporated into 
cognitively based research without necessarily becoming structuralist in 
nature. As with archetypal criticism, the work to which I refer contains 
little reference to structuralist theories.
Literary Universals
Hogan defines literary universals as “properties and relations found 
across a range of literary traditions” (Hogan 2003b, 17). This, of course, 
requires some further qualifications. First, just like in the study of lin-
guistic universals, to pursue literary universals one must be careful to 
distinguish those regularities that are traceable to a common ancestor 
(constitute one literary tradition), and are, thus, not a cross-cultural uni-
versal, from those that are “genetically and areally distinct” (Hogan 
2003b, 17) and that did not influence each other regarding the studied 
property. Second, the term “universals” does not entail that the studied 
property needs to be found in all cultures. Again, just like in the pursuit 
of linguistic universals it is important that the property or relation occur 
across unrelated cultures “with greater frequency than would be pre-
dicted by chance alone” (Hogan 2003b, 19). An absolute universal, that 
is, when a property or relation is found across all traditions, is a special 
case of the statistical universal. An example of an absolute universal in 
linguistics can be the fact that all languages contain vowels. A very gen-
eral literary universal is that all cultures appear to produce and consume 
literary forms. The standard Western typology of the three basic literary 
forms: prose, poetry and drama, is just a particular manifestation of the 
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universal feature that all, or almost all, cultures tend to produce verse, 
“a verbal art involving formalized cyclical organization of speech based 
on fixed, recurring patterns of acoustic properties” (Hogan 2003b, 23). 
Similarly, storytelling in terms of “sequences of non-banal events involv-
ing human agency” (Hogan 2003b, 23) including “patterned variation of 
emotional intensity” (Hogan 2003b, 23) produced partly for enjoyment, 
partly for other reasons (religious, cognitive, etc.), along with some form 
of its enactment, though sometimes in a rather limited fashion, as with 
“brief episodes on festival occasions or in rituals” (Hogan 2003b, 23) 
appear to be absolute, or near absolute universals.
According to Hogan, literary universals include two broad catego-
ries: a repertoire of techniques and a range of non-technical correlations 
“ derived from broad statistical patterns” (Hogan 2003b, 20). One exam-
ple of the latter might be the fact that cross-culturally the “standard line 
lengths appear to fall regularly between five and nine words” (Hogan 
2003b, 20), a fact that Hogan explains as being either a cognitive con-
straint or a natural tendency that stems from the mechanisms governing 
working memory and attentional focus (Hogan 2003b, 20). Examples 
of universal techniques encompass the use of symbolism and imagery, 
assonance, rhyme, alliteration, verbal parallelism, foreshadowing, plot 
circularity, structural assimilation etc. (Hogan 2003b, 23). Further, 
techniques are organized into schemas that define literary types and 
subtypes within which a technique may be defined as obligatory or op-
tional. For example, for a work to be classified as a traditional sonnet, it 
is obligatory (apart from a certain rhyming scheme) that it has fourteen 
lines, whereas it is not obligatory that it contain alliterations. Within 
schemas, one can isolate more specific patterns concerning, for exam-
ple, narrative structure. As Hogan claims, it appears that every tradi-
tion does tell stories of conflict in two areas, “love and political power” 
( Hogan 2003b, 23) that contain common motifs, character types and 
plot developments.
The fact that certain basic narrative structures tend to recur across 
cultures leads Hogan to formulate a cognitively based theory where the 
romantic and the heroic tragi-comedies figure as cross-cultural narra-
tive prototypes. This might seem like a nod to Northrop Frye’s theory, 
but Hogan adds that this is merely due to the fact that both his and 
Frye’s theories make use of well-established facts and in this particular 
respect are not really original.3 The fact that similar stories regarding 
romantic union and political power recur leads to him to claim that they 
are connected with eliciting basic conditions of happiness. This seems 
quite predictable taking into consideration the narrative embeddedness 
of emotions that I outlined earlier. Hogan adds the following:
romantic union and social or political power are the goals sought 
by protagonists in prototypical narratives. The corresponding 
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prototypes for sorrow are the death of the beloved and the com-
plete loss of social and political power, typically through social and 
political exclusion, either within society (through imprisonment) or 
outside society (through exile).
(Hogan 2003b, 94)
The cross-cultural structure of the romantic tragi-comedy is easily 
recognizable and roughly follows the pattern where two lovers cannot 
be united because of some constraint of social structure; the story often 
includes a rival “preferred by the interfering parents” (Hogan 2003b, 
101). Next comes the separation of lovers associated with death or im-
ages of death, followed by a reunion preceded by a struggle and defeat 
of the rival (even if this entails union in afterlife). The middle-part, the 
development of the story, is normally associated with feelings of sorrow, 
something that is accountable by contemporary research into emotions: 
due to habituation, the feeling of joy is intensified to some degree by 
preceding sorrow (Hogan 2003b, 103). This leads Hogan to another 
interesting observation, namely, that romantic tragedies are “truncated 
tragi-comedies” (Hogan 2003b, 103) as their plots stop precisely at the 
moment associated with feelings of sorrow. What further supports the 
claim that tragedies have, in fact, evolved from tragi-comedies is the fact 
that they are less common cross-culturally than comedies. Moreover, as 
Hogan points out, it is very often the case that early instances of tragedy 
are “integrated into larger cycles that are ultimately comic,” (Hogan 
2003b, 104) as in Oresteia, Oedipus plays and in traditional Japanese 
drama (Hogan 2003b, 104).
The plot of the prototypical heroic tragi-comedy is, similarly, easily 
recognizable. Its beginning marks a social conflict between the hero and 
the ruler/usurper, following a usurpation or deprivation of the kingdom 
or any other rightful position. What follows is imprisonment or exile 
of the hero associated with death-like imagery. Next, a threat haunts 
society, often in the form of invasion, which is alleviated through some 
struggle and thanks to the returning hero. The final prototype narrative, 
according to Hogan, is the sacrificial tragi-comedy associated with a vio-
lation of a divine rule that leads to the whole community being punished 
either by means of food deprivation or an exile from land of plenty.
Apart from the three basic prototypes, Hogan mentions also some 
“minor genres,” (Hogan 2013, 29) which he considers less prominent 
across literary tradition but still quite widespread. In fact, their existence 
seems to be predicted by the theory of prototypes, if we acknowledge 
that cross-cultural emergence of such stories is directly connected with 
fundamental human needs and emotions with which these needs are 
bound. So, the romantic tragi-comedy prototype is rooted in the “com-
bination of sexual desire and attachment” (Hogan 2013, 31) associated 
with romantic love. The heroic prototype bears on the feelings of both 
126 Literature and Minds
group and individual pride and the related concerns over the stability 
and security of the society, emphasizing loyalty, violence and defense. 
Sacrificial tragi-comedy concerns perhaps the most basic needs – access 
to food and water related with general physical health and well-being. 
In accord with the above, minor types tend to develop when some of the 
combined emotions are addressed separately. Thus, the minor familiar 
separation prototype is related to the romantic one (Hogan 2013, 32) 
with only attachment being involved and the sexual component omitted. 
Conversely, the seduction prototype takes up only sexual desire leaving 
out attachment. The personal revenge prototype is driven by anger and 
disgust, both of which are taken directly from heroic narratives ( Hogan 
2013, 32). The fourth recurring narrative involves identification and 
punishment of criminal activity.
In addition to the widespread occurrence of whole genres, Hogan 
claims that it is possible to isolate recurring sequences of events, scenes 
and character types (Hogan 2013, 32). Characters such as tempters, 
heroes, villains and sacrificial victims are clearly identifiable cross- 
culturally. Some event sequences, such as exile, seem to be present across 
genres. Recurring places include, predictably, home society and an alien 
place.
Taking into consideration the broad cognitive framework involving 
both Lakoff’s notion of embodied cognition, Johnson’s theory of the 
literary mind and Oatley’s theory of emotions, Hogan’s theory of the 
prototypes should make yet another prediction: that the prototype the-
ory itself be extendable to encompass other literary and non-literary cre-
ations of the human mind. This is precisely what the theory claims to 
achieve, as Hogan suggests that his emotional/narrative prototypes can 
explain some aspects of lyric poetry and religious belief.
Although perhaps intuitively, we tend to think that narrative and 
non-narrative verbal art are entirely separate, Hogan claims this is not 
the case. Instead, lyric poems appear to be, traditionally, “elaborations 
of junctural moments in narratives” (Hogan 2013, 153) that focus on 
specific emotions elicited by particular events or sequences of events. 
Old Testament psalms are a good example both regarding their mean-
ing and the roots of their affective force, as is the case with the famous 
lines from psalm 137 “Beside the streams of Babylon/we sat and wept” 
(Hogan 2013, 155). Thus, its affective force and its meaning is not dis-
connected from its place within the longer narrative. Other examples of 
Western literary tradition that involve lyric poems as part of narratives 
include the development of the sonnet where poems are structured into 
“loosely plotted series of events” or in medieval prose narratives ( Hogan 
2013, 155). Similarly, poetry marks and elaborates on the junctural 
 moments in narratives in traditional dramatic works cross- culturally, 
as well as in popular Hollywood, Bollywood or Broadway musicals 
( Hogan 2013, 157).
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Apart from explicitly junctural functions of lyric poetry, some of its 
genres seem to be directly related to heroic or romantic narrative pro-
totypes in a non-junctural way. Thus, the praise and blame poetry of 
eulogy and satire focus on the physical properties or personality traits 
germane to heroic plots. Natural imagery, on the other hand, is often an 
essential part of romantic plots. Accordingly, devotional poetry tends to 
fall into two categories of relation to God: that of awe, and that of long-
ing, which appear to have some connection with praise associated with 
the heroic prototype, and attachment typical of romantic plots (Hogan 
2013, 169–171).
On a side note, a related discussion of poetic conventions can be 
found in the work of Reuven Tsur (2009). In short, Tsur argues that 
some forms of traditional poetry, by which he means mostly medieval 
and renaissance works, across cultures are in fact “cognitive fossils,” 
that is, “cognitive solutions to adaptation problems that have acquired 
the status of established practice” (Tsur 2009). This means that certain 
themes and forms often found in poetry are conventionalized psycho-
logical processes commonly occurring in human minds. An example 
that Tsur gives is the Freudian ambivalence toward the beloved, which 
indicates that his interdisciplinary perspective bridges psychoanalysis, 
evolutionary psychology and cognitive anthropology. Though surely it is 
not the case that all love is ambivalent, it is not unusual to happen. One 
fairly natural process of dealing with the displeasure of ambivalent love 
is splitting the ambivalent image into polar opposites of good and bad. 
This is, in turn, fossilized into a convention commonly used in folktales 
as in the case of splitting the ambivalent feelings toward the mother into 
that of an evil witch and that of a good mother. In traditional poetry 
(exemplified in Tsur’s discussion by Catullus, Petrarch and many of their 
imitations), ambivalent feelings toward the beloved one are dealt with 
using conventions that are different fossilized mechanisms of resolving 
ambivalence-related tension: leveling and sharpening, that is, either min-
imizing or maximizing the “unfitting detail” (Tsur 2009). Tsur indi-
cates, however, that fossilization of cognitive devices does not refer only 
to the thematic aspect of art. Just like Hogan, he readily admits that 
certain cross-cultural patterns of versification and prosody are not just 
arbitrary conventions that have been then culturally transmitted with no 
connection to the propensities of the human mind, but do, in fact, reflect 
some natural tendencies of the mind regarding working memory (as with 
the natural, time-related limitations on the capacity of the mental pho-
nological loop which serves as a short-term storage of incoming verbal 
data) and attention span (Tsur 2002b).
I take the basic claims put forward by Hogan and Tsur to be uncon-
troversial. Partly because, as Hogan admitted, the theory is not greatly 
original in some respects: that certain thematic and formal properties 
of literary works appear cross-culturally without the possibility of them 
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being merely transferred from one culture to another is a well-known 
fact. But the value of both theories lies elsewhere: in their ability to ex-
plain the data in a unified interdisciplinary theory that bridges the liter-
ary with what we know about the human mind, being both up to date 
with recent research in other disciplines and offering a fertile ground for 
future research. The perspective offered is that of combining the cog-
nitive with the cultural. It is clear that those stories or poems served a 
different cultural function than they do nowadays. They were not simply 
candidates for appreciation to be judged by a competent literary critic. 
Rather than that, they served religious, ritual, social, cognitive and polit-
ical functions. But apart from that, their design indicates that they com-
ply with the basic propensities of the human mind regarding emotions 
(and their embeddedness in stories) and pleasure so as to satisfy natural 
human expectations. It may be concluded, then, that the organization of 
the human mind sets the broad framework and broad constraints on the 
production of these prototypical stories.
Nevertheless, it is crucial to remember that the three narrative pro-
totypes posited by Hogan, or the cognitive fossils hypothesis put for-
ward by Tsur, cannot be said to encompass all stories. One can tell an 
ordinary story about how they spent several hours in a terrible traffic 
jam or how they repeatedly have problems with postal services and the 
story will be neither romantic, heroic nor sacrificial. Similarly, many cel-
ebrated contemporary stories fail to submit to the pattern. Hogan’s own 
example of a canonical work that does not fit to the pattern is Waiting 
for Godot, but it is also true that the story is far from being usual or pro-
totypical in any sense. I doubt if the universals theory can even have such 
grand ambitions as to claim that stories circulate in culture in a given 
form because the form itself must always be perfectly fit for the natural 
tendencies of the mind. Such arguments are often put forward by the 
literary Darwinists, but I suppose that pursuing putative evolutionary 
advantage in reading Kafka or Beckett is an intellectual dead end that 
entirely eliminates cultural input and the importance of cultural trans-
mission in favor of crude reductionism. What a cognitive cultural theory 
can offer instead is to explain why certain basic stories were most prob-
able to originate as prototypical forms and, perhaps, why many popular 
stories nowadays might also follow similar patterns. What it cannot of-
fer is another monomyth theory, a one-size-fits-all key to all narratives.
Although the prototype theory cannot be decisive regarding artistic 
value of stories, its relation to value theories is, nevertheless, quite inter-
esting. For one thing, many prototypical stories are among the canoni-
cal and most celebrated ones. On the other hand, many canonical and 
valuable works are far from being prototypical, and similarly, myriads 
of pop-cultural reproductions of prototypical stories are not artistically 
valuable. Still, informed value judgments in art must include references 
to art history, that is, we always evaluate partly comparing a candidate 
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for appreciation to classical works. Classical works are, in turn, most 
often prototypical and what we value in later works that constitute lit-
erary tradition is, among other things, their ability to challenge, change 
or enter in a dialogue with the prototypical forms. The fact that heroic 
or romantic tragi-comedy appear to be universal prototypes tells us little 
about its intrinsic artistic value per se, but they touch upon artistic value 
on at least two levels: indirectly, by being originators of the canon of ver-
bal art to which other works relate, but also on the level of what I should 
call ordinary reader experience. I doubt that the fact that prototypical 
stories permeate popular culture narratives is exclusively due to their 
embeddedness in narrative tradition or due to exposure effects on mass 
audience.4 If the cognitive cultural theory is correct, exposure can rein-
force certain expectations but, more importantly, the themes and struc-
ture of prototypical stories resonates well with the natural tendencies of 
the mind. This also entails that if these stories are valued by everyday 
readers/audience, there might be some connection between basic human 
emotional reactions and evaluation. After all, prototypical stories are 
widely enjoyed because they touch upon most universal, most common 
human desires and are, thus, constructed in a way that maximizes the 
chances of empathy and identification, which, in turn, facilitates the 
enjoyment of stories. I feel that the above makes both strong cultural 
constructionism on the one hand, and naturalistic reductionism a la Lit-
erary Darwinists, on the other hand, seem implausible in comparison to 
cognitive cultural (historical) theories.
Information Processing
So far throughout this chapter I have been trying to demonstrate how 
literary texts rely on and exploit natural cognitive processes and ten-
dencies in terms of both the form and the content of verbal art. My 
aim was to argue that the proviso introduced by institutional theories of 
art that literary works should touch upon topics of human interest has 
deeper implications than perhaps suggested by the theory. For if the con-
stitution of both form and content of artworks depends greatly on the 
natural propensities of the human mind, then the claim that informed 
consumption of art is a convention not unlike engaging in a game of 
chess should be revised. As the case may be, calling the vaguely con-
ceived rules and procedures involved in appreciation of literary works 
conventions is useful on a certain level of description. But, as I already 
suggested in Chapter 2, the claim becomes problematic when compared 
to how the notion of “convention” is understood. A fair amount of both 
themes and forms that verbal art uses is not merely conventional and, 
thus, the notion of “institution” must in fact be a partly naturalizable 
phenomenon as it depends on natural facts about humans and human 
minds in a non-trivial way.
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Although I touched upon certain general issues regarding language, 
mind, emotions and cognition, I have not yet adequately discussed that 
aspect of cognitive science that is, in fact, central to its interests: how 
the mind processes incoming inputs. Just as a previous consideration in 
this chapter outlined what underlies some formal and thematic “conven-
tions” of verbal art, discussion of information processing sheds some 
light on how humans come to understand and appreciate literature. This 
is, after all, another essential component of the literary institution.
It is common knowledge that cognitive science is a vast, heterogeneous 
field where scholars often share very little when it comes to research in-
terest and methods. After all, investigating the workings of the mind can 
fall anywhere between hard, physicalist neurobiology and neuroscience 
to quasi-phenomenologist accounts of subjective experience and folk 
psychology. My discussion will follow Patrick Hogan’s (Hogan 2003a, 
29–59) and, thus, I will assume that the space between the physicalist and 
folk psychology consists of various, complementary levels of description 
and not necessarily of competing, mutually exclusive paradigms, all of 
which are, in the end, explained on the meta-level of human evolution. 
What all the levels of description share is the conviction that human cog-
nition needs to be studied by introducing information processing models 
consisting of interplay between perception and memory. Consequently, 
they include references to structures, contents and processes. The first 
are equivalent to “organizational principles of the mind” (Hogan 2003a, 
30) and might comprise: working and long-term memory, sensory pro-
cessors and buffers, specialized modules, such as loops and sketchpads, 
as well as a general workspace and central executive, or, a segment of 
working memory we normally call “consciousness.” Contents are un-
derstood as representations, or symbols occupying space within struc-
tures, as in one’s lexical entry for “cat.” Processes are “operations that 
run on contents” (Hogan 2003a, 30) in or across structures. The pro-
cesses will roughly include selection, segmentation and structuration. 
When it comes to the levels of description, two accounts most relevant 
for understanding experience of art would be representationalism and 
connectionism.
In the neurobiology-phenomenology spectrum, representationalism is 
closer to the latter. In fact, it might be seen as systematizing and objecti-
fying the language of folk psychology, as well as subjecting it to experi-
mental method. Following Johnson-Laird, LeDoux and Hogan (2003a, 
34–42), I will assume that, in representationalist accounts, each sensory 
processor (responsible for processing inputs from each respective sense), 
along with its buffers and specialized modules operate in a parallel and 
independent way. For instance, an auditory processor selects data from 
the incoming stream of sounds. Next, the signal enters temporary buf-
fers whose role is to match the selected material with information stored 
in long-term memory. If recognized as speech, the partly encoded input 
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enters specialized processors. Finally, the encoded data enters workspace 
and is used by the central executive, where it can be synthesized with 
other inputs or long-term memory data.
When it comes to the processes involved in encoding information, se-
lection is perhaps the most obvious one. It is almost a platitude to say 
that we cannot register all the incoming signals of the outside world in 
a naïve realist fashion. There is a lot of information that we are not able 
to register, and this refers to each of the senses. Selection, however, is 
not only a matter of the perception-level processes. Specialized proces-
sors, buffers and memory make sure that only some, relevant informa-
tion enters further stages of encoding, whereas some inputs are filtered 
out as irrelevant for currently running goals. Predictably, segmentation 
involves dividing the incoming stream of information into discernible 
units. Again, if the incoming sound is identified as speech, the input 
will be segmented into speech sounds, words, etc. Other examples in-
clude isolation of notes and phrases in music or recognition of rhythm 
in poetry. Structuration includes matching the selected segmented inputs 
with some system-stored in long-term memory. In language processing, 
the identified small-scale segments are put together by morphology and 
syntax owing to structuration. At this level, the segmented units have 
some interrelations assigned and a complex, hierarchically structured 
model is produced.
Although the outline is, necessarily, very rough, I am convinced that 
the above processes and structures have an important bearing on how 
art is produced, understood and appreciated. First, Olsen’s institutional 
account of literature, which I discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, uses seem-
ingly analogous steps in the discussion of competent reader’s (or, a lit-
erary critic’s) actions. One can clearly distinguish there the stages of 
selection, segmentation and structuration as parts of a goal-oriented 
process of literary appreciation, which mirror almost exactly the cogni-
tive processes outlined above following Hogan and others. I take it that 
it is not a mere terminological coincidence and, consequently, how we 
cognize and appreciate something as art is not an entirely arbitrary pro-
cedure, but it bears significant affinity with how we cognize in general. 
I will have more to say about this in the last chapter.
Second, the model produced owing to structuration serves as a kind 
of compass for orienting ourselves in a given situation. Specifically, situ-
ation models, that is, the ones that refer to the environment in which we 
are acting, guide our responses and actions in the world (Hogan 2003a, 
40–42). Entering a room is equal to opening a general category in the 
workspace, such as “a room.” This already shapes a broad array of ex-
pectations that are in tune with ongoing goals. It guides our attention 
and “provides structure for incoming information” (Hogan 2003a, 41). 
Obviously, a couple of decades before the explosion of cognitive science, 
reader-response theorists, phenomenologists and some semioticians, as 
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Umberto Eco, noticed that the way in which we come to understand the 
world applies to literary experience. How we accumulate information 
about the world and what we store in our memory bears directly on 
how we experience fiction. Hogan’s simple example of this application 
is the processing of a line from Coetzee’s Waiting for Barbarians, “We 
sit in the best room of the inn with a flask between us and a bowl of 
nuts” (Hogan 2003a, 41). Reading it already opens relevant categories 
(e.g., novel, characters and pub) that shape some expectations, and ac-
tivates specific modules (e.g., visuo-spatial sketchpad for outlining the 
room). Selection of inputs on the basis of the saliency is also crucial. 
Probably, the nuts and flask would be ignored and quickly forgotten on 
first reading. Alternatively, they might be ascribed some significance in 
the context of the whole work, perhaps on another reading or when one 
specifically reads with food-related themes in mind. Some inputs are just 
not processable all at once.
As with the relation to institutional accounts of literature, I will have 
more to say about this in the final chapter. But the general point is, as 
Hogan noticed, the same complex processes of encoding taking part in 
the same cognitive architecture generate identical situational models and 
inferences both in understanding fiction and in the cognition of the real 
world.
There remains at least one important feature of memory in represen-
tationalist account of the mind that illuminates how we come to under-
stand and appreciate art in general, and verbal art in particular, and that 
is the relation between long-term memory and mental lexicon. Long-
term memory should not be understood as a uniform module, but rather 
as a set of separate systems and subsystems that include modules for 
skills (procedural, or skills memory), knowledge and experience, and 
episodic memory. Of course, this does not mean that these systems are 
not interrelated or that they do not offer easy access from one to an-
other. The part of long-term memory germane to verbal art experience 
is semantic memory, or the mental lexicon. Despite the term lexicon, it 
is not organized as typical dictionaries are. It is not a list of definitions 
consisting of necessary and sufficient conditions of word use. Instead, as 
Hogan puts it “it is a system of circuits that spread throughout long-term 
memory, encompassing a wide range of information” (Hogan 2003a, 
42) that includes, apart from definitions, beliefs, attitudes, visual im-
ages, memories, ideals, norms, common beliefs, etc. Moreover, just like 
all other items stored in long-term memory, lexical entries are content- 
addressable, which means that in order to arrive at them, it is not prereq-
uisite to begin with the initial sound of the linguistic representation of an 
entry. One can access an item through part of the meaning or a referent. 
Apart from that, access is possible thanks to the linking of entries. Cat 
and pet can lead to dog or the other way round. Some entries might 
be linked due to complementarity, as male and female. Others may be 
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linked in a scalar way (as with descriptions of temperature), may share 
a superordinate category: dog and animal, or can be subsumed under 
one domain (when entries are linked in the same way), as with days of 
the week (linked in a serial way), or with temperature (linked in a scalar 
way). Domains are particularly important for the conceptual metaphor 
theory I outlined earlier, where one, a more tangible domain, is used to 
conceptualize a more abstract one. Entries in the mental lexicon have 
not only external relations but also internal structures, where contents 
of an entry are ascribed degrees of importance and form a hierarchy.
Finally, features of lexical entries are more important in the complexes 
of features that they make up, rather than on their own. Thus, organi-
zation of knowledge in long-term memory could be further divided into 
complexes of features such as schemas, prototypes and exempla. Feature 
lists, or definitions, considered on their own might be called represen-
tational schemas; skills are procedural schemas, whereas a script is a 
schema involving a situation rather than an object, or a concept. Scripts 
are also internally organized into hierarchies that include defaults and 
alternatives, but the contents are usually organized spatio-temporally 
rather than in a manner of naming properties and relations. Thus, we 
have a script for visiting a restaurant that includes subscripts such as 
talking to a hostess or ordering an item from the menu with the help of a 
waiter. Clearly, scripts are essential to understanding fiction. A passage 
such as “would she be at home? It was a chance. I found a booth. Fum-
bled for a quarter. 444–3993. Was that it? I waited for the ring” (Hogan 
2003a, 45) would be impossible to understand without the reader having 
a script for a phone call. Prototypes, on the other hand, might be called 
standard cases where the default features are what we consider average. 
This, however, frequently has nothing to do with actual average: the 
prototype for man or a woman might be very far from statistically av-
erage men and women. Finally, exempla are particular instances within 
a category.
The above categories clearly apply to experiencing literature. Orga-
nizing literary works in terms of genres involves schemas. Particular 
genres involve prototypical works, plots and characters. Originality in 
literature and other arts often depends on rearranging and introducing 
new elements in familiar scripts and schemas or altering the features 
commonly associated with a prototype or an exemplum. The schemas 
and prototypes could obviously be innovations based on real-life ex-
pectations and particular aesthetic expectations that we have as a result 
of accumulated knowledge about art. Predictably, creation of art also 
depends on using and manipulating hierarchies of features, drawing on 
scripts, contrastive prototypes and salient exempla.
What leads us from representationalism to another level of description 
of cognitive processes is the account of lexical processes, or how lexical 
entries and complexes are operated upon. One standard process is full 
134 Literature and Minds
activation, where items stored in long-term memory are fully accessible 
in working memory. Another process is priming which entails partial 
activation of entries, which are not placed in workspace and are oper-
ated upon in working memory. They are, however, more immediately 
accessible than entries that are latent in long-term memory. For example, 
activating an entry such as river makes related entries partly activated: 
bank or boat will be accessed by the working memory easier than dog. 
I suppose that both types of activation have significant bearing on the 
experience of literature, specifically poetry and what we tend to call po-
etic language. To illustrate this, another level of description in cognitive 
science needs to be outlined.
If the language of representationalism is closer to folk psychology and 
accounts for cognitive processes in a serial manner, connectionism is 
its opposite, being closer to neurobiological accounts. Connectionist ac-
counts are typically networks that are supposed to represent neuronal 
activation in simplified terms. Thus, the electric activation is presented in 
terms of a model that contains a structure of units (nodes), connections 
between which vary in strength, and processes of inhibition and trans-
ferring of activation. The major advantage of the neural network is that 
it is able to account for the cognitive processes in a parallel, rather than 
serial, fashion by tracing how activation of neurons spreads throughout 
a circuit. In other words, connectionism models simultaneous, multiple 
processes, which are not necessarily localized in a particular area of the 
brain, in what is often called “parallel distributed processing” (Hogan 
2003a, 48–58). One simple illustration of how a connectionist network 
might work that Hogan uses is answering a question such as “name the 
first US vice-president that comes to your mind.” As a result of specific 
series of activations and inhibitions one might say “Joe Biden” or “Dick 
Cheney” or something altogether different. Yet, what makes it distinct 
from representationalist processing is the emphasis on degrees of activa-
tion, rather than on one final result. Suppose one person says “Joe Biden,” 
and the next one says “Dick Cheney,” but upon hearing the other name, 
they admit that they thought about it, too. This does not necessarily 
mean that the person consciously chose one answer instead of the other, 
but rather that only one answer got the strongest level of activation and 
entered working memory. The other answer was partly activated, below 
the activation threshold, as in priming. Other answers could have been 
entirely inhibited and kept latent in long-term memory. This could be 
further explained in terms of background activation. Some answers will 
access working memory easily because they are frequently activated: for 
instance, the current vice-president could be mentioned regularly in the 
media, and thus his name “comes first to one’s mind,” because he has 
the strongest background activation. This leads to acknowledging the 
fact that activation is also dependent on the strength of connections, 
that is, how strong an impulse can be transmitted from one node to 
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another. Each time Dick Cheney is introduced as “vice- president” the 
bond between the two nodes is strengthened. On the other hand, George 
H. Bush has probably never been introduced as “vice-president” since he 
became a president. Hence, every time he is introduced, the strength of 
connection between his name and “vice-president” is weakened, leading 
to his name not being activated.
The above seems quite elementary and, moreover, what bearing could 
it have on experiencing literature? Hogan claims that understanding 
complex metaphors and other aspects of what we tend to call poetic, or 
literary, language can be modeled using connectionist networks, and I 
entirely agree with him. His own example is the passage from King Lear, 
“You do me wrong to take me out o’ the grave./Thou art a soul in bliss; 
but I am bound/Upon a wheel of fire” (Hogan 2003a, 58). Here, “grave” 
and “soul” can lead to activations of “death” and “Hell” with “bound” 
and “fire” perhaps reinforcing the strength of “Hell” activation. More-
over, “bound” can activate notions of “prison,” “crime” and “torture,” 
just like “wheel” and “fire.” “Crime” and “betrayal,” along with “Hell” 
and “death” lead in the context of the passage into “sin,” finally into “re-
morse,” which seems to be the chief meaning behind the metaphorical 
passage uttered by Lear.
Although I find the very broad possible applications of representa-
tional and connectionist models of cognitive processes to understanding 
production and consumption of verbal art quite compelling, Hogan’s 
accounts of the phenomena discussed above rest on several more or less 
implicit assumptions that should be made explicit here so as to show 
their potential, as well as their shortcomings in literary applications.
First, and this is again symptomatic of cognitive literary studies as 
such, the identity of the reader interpreting Lear’s metaphor in this way 
is not altogether clear, and Hogan says nothing about the status of such 
reading. On the one hand, it is clear that the use of metaphors is essential 
to everyday language use and to rational thought. On the other hand, 
in non-literary contexts, metaphors are easy to recognize as they usually 
acquire a rather formalized status. In other words, everyday language 
is probably not as creative as imaginative writing when it comes to the 
formulation and use of metaphors. This indicates that literary figurative 
language might not be immediately recognizable for naïve readers. In the 
previous chapters, I mentioned Olsen’s attack on structuralism based on 
the premise that when beginning to read a literary work, one does not 
have specific expectations as to its structural organization in the sense 
that one can have them when expecting to hear a linguistic utterance. 
The structure of a work does not necessarily follow easily recognizable 
patterns in the fashion of everyday language use, and, consequently, 
competent readers do not have strictly formulated expectations about 
it. I suppose that the same holds for the meaning of metaphors used 
in a work. Thus, we recognize and widely use metaphors in ordinary 
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language, but this need not be sufficient to universally recognize the 
meaning of fresh metaphors, as well as their structural role within a 
work.
The above remarks could suggest the superiority of the view that in-
formed literary response is a convention, but, as I argued throughout 
the book, I consider it to be too radical. For one thing, it is far from 
clear as to when one becomes competent in understanding and appre-
ciating art, as the latter skill seems to be inseparable from having basic 
linguistic and cultural competence. In the case of Lear’s metaphor, we 
already assume that any reader will have some language skills and some 
knowledge of cultural background within which English is used. It is 
pointless to argue that a metaphor will have a fixed meaning indepen-
dent of a particular context of use: Lear’s metaphor of remorse makes 
sense only when one understands the earlier events in the story and the 
motivation of characters. In other words, a cognitive analysis of literary 
works presupposes that their readers already belong to a certain culture 
and have some degree of cultural competence. It does not describe purely 
naturalistic or mechanical processes. Consider the notion of “sin” or 
“Hell.” The above model of activation would be inadequate for people 
who have no idea what “sin” or “Hell” is: the passage might then acti-
vate completely different patterns of associations or be incomprehensible 
and without any aesthetic or artistic quality to it. The tacit assumption 
here is that the above pattern of activation works for readers with some 
degree of literary and cultural competence: it is perhaps not a definite 
model, but it is one of the acceptable responses to the passage, that is, 
based on a recognition of King Lear as a literary work produced by 
a given author operating within a culture in a particular art-historical 
context.
If my above claim is correct, one can envisage cognitive literary stud-
ies as serving two functions, or rather, exploring two separate areas of 
investigation related to literature. First, it can illuminate how figurative 
language, memory, perception, theory of mind and various natural men-
tal processes inform our experience of literature, demonstrating how 
verbal art dwells on natural predispositions of the human mind. Sec-
ond, and this concerns more Hogan’s connectionism, as well as cognitive 
poetics, it can serve a subsidiary function to aesthetic and, in the long 
run, theoretical approaches to literature, since the type of analysis es-
poused by cognitive poetics or representationalist/connectionist models 
as outlined by Hogan presupposes that the experience/reception/inter-
pretation5 is actually based on a recognition of a particular text as a 
literary work. It relies on the concept of literature. This does not mean, 
however, that connectionist models have no other application beyond 
modeling competent responses: obviously, one can empirically study 
responses of various types of readers (including naïve ones), and then 
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produce a different connectionist model that could predict yet another 
type of response.
What the above suggests is that it is impossible to account for litera-
ture as literature in some purely naturalistic language of cognitive science. 
We can either point out to natural mental processes that underlie literary 
appreciation, or we can produce models of informed responses as a sub-
sidiary tool to produce interpretations and evaluations of literary works, 
as in the language of literary criticism. It would be simply impossible to 
account for artistic value in the naturalistic language of bio- psychology 
where we have an ahistorical encounter of some idealized model of mind’s 
natural inclinations with an abstract text, unmediated by culture and 
history. Moreover, in cognitive terms, there is no qualitative difference 
between ordinary and literary language, which can lead to cognitive lit-
erary studies being prone to making quasi-formalist errors of correlating 
artistic value with quantitative difference and deviation of language use. 
If we cannot account for artistic value in purely naturalistic terms of, say, 
neuroscience, then I believe that we cannot dispose of the aesthetic dimen-
sion of artistic appreciation discussed by philosophical aesthetics. We can 
point to continuities, but we cannot altogether reduce one to the other.
So far, I have mostly discussed the underlying cognitive-emotive con-
ditions for the emergence, and also for the understanding and apprecia-
tion of art (as well as some cognitive constraints on the form and content 
of art). In the following chapter, I will elaborate on the continuities and 
transitions from the level of cognitive science to the level of informed 
aesthetic appreciation.
Notes
 1 I am of course alluding to Jan Mukařovský’s use of the term, as the 
 formalist-structuralist spirit of his works holds sway over many cognitive 
poeticians.
 2 A detailed discussion presenting several variants of understanding Barthes' 
essay was included in Chapter 2 of this book.
 3 On page 13 Hogan states that
Specifically, some readers may be inclined to see my account of romantic 
 tragi-comedy as Fryean. However, at the level where they overlap, neither 
account is greatly original. To a considerable extent, Frye took well-known 
facts about New Comedy and its progeny and integrated these into a larger, 
typological framework. I have drawn on the same well-known facts – along 
with less widely known, but no less well- established facts about literary 
works in other traditions – to make claims about literary universals and to 
integrate these into a quite different, explanatory framework.
 4 The empirical research about exposure effects is problematic due to the very 
nature of the problem. The few studies that have been carried out are mutu-
ally exclusive, and thus, inconclusive. I mention them in Chapter 4.
 5 I am inclined to use the concepts interchangeably in this particular context.
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In the preceding chapters, my main focus was to explore the aims, meth-
ods and concepts used in three seemingly disparate areas of research in 
literary studies: literary theory, analytic aesthetics and cognitive literary 
studies. Apart from that, I attempted to demonstrate how each of the 
disciplines sees its place in literary studies and how it relates (implic-
itly and explicitly) to the others. My contention was that the three need 
not be mutually exclusive. On the contrary, a critical review of some of 
each discipline’s assumptions reveals a possibility of a more nuanced 
approach, where the three disciplines appear to be bound in a hierarchy 
of dependence, with a higher order discipline relying on the lower-order 
discipline’s research. In the final chapter of my book, I will elucidate 
the nature of this hierarchy. First, however, I should like to expand my 
discussion of the continuity between cognitive science and aesthetics.
The Sublime, The Beautiful and the Everyday
If the model of disciplinary hierarchy that I am outlining here is sup-
posed to give at least a rough account of key levels of investigation of 
art, one of the crucial questions it should account for is the continuity 
between art behaviors, emergence of art in the institutional sense and 
the study of art through the notion of “cultural text.” In other words, 
my focus here will be to illustrate how out of the material that originally 
serves non-artistic purposes (including thought processes, activities, but 
also artifacts) we can expect the contemporary concept of art to emerge, 
and later, how the emergent aesthetic structure informs the textualist 
research.
To begin with, one has to reconsider some seminal concepts, such as 
“art,” “aesthetics” and “aesthetic experience.” So far, I have been mostly 
preoccupied with a rather narrow and local understanding of aesthetics 
and art. It is narrow, because it covers only institutionally and historically 
established definition of art and art’s appreciation. It is local, because 
such a concept of art has developed in the Western world in the last cou-
ple of centuries, and it is relevant almost exclusively to the phenomena 
observed there. In other words, it is disputable (Currie 2009, 1–10) if the 
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discourse of contemporary Western aesthetics, and the Western, narrow, 
definition of art are applicable to non-Western phenomena. Though it is 
indisputable that the discourse is largely local, I will argue, in tune with 
the rest of my argument, that it is emergent in relation to some universal 
tendencies of the human mind. As Gregory Currie has put it, “whatever 
humans do, they must have a biological make-up that allows them to do 
it” (Currie 2009, 2).
The use of concepts related to art is, however, far from uniform and 
often applies to phenomena that we do not typically consider art in the 
contemporary, institutional or historical sense. As I earlier indicated, 
the advent of conceptual art has had a significant bearing on how we 
understand art today. One of the points of the artistic revolutions of the 
early twentieth century was to challenge the traditional ideas about the 
quality of art. Traditional philosophical aesthetics held that an artwork 
was supposed to be admired for its beauty, but perhaps starting with 
Duchamp’s provocations, this was no longer the case. It is a brute fact 
that Western art has since largely abandoned “the idea that art involves 
the production of beautiful or aesthetically pleasing objects” (Currie 
2009, 2). Accordingly, contemporary philosophical aesthetics has em-
phasized the need to include the notion of an institution, of the artworld, 
in any overarching definitions of art. We might thus say, that this led to 
a separation of aesthetic value (and, accordingly, aesthetic qualities or 
experience) and artistic value. The former would be, predictably, asso-
ciated with a sense of beauty or pleasure, whereas the latter with an in-
formed appreciation of an artifact as a work of art. Although nowadays 
the two need not be correlated (a highly valuable artistically work can 
have little aesthetic value and the other way around), it would be rather 
hasty to abandon any sense of connection between the two. After all, 
for philosophical aesthetics, the two have been separated for no more 
than five decades, and probably only a little longer for the artists them-
selves. It is just another brute fact that the human species has always 
spontaneously been involved in art-related behaviors, and what I wish to 
claim is that, corresponding with the previous paragraph, artistic value 
is emergent in relation to aesthetic value.
The question regarding the beginning of art is clearly a perennial one 
in the philosophy of art. Ever since archeologists started to discover ar-
tifacts produced by prehistoric cultures that either did not appear to be 
simple tools with exclusively practical value, or being tools, were at the 
same time highly decorated, questions began to arise concerning their 
role, and consequently, their possible status as art. The lack of any in-
formation about their status apart from the sheer fact of their existence 
makes it a puzzle that probably shall never be convincingly resolved. 
Some things, though, can be definitely established. We know that hu-
manoids used tools resembling axes made with exceptional and appar-
ently unnecessary care regarding their visual qualities  (colors,  shape, 
142 Values and Competence
symmetry) as early as 400,000 years ago (Currie 2009, 1). Ochre, be-
lieved to be used for personal decoration (though this was most proba-
bly not its only use), began to be collected around 100,000 years later 
( Davies 2012, 4). More obvious personal decorations, such as those 
crafted from shells, bones, stones, amber, etc. date back to at least 40,000 
years. Perhaps counting the decorative as art might sound controversial, 
but even though I wholeheartedly agree that it is pointless to discuss 
art nowadays without the notion of the artworld, I find the question 
whether prehistoric beads are really art quite uninteresting. Art is clearly 
an extremely fluid concept and I see it as uncontroversial to use both the 
narrow, artworld understanding of art, and the broader one associated 
simply with beauty or sensual pleasure. Apart from the decorative, other 
important artifacts related to art behaviors would typically belong to 
visual arts: painting and sculpture. Although some of the cave paintings 
admittedly contain “doodles and erotic graffiti” (Davies 2012, 3), others 
“display breathtaking artistic skill, power, grandeur, and eloquence in 
abundance” (Davies 2012, 3). The puzzle of the cave paintings’ function 
and value was adequately summarized by Lamarque:
On the one hand, the surface perceptual qualities of the paintings 
naturally invite description in aesthetic or art historical terms. The 
techniques, pigments and materials have been studies and there is 
extensive commentary on the form and texture of the paintings, 
the ways that natural features of the cave walls are exploited, the 
recurring motifs, the fidelity of naturalistic representation (allow-
ing for the ease with which the subjects can be identified), and the 
sheer power, economy of means, and vitality of the depictions. On 
the other hand, the paintings remain a complete mystery; they are 
uninterpretable, and the role they played in the cultural or social 
life of the peoples who made them is unknown, as are the attitudes, 
aspirations, values, and beliefs of those who viewed them.
(Lamarque 2005, 22)
To this, Davies adds that even if the function of the cave paintings re-
mains unclear, we can definitely assume that they were very important 
due to the difficulties that must have arisen during their creation:
their painters climbed beneath the surface of the earth with only 
candles or lamps for light. They erected scaffolds to paint high up 
on walls and ceilings. Some of the pigments they used had to be pre-
pared by being heated to a very high temperature.
(Davies 2012, 4)
The same meticulousness holds for multiple examples of early sculpture 
and carvings, as well as early musical instruments (Davies 2012, 4).
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Two important hypotheses have been proposed regarding the use of 
visual representations in the Paleolithic. One longstanding hypothesis 
put forward by anthropologists points to the connection between cave 
art and some cultural developments, such as magical and religious prac-
tices (Currie 2009, 7–9). According to this theory, caves were considered 
boundaries between the supernatural and the natural worlds. The pres-
ence of cave paintings could allegedly contribute to the experiences of 
magical connection with the other world. As Currie notes, this theory 
“associates the development of pictorial art with the growth of relatively 
sophisticated cultural practices such as storytelling and religion” (Currie 
2009, 8) to which it can be added that it places the symbolic as pre-
ceding the aesthetic: the capacity to symbolize is prior (and necessary) 
to the development of art and aesthetic sensibility. Another important 
hypothesis makes an opposite claim regarding the symbolic/aesthetic. 
In a celebrated paper, Nicholas Humphrey argues that there are striking 
similarities between cave paintings and drawings made by autistic chil-
dren with severely impaired language skills (Humphrey 1998, 165–191). 
This, along with the fact that when autistic children do acquire lan-
guage, the “Paleolithic” quality of their drawings declines, leads him 
to speculate that the style of cave paintings might be due to some form 
of linguistic impediment of the Stone Age humans. Although it is estab-
lished that some form of linguistic communication must have existed “at 
least a million years ago” (Humphrey 1998, 173), Humphrey argues that 
there are good reasons to suppose that Upper Paleolithic language use 
was still limited to mostly interpersonal use: naming and talking about 
other humans. Special modules such as “technical intelligence” or “nat-
ural history intelligence” were not in use, and a general language-based 
schema of knowledge was not necessarily present. Cave artists might 
have had little interest and skill regarding conceptualizing or classifying 
non-human phenomena, and thus, their works present a curious type 
of naturalism of representation: uncontaminated by language, painting 
without having to recourse to a concept that needs to be depicted. In 
the end, perhaps both hypotheses need not be mutually exclusive, as the 
painting could have had some form of magical or ritual use while being 
produced by humans of limited language skills.
Even if nothing conclusive can be said about the function or the source 
of the paintings, Humphrey’s hypothesis cannot be immediately rejected. 
Moreover, one interesting implication of his claim is that the symbolic 
need not be prior to the aesthetic. If Paleolithic humans found something 
appealing in animal paintings, at the same time having limited concep-
tualizing skills, then perhaps some aesthetic sensibility precedes sym-
bolic content. If true, this might lead to revising some established beliefs 
about the relation between the two. One might specifically think of some 
development of Saussurean linguistics where the sign is given primacy 
over other cultural products, or where aesthetic value is associated with 
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a deviation of code. Currie speculates that with such a reversal of the 
order of priority, it may be the case that aesthetic sensibility plays “its 
part in explaining the development of symbolic culture” (Currie 2009, 
9), and consequently “the design-features of the natural world can be 
expected to trigger aesthetic responses and to create illusions of purpose, 
leading to ideas of magic and religion” (Currie 2009, 9) In the end, the 
claim that the symbolic emerges out of the aesthetic could be as valid as 
the one that the aesthetic emerges out of the symbolic.
Another important point is that even if the aesthetic could be in some 
sense prior to the symbolic, or to culture in general, it goes without say-
ing that historically artworks have usually served other functions than 
just the aesthetic one. The insistence on the importance of art’s intrinsic 
value, on its the purely aesthetic or artistic qualities is quite a recent 
phenomenon. Before that art always played a non-aesthetic role, too 
(e.g., religious, political, ethical, ritual, cognitive, decorative). The point 
is, however, that beauty and the appeal to some aesthetic sensibility of 
those participating in a culture was an essential adjunct to the prolif-
eration and successful circulation of the cultural products, along with 
whatever instrumental value was conferred on them, and institutions 
involved.
The fact that art has been used to facilitate the non-artistic areas of 
human culture leads to a question about the source of this need and its 
universal success. It is perhaps easy to point out the reasons for instru-
mental and utilitarian uses of art in more advanced cultures (transmis-
sion of ideologies, religious beliefs, advertising, propaganda, etc.), but 
what about prehistoric and possibly pre-symbolic times? In the language 
of evolutionary psychology, one could ask why would a species invest so 
many resources for a costly appeal to aesthetic sensibilities? One hypoth-
esis is that this has something to do with sexual selection: being able to 
produce a decorated axe requires some skills useful for survival, such as 
manual and spatial skills, finding resources, general efficiency, etc. Some 
evolutionary psychologists would argue that decorated axes were, in 
fact, means of advertising one’s adaptive advantage (Currie 2009, 6–7). 
Alternatively, it can be said that the objects themselves were appealing 
to the senses, which made their creators more likeable and having more 
prospects for reproduction. I will explore the relation of evolutionary 
psychology to aesthetics and, particularly, to literary aesthetics later 
throughout this chapter, but what needs to be addressed first is the bi-
ological foundation of the aesthetic sensibility, as this is impossible to 
ignore when considering prehistoric, humanoid art-related behaviors.
In the language of evolutionary psychology, the sense of pleasure that 
members of a species feel cannot be disconnected from considerations 
regarding its adaptive value: enhancing or decreasing the chances of suc-
cessful reproduction. The evolutionarily shaped mechanisms regulating 
reward and punishment made humans wired in to respond positively to 
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these stimuli in the environment that increase the chances of survival 
and reproduction, and negatively to those that decrease the chances. 
This is the source of the pleasurable feelings that humans experience 
while engaging in sexual acts, eating foods rich in fats and carbohy-
drates, seeing landscapes that abound in features indicative of good 
conditions for life sustainment, or the pleasurable response to some 
physical features of fellow humans that indicate good genetic material, 
etc. The innate reactions of disgust and displeasure operate accordingly 
in  reaction to the stimuli that are evidently harmful for the well-being 
of the organism. It should not be assumed, however, that feelings of 
pleasure will always involve aesthetic pleasure. Stephen Davies pointed 
this out, arguing against the claim that perceptual pleasure is equivalent 
to aesthetic pleasure and, thus, we should not assume that most reward-
ing experiences that animals have are aesthetic in nature (Davies 2012, 
13–14). The former need not entail the latter: if a hen responds positively 
to a male, her pleasure may be that of “lustful anticipation” (Davies 
2012, 14), or a sense of looking right, rather than acknowledging the 
mate as beautiful. It is not clear whether the pleasure that animals feel 
takes on an aesthetic hue, “do they find what they see beautiful as well 
as pleasurable to look at?” (Davies 2012, 14).
As I pointed out earlier, before the emergence of modern art, aes-
thetics saw the value of art in its being able to evoke the experience 
of beauty, sublimity, or, conversely, ugliness, dreariness, etc. Though, 
the sensual appears to be central to aesthetic pleasure, a theory that 
holds that every pleasure is aesthetic in the above sense seems too liberal. 
In fact, it is a relatively new approach, whose naturalizing tendency is 
boosted by evolutionary psychology and biology. Modern aesthetics, at 
its inception in the eighteenth century, actually put forward a more bal-
anced understanding of the relation between the aesthetic, artistic and 
the sensory experience, though I believe, following Davies’s discussion, 
that it should be rejected too, as it offers an excessively limited perspec-
tive on what counts as aesthetic.
The theory I am alluding to is of course the one attributed to Kant. 
Immanuel Kant opposed the idea that every kind of pleasure might be 
called aesthetic, even though he acknowledged that the subjective sense 
of pleasure is the basis of aesthetic judgments. The latter are, however, 
concerned with the experience of what he called “free beauty,” delight 
taken while apprehending the perceptual form of an object. This, in turn, 
requires an interaction between imagination and understanding. “Free 
beauty” means that it does not require extended conceptual apparatus, 
or a governing schema. This is why, as Davies claims, the delights of, say, 
a football connoisseur would not count as aesthetic in Kant’s sense: they 
require too much conceptual input to fall under “free beauty” (Davies 
2012, 17). Likewise, the type of analysis characteristic of cognitive po-
etics would not fall under “free beauty” as its meticulous dissection of a 
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work using sophisticated technical jargon has little to do with the play 
between imagination and understanding. Rather than that, Kant’s idea 
of aesthetic pleasure entails a form of contemplation where imagination 
helps us to reflect on the object and conceive of it in terms of a unity and 
coherence which the human need for understanding demands, without 
any particular conceptual content. Moreover, Kant’s aesthetic experi-
ence is supposed to be disinterested, disconnected from our personal 
goals, beliefs or practical interests.
Davies makes a point that perhaps Kantian aesthetics could work as 
a model for fine art appreciation, but it is too exclusive to account for 
a broader sense of aesthetic experience. I believe that the model is in-
adequate for high-brow art appreciation, either, as I repeatedly demon-
strated throughout this book that appreciating modern fine art requires 
specific knowledge about art-historical contexts, conventions, etc., but 
these are precisely the things whose relevance Kant rejects. Moreover, it 
has been argued that Kant’s model is too much concerned with natural 
beauty (Davies 2012, 17), mere contemplation of form (Davies 2012, 17), 
and that it unjustifiably privileges some sensory experiences over others 
(Davies 2012, 17). For instance, touch, taste and smell could not really 
lead to aesthetic experience on his account, as they are only “agreeable,” 
rather than beautiful. The pleasures they afford, he claimed, are too sim-
ple, unstructured, overly reliant on mechanical, sentimental reactions, 
and leave no space for the imaginative contemplation of “free beauty.” I 
suppose there is no reason to believe that the more proximal senses can-
not afford aesthetic experience in Kant’s sense: one can easily imagine 
certain qualities of food consumption (preparation, serving, setting) that 
will more or less fall under Kant’s sense of beauty or sublime. John Dew-
ey’s inclusion of the everyday experience as the source of aesthetic plea-
sure (Dewey 1980) or Richard Shusterman’s development of Dewey’s 
theory that encompasses all sensory and bodily experiences ( Shusterman 
2008) are good examples of aesthetic theories that compellingly argue 
against privileging some senses over the others.
Finally, as I argued in Chapter 2, it is questionable whether the notion 
of disinterestedness is really helpful in explaining anything regarding 
the experience of art. Out of the many attacks on the notion, Georgie 
 Dickie’s remains probably the most famous one (Dickie 1964, 56–65). 
Dickie enumerates a range of philosophers who seem to be claiming, sim-
ilarly to Kant, that experiencing art in the proper sense necessitates an 
“aesthetic attitude,” a special mode of distanced attention that enables 
the art’s audience to respond to it in a disinterested way without practical 
concerns. To counter it, Dickie proposes to ponder upon possible ways 
of attending to an artwork in an interested way. The examples include a 
spectator who watches a staging of Othello, thinking obsessively about 
his wife’s infidelity, or an art collector financially satisfied with a work 
being a good investment. These, Dickie persuasively argues, are in fact 
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examples of inattention, not attending to the work at all. So, it cannot be 
maintained that there is a special aesthetic mode of attending to a work 
of art. We can attend to it, or not, but disinterestedness does not seem to 
be a helpful concept here. On the other hand, Patrick Hogan argues that 
Dickie himself admits that one can read a poem aesthetically or for other 
reasons, such as concentrating on its informational value, etc. (Hogan 
1996, 161–169). This, Hogan claims, is indicative of the fact that we 
sometimes open ourselves to an aesthetic experience and sometimes we 
do not. Consequently, some form of aesthetic attitude theory should be 
kept. But here I would argue against Hogan: it is true that we can attend 
to a work with a different purpose in mind rather than just experiencing 
the aesthetic, but the point is that if such an endeavor is to be productive 
and informative in any sense, it must be underlain by an understanding 
of the work as an artwork. We simply have to identify and understand 
it correctly in order to pursue our specific goals regarding attending to 
it. This is merely a variation of my argument from Chapter 2 concerning 
literary theory: any investigation into the contents of a work that goes 
beyond appreciation must be carried out after properly identifying the 
object as aesthetic.
Earlier I mentioned John Dewey’s aesthetics in opposition to Kant, 
and I believe his theory is a more promising link between those areas of 
cognitive science relevant to my discussion and philosophical aesthetics 
as carried out in the manner of analytic philosophy, if the concept of 
the aesthetic is to be kept at all and proved to have some links with 
both the human biological organism and discussions of art. Dewey was 
probably one of the earliest to include everyday experience into the aes-
thetic, emphasizing the continuity “between the refined and intensified 
forms of experience that are works of art and the everyday events, do-
ings, and sufferings that are universally recognized to constitute experi-
ence” (Dewey 1980, 3) and arguing against excessive spiritualization of 
the experience of art where it becomes disconnected from the everyday 
experience. Dewey goes on to argue that every unified, complete and 
intense experience should be called aesthetic and the roots of aesthetic 
experience stem from the constant interaction of the organism with 
its environment. According to Dewey, we get an aesthetic experience 
whenever we feel “an adjustment of our whole being to the conditions 
of existence, we experience a fulfilment that reaches to the depths of 
our being” (Dewey 1980, 17), which indicates that in our daily falling 
in and out of sync with our environments, aesthetic experience marks 
the moment of restoring the balance and harmony. Not any experience, 
however, can be counted as aesthetic, and Dewey makes a proviso that 
aesthetic experience is characterized by unity, fulfillment and a certain 
complexity where its internal elements can be conceived of as interre-
lated. Against Kant, Dewey stresses that all the senses and bodily func-
tions can be sources of this feeling, a point that is very much in tune with 
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the concepts of embodied cognition as well as being rather up to date 
with the overarching metatheory of cognitive science, that is, evolution-
ary psychology with its stress on the organism-environment relationship 
basis of human experiences, values, culture, etc. Art is, then, perhaps a 
particularly refined, elaborate or structured form of the aesthetic, but 
the experience it affords lies beyond art itself and in the everyday expe-
rience of the environment by the organism.
In the preceding chapter, I mentioned some literary universals that 
point to a continuity between literary forms and contents, and mental 
processes. By now, it should be clear that in spite of the problems with 
formulating a universal definition of art, the existence of art itself, or 
rather art behaviors, is a cross-cultural universal. In fact, the elusive-
ness of the concept does not prevent people of different cultures from 
easily recognizing certain cultural artifacts as belonging to the fuzzy 
concept of art. As Noël Carroll puts it, this is not to say that people of 
different cultural backgrounds will immediately recognize the cultural, 
historical and contextual complexity of a given artifact, but, that certain 
traditional forms of art will be immediately recognized as such (Carroll 
2004, 95). Europeans can easily identify Ganesha’s statue as art without 
having any knowledge of its meaning or status in India. Similarly, large 
portions of European art are accessible and enjoyed outside Europe, just 
as Westerners can easily appreciate “sub-Saharan music, Chinese paint-
ing, and woven carpets from the Middle East” (Carroll 2004, 95).
To summarize this section, I tried to demonstrate how some powerful 
theories of aesthetic experience that came to prominence in the Western 
world have created an illusion that the experience that art affords is dis-
connected from the natural world and from the reactions of the human 
organism to its environment. This can be held against both contempo-
rary institutional theories of art (including the institutional theories of 
literature that I discussed in Chapters 1 and 2) and against a long tra-
dition embracing a myriad of scholars that goes back to Kant’s aesthet-
ics. What I find more compelling in the light of the growing body of 
research on the relation between the human biological organism, human 
cognitive capacities and culture is that such dualistic concepts marked 
by strong conceptual distinctions must crumble. Instead, I propose to 
embrace theories that point out to continuities between the sensual, ev-
eryday experience, and the structured artworks that stem from these 
experiences. The next section will continue these considerations, moving 
from the notion of aesthetic experience to that of aesthetic and artistic 
value.
Artistic and Aesthetic Values
The notion of artistic and aesthetic value is inseparable from my previ-
ous discussion of aesthetic experience and will continue and refer to a 
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large portion of the points I made in the preceding section. One import-
ant difference is perhaps that even if the notion of aesthetic experience 
can be to a large extent accounted for in a naturalistic language of cog-
nitive science, emotions, sensual impressions, etc., I suppose that artistic 
value cannot. In other words, it is impossible to explain the value of the 
works listed in artistic traditions or canons purely in terms of how they 
may interact with some idealized model of human cognitive capacities. A 
substantial amount of artistic value stems from a work’s relation to other 
works, its historical significance, its drawing on the works of the past 
and its influencing future works. These are central to appreciation of art, 
though they require to move beyond the idiom of natural sciences. Yet 
overall, artistic value seems to have partial naturalistic underpinnings 
while retaining its autonomous, local and historical character. If the 
above is what might be called intrinsic value of art, there are multiple in-
strumental values that are associated with the experience of art: moral, 
cognitive, political, sentimental, etc. In what follows, I will look at some 
major tendencies regarding artistic value in analytic philosophical aes-
thetics, then I will overview some neurobiological theories of human 
values in general. I will begin my speculations on how the two could be 
merged together and applied to understand artistic and specifically liter-
ary value, and then move on to elaborate on it, as well as to integrate it 
with my earlier discussions in the next section of this chapter.
One of the most celebrated accounts of the value of art in the analytic 
tradition, and the one which I find compelling and relevant to my dis-
cussion, was proposed by Malcolm Budd (Budd 1995). Budd begins his 
discussion by noting that there are clearly numerous types of value that 
we can ascribe to art. There can be “a cognitive value, a social value, 
an educational value, a historical value, a sentimental value, a religious 
value, an economic value, a therapeutic value” (Budd 1995, 1–2) and so 
on. But the central and logically prior type of value must be the artistic 
one. It must be a distinctive type of value owing to which we can say 
that we value something as art, or as a specific type of art. Budd goes on 
to say that the value of art lies “in the experience a work of art offers” 
(Budd 1995, 4). This, however, requires a constraint that the work is 
properly identified and understood as a work of art, thus the experience 
implies the one in which it is properly understood. The experience Budd 
mentions is an experience of the work itself and should be construed 
in terms of a type of experience that can be instantiated multiple times 
rather than some actual experience of a person. It should be noted that 
even though the value of a work is accessible through experience, it is 
the experience of the work, and the qualities ascribed to it are qualities 
of the work, and not of the experience. This means that artistic value is 
intrinsic in the sense of being experienced with full understanding, thus, 
including the aesthetically valuable properties, and in the end, the expe-
rience of the work is intrinsically valuable. It is important to note that 
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Budd does not contrast intrinsic value with extrinsic value, but rather 
with instrumental value, that is, one that looks for further effects and 
benefits of the experience, attaining further goals or fulfilling desires, 
rather than it being worthy for its own sake. We could, then, say that 
Budd’s theory of value is able to link both the intersubjective qualities 
of a work (its “surface” qualities such as a general understanding of the 
form and content), and the rewarding experience they afford, against 
either formalism (which sees value of purely in terms of its formal quali-
ties) or reader-response theories (which concentrate on the effects of art).
Apart from being intrinsic, Budd adds that artistic value is  sentiment- 
dependent, intersubjective, anthropocentric and incommensurable. The 
first of the essential qualities Budd enumerates can be most probably 
linked to Hume’s famous discussion in “Of the Standard of Taste,” 
where it is roughly equivalent to general human emotionality. Though 
Hume also claimed, in congruence with his broad sentimentalist out-
look on ethics, that judgments concerning art are sentiment- dependent 
or rooted in one’s natural features of character, subjective taste, etc., 
he focused, contra Budd, almost exclusively on the actual reactions of 
art’s audience, marginalizing the actual qualities of a work. What Hume 
and Budd do share is the insistence that what we hold valuable in art 
must have an emotional underpinning. The judgments about art’s value 
that we pronounce are not, however, entirely sentiment- dependent in a 
subjective sense. Budd explains they are intersubjective, as it is evident 
that one’s assessment of a work can be approved or criticized in a well-
founded way. They are argued in a rational way: drawing informed in-
ferences, using evidence, and some basic ideas of rational discourse and 
communication. Artistic value is also anthropocentric, as it is valid only 
for those who possess distinctly human sensibility, perception, compre-
hension and emotional response (Budd 1995, 38–40). Finally, it is in-
commensurable, as even though value judgments are a matter of degree 
(we confer some degree of value on one work and a different degree on 
another one), it is impossible to specify the degree to which a given work 
can possess artistic value; it is not measurable. Moreover, incommen-
surability of value refers both to works across different arts, as well as 
within a single art. The point is that there are different types of qualities 
that can shape a work being valuable or not, and these qualities might 
not be commensurate. Budd concludes that incommensurability or in-
determinacy of value rankings need not imply incomparablity; it merely 
implies vagueness of comparative judgments.
Just as with any other philosopher I mentioned, Budd’s position can 
in no way be considered representative for analytic aesthetics. In fact, 
there are many celebrated scholars who argue that the value of art is 
largely instrumental in Budd’s sense. For example, Kendall Walton has 
argued that most reasons why we value art have something to do with 
its cognitive, moral, religious or other practical concerns (Walton 1993, 
499–510). It seems hard to believe that what we judge
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so wonderful aesthetically about much great poetry, for instance, 
has nothing at all to do with the insight we receive from it, or that 
the feelings one has in appreciating music aesthetically are entirely 
unlike and irrelevant to everyday emotions.
(Walton 1993, 500)
I do not deny that these are important, but I doubt all artistic value 
can be reduced to what we consider instrumentally valuable. Moreover, 
Walton seems to be either blurring the line between appreciating some-
thing as art and just enjoying something without necessarily having it 
properly identified, or his remarks against intrinsic value are misguided, 
as his points seem to be included in Budd’s claims about the sentiment- 
dependent and anthropocentric nature of art.
Needless to say, Bud’s theory of value is applicable to contemporary 
narrow definition of art and we should not assume that it holds for what-
ever artifacts from different cultures and times we tend to call art. It is 
clear that in pre-Kantian times, what we now call “art” served multiple 
purposes, displaying significant instrumental value and afforded aes-
thetic experience (in the broad sensual sense) at the same time, but Budd’s 
elucidation of artistic value need not apply there. Moreover, artworks 
can nowadays be both instrumentally and intrinsically valuable. A good 
example is the emergence of the so-called “no-brow” or middle-brow 
art which undermines the traditional distinction into high-brow elite art 
and low-brow mass art. Instead, it aims at offering something valuable 
to both palates: some form of aesthetic or other instrumental enjoyment 
for a low-brow audience, and the pleasure of a perceptive, informed 
judgment of artistic value conferred by competent audience. The issue is 
far from settled in analytic philosophy of art. Jerrold Levinson, although 
sympathetic toward Budd’s theory, maintains that, in the end, we value 
art for instrumental reasons (Levinson 2004, 319–329). I will set the 
debate aside for the sake of brevity, but take up the issue again after in-
troducing some neuroscientific accounts of value. Before that, however, 
there is a need to elaborate on another understanding of how the value 
of art might be called intrinsic.
Assuming that Budd’s theory is essentially correct when it comes to 
explaining how we come to value art nowadays, in the narrow sense, 
not everything is clear regarding the experiential value of art. There are 
some facts that contribute to a work’s artistic value which seem to be 
difficult to grasp experientially. To illustrate this, I will tentatively as-
sume that the intrinsic value Budd discusses (as opposed to instrumental 
value) can be further divided along the axis of interiority and exteriority. 
Thus, Budd’s value would be constituted by internal and external facts 
about the work. In this sense, its intrinsic value would be roughly equiv-
alent to its aesthetic value, the accessible, experiential pleasure that it 
affords and that we describe using typical aesthetic vocabulary: harmo-
nizing, balanced, moving, etc. I suppose we might assume that intrinsic 
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value in this sense can hardly be subject to radical changes in status over 
time. For instance, I find it doubtful that Taming of the Shrew could 
at some point cease to be considered comical and become tragic, that 
Macbeth could cease to be grim, that certain works of poetry would lose 
their euphonic qualities, or that Henry James’ novels would no longer be 
considered realistic psychologically. Now, a value-relativist could even 
at this point object that readers might not, and they do not, necessarily 
judge the works by ascribing them the qualities I mentioned. It is true that 
works can be, and are, consistently misread and read entirely according 
to one’s prejudices, in the manner Stanley Fish envisaged, but I do not 
see it as a broad philosophical principle (as I would have to be commit-
ted to a dubious type of framework relativism and  Cartesianism), but 
simply as an action that stems from insufficient understanding of the 
object in question. Budd’s proviso is that a work is considered valuable 
only when one grasps it with full understanding, including its art-histor-
ical context and having some interpreting skills. But to read Macbeth as 
a comedy is just a mild case of, say, reading King Lear as a story about 
football Champion’s League, or reading the Chinese alphabet as random 
pictures: it results from ignoring substantial portions of the text and 
misidentifying the object of attention, not to mention that reading-in en-
tirely personal, idiosyncratic meanings to a text has nothing to do with 
the concept of interpretation and appreciation.
Apart from the intrinsic value I have outlined above, the status of a 
work of art would be influenced by its extrinsic value, by which I un-
derstand its relation to other works of art, artistic tradition, canon, etc. 
This aspect of value might be a challenge for Budd’s theory, as the work’s 
position and reputation in relation to other works is subject to consider-
able change and is not easily grasped experientially. Levinson correctly 
observes that this type of value might be experiential in Budd’s sense, but 
only in relation to past works: appreciation of an artwork presupposes 
knowledge of its relation to other works, or in other words, in most cases 
how the work relates to a given artistic tradition (of the past) can be 
accurately determined in the moment of its publication/display/perfor-
mance, etc. (Levinson 1996, 667–682). But it is impossible to assess the 
potential that a work has regarding its influence on future works, and it 
is precisely this component of artistic value that can change substantially. 
On the other hand, I am well aware that the idea of extrinsic value that 
I outlined is only useful as a future potential, as in any given moment 
in time when an artwork is properly evaluated, determining its relation 
to other works will fall under Budd’s notion of intrinsic value. Peter 
Lamarque argued quite rightly, on the example of indiscernibles, that 
the experience and evaluation of a work depend on its proper identifica-
tion (Lamarque 1998, 60–78). Assuming we perceive certain aesthetic 
qualities in Larkin’s High Windows, upon a hypothetical discovery that 
Larkin’s work is plagiarized, we would no longer ascribe these qualities 
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to Larkin, but to the original work. This reflects Lamarque’s distinction 
into works and texts (which, as I argued in Chapter 2, does not neces-
sarily reflect the distinction as used in literary theory): aesthetic qualities 
are ascribed to a work and not to its textual tissue. To put it crudely, if 
I published Shakespeare’s sonnets under my own name, my own “cre-
ation” would not have the same aesthetic qualities the originals have, 
since whether we see an artifact as possessing certain aesthetic qualities 
depends on its prior and proper identification.
Finally, artworks are continuously ascribed multiple instrumental val-
ues, be they moral, political, personal, etc. One’s involvement with art 
might be a matter of looking for simple sexual gratifications, therapy, 
financial investment, cheap laughs, didacticism, showing off, etc. Instru-
mental values are crucial both on a personal level and on the level of the 
whole community: canon, curricula and reading lists are always created 
with at least some instrumental values in mind. Needless to say, these 
values are almost infinitely malleable. A good example of how artworks 
with little, or disputable aesthetic value, can become canonical owing 
its status almost exclusively to malleable instrumental values is the case 
of Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein.1 Upon its publication, the novella drew 
little attention and received negative reviews. It went out of print for 
several decades and was largely ignored throughout nineteenth century. 
Interestingly, it appears that its commercial success and later recogni-
tion is largely due to its various popular culture adaptations produced 
throughout the previous century. In an almost Bakhtinian, dialogic fash-
ion, the book received wider critical attention in the second half of the 
twentieth century after being thoroughly digested by popular culture 
and repeatedly reworked, staged and adapted to films. It was not until 
the early twenty-first century that the novel became common on the cur-
ricula of American English departments. It is perhaps arguable whether 
the novella is good in a strictly artistic sense, but it became increasingly 
valuable as a result of its relation to other works, and perhaps, among 
other things, due to the themes of the story becoming more relevant 
nowadays.
The above is, of course, an idealized model, as in reality the value of 
an artwork could change dramatically upon discovering other, forgotten 
or unnoticed works. The other thing is that a given work tends to have 
its value established over time rather than immediately after its release, 
which is perhaps a question of developing its relation to other works or 
a matter of arriving at certain degrees of consensus among the informed 
audience, which is necessarily extended in time.
The account of value I subscribe to goes entirely against the pur-
ported view of post-structuralist critics about the need to dispose of 
the notion of value altogether, and against the stance of authors such as 
Barbara Herrnstein Smith, who argued for an entirely contingent, local 
and  power-infused vision of artistic value (Herrnstein Smith 1988). In 
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her view, literary value is socially constituted, and thus, contingent and 
constantly variable. The establishment of a text as valuable is a matter 
of agreement of certain social groups relative to their own agendas. It 
merely serves their ideological purposes. Eventually, a given standard 
of literary value is a matter of reinforcing cultural power of the privi-
leged and perpetuating the dominant social order. Although it is cer-
tainly true that artworks have always been used for political ends and 
for other instrumental purposes, to argue that all there is is a contin-
gent,  ideologically-motivated value is a different thing altogether. Stein 
H. Olsen challenged this view quite convincingly by pointing out the 
fact that debates questioning the canon in Herrnstein Smith’s way tend 
to focus on the classics, ignoring the question of artistic failure regard-
ing the canon (Olsen 2001, 261–278). Olsen gives numerous examples 
of authors who, in spite of being very much in tune with the dominant 
ideologies of their times, and in spite of initial popularity, did not make 
it to the canon, because, as he demonstrates, they failed artistically. This 
indicates that apart from merely instrumental values, a candidate’s work 
must still have other, artistic qualities to become canonical.
Furthermore, Olsen points out a serious flaw in Herrnstein Smith’s 
reasoning. Her notion of value is ill conceived as it refers to social iden-
tity, such as race, class or gender, and fails to provide a conceptual 
framework that would elucidate the standards according to which the 
practice of evaluation is organized within the community. Herrnstein 
Smith simply fails to account for how meaning and value are established, 
identifying it as some form of consensus of practical interests, a balance 
of power within a group. This is crucial as the literary institution is 
not defined by some identity-based membership (as being male, or being 
white) but is a matter of applying concepts and conventions used when 
appreciating a literary text, whose nature and structure is generally ac-
cessible to everyone and transparent, rather than some impenetrable, 
non-arguable power struggle; they depend on the internalization of the 
practice itself. Another implication of the view that value assessment de-
pends on applying specific concepts, conventions and is a rule-governed 
procedure is that value judgments are not merely a question of appar-
ent communal consensus but are results of reasoned arguments (Olsen 
2001, 261–278). Again, value judgments are not a matter of somebody 
literally enforcing one’s opinion in a power struggle, but are subject to 
evaluation in terms of evidence, reasoning, etc.
Values and Emotions
The aspect of Budd’s theory of artistic value that might be related to 
some natural human dispositions in the most evident way is its insistence 
on sentiment-dependence and anthropocentricity. As I said, Budd’s use 
of the term “sentiment” should be understood in the sense of general 
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emotionality, thus entailing that emotional reaction to the work is a com-
ponent of its overall evaluation. Again, this should not be confused with 
random reader-response or affective fallacy, since Budd’s focus is the ex-
perience of a work with its proper understanding. The study of emotion 
or affect has long been neglected in literary studies, partly due to con-
cerns about emotional response being too idiosyncratic and subjective, 
or being a distant effect of the work, rather than about the work itself. In 
the previous chapter, however, I tried to demonstrate that contemporary 
knowledge of emotions points to their inseparability from reasoning and 
general human cognition. This indicates that we cannot entirely exclude 
emotional component from our interpretations of artworks and from 
our reasoning regarding why certain works are more valuable than oth-
ers. Some scholars noted that even the seemingly neutral commentaries 
on the formal aspects of a work contain  emotion-laden value judgments 
(Norwood 2013, 135–152). Consider stating that a plot of a story is 
balanced or unbalanced, that characters are flat, or that a passage is 
surprising. Emotion-laden value judgments are also crucial for the pro-
cess of interpretation itself: while reading, we constantly make value 
judgments concerning the meaning and the status of a passage, we try 
to relate it to other passages in the work so as to make a coherent inter-
pretation which we further evaluate and compare with rival hypotheses 
about meaning, etc. Moreover, without our emotional system, the ability 
to empathize and to attribute mental states, we would not be able to 
understand art, fictional words and characters at all.
The link between what we call “human values” (ethical and aesthetic) 
and emotions is a standard one in neurobiology. In a representative ac-
count of the relation, Antonio Damasio points out that the roots of what 
humans tend to hold valuable ethically and aesthetically are in certain 
biological mechanisms that predate human species (including emotions) 
(Damasio 2005, 47–57). The mechanism that Damasio discusses is the 
homeostatic life regulation or the drive toward preservation of life and 
striving for its well-being. In the course of evolution, this system has 
managed to develop mechanisms that promote emotional reactions as-
sociated with “the maintenance of health, prevent circumstances leading 
to death and procurement of states of life tending toward optimal func-
tion” (Damasio 2005, 48). In other words, the system of homeostasis 
elicits feelings on the spectrum from pleasure to pain and punishment in 
response to the stimuli the organism is experiencing. The smell of rotten 
meat or faeces triggers the feeling of revulsion and disgust and a negative 
evaluation. The smell of food, the sight of a life-supporting landscape or 
features of a fellow human that indicate health and fertility elicit feelings 
of pleasure and a positive evaluation. The two are the basis of ethical 
and aesthetic evaluations.
This is not to say that emotional reactions to life-threatening and 
life-promoting stimuli are all there is in artistic appreciation. On the 
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contrary, not only can the responses be contained, changed or acquire a 
highly personal degree through specific experiences in life, but there is 
more to evaluation of art than the pleasure or displeasure of the senses. 
Consider again the case of ready-mades. An aesthetic experience of a 
urinal in a gallery and a urinal in a lavatory would be the same, un-
less one attributes a proper art-historical context to the former. The 
evaluation that follows comes from recognizing the work’s relation to 
traditional works and the pastiche-like qualities its title and placement 
affords. Thus, if one attributes to it originality, freshness, wit, humor, 
etc. then the indirect, simulational2 emotional evaluation is there, but it 
is not directly accessible. To say that we appreciate Greek statues merely 
because they represent healthy, attractive bodies is flawed as it fails to 
explain why we appreciate the type of art that rejects the imitation of 
natural beauty. Still, if we accept that a work becomes valuable through 
the experience of its qualities, then the aesthetic component must entail 
a degree of affective attraction and evaluation.
The claim that to be successful in terms of its effects an audience, 
established status or popularity, an artwork must have some underlying 
affective component leads to some important implications regarding the 
circulation of the work in a culture. It implies that a success or a failure 
of given art forms or individual works must be also partly due to its 
ability to tap into some natural propensities of the human mind. The 
fact that a given work is successful cannot be, to repeat the argument 
against Herrnstein Smith and others, entirely owing to cultural-specific 
factors or ideological manipulation. A variant of this theory is to claim 
that works become seen as valuable because of exposure effects: the fact 
that our culture sees Shakespeare as more valuable than Chandler is 
simply due to Shakespeare being reproduced, referred to and discussed 
more than the latter. The thesis about exposure effects has some po-
tential of being empirically testable and that is why I will restrain from 
making definite claims about it (though I suspect it to be false much in 
the same sense as Herrnstein Smith’s thesis is). Although it has not been 
sufficiently investigated so far, some recent research indicates that mere 
exposure does not necessarily increase one’s liking of a work (in the case 
of the studies mentioned: works that would fall into a category of bad 
art) (Meskin, Phelan, Moore and Kieran 2013, 139–164).
Noël Carroll made the claim about the need to revise and re-include 
the notion of “human nature” into broader considerations in philoso-
phy of art. Carroll maintains, and I can only concur in tune with my 
argument so far, that art is not “culture all the way down” (Carroll 
2004, 96), for art, as part of culture, is partly woven from evolutionarily 
shaped “cognitive, perceptual, and emotive architecture” (Carroll 2004, 
96). As a consequence, much traditional, transcultural art “addresses 
our evolved sensibilities, feelings, emotions, and perceptual faculties in 
a fairly direct manner” (Carroll 2004, 99). Certain historically specific 
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forms of mass art, such as film and TV, have become increasingly pop-
ular largely due to “ways in which they engage our evolved cognitive, 
perceptual, and emotive architecture” (Carroll 2004, 99). In TV’s case, 
it is specifically the ease with which humans cross-culturally process 
visual representations of natural objects and fellow humans (especially 
faces and emotion types associated with them, an issue I mentioned in 
 Chapter 3 with regards to empathy and theory of mind). Had films and 
TV shown just words instead of visual representations, they would clearly 
be much less successful commercially. One can mention other features, 
much in tune with the notion of artistic universals listed in the previous 
chapter, which will have higher ratio of accessibility for humans due to 
their evolved cognitive architecture. Thematically, they would of course 
include romance, reproduction, social status and political power, horror, 
fear of death, survival, etc. Formally, to expand Carroll’s examples, one 
could think of sound qualities, rhythm, memory and phonetic loop, or 
the sense of “now” that puts cognitive constraints on poetic forms (as I 
argued in Chapter 3, traditional poetic forms tend to have limits on the 
line length), visual images, as well as figurative language that is imme-
diately appealing, as well as a sense of harmony and symmetry. Stephen 
Davies cites numerous researches into how certain innate preferences 
predate human species: e.g., birds and monkeys also display a preference 
for symmetry, order, etc. (Davies 2012, 192). Furthermore, we can spec-
ulate, and rightly so, that the above explains why traditional art is more 
about direct sensual experience, bodily sensations, as well as imitation 
of the natural world. It would be highly improbable, if not impossible, 
that conceptual art developed historically before art developing as imi-
tation of nature/life.
The list can go on and on, but I suppose the point is clear: artworks 
do consist of some “primal” stimuli, that is, devices that stem from and 
engage ordinary perception and emotive, as well as cognitive processes. 
It makes use of things people are normally drawn to. They are obviously 
more than that. Apart from mimetic art, they are structured in a way 
which does not normally occur in nature, and they do have a set of vol-
atile external relations to other works which are crucial for how we un-
derstand and value them. All this leads to restate the claims I have been 
making throughout the book, namely, that even though artworks must 
have affective and anthropocentric qualities, what they mean and how 
they become valuable is not reducible to the language of biology or psy-
chology, and thus, we cannot dispose of the autonomous aesthetic level 
of reception of art. It is, as Peter Lamarque stresses, that aesthetic qual-
ities are based in non-aesthetic properties but the former are not reduc-
ible to the latter (Lamarque 1998, 60–78). I would add that they form a 
continuity with aesthetic qualities emerging out of the non- aesthetic. I 
should also say that, potentially, one may ask where aesthetic experience 
proper (supposing it makes sense to use the term “proper” here) starts in 
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relation to the merely sensual, an issue I discussed in the preceding sec-
tion. I do not think we can convincingly set such a borderline. Moreover, 
I do not consider it a problem or even an important issue. Some philoso-
phers of art argue that the proviso that for an experience to be aesthetic, 
it should be unified and structured is only valid when talking about the 
intersubjective, communicative aspect of the experience. In other words, 
only when we intend to embed our experiences in a network of com-
munication with others, do we need to talk about it in terms of coher-
ence and unity. On a personal level, unstructured experiences such as 
itching could be called aesthetic (Irvin 2008, 25–35). I do not intend to 
settle the matter here, but I suppose one cannot reject the argument all 
too hastily. What it does show conclusively, though, is the necessity of 
tracing a non-trivial continuity between the sensual, the emotional, the 
aesthetic, and the artistic.
Natural and Competent Responses
This section of the chapter will attempt at summarizing and integrating 
some elements of my argument so as to give a coherent account of the 
continuity between cognitive and aesthetic research into art and liter-
ature. The two preceding sections gave a rather general account of the 
relation, or of the roots of the relation, without particular attention to 
the verbal art, or perhaps even privileging the more perceptual, sensual 
arts. It is precisely to the verbal that I now turn.
First, I want to clarify the nature of the relation between the more sen-
sual and the verbal art. For one thing, literature does not give us imme-
diate sensual experience in the sense painting or music do, even though 
the roots of verbal art surely lie in the sensual, as with the effects of the 
early spoken poetry. But it is clear that with the development of writing 
and printing that altered the habits of verbal art consumption promot-
ing quiet reading, the experience of the verbal became less sensual. This 
does not mean, however, that the relation of literature to other arts be-
came severed or that some of the points I made in the preceding section 
lose their validity regarding literature. In fact, some key developments in 
visual arts in the twentieth century seem to reinforce the link between 
the sensual and the verbal.
Grounded Cognition and Simulation
As I insisted throughout this chapter, an indispensable component of the 
value of art is its informed experience that is understood in emotional 
and sensual terms. This however seems problematic when applied to 
evaluation of those works of art whose value seems to be removed from 
direct sensory experience, e.g., literature and conceptual art. To clarify 
the issue, I will draw on and expand the account of the mechanisms 
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I discussed in Chapter 3 that account for human interest in fiction 
and other arts using the notion of “grounded cognition.” The issue is, 
roughly, that conceptual art and literature appear to pose a problem 
to the theories of art that stress its sensory element. How can we say 
that Warhol’s Brillo Boxes are valuable due to their sensory experience 
if they look no different than regular bars of soap? Accordingly, there 
appears no sensory, or stimulus-like basis for an aesthetic experience 
of literature. Institutional theorists, such as Olsen or Lamarque, would 
perhaps claim that this illustrates how art appreciation is a matter of 
knowing proper art-historical context of a work and actively following 
conventions and rules that govern the practice as in a game of chess. To 
counter the claim that appreciation of literature is a matter of conven-
tion, I surveyed a number of concepts developed in cognitive science 
that undermine any strong distinctions between literary appreciation 
and other forms of cognition. I reckon that the notion of “grounded 
cognition” gives further ammunition against the institutional claim as I 
conceive of it.
Grounded cognition is closely related to, but significantly broader, 
the concept of embodied cognition I discussed earlier. In the words of 
one of its most famous exponents, grounded cognition opposes the view 
that “knowledge resides in a semantic memory system separate from the 
brain’s modal systems for perception […], action […], and introspection” 
(Barsalou 2008, 618). In other words, typical accounts of cognition 
assume that humans store knowledge via semantic, amodal symbols. 
Grounded cognition points out that it is either unlikely that knowledge 
resides in amodal symbols, or such representations “work together with 
modal representations” (Barsalou 2008, 618) in order to create cogni-
tion. Thus, we do not store knowledge in terms of abstract, symbolic 
items, but we store multimodal representations that keep sensory im-
pressions, as well as actions and mental states. This also entails that a 
crucial aspect of human cognition comes from “simulation,” or, the “re-
enactment of perceptual, motor, and introspective states acquired during 
experience with the world, body, and mind” (Barsalou 2008, 618). Every 
experience that occurs or every action that is taken uses simulation ex-
tensively. Suppose one sits on a couch and turns on the TV. The brain 
then integrates “states across modalities” (Barsalou 2008, 618) with 
multimodal representations stored in memory. Every time some portion 
of knowledge is needed to represent a category, such as “couch,” the 
multimodal representations that are kept in memory “are reactivated to 
simulate how the brain represented perception, action, and introspection 
associated with it” (Barsalou 2008, 618–619). One might say that the 
claim about the multimodal nature of knowledge goes hand in hand 
with the particular outline of semantic memory I discussed, following 
Hogan, in Chapter 3. The difference is perhaps about the emphasis on 
the role of simulation in cognition.
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At least one thing that has a significant bearing on understanding 
human interaction with art follows from the above. Namely, any strong 
distinction into perceptual and non-perceptual (conceptual) art seems 
suspect in the light of how concepts and perception function and are 
stored in memory. It seems inadequate to claim, as some proponents 
of the Institutional Theory appear to be doing, that with the advent of 
modern art it has become clear that appreciation is a matter of following 
rule-governed conventions, as conceptual art affords no directly accessi-
ble pleasure. On the contrary, it is clear that memory is largely represen-
tational, and thus the appreciation of both perceptual and the seemingly 
non-perceptual art requires reactivation of the multimodal representa-
tions stored in memory, “unless the properties in question evoke instinc-
tive responses from mere exposure” (Norwood 2013, 143). Needless to 
say, appreciation of most art requires some degree of reliance on mul-
timodal representations, and this is most evident in conceptual art, as 
well as in poetry and prose. Venus of Milo might elicit some natural, in-
stinctive aesthetic response cross-culturally, but surely Duchamp’s “The 
Fountain” cannot elicit such responses unless the audience is familiar 
with the concept of a “urinal,” of a “fountain” and of a “gallery,” that 
is, unless the person in question has some degree of acculturation and 
cultural competence. The ability to employ one’s cultural competence 
in comprehending works of art is thus translatable into the language of 
cognitive science in terms of simulation, mental lexicon, priming, sche-
mas, scripts, prototypes, etc. Since, as I stressed in Chapter 2, there is 
no special social institution that regulates the activities of literary critics 
and of proficient readers and that grants certificates of literary compe-
tence, or that publishes a rule book according to which humans interact 
with arts, there cannot be any difference in essence when it comes to 
the workings of untutored and competent readers. Both readers employ 
the same cognitive processes in understanding and evaluating art. The 
difference lies largely in the contents that these processes utilize.
Simulation and Appreciation
In accord with my discussion of simulation and, earlier, types of acti-
vation in the mental lexicon, I wish to have a look at their application 
to the aesthetic response to literary works. Perhaps the clearest exposi-
tion of how simulation-related processes operate with regard to literary 
works was offered by Patrick C. Hogan. Hogan noticed that there are 
striking similarities between much of contemporary work in cognitive 
science regarding levels of activation in the mental lexicon and some 
Sanskrit works on literary aesthetics from as early as tenth century AD 
(Hogan 1996, 163–194). Though he offers an interesting discussion re-
garding the commensurability of the concepts applied in both fields, I 
will leave this issue aside and try to summarize the views he presents 
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without either the technicalities of cognitive science, or the specificity of 
the Sanskrit conceptual apparatus.
Hogan begins by addressing one of the perennial questions of philos-
ophy of literature. There are clearly multiple ways we can read, or read 
into, a literary text: we can look for specific information, we can study 
it linguistically, etc., In other words, whenever we attempt to construe 
some meaning of the text, we must first stipulate what meaning we are 
interested in. There is, however, a type of meaning that we take as some-
how logically prior, or defining, when it comes to artworks, and thus, 
literary works. The meaning we stipulate while approaching an artwork 
comes from the assumption that the work in question was designed with 
some aesthetic intent: so as to elicit an aesthetic experience in its audi-
ence/readers. So far, so good, but interestingly enough, Hogan attempts 
to explain the nature of this experience in terms of an aesthetic attitude, 
a notion that I found problematic earlier in this book. Although Hogan 
rejects the idea that an aesthetic attitude is a matter of special, disinter-
ested attention on the same grounds I did, following George Dickie, he 
assumes that we should think of aesthetic attitude in terms of expecta-
tions regarding the form and content of the work and the effects it can 
elicit in audience. Specifically, by adopting the aesthetic mode we expect 
that a literary work will afford us specific type of pleasure by activating 
networks of emotion-laden associations stored in our minds.
Despite the fact that I see Hogan’s understanding of aesthetic attitude 
as more promising than the traditional one, I still consider it problem-
atic, and perhaps even redundant. The problem with defining literary 
response purely in terms of an attitude is prone to marginalizing the con-
cept of art and literature entirely. If I can experience something aesthet-
ically or not by merely switching my aesthetic and non-aesthetic mental 
modes on and off, the ontological consequences are dire, for an external 
object of attention which initially drew my interest by virtue of the pos-
sibility of experiencing its formal and thematic qualities ceases to exist 
(I believe this is roughly the view of Stanley Fish and Norman Holland). 
Consequently, if the experience is entirely a matter of the creative pro-
pensities of my mental aesthetic mode, I should be able to have exactly 
the same aesthetic experience reading David Lodge and mowing the 
lawn, which is surely not the case. On the other hand, it is true that I can 
attempt to read a non-literary text with a set of expectations  normally 
reserved for artworks and do have similar experiences occasionally, but 
it is doubtful that they will turn out to be structured in the same way 
and, eventually, be as rewarding as an experience of an artwork. Clearly, 
the quality of a literary experience cannot be merely a matter of an atti-
tude. I will return to these considerations after discussing Hogan’s liter-
ary aesthetics in more detail.
Hogan proceeds to observe, quite correctly, that the specifically liter-
ary experience cannot be unstructured and it must be unified. This unity 
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cannot be, however, reduced to simple causal or logical unity, as it is 
clear that celebrated works of, say, postmodern fiction may lack internal 
causal and logical unity, but we are able to experience them as unified in 
the way in which they were designed. Thus, just as in my discussion of 
Olsen in Chapters 1 and 2, Hogan assumes that the unity, or integrity, 
of an artwork is the “mutual relevance between parts, or elements of a 
work” (Hogan 1996, 174). Yet, this still seems too broad and insufficient 
to define the experience of artworks. It is precisely to clarify the issue 
that Hogan brings together Indian aesthetics and cognitive science.
To specify the nature of the literary experience proper (though as I 
said, I believe his account is generally applicable to understanding other 
arts), Hogan quotes an analogy drawn by one of the Indian authors 
between “aesthetic experience and savoring the taste of food” (Hogan 
1996, 169). To experience the aesthetic value of art is to squeeze out “the 
poetical word” (Hogan 1996, 169), and to “read and taste many times 
over the same poem” (Hogan 1996, 174), “dallying with the meanings, 
contexts, associations of the words and phrases” (Hogan 1996, 174). 
This, in turn, implies delectation of suggestions or evocation that are 
linked to a particular sentiment or emotion. Aesthetic suggestiveness is 
not equivalent to mere implication. A phrase such as “a hamlet on the 
Ganga” implies that the hamlet is on the bank of the river, rather than 
on the river itself, but it suggests “sanctity, […] as well as peace, purity, 
and so forth” (Hogan 1996, 169). This means that the type of activation 
in semantic memory that is crucial for literary aesthetic experience is not 
entirely paraphraseable, as it includes both the emotive and the cogni-
tive. It is an activation of the conceptual and the associations, images, 
feelings and beliefs along the lines of a unifying sentiment or feeling 
(Hogan 1996, 174). In the end, the type of unity that is relevant for lit-
erary works is the “unity of emotionally evocative association” (Hogan 
1996, 174). To link this claim with Hogan’s earlier point about artistic 
unity, as well as with Budd’s discussion of value, and with Olsen’s notion 
of expectations of competent readers, I suppose the above outline is per-
fectly congruent with Budd’s insistence on merging the formal and the 
experiential while ascribing some value to art. We approach a work of 
art with expectations regarding the experience it may afford; we assume 
it to be unified in the sense of being composed of interrelated elements, 
but we also expect that if the work proves to be structured in such a way, 
this would produce in us a set of semantic and emotional associations 
structured around a posited unifying theme of the work linked to a given 
sentiment/emotion. I find such a vision to be perfectly congruent with 
Olsen’s idea of aesthetic experience, though he is unwilling to admit the 
precise nature of aesthetically relevant expectations.
Further, and in tune with the notion of simulation I outlined earlier, 
the chain of associations is able to evoke emotions because of latent traces 
of previous, related experiences stored in memory, either experienced 
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sensually or simulated. However, we must be careful to emphasize that 
the experience is still an experience of the work, rather than dwelling on 
our own deeply personal, contextualized memories, so as not to fall into 
the pit of affective fallacy or Dickie’s inattention to the work. Thus, a 
proper aesthetic appreciation requires a degree of generalization of one’s 
emotional response. If personal sorrow is supposed to elicit aesthetic 
experience
it must be in some way generalized from specific memories of per-
sonal loss, which is to say that it must be in some way removed from 
those specific memories, while at the same time remaining in some 
way connected with them (as the continuing source of feeling).
(Hogan 1996, 170)
This can be explained through reference to the notion of priming or 
partial activation. Why we respond emotionally to a literary text can 
be a question of not only full activation where we are aware of par-
ticular personal experiences, but, more importantly, that of partial 
activation, where certain feelings, beliefs, etc., are primed; that is, 
we somehow feel their “traces,” but they do not cross the threshold 
of full activation and, consequently, do not enter our consciousness. 
But this does not yet explain whether the type of priming we can 
possibly experience from literary or other artworks is in any sense 
unique. It seems that the type of activation can be elicited by entirely 
non-artistic events, but I would add again that highly esteemed liter-
ary works aim at a specific structuration of the response: one that we 
do not expect to see while chatting with friends in a pub, shopping or 
watching news on TV.
Additionally, Hogan suggests that while reading in the aesthetic mode 
(that is, having relevant expectations about the work), we tend to sup-
press the overly personal dimension of the experience and stay focused 
on the work itself: that is why in proper aesthetic response, the acti-
vation of memories is closer to priming, rather than to full activation. 
Again, this remains puzzling as it leads us back to the question of the 
nature of relevant expectations. According to Hogan, it appears that 
this suppression is not something that happens spontaneously or nat-
urally, but it is a conscious decision based on informed expectations, 
that is, occurring when one had already internalized a proper concept 
of an artwork/literary work. This seems to push us back to square one 
as the overall conclusion is that, just like in the Iinstitutional Theories, 
a proper response to an artwork is only possible when one internal-
izes a body of conventional knowledge about its nature and about its 
appreciation. Sadly, Hogan does not elaborate on the matter, but I am 
convinced the anti-conventionalist cause is not lost, however it requires 
some clarification.
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First of all, for a number of reasons I already listed, it is unlikely 
that there can be any strong distinction into the conventional and non- 
conventional (natural, spontaneous) regarding responses to art. At the 
same time, it would be absurd to claim that there can exist strictly spon-
taneous, untutored responses to the type of art that does not directly 
address the senses and instinctive human reactions. Showing a novel 
(a book) to a person who has no concept of the novel in any sense (say, 
belongs to a culture that has not developed writing, or was brought up 
outside human culture and does not know any language; in milder cases: 
is illiterate, does not know the particular language of the work, etc.) will 
not lead us anywhere, and we cannot expect any form of appreciation 
and understanding to emerge there. That is, when talking about read-
ing a novel, or contemplating “Brillo Boxes,” we tacitly assume that a 
person engaged in such an activity already has some degree of accultur-
ation. Note that Hogan’s example of “a hamlet on the Ganga” requires 
both some linguistic knowledge and cultural background so that the 
reader can experience the possible suggestion of sancticity. One has to 
know the meaning of “hamlet” and “Ganga,” along with their cultural 
connotations. The point is not trivial, as it demonstrates that merely by 
being brought up in a given culture and having some language skills 
we already begin to internalize a degree of the conceptual apparatus or 
cultural competence used in this culture; thus, the question of being a 
competent or incompetent reader must be, in reality, a matter of degree. 
Now, the relevant aspects of the acculturation in question include here: 
linguistic competence, knowledge of art-historical contexts and the abil-
ity to read a literary work having relevant expectations about its struc-
ture and content, or in other words, knowing the strategies involved in 
literary interpretation (the aesthetic mode, in Hogan’s sense). This also 
means that how we come to grasp something as a literary work is grad-
able, rather than a matter of becoming acquainted with an entirely arbi-
trary concept which is defined in a rule book of aesthetic appreciation. 
In other words, the concept of a “king” in chess, an “offside” in football 
or “full house” in poker are entirely arbitrary and require becoming 
introduced to the specific set of rules of applying the concept in their 
respective activities. Literary works do not exist in the same arbitrary 
manner; there is an overwhelming evidence of the concept of the literary 
work (in terms of its ontology, form and contents) and literary apprecia-
tion (as in literary/artistic universals, or Sanskrit and Chinese aesthetics 
that Hogan discusses) developing independently across cultures.
The concept of a literary work itself and how we come to cognize it 
are, likewise, not arbitrary constructs in any meaningful sense of the 
concept of “arbitrariness.” In Chapter 3 I discussed how factors such as 
empathy, theory of mind and emotionality provide the broad framework 
in which humans come to understand a literary work, and these are 
quite instinctive and spontaneous. They provide a substantial portion 
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of our natural response to art. Furthermore, the argument that the only 
reason we attempt to understand a literary work as a coherent, unified 
structure (though, as I pointed out, this does not entail standard causal/
logical internal coherence), and ascribe it some agency and space-time 
indexicality is because we are slaves to bourgeois ideology which ne-
cessitates such a perception of art (since it reinforces and perpetuates 
the dominant power structures in an overarching network of ideological 
practices) is a little far-fetched. The basic features of an artwork listed 
above are just standard features humans are initially interested in, as 
their determination is prerequisite to humans being able to orient them-
selves in the surrounding world. The above is how we come to cognize, 
identify and categorize the elements of the world around us in general, 
and man-made artifacts (from bread to space rockets) in particular.
Similarly, the formal and the thematic aspects of literary works are 
not made of entirely arbitrary substance, in the sense in which the con-
ventional rules of card games shape the progress of the game. We can 
program a computer how to simulate a gameplay of cards, but it is im-
possible to program it so as to understand and appreciate art, for art is 
anthropocentric and requires specific type of emotional-cognitive archi-
tecture as well as specific types of human experience and memories in 
order to be enjoyed. I indicated in Chapter 3 how the formal aspects of 
literary works ranging from the length of lines and phonetics in poetry, 
through the use of figurative language, storytelling and the structure 
of prototypical stories are necessarily intertwined with the dispositions 
of human cognitive architecture. The fact that we see, or see-in, met-
aphorical meanings in a work is bound with our natural way of con-
ceptualizing, or seeing-in connections between various elements of our 
ordinary experience. How we are skilled in identifying and relating the 
internal elements of a work or to see its figurative meaning is related 
to our individual capacities to conceptualize and understand the world 
around us.3 Figurative language and stylistic ornaments are used widely 
in ordinary language and it is an exaggeration to claim that we need a 
special conventional knowledge to hypothesize a metaphorical level to 
a literary text. It is not that we cannot experience anaphoras (though, 
we, of course, might not know the term), alliterations or various forms 
of foregrounding (Hogan 1996, 177) unless we are acquainted with a 
special rule book.
Hogan mentions Aristotle’s idea of “epitedic unity” (Hogan 1996, 
173), that is, a certain unity of design of an artwork that is not equivalent 
to standard causal-logical unity. Rather than that, he sees it as related, 
and apparently rightly so, to his idea of literary experience as elicited by 
a chain of associations structured around a unifying theme linked to a 
certain sentiment. He mentions an example of this type of associative 
unity used by Aristotle, “the statue of Mitys at Argos killed the man who 
caused Mity’s death by falling on him at a festival” (Hogan 1996, 173). 
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We link the two events as forming a coherent narrative, though no 
causal relations define them. Despite its brevity and simplicity, I regard 
this example to be symptomatic of one of the most central aspects of the 
practice of literary understanding/interpretation and appreciation, as it 
illustrates the necessity to recognize the figurative as well as the inter-
connectedness of the internal parts of the work (in this case, the elements 
of the plot, but this also refers to the relatedness of form and content, 
including the specific layers of both aspects of a literary work). Accord-
ing to Institutional Theoriess of art, in order to recognize this passage 
as figurative and in order to be aware of its symbolic significance in re-
lation to other elements of the work, one has to be acquainted with the 
conventions that govern the appreciation of literature. This, however, 
seems implausible, as the ability to connect associatively, rather than 
causally, certain events, elements, images and quite distinct forms, is not 
something specific to art appreciation. Our ability to link various levels 
and various elements of a work is broadly used even in such simplistic 
forms as jokes or proverbs. Take the famous proverb derived from the 
Gospel of Matthew, “for all they that take the sword shall perish with 
the sword,” or “those who plow evil and those who sow trouble reap it” 
taken from the book of Job. There is no logical connection between the 
events the proverbs discuss. But we are able to link the two by means 
of emotional associations, by conceptualizing some degree of analogy 
between them. They can both refer to Aristotle’s example and I believe 
there is no reason to suppose we need a special rule book to see (or 
see-in) this type of relation, as this kind of figurative language is wide-
spread in everyday communication, as well as in multiple cultural texts 
that we would not normally consider artworks.4 It is just another case of 
humans looking for patterns and connections in how they make sense of 
the surrounding world.
On the other hand, I am far from claiming that competent apprecia-
tion, in the sense of literary critics and models outlined by Olsen et al., 
happens spontaneously. Certainly, though, some responses to literary 
works that eventually lead to full-blown appreciation do happen sponta-
neously among all members of a literate culture. Everybody is capable of 
reading-in some degree of figurative dimension, allusion, metaphor and 
symbol into a literary work. Further, we quite instinctively ascribe some 
agency to a linguistic artifact, so as to frame it in at least some minimal 
limits of possible meaning. We all have rather spontaneous evaluative re-
sponses to literary works which can be broadly conceived of in terms of 
emotionality, but which are, in fact, always a contingent mixture of the 
capacities of our cognitive-emotive architecture, personal memories and 
experiences, and our current state of knowledge about the art-historical 
context of the work in question (including the knowledge about literary 
traditions and conventions). This leads me to claim that literary interpre-
tation cannot be entirely removed and disconnected from other forms of 
human inquiry, even though it does have its own peculiarities. Following 
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Patrick C. Hogan, I believe that literary interpretation is a variant of ratio-
nal inquiry (Hogan 1996, 1–94), where readers continually test and evalu-
ate their hypotheses about the probable meaning of subsequent fragments 
of a work using their personal experiences, cultural competence and the 
knowledge of art-historical contexts of a work to produce its probable 
meanings.
In one of his recent books, all of which actually mark his reinvigorated 
interest in the actual practices of appreciation of literature not dissimilar 
from the one displayed by analytic aestheticians, Terry Eagleton gives 
an example of what inferences we might draw from short passage of a 
literary work. I dare say that his approach is not neglectful of the aes-
thetic dimension of literature and is typical of at least some early stage of 
textualist analysis (Eagleton 2013, 40). Consider the opening sentence of 
Anthony Burgess’s Earthly Powers, “It was the afternoon of my eighty-
first birthday, and I was in bed with my catamite when Ali announced 
that the archbishop had come to see me” (Burgess 1980, 7). Some min-
imal background knowledge about the language in which the novel was 
written, as well as its year of publication, along with some basic facts 
about the author (e.g., that he was British) suffice to form initial hypoth-
eses about the meaning of the passage. For instance, the use of the word 
“catamite” makes a strong case for assuming that the speaker is male 
(though, of course, it could turn out in the course of reading that this is 
not the case). Moreover, his sleeping habits indicate that he might have 
a lot of leisure time at his disposal. The visit of an archbishop probably 
entails his high social position (at this point, one can also assume that 
the speaker holds a very high position in the clergy, e.g., he is a cardinal). 
The character of “Ali” could probably lead the reader to think about 
colonial setting and a servant-like occupation, and so on. These are very 
simple inferences that moderately competent readers could make, but I 
suppose they illustrate the idea of probable/rational inquiry into a liter-
ary text. All of the above are, of course, subject to change and revision 
in the course of reading, but the procedure itself should operate as in my 
example. Furthermore, I do not believe that the inferences I mentioned 
are verbalized or necessarily conscious. In tune with my discussion of 
types of activation, I believe it makes more sense to think about sets of 
possible hypotheses that we have at hand while reading: some of them 
are perhaps fully activated, whereas others remain primed so that we 
can easily follow along few possible lines of interpretation of a passage.
Suppose, for example, that one reader who happens to be fond of box-
ing or has just heard some facts regarding the history of the discipline 
reads the name “Ali” in the above example and experiences an activa-
tion of “Mohammed Ali,” leading him to see the famous boxer in the 
scene depicted. It is of course possible to start out with such an initial 
hypothesis about the meaning of the passage, but it will be increasingly 
difficult to read the servant-like character as a boxer, as there will be 
less and less evidence to support this hypothesis, as well as less and less 
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putative functionality of such an inference in the sense of its relation to 
some general themes of the work.5 I believe, thus, that interpretation is 
a matter of making ongoing, always revisable rational inferences consid-
ered most likely in relation to current knowledge. It is, then, a type of 
abductive reasoning.6
Of course, the above Ali example is again just one case of responding 
to art in an entirely personal, idiosyncratic way. As I indicated earlier, 
it is not much different than persistently reading Coriolanus specifically 
as a story about Stalin, or reading King Lear as a story about one’s 
family. Related cases of personal readings happen every day and they 
are entirely explainable in terms of memory activation I discussed. Why 
should we even expect, then, that readers might follow the general rules 
of rational inference? I believe the answer lies in Budd’s condition that 
proper value judgments about art are intersubjective, and I should add 
that, in reality, readers with various levels of competence will display 
corresponding levels of movement toward intersubjectivity in their inter-
pretations, rather than toward idiosyncrasy of interpretations. There are 
several reasons for that. First, intersubjectivity presupposes communi-
cation and a certain level of common ground between participants. It is 
most unlikely that a community of competent critics will form where all 
members share highly idiosyncratic interpretations of a number of art-
works. Rather than that, interpretations will move toward the shared, 
that is, toward seeing the work as touching upon matters of general hu-
man interest and not the particular. Second, and more importantly, I do 
not believe we can have a literally personal understanding of an artwork 
for the simple reason that it is impossible that we participate in experi-
encing artworks in an entirely individual manner: we are introduced to 
art by others, we enjoy it with others, we talk about it with others, just 
as we are introduced to any other aspects of human culture. My point 
is derived from the anti-Cartesian sentiments of both cognitive science 
and Donald Davidson’s philosophy. Human rationality is not a preoccu-
pation of individual minds but requires knowledge of other minds to be 
actually formed: our understanding of the self is intertwined with our 
understanding of other minds and with our understanding of the world. 
It presupposes communication with other minds. Understanding and en-
joying art, thus, requires the peculiar type of human rationality, rather 
than any idea of abstract rationality. All in all, where we are located on 
the scale between idiosyncratic readings and ideal intersubjective read-
ings of literary critics is a reflection of our general sense of relation to 
other minds and our ability to communicate with them, as well as it is 
an indication of our cultural competence.
A similar point against the austerity of Institutional Theories of art 
was made by Susan Feagin, a scholar famous for her explorations of 
the emotional underpinnings of aesthetic appreciation (Feagin 2010, 
89–92). Feagin noticed that the claim made by Peter Lamarque about 
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the relation between a literary critic and a competent reader has more 
far-reaching implications than Lamarque admitted. In short, Lamarque 
sees literary critics as model readers, fully capable of informed, inter-
subjective value judgments in Budd’s sense. They are well acquainted 
with the rules and conventions governing literary appreciation. In fact, 
Lamarque holds there should be no significant difference between “the 
practice of criticism […] and the responses of an educated reading pub-
lic” (Lamarque 2009, 135) and that “a literary critic is simply a reader 
who has more experience and heightened perceptiveness than the ‘com-
mon reader’” (Lamarque 2009, 135). Although I entirely agree with 
Lamarque’s claims, I see merit in Feagin’s remark that he marginalizes 
one important aspect of literary criticism that is not necessarily present 
in the appreciation experienced by competent readers. This aspect is the 
critics’ duty to communicate about the work to others (Feagin 2010, 92). 
To place it within the framework of my previous discussion, communi-
cation presupposes stronger emphasis on intersubjectivity, that is to say, 
the language of criticism tends to be more impersonal with the critics’ 
initial emotion-laden appreciation swept under the carpet. Thus, even 
though the responses of critics and competent readers should be com-
parable, the latter’s professional position requires them to marginalize 
their emotional appreciation and to focus on intersubjective communi-
cation about art whereas competent readers can appreciate art “enriched 
by emotions and other affective responses without fear that they might 
interfere with one’s professional responsibilities” (Feagin 2010, 92).
My outline of the interpretive decisions placed on the spectrum of 
intersubjectivity/idiosyncrasy might give the impression that the only 
mechanism that regulates the limits of interpretation is the presupposi-
tion of its communicative nature. This is not the case. Despite the fact 
that it is precisely intersubjectivity that entails the movement toward 
commonality or universality, it does not imply that intepretations are 
just arbitrary constructs. They are not produced out of thin air by au-
dience as, for an interpretation (or a value judgment, for that matter) to 
be accepted, it has to be argued using evidence from the work – from 
the material accessible to other members of the culture. In other words, 
relevant aesthetic expectations, as in Hogan’s understanding of aesthetic 
mode, are not enough for appreciation to be experienced, for there has to 
be something in the work itself that fulfills the expectations and rewards 
the reader. I am thus, contra Fish, of the view that aesthetic expecta-
tions may or may not be met while attending to a work of art or to any 
other cultural text for that matter. In the end, what I am suggesting does 
have a remotely Humean flavor, owing to the fact that Hume stressed 
both the sentiment-dependence and the argued intersubjectivity of value 
judgments, but I believe my adherence to Budd’s theory of artistic value, 
neurobiology, and to Hogan’s cognitive literary studies makes it signifi-
cantly different.
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I should add here that Susan Feagin made a significant contribution 
to the philosophical debate on the role of emotions in appreciation of 
literary works, offering the first book-length treatment of both the na-
ture of affective response to literature and of how these responses shape 
literary value. With a slightly different outlook than the later work of 
Jenefer Robinson, Feagin insists on interpretation and appreciation 
being different pursuits and though the former underpins the latter, 
it is  appreciation that is the pivot of her discussion. Appreciation for 
Feagin is largely a rather complex emotional response where, in an early 
stage of reading, small sections of a work trigger affective reactions 
and later shape further reactions causing “mental shifts” and “slides” 
( Feagin 1996, 59–83) manipulating our perspective, sensitivity and over-
all emotional state. Empathy is particularly important in her theory and 
she maintains it operates on the basis of simulation of the mental states 
of others and, thus, one of the values of reading literature is the abil-
ity to understand and improve the skills of understanding other minds. 
Much like Jenefer Robinson, whom I mentioned in the previous chapter, 
Feagin seems to be claiming that appreciation of literature is largely 
an  emotionally-based activity and that it requires actually experienc-
ing emotional states while attending to a work. I suppose that Peter 
Lamarque rightly holds, against Feagin and Robinson, that appreciation 
of literature involves what Noël Carroll recently called “appreciation as 
sizing-up” (Carroll 2016, 1–14) evaluation without the necessarily affec-
tive component. Instead, appreciation of a literary work involves “seeing 
how it works, what it attempts to do, how the elements hang together, 
admiring the intricacies of plot, the delineation of character, the aptness 
of dialogue, the subtleties of thematic vision” (Lamarque 2000, 147). I 
think it is clear that a large portion of appreciation is not really emo-
tional at all. On the other hand, it does seem to have the affective un-
derpinnings, sentiments and anthropocentric qualities Budd discussed. 
Robinson is entirely correct in maintaining that without particular emo-
tional memories, experiences and certain, say, maturity of the mind, we 
would not be able to appreciate art. As she puts it,
a precocious little girl reading ‘The Ambassadors’ might understand 
what she reads in a sense if she understands the literal might under-
stand what she reads in a sense if she understands the literal mean-
ing of the words, but in another, deeper sense she won’t understand 
because she won’t under- stand the characters or their motivation. 
The book is ‘too old’ for her in that it describes experiences out-
side her emotional range. She understands the words ‘I come from 
 Woollett, Massachusetts,’ but the emotional implications are most 
probably beyond her reach. Here cognition is clearly not enough. 
The little girl needs emotional sophistication as well.
(Robinson 2005, 129)
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The problem with Robinson and Feagin is that they claim proper appre-
ciation of artworks involves full emotional response. But with the notion 
of priming and simulation that I outlined earlier it is clear that affective 
component need not be full-blown. I suspect that understanding and ap-
preciating literature in the sense suggested in the quotation above involves 
priming or partial activation, which touches deep memory content without 
necessarily crossing the threshold of full awareness. A competent reader 
would, thus, be able to understand The Ambassadors thanks to some af-
fective component stored in his memory, but I guess it is not typically fully 
activated. In this sense, I am on Lamarque’s and Carroll’s side in the sense 
that Robinson’s argument about the necessity of full emotional response is 
false. But by revising and updating it to include priming and partial acti-
vation of affect (which is then not the locus of literary critic’s actions, nor 
necessarily a major part of conscious reflection or debate on art), not only 
can it be saved, but it remains congruent with the opposing anti-emotional 
view. I believe the above is a brief example how bridging cognitive psychol-
ogy and analytic aesthetics can clarify some issues in both disciplines.
Not much has been written so far on the continuity between naïve 
and expert type of response to literature, though this is an area that lies 
precisely on the border of cognitive and philosophical aesthetics. There 
has been, however, some debate and research on visual perception and 
response to arts, results of whose may prove to be applicable to tackle 
similar problems regarding literature. Mark Rollins argues for a natu-
ralistic approach to interpretation of pictorial art along the lines of hy-
pothetical intentionalism, claiming contra Levinson that both categorial 
intentions, those pertaining to locating a given work within a broader art 
category, and the semantic intentions, which we typically call meaning of 
an artwork, are work-internal and extractable by responders. The latter 
are formed on the basis of microintentions, “small-scale internal repre-
sentational events” (Rollins 2004, 185) which tend to guide and manipu-
late perception by, say, certain treatment of colors or contours, revealing 
“minimal communicative intent” (Rollins 2004, 185). There is no direct 
way in which this can be applied to literature, but I suspect the theory 
with which Rollins bears most affinity is a variant of defamiliarization 
thesis put forward by many neuroaestheticians, cognitive scientists and 
proponents of empirical studies of literature (see next chapter), which I see 
as seriously flawed and what I think is particularly evident in the context 
of literature, as demonstrated in previous chapters. On the other hand, 
I take it that it is undeniable that we are guided by actual or posited in-
tentions which are largely extractable from a literary work and I agree 
entirely with Rollins and Danto that “sociohistorical practices supervene 
on psychological states” (Rollins 2004, 177) but it will not suffice to say 
that we hypothesize about the semantic content of what is actually there 
in the text. Recognizing and appreciating nuances of linguistic style, nar-
rative and psychological representation or complexity of metaphors in a 
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given literary work is not a matter of mere perception or easily extractable 
microintentions but a blend of natural skills which are further fossilized 
in conventionalized interpretive procedures and art-historical knowledge. 
For more on the need to expand and connect research goals in aesthetics 
and cognitive science in relation to pictorial arts, and on cognitive pen-
etration of perception and its effects on expert and untutored responses 
see Stokes (2009, 2014), Bergeron and Lopes (2012) and Dilworth (2005).
In most of Chapters 3 and 4 I tried to demonstrate the inadequacy of 
the claim that literary appreciation is solely a matter of convention, a 
rule-governed procedure not unlike playing chess. I believe there is over-
whelming evidence against the claim. Institutional Theorists themselves 
do not appear to be entirely clear on that matter. On the one hand, their 
central claim is the institutional-conventional nature of art and of artistic 
appreciation. On the other hand, Olsen maintains that literary works 
have to be of human interest, but if so, this interest is not reducible to a 
convention or to a cultural locality. Similarly, Lamarque holds that there 
is no major difference between the responses of the critics and competent 
readers, and the latter are different from “common readers” merely ow-
ing to art-historical knowledge and heightened perceptiveness. All of the 
above indicates some degree of confusion over the status of the literary 
institution. Whereas I am of the opinion that literary appreciation does 
not happen spontaneously and becoming a competent reader does require 
time (as in accumulating memories of some experiences), practice and 
art-historical knowledge, just as being introduced to the generals rules 
that govern appreciation can facilitate the process and improve one’s in-
terpretive skills, it is not equivalent to saying that both appreciation, as 
well as the form and content of art, are conventional. The concept of 
literature as we have it now is not fully natural; obviously, it developed 
along the lines of development of human culture, society, economy, etc. 
It would be impossible to appreciate it if we were entirely outside of cul-
ture (within it, our skill at appreciation is a matter of degree), but it also 
 engages our evolved cognitive-emotive architecture. It is not fully expli-
cable in naturalistic terms, but our contemporary, institutional concept 
of art only utilizes and clarifies what humans are naturally interested 
in or driven to, and its foundations (both in terms of content, form, as 
well as its appreciation) existed long before the emergence of our narrow 
sense of literature. My belief in the continuity-like relation between spon-
taneous responses to art and non-art, responses of ordinary readers of 
fiction, and those of competent audience, might suggest that perhaps the 
notion of the institution is redundant and should be disposed of. On the 
contrary, there are sound reasons to believe that in spite of its problems 
and unclear status, we are not able to fully understand art without it. I 
will try to demonstrate this in the final section of the chapter.
One final comment before proceeding to the next chapter concerns 
my use of certain key terminology. Throughout this section, I have 
been using the terms “convention,” “competence” and “acculturation” 
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interchangeably to denote some degree of acquired or learned proficiency 
in appreciation of art. At the same time, I have argued for a partly nat-
uralistic explanation of what art is made of, to put it crudely, and how 
humans come to understand and appreciate it. This requires some clarifi-
cation. In the hierarchy proposed here, all the above mentioned concepts 
belong to the aesthetic level of explanation. It is the terminology that usu-
ally describes the workings of literary critics and proficient consumers of 
art. As such, it suggests being acquainted with a fair amount of culturally 
produced knowledge that seems to belong squarely to an entirely auton-
omous domain of culture. This view, however, would be too simplistic. 
Referring back to my earlier discussions of Baxter and Tsur, not every-
thing produced by a culture is an arbitrary construct. The existence of 
art itself in the broad sense is definitely not arbitrary. Likewise is human 
interest and delight taken in it. As Tsur pointed out, some cultural prod-
ucts or institutions are fossilized cognitive devices. Some cultural phe-
nomena are more likely to occur or to become popular because of how 
they engage human cognitive-emotive architecture. Literary appreciation 
stems directly from certain cognitive-emotive processes and it is not fun-
damentally different from our ways of cognizing the world in general. It 
is true that model appreciation (in the sense of literary critics’ actions) 
requires some degree of knowledge about, say, history of art. But this is 
only part of the story. It provides some contents to the cognitive-emotive 
human architecture, but the processes operating remain the same. The 
procedures involved in appreciation of art are not arbitrary in the sense 
that traffic organization or housing policy are. One’s skills can be clearly 
facilitated by practice and formal training, but they are not equivalent 
to being introduced to the rules of chess. I see being formally trained 
in literary appreciation as being introduced to certain fossilized natural 
processes. The exposition obviously accelerates the development of the 
skill. Overall, if the “conventions” applied to appreciation of art are not 
entirely arbitrary does it not mean that the term should not be used? Not 
at all. One has to keep in mind that “convention” and “competence” are 
fairly established and, to a large degree, helpful terms used in accounting 
for art appreciation. They belong to the aesthetic domain and make sense 
within the conceptual framework used there. If one looks closer, they 
cease to be conventions in the purely arbitrary sense, but this is equivalent 
to saying that if one looks closer at a human being it ceases to be one and 
becomes a cluster of various cells. It all depends on one’s current level of 
explanation and therefore, there are pragmatic reasons to use the term.
Notes
 1 My brief summary of Frankenstein’s case is based on an unpublished paper 
by Professor David Fishelov “Frankenstein is Alive and Kicking: A Multi- 
dimensional Model for the Literary Work in Culture,” which he delivered 
at International Society for the Empirical Study of Literature (IGEL) Con-
gress in Turin, Italy, July 21–25, 2014.
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 2 In the sense developed in cognitive science by L. Barsalou, “Simulation is the 
reenactment of perceptual, motor, and introspective states acquired during expe-
rience with the world, body, and mind.” Quote taken from Lawrence Barsalou 
“Grounded Cognition,” Annual Review of Psychology 59 (2008): 617–645.
 3 In this sense, I am inclined to believe that literary works can be instrumental 
in developing human cognitive and emotional skills.
 4 There are, of course, innumerable examples of how we use, or are expected 
to recognize this type of interrelatedness either in artworks, in other cultural 
texts and even in real life events. I wish to illustrate the latter using a spe-
cific personal anecdote. Some time ago, a horrible gas explosion destroyed 
a tenement in the city where I live, killing several tenants including a local 
journalist. Upon discussing the event my friend remarked that there is a 
tragic, grim irony to this event since the journalist’s career had boosted as a 
result of his covering a similar building collapse a few years back. This case 
resonates again with Aristotle’s example. Surely, there is no logical or causal 
connection between the events. Nor is there anything particularly literary 
about them. Still this is yet another case of the human propensity to look for 
patterns and similarities structured around a unified emotional-associative 
response in order to produce and to experience stories aesthetically. We see 
them in particular literary works just as we see them in real life.
 5 I am well aware that literary theorists such as Stanley Fish or Norman 
 Holland would argue that readers are only able to affirm their own presup-
positions in the course of reading (and thus a boxing afficionado will read 
Burgess’ entire novel with Mohammed Ali as one of the characters) but I 
reject their view for the reasons outlined earlier.
 6 I am referring to “abduction” in Charles S. Peirce’s sense, as a probabilistic 
method of reasoning from observation to forming a hypothesis using the 
simplest explanations.
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In this chapter I will summarize and combine my earlier discussions 
about the relation between cognitive science, aesthetics and textualist 
literary theory as relevant to literary studies. My general thesis is that 
rather than being three disparate and unrelated research approaches, 
they remain intimately related and represent three levels of explanation 
when it comes to the inquiry into literature. Before going on to explain 
details of this relation, it is prerequisite that I explore related general 
issues regarding explanation in philosophy of science. First, however, 
I would like to address one objection about the purpose or the need to 
bring the three approaches together, as the rationale behind my project 
might not be obvious.
The fundamental objection to my analysis, as I see it, would be, 
roughly, as follows. What is the point of looking for links between the 
three research approaches if we know that they have fundamentally dif-
ferent methods and purposes? For instance, cognitive literary studies in-
vestigate how literary works engage human mental processes, the point 
of aesthetics is to read literary works so as to elicit aesthetic experience, 
whereas textualist literary theory analyzes texts in order to elicit social 
change. What can we achieve by conducting such an analysis?
To begin with, one should be careful about making generalizations re-
garding each of the aforementioned areas. It is a mistake to see them as 
highly unified fields. Consider textualist literary theory: it is true that 
a substantial portion of the scholars associated with it pursue literary 
analysis with the aim of bringing about social change. But what are their 
means and what exactly is the social change they pursue? It is hard to find 
a homogenous research method among scholars as diverse as Derrida, 
Eagleton, Gubar and Gilbert, and Hoggart, all being luminaries of textu-
alist literary theory. Similarly, the type of putative liberation that literary 
studies should lead to is in no sense unified. For some, it would be a liber-
ation from colonialist hegemonic discourses, for others a liberation from 
the ideology that justifies economic oppression, or liberation from male 
dominance, liberation from logocentrism, transcending one’s fundamen-
tal phantasm, etc. Moreover, it is far from clear whether we can authori-
tatively claim that all literary theorists really envisage any kind of tangible 
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liberation that their analyses lead to. It is hard to imagine any revolution-
ary potential behind Goldmann’s analysis of Jansenism in Racine. It does 
illustrate the well-known cliché about the economic basis of cultural phe-
nomena, but there is nothing that necessitates revolutionary social change 
upon reading it. After all, why not read it and acknowledge it with an 
altogether conservative political agenda in mind?1 Specific instrumental 
uses of literary analyses can vary and they are of little importance to my 
thesis; what I am interested in are the very procedures involved in the 
analyses themselves, the procedures that make up the textual analyses.
The point holds similarly for analytic aesthetics and cognitive sci-
ence. Throughout the book, I maintained that they are far from unified 
and there is a very limited set of principles that make it valid to put all 
the scholars into one of the categories, e.g., in Chapter 1, I mentioned 
the claim that it makes no sense to define analytic aesthetics in terms 
other than just specific writing style. In Chapter 3, I mentioned some 
seemingly opposing tendencies within cognitive science along with some 
suggestions on how to see them as complementary rather than opposite. 
In other words, I would partly agree with the claim that the three disci-
plines have disparate means and methods, but the very claim rests on a 
tacit and wrong assumption that each of the fields has quite a homoge-
nous set of means and methods. It is not just that they are disparate on 
the outside, they are internally heterogenous. But with this observation, 
we are back at the beginning of the discussion. We should not assume 
that the relation between the three areas is already established as that 
of an opposition, just as it is not objectively given what the internal re-
lations between specific movements within each of the orientations are. 
Literary theory is perhaps the most radical of the three when it comes to 
internal heterogeneity, as there is hardly any agreement about the most 
fundamental concepts used in the field. But it is precisely the point of my 
book: to make preliminary definitions and claims, and to argue, to clar-
ify some concepts, to see how this state of internal confusion can be alle-
viated by cross-disciplinary cooperation. In a field as heterogenous and 
interdisciplinary as literary studies, nothing can be taken for granted, 
especially with the new, related research areas emerging in recent years.
Emergent Structures and Special Sciences
One of the topics typically explored in the philosophy of science, and 
correspondingly, in ontology, is the relation between different types of 
scientific investigations along with the relation between the different 
types of entities or substances that each respective area of investigation 
describes. The topic has been of major concern for the philosophy of 
mind, specifically regarding the mind-brain dilemma, and it has direct 
bearing on the formulation of method of research for psychology, and 
hence, for the status of the whole discipline.
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Needless to say, with the rise of empiricism and positivism in the 
 nineteenth century, English-speaking philosophy has experienced a shift 
of discourse toward physicalist monism. Some important positivist be-
liefs regarding the philosophy of science included the need to imitate 
the research method of natural sciences in all other disciplines and the 
conviction that science is unified: that all specialized disciplines are ex-
plainable and thus reducible to the foundational science of physics, and 
that we should follow the principle of ontological minimalism. Perhaps 
the most radical forms of positivism were typical of the Vienna Circle 
philosophers who held that all assertions are either tautological, subject 
to direct empirical verification or meaningless. This of course leads to a 
predictable conclusion that history, social science and all sorts of consid-
erations about art, ethics, religion, etc. are devoid of meaning. Equally 
puzzling on this account is the status of philosophy itself. The idea of 
verification as a scientific method was harshly criticized by Popper and 
Quine among others and has since been largely rejected by philosophers 
of science.
In the philosophy of mind, a radical opposition to Cartesian dual-
ism appeared in the form of behaviorism, a tendency inspired by the 
works of Wittgenstein and Ryle. Behaviorists maintained that psychol-
ogy should talk about mental states in terms of observable behavior. 
More recently, a different strain of positivist scientism developed, called 
eliminative materialism. Its proponents claim that it is a matter of time 
when the mental will be entirely reducible to and explainable by neuro-
physiology and that the language of psychology will become obsolete. It 
is important to emphasize that, just as with the neopositivist Vienna Cir-
cle’s claims, neither behaviorism nor eliminative materialism is widely 
accepted nowadays. In fact, most scholars working in the area accept 
some form of physicalism, that is, the monistic thesis that everything 
either is or somehow supervenes on the physical, without necessarily 
supporting the idea of reductionism and the positivist unity of science. 
I will not venture into exploring or deciding between the particular fla-
vors of physicalism, as this has little bearing on my thesis. What I want 
to stress is that by referring to anti-positivist physicalist philosophers, I 
refer to the work of mainstream scholars in the areas, even if only to the 
extent that is relevant to my own project.
One very famous attack on the positivist idea of the unity of science 
was launched by Jerry Fodor, a notable physicalist himself. It is impossi-
ble, Fodor claims, to say that the phenomena described and the laws pos-
ited within one discipline are entirely explainable by some corresponding 
laws of physics (Fodor 1974, 97–115). Consequently, special sciences, 
that is, those that are not physics on positivist view, do retain rather 
strong autonomy in relation to the hard sciences. This is clearly visible 
in social sciences and psychology. Take, Fodor suggests, Gresham’s law 
in economics. Its actual formulation is irrelevant, but it suffices to say 
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that it “says something about what will happen in monetary exchanges 
under certain conditions” (Fodor 1974, 103). Further, for reductionists, 
“any event which consists of a monetary exchange (hence any event 
which falls under Gresham’s law) has a true description in the vocabu-
lary of physics and in virtue of which it falls under the laws of physics” 
(Fodor 1974, 103). This, however, seems obviously false. Some forms of 
monetary exchange involve strings of beads, signing checks or transfers 
of virtual currency. They encompass various physical and non-physical 
events. There seem to be no chances that all these events express a phys-
ical natural kind or that they are a consequent of a law of physics. Even 
if the events had some commonality in physical description it would tell 
us nothing about the substance of the specific law in economics. The 
fact that two biological organisms exchange strings of beads is a phys-
ical event, but physics alone tells us nothing about the laws of currency 
exchange. The above also applies to psychology: it is highly unlikely that 
thinking about the weather is coextensive with any single neurological, 
and consequently, physical property. Fodor is not alone in his attack on 
positivist formulation of the unity of science, but his discussion has been 
quite influential and I use it to illustrate my indebtedness to his general 
outlook. The concept of “emergence” with particular focus on irreduc-
ibility that I use is roughly equivalent to stating that:
properties and laws are systemic features of complex systems gov-
erned by true, lawlike generalizations within a special science that is 
irreducible to fundamental physical theory for conceptual reasons. 
The macroscopic patterns in question cannot be captured in terms 
of the concepts and dynamics of physics.
(O’Connor and Wong 2015)
Despite the fact that Fodor does not use the term “emergence” in his 
paper, his views seem to match the above definition.
A related discussion about various levels of explanation with special 
attention to arts was brought up by Patrick Hogan. Following some 
rather basic and uncontroversial facts about the relation between specific 
disciplines, Hogan mentions several rules about the order of explana-
tion in science. First, lower-level elements “provide necessary conditions 
for elements higher in the hierarchy” (Hogan 2003, 202), that is to say, 
laws of physics/chemistry that apply to inorganic matter provide neces-
sary conditions for the existence of higher elements, e.g., organic matter 
studied by biology. Second, “laws are conserved in the conceptual or 
explanatory movement from lower or more basic levels to higher levels” 
(Hogan 2003, 202), which means that they continue to operate in all 
the levels higher than the one in which they were originally formulated. 
“The laws of biology do not cease to operate with respect to mind. The 
laws of psychology do not cease to operate in society” (Hogan 2003, 
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202). Third, “each level is defined by the emergence of some structure 
that is not accounted for by laws at the lower level” (Hogan 2003, 203). 
The emergence of mind is not accounted for by the laws of biology, just 
as the patterns that result from the emergence of organic matter are not 
captured by the laws of physics and chemistry. The higher level incorpo-
rates the lower level and derives from it. Moreover, the lower level pro-
vides a general framework and constrains the patterns that can emerge at 
the higher level. There is, of course, a principle, or a set of principles, that 
regulate the transition (e.g., mutation in biology) and allow that some 
possibilities provided by the conjunction of lower-level laws are actually 
“realized and stabilized in continuing patterns” (Hogan 2003, 203).
Hogan is quite correct in stressing that laws operating on a higher level 
are not fully reducible to a lower level, that is, apart from a realized pos-
sibility resulting from a conjunction of lower levels, new laws appear, and 
the fully emergent structure is a combination of the possibilities realized 
owing to the transition principle, as well as new relations and patterns 
that emerge. The point is particularly valid when discussing the mind 
and evolution, as evolutionary psychologists are prone to ignoring the 
importance of a newly emerged, partially autonomous structures with its 
own body of contingent laws, and thus of reducing some local cultural 
and historical phenomena to evolutionarily shaped mechanisms, some-
times reinforcing possible cultural stereotypes and prejudices. As Hogan 
rightly concludes, it is disputable, to say the least, that evolutionary psy-
chology can successfully prove that the act of rape has had an evolution-
ary advantage, or that men are naturally promiscuous, both of the claims 
being a cliché in evolutionary psychology (Hogan 2003, 200–201). What 
the claims do indicate is a negligent attitude toward the emergent struc-
tures of society and culture and a belief that a higher-level discipline has 
already been entirely explained in terms of the lower level. To put it dif-
ferently, it implies redundancy of the higher disciplinary levels.
Earlier, I indicated that lower-level laws remain valid upward in the 
disciplinary hierarchy. It remains to be added that the overall structure 
of the disciplinary hierarchy is not entirely a matter of bottom-up forma-
tion, but it might be said that the higher levels make their own use of the 
structures formed on lower levels. This does not imply literal interrela-
tion, as the higher levels do not alter the lower-level structures, but it does 
mean that, overall, structures tend to be projected downwards, that is, a 
 higher-level structure organizes elements on lower levels on its own terms. 
For instance, psychological laws operate on the social level and put broad 
constrains on its organization. On the other hand, patterns that emerge 
on the social level “themselves place minds in certain social relations” 
(Hogan 2003, 203). The same goes for other levels: anatomy of the neural 
system does not fix psychological structure, but neuroanatomical laws 
do put limits on it. Also, patterns that appear on the psychological level 
“define certain structural relations in neuroanatomy” (Hogan 2003, 203).
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It is also important to stress that the above does not apply only to 
strictly scientific disciplines, nor does it apply to contiguous structures. 
Hogan illustrates this using two examples: music and transportation. 
We hear certain sequences of sounds as having certain relations to each 
other (as with quantized pitch intervals), tonal centers, we cluster sounds 
together into sequences, themes, variations, etc., owing to certain psy-
chological processes which project the structure downward through 
neurobiology to physics of sound. Similarly, transportation systems are 
integrated at the social level and, regardless of the fact that “they are 
physically diverse and spatially dispersed” (Hogan 2003, 202), they 
project down to the physical level “taking diverse bits of matter spread 
discontinuously across different regions and making them into a single 
structure” (Hogan 2003, 203). Michael Gazzaniga, a prolific neurosci-
entist, made a similar point about the relative unpredictability of emer-
gent complex systems:
A complex system is composed of many different systems that inter-
act and produce emergent properties that are greater than the sum 
of their parts and cannot be reduced to the properties of the con-
stituent parts. The classic example that is easily understandable is 
traffic. If you look at car parts, you won’t be able to predict a traffic 
pattern. You cannot predict it by looking at the next higher state of 
organization, the car, either. It is from the interaction of all the cars, 
their drivers, society and its laws, weather, roads, random animals, 
time, space, and who knows what else that traffic emerges.
(Gazzaniga 2011, 71)
Recently, Reuven Tsur, a leading cognitive poetician, vehemently op-
posed the tendency which he sees as reductionist in literary studies, that 
is, ignoring the emergent higher levels and seeking answers to ques-
tions about art directly in neuroscience (Tsur 2012, 429–446). Tsur’s 
points are compatible with Hogan’s discussion, as he also invokes the 
bottom-up unpredictability and refers to Michael Polányi’s idea of tacit 
knowledge (Polányi 1967), which implies that there is always a tacit, 
unverbalized dimension to any knowledge, partly corresponding with 
the idea that a given claim or law is always already underpinned by some 
tacit assumptions taken from a lower-level discipline, as well as to “the 
principle of marginal control” which, roughly, states that lower-level 
laws always leave a substantial portion of upper-level indeterminate and 
it is precisely where new, emergent laws apply. In his words:
You can see, for example, how, in the hierarchy constituting speech 
making, successive working principles control the boundary left in-
determinate on the next lower level. Voice production, which is the 
lowest level of speech, leaves largely open the combination of sounds 
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into words, which is controlled by a vocabulary. Next, a vocabulary 
leaves largely open the combination of words into sentences, which 
is controlled by grammar. And so it goes. Moreover, each lower level 
imposes restrictions on the one above it, even as the laws of inani-
mate nature restrict the practicability of conceivable machines; and 
again, we may observe that a higher operation may fail when the 
next lower operation escapes from its control.
(Polányi 1967, 40–41)
The last point is particularly important as it indicates the risk of fail-
ure of an explanation that ignores the hierarchical dependence of disci-
plines. The question of what constitutes such a failure is not trivial, and 
should be clarified as criteria for such a failure might be slightly different 
for natural sciences and for the humanities.
For one thing, the overall natural-scientific criterion is pragmatic: 
excessively reductionist accounts will yield certain propositions, solu-
tions to problems and theories increasingly unable to meet expectations; 
observed phenomena will become more and more unpredictable, etc. 
Things surely get trickier starting with psychology, social sciences and 
the humanities, as it is evidently less clear-cut what constitutes the prag-
matic test there, though I believe similar general rules apply for psy-
chology and social sciences. Moreover, we do not really test individual 
hypotheses but larger chunks, or the whole of our knowledge which 
we expect to be coherent and consistent with other, related types of 
knowledge.
There are at least three broad reasons why the positivist thesis in the 
humanities should not be accepted and that the model of emergence 
should be used instead, all of which are related to some form of prag-
matic success. First, one might refer to varieties of scientific realism 
which state that entities that science posits really exist, and that science’s 
chief role is explanation rather than mere prediction, as in standard pos-
itivist claims. Needless to say, the predictive power of a theory that ig-
nores these entities and marginalizes explanation in favor of positivist 
reductionism could be weaker. Second, objects might be explained on 
various levels of description depending on current goals. There is no 
need for me to think about a chair always in terms of energy and force. 
I might describe it in terms of the history of art, anthropology, cultural 
studies, etc., where simple physical properties are not all there is. In 
other words, a given object can be said to exist on multiple levels simul-
taneously, but there is no reason to believe that its stipulated “nature” is 
entirely covered by physics. Third, the objects and the laws that we posit 
should be somehow consistent with our experience. Therefore, there is 
no reason to eliminate mental states in favor of neuronal activity, or re-
place an object such as a chair in favor of a swarm of atoms, for it would 
be grossly impractical with regard to our everyday experience and the 
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constitution of our minds and organisms. I will leave the notion of prag-
matism and humanities aside and return to it after outlining my vision 
of the application of the hierarchy to literary studies.
Special Sciences and Literary Studies
My argument throughout the whole book has been to demonstrate how 
the three broad approaches to literary studies (cognitive literary studies, 
analytic philosophy of literature and textualist literary theory) consti-
tute the type of disciplinary hierarchy, forming partially autonomous 
structures with emergent sets of properties. Specifically, to prove my 
point, I focused on two issues located, as I see it, around both ends of 
the spectrum of problems covered by philosophical reflection on litera-
ture. The first of the issues, or focal points, was the possible contiguity 
of the analytic notion of “work” and some construals of the notion of 
the “text,” as used in literary and cultural studies. The other issue was 
the status of the procedures and concepts involved in understanding and 
appreciation of literature, including the notion of literature itself. In both 
cases, I am convinced that there exists a continuity of the type discussed 
above. However, several further issues need to be clarified.
First, the three disciplines that I discuss do not form a simple rela-
tion such as that between physics, chemistry and biology. The type of 
relation for which I argue here is but a tiny fraction in the complexity 
of external relations that the three research areas display. For instance, 
literary studies are linked to many other disciplines, such as history and 
sociology. Patrick Hogan suggested that literary studies can also, recip-
rocally, influence some areas of cognitive and affective research, point-
ing to a possibility of a top-down reflexive causality, perhaps (Hogan 
2011). In other words, there can be many other configurations of the 
disciplines I discuss, but the other models that could be proposed would 
touch upon different problems, and would not have any significant bear-
ing on my thesis.
Second, one should always keep in mind the internal subdivisions, 
or layers, of each respective discipline, as some of their components are 
obviously more relevant than others. Neurobiology has little direct con-
nection to literary studies, clearly less than, say, cognitive linguistics. 
The sensuality of the aesthetic experience has little to do with “cultural 
texts,” clearly less than, say, definitions of artworks. Each discipline con-
sists of a spectrum of issues, or layers, which tend to have varied “con-
nection strength” to other, external disciplines. A discipline as vast and 
heterogeneous as cognitive science can inform literary research on many 
levels. As I argued, neurobiology can illuminate some aspects of value. 
Representationalism can show how various sensory experiences inter-
twine with memory and cognition. Connectionist accounts, cognitive 
linguistics, along with Turner’s idea of the “literary mind,” demonstrate 
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how figurative and emotionally saturated language produces literary 
experience and engages our cognitive-emotive architecture. Apart from 
that, cognitive science can tell us something about instinctive responses 
(it is, thus, a useful tool in empirical studies of literary response) and ten-
dencies of the human mind, as well as intersection of the literary and the 
ordinary, bridging humanities with other disciplines. Correspondingly, 
every level (in cognitive approaches, that would only be some layers) also 
necessarily uses some philosophical assumptions about art/literature.
Another important point about the structure of the levels discussed 
regards the observers and the materials studied. In cognitive science, the 
object is, roughly, the mind and cognitive processes with the scientist as 
the observer. In aesthetics, the object stretches from common aesthetic 
experiences and responses to art to the actions of art critics, and it partly 
covers the experiential as well as the formal and historical aspect of art. 
The observer is the philosopher of art, and the discipline’s focus is pro-
ducing an account of certain types of human activity. It is again different 
with literary theory, for here there is only an observer (the scholar, the 
“theoretician”) and the cultural text that they study. There is little or no 
focus on particular human actions, as the discipline is strictly academic 
and tends to study large-scale cultural processes.
I have already mentioned multiple links between cognitive science and 
aesthetics, including how the former informs and constrains the latter. 
To add to or to clarify my claims, I should like to say that, in accord with 
my account of emergence and the principle of minimal control, cognitive 
science links with art through the experiential rather than through the 
study of some hypothetical pure artistic form. In fact, following Budd, 
Damasio and others, I suppose that discussions of art that ignore the 
experiential and art’s anthropocentric quality are misleading. The con-
straints that cognitive science places on aesthetics are not about the pos-
sibilities of some form being considered art (we know at least since the 
advent of conceptual art that this is impossible), but rather on the natu-
ral tendencies of the mind that shape our responses to art. How we come 
to value and understand art is constrained by our cognitive- emotive ar-
chitecture. This also illuminates some aspects of the beginnings of art, 
for example, the fact that early art has a tendency toward the sensual, to-
ward imitation, rather than toward, say, the conceptual, as well as shed-
ding light on the popularity of certain forms and themes in mass art. 
Accordingly, there is little chance that arbitrarily set, normative reading 
strategies, interpretations or value criteria (including highly local and 
idiosyncratic ones), as envisaged in the analogy of literature as chess, 
could ever achieve widespread acclaim.2
The transition from the everyday, sensual, symbolic and figurative to 
full-blown contemporary aesthetics marks also an emergence of a new 
structure. As I argued, what counts as valuable, or canonical, is not fully 
explicable in naturalistic or psychological language. Structured artworks 
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are not natural objects. Similarly, psychological language cannot explain 
why Campbell’s Soup Can is seen as more valuable than realist land-
scape paintings sold in the streets. Predictably, cognitive science leaves 
large portions of aesthetics unexplained and indeterminate, and these 
places are, in turn, covered by new patterns that emerge at the new level.
Similarly, the level of aesthetics provides the necessary foundations 
for the type of research carried out by literary theories. As I argued in 
Chapter 2, if textualist research is to produce reliable results, it must 
rely on proper identification of the artifacts studied. This implies, in 
terms of literary theory, that the object is recognized as a literary work, 
which already entails several assumptions about its aesthetic nature. 
One mistaken assumption of textualist literary theorists is that meaning 
is arbitrary and entirely autonomous from any anthropocentric qual-
ities, as well as from evaluative practice. On my account, research in 
aesthetics and cognitive science shows this is not true, since it seems that 
artistic meaning is tightly interrelated with value and biological human 
nature. This does not mean that the patterns that emerge at the level of 
cultural text are fully accountable by the lower level. Our knowledge 
of an artwork, or of an oeuvre, cannot predict the overarching cultural 
phenomena that a textualist scholar explores. Aesthetics, along with its 
adjunct disciplines such as history of art, is not enough to understand 
the complexity of Jansenism and how it shaped Racine. Similarly, aes-
thetics cannot explain why nineteenth-century female writers struggled 
with the images of an angel and a monster. Value is perhaps not cen-
tral to the literary theorist, but understanding and appreciation must be 
part of some lower layer of textualist research as, just as in aesthetics, 
 philosophers of art do not strive for appreciation (as critics do), but they 
do acknowledge its importance for understanding art.
Finally, it is doubtful whether in the actual practice of reading/anal-
ysis, the three levels are consciously distinguished or temporally sepa-
rated. Peter Lamarque’s remarks about Marxist and feminist criticism, 
which I quoted in Chapter 2, indicate that no strict boundary between 
the aesthetic and the textualist level can be delimited. In other words, 
the model that I outline is chiefly about logical dependence and I do 
openly acknowledge that the levels I posit are internally heterogeneous 
and fuzzy at the edges.
So, to sum up, what is the point of following the model I propose? 
 After all, people systematically depart from the model I embrace and 
apply all sorts of reading strategies toward literary works. What I am 
interested in, however, is laying down some conditions for producing 
reliable knowledge in literary, and narrowly, textualist studies, and my 
argument has been to demonstrate how such a production is possible. 
It is an entirely different matter how we instrumentally approach art-
works. But there is another thing: I believe knowledge is holistic and 
coherent. How we understand and appreciate literary works is, on some 
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basic level, not much different from how we understand other artifacts. 
Departing from such a practice in favor of normative and highly arbi-
trary reading strategies seems unnecessary.
Psycho-Historical Framework for Art Appreciation
My vision of levels of explanation in literary studies and of literary on-
tology is obviously not without any precedents and is indebted to the 
work of numerous scholars that inspired it in various respects. In what 
follows, I would like to review and compare most important related 
ideas of orders of explanation and ontologies that arose in literary stud-
ies, aesthetics or cognitive science.
Starting with perhaps the most general scope of inspiration, the no-
tion of a multilayered literary ontology where all the strata exist simul-
taneously with lower-level layers providing a delimiting framework for 
the emergence of partly unpredictable higher-order ontological level can 
clearly be seen as an idea of Ingardenian flavor. However, apart from the 
structural similarity between both models, they largely differ in scope 
and in terms of philosophical commitments, an issue which I discussed 
in Chapter 2.
Clearly, a much more direct methodological inspiration comes from 
the work of Patrick C. Hogan, to whose explorations in philosophy of 
science covering orders of explanation, emergence and disciplinary hier-
archy I am entirely committed. Hogan is particularly wary of evolution-
ary reductionism in explaining literature and attacked hasty jumping 
to general conclusions about the nature of literature on the side of evo-
lutionary psychologists who debate putative adaptive and non-adaptive 
functions of literature in general or see it as a space of simulation where 
we can test strategies for survival and reproduction. Instead, Hogan 
claims cognitive and evolutionary explorations should focus on very 
specific components of aesthetic experience that underlies the working 
of literature and strive toward more meticulous definitions of art and 
literature, as opposed to intuitive notions about them that evolutionary 
psychologists often hold (Hogan 2003, 192–217). Even though Hogan’s 
investigation of arts is sensitive to cognitive-emotional, art-historical 
and cultural-ideological factors, I found his work lacking in specific ac-
count of the relation between those components. My tracing of interdis-
ciplinary breaks and continuities between those areas might thus be seen 
as clarification and exposition of the spirit of his oeuvre.
Similar proviso was voiced by Reuven Tsur who condemned the re-
ductive tendencies in brain science, calling them neurological fallacy. 
Tsur acknowledges that just like mind is an emergent process and cannot 
be predicted by brain structures, human experience of literature can-
not be comprehensively accounted for by purely neurological research 
such as brain scans. Perhaps we can learn which regions of the brain 
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are activated when reading Crime and Punishment or sensually stimu-
lating vocabulary in Baudelaire’s poetry but it will never give us a better 
understanding of the relation between our empathy and Dostoyevsky’s 
novels or why we should even bother to read Baudelaire instead of lists 
of words that activate brain areas associated with sensations (Tsur 2012, 
429–446). Just like Hogan, Tsur claims there are particular areas of 
research where neuroscience could be beneficial, but it is counterpro-
ductive to explain a complex conventionalized and art-historical artifact 
such as a literary work entirely in language of neuroscience.
When it comes to outlining a model of the aesthetic that includes 
both the art-historical and cognitive-emotive components, the above 
examples only point toward the necessity of formulating it and warn 
against ignoring the levels of explanation in science, but do not offer any 
conclusive outline of both components. Perhaps the most comprehen-
sive account of this relation, and the closest to the one proposed here, 
was recently proposed by Bullot and Reber, who dubbed their model a 
“ psycho-historical framework for the science of art appreciation” (Bullot 
and Reber 2013, 123–137). The authors aim precisely at filling the blank 
that stretches between the psychological and the historical inquiries into 
art appreciation, stressing that both are “equally relevant” (Bullot and 
Reber 2013, 124). They developed separately and lack “a common core 
of theoretical principles” (Bullot and Reber 2013, 124). Both authors ac-
knowledge some flaws in a purely psychological approach to art appre-
ciation and attempt at integrating it with the historical (by which they 
mean appealing to appreciators’ sensitivity to historical contexts and 
their evolution as used to explain art appreciation) in their framework. 
Their stance, which I applaud, is that art-historical contexts of artworks’ 
creation leave traces of crucial causal information, such as “historical 
events, artists’ actions and mental processes” (Bullot and Reber 2013, 
123) within each artwork and whose extraction, and thus proper appre-
ciation, requires a more competent level of appreciation then the type of 
mere exposure that psychological approaches sometimes tend to espouse. 
The psychological approach investigates the mental and neural processes 
that take part both in production and appreciation of artworks, though 
as they stress, it often falls victim to a reductive approach where art 
simply obeys the laws of the brain and that appreciation and aesthetic 
preferences are directly caused by deep neurobiological laws. In con-
trast, the contextualist-historical approach acknowledges that certain 
historical and social contingencies play a crucial role in the circulation 
of art. In other words, and again in tune with my discussion throughout 
this book, a work of art comes into being as a result of actions of certain 
human agents, including, artists, critics, readers, audience, curators em-
bedded in certain historical contexts and institutions rendering certain 
events unrepeatable and objects irreplaceable. Moreover, as Bullot and 
Reber correctly observe, work of art is an artifact, meaning an object 
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or a performance brought to life through human action and intentions 
and its cognition is not significantly different from other artifacts where 
intended, historical functions are taken into consideration along with a 
distinction into proper and accidental functions. It seems only natural 
that people try to understand man-made objects partly by recourse to 
their contexts of creation and putative intended functions and it is also 
a premise that underlies appreciation of artworks. This, in turn, implies 
that proper appreciation of art requires contextual knowledge pertain-
ing to these historical and institutional contexts and is not measurable 
purely in terms of instinctive, hard-wired responses.
The first, elementary level of art appreciation outlined by Bullot and 
Reber is basic exposure which refers to sets of mental processes in-
volved in the experience of artwork without art-historical knowledge. 
This stage involves perceptual representation and attentional tracking of 
observable features, syntactic and semantic processing of symbols and 
narrative structures, implicit learning of regularities and probabilistic 
anticipation, as well as automatic elicitation of emotions, pretense and 
mindreading (Bullot and Reber 2013, 128). The second stage of appre-
ciation is the design stance, where appreciators begin to look at an art-
work as an artifact, reasoning about its causal history, functions and 
agents that brought it into existence and processing abductive inferences 
concerning art-historical and causal information carried by artworks. 
Mindreading activities are further constrained by historical contexts 
and may involve apprehending the artist’s perspective on the artwork, 
its intended effects on the audience or particular problems the creator 
wished to solve (Bullot and Reber 2013, 130). Finally, knowledge gained 
during the design stance may lead appreciators to the level of artistic 
understanding where they are able to competently identify and evaluate 
an artwork, much like in Malcolm Budd’s earlier discussed vision of ex-
perientially accessed intrinsic value of art. At this stage, appreciators are 
able to classify works, identify styles or apply art theory-based reasoning 
to produce cognitively rich interpretations equivalent to abductive infer-
ences to the best explanation
Both my model and their psycho-historical framework states that it is 
necessary to bring together the psychological and the historical. First, 
my discussion was perhaps more focused on the institutional rather than 
purely art-historical context of appreciation, but this is partly a termi-
nological decision, though on the other hand, I believe the institution 
is a broader concept that includes references to art-historical contexts. 
Second, I take it that their first stage of appreciation, the basic exposure 
and the psychological frameworks used to study it, is largely equiva-
lent to my first disciplinary level concerned with the workings of hu-
man cognitive-affective architecture discussed in Chapter 3. Bullot and 
 Reber, however, think primarily of responses to visual arts, whereas my 
discussion was limited to verbal art where some of their observations 
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need to be altered. For instance, if a literary work is read quietly, track-
ing observable features would probably blend in with semantic-syntatic 
processing, though it should involve various degrees of primed affective 
responses to sound qualities and devices. This might be reinforced when 
a work is recited, depending on the quality of the performance. Sim-
ulation of verbal representations included in a work is obviously both 
central to the experience of literature and very limited in the experience 
of other arts, but it clearly must appear at the stage of basic exposure. 
Moreover, Bullot and Reber stress the utility of various strains of psy-
chology, cognitive science, neuroscience and empirical studies to the in-
vestigation of this level of appreciation, which is entirely in tune with my 
discussion, though I emphasize that these disciplines underpin further, 
more specialized approaches which are particularly valuable for literary 
studies, such as cognitive poetics and narratology. Third, my competent 
level of art experience is something that stretches over both Bullot’s and 
Reber’s artistic understanding and design stance. Though we appear to 
be in concord regarding the nature of informed appreciation, the differ-
ences here lie chiefly in decisions of taste that concern the necessity of 
conflating or separating the actions that trigger artistic understanding 
as a distinct stage. I guess that one can further subdivide the stages of 
appreciation ad infinitum, depending on one’s particular purposes. and 
it suffices to say that for the purposes of my discussion there was no 
need to distinguish “design stance” as a significantly distinct transitory 
stage. Even though it clearly leads to artistic understanding in the long 
run, it seems to be a fuzzy link between exposure and understanding 
underpinned by our natural processing involved in artifact cognition, 
but refined and enriched by institutionally determined knowledge and 
the proper ways of acquiring it.
There are, however, more substantial differences. Bullot and Reber 
tend to see the stages of appreciation as largely temporal and I see them 
as abstract models of causal-logical dependencies since, in reality, nat-
ural exposure will be temporally indistinguishable from artistic under-
standing and the natural responses will be always already infused with 
various degrees of cultural and art-historical competence. In practice, 
causality might be more complex with various types of loops and feed-
back operating simultaneously: substantial competence in responding to 
art might shape basic exposure immediately drawing readers’ attention 
to things they would perhaps not notice before. Moreover, throughout 
my book, I have tended to use the term “appreciation” in reference only 
to those informed responses to art, and indeed, basic exposure responses 
are a premise of competent appreciation. However, contrary to Bullot 
and Reber, I would not call a responder to an artwork who is not in-
volved in design stance and artistic understanding an appreciator. This 
is not mere word choice difference, but important conceptual distinc-
tion which, in my case, emphasizes that not any response to art might 
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be reasonably called appreciation. Finally, and most importantly, Bullot 
and Reber stop their discussion at the level of artistic understanding, 
or in terms of my model, on the artistic level of experience, and are not 
interested in exploring another level of understanding and explanation 
of art, the one that is underlain by artistic understanding but which goes 
beyond it to the dimension of cultural texts that make up the highest 
stage in the model outlined here.
Surface and Deep Interpretation
The relationship between the type of interpretation involved in com-
petent appreciation of art, as studied by analytic philosophy and art, 
and the one more associated with continental philosophy involving 
psychoanalysis, Marxism, Feminism, semiotics, etc. widely pursued in 
humanities departments outside of analytic aesthetics was famously 
explored by Arthur Danto, one of the key figures of twentieth-century 
 American aesthetics. Danto made a number of claims with which I agree 
and which are in accord with my model, but remained ultimately hostile 
toward the latter type of interpretation. In what follows, I wish to revisit 
his argument.
Central to Danto’s discussion of the matter is the belief that interpre-
tation is constitutive of artworks’ ontology. It is by means of informed 
response to art, the one that acknowledges art-historical context of its 
creation and is bound by artist’s intentions, that a work of art is actu-
ally brought to life as art. This historical and intentional identification 
is what Danto calls “surface interpretation.” But there is another type 
of interpretation, which plunges below the level of the first one and at-
tempts to disclose a type of meaning that is not possible to realize at 
the surface level, that is, it is not easily confirmable by the artist or even 
attributable to them. Danto calls this “deep interpretation” and equates 
it with the types of readings that emerge from some pre-established 
framework imposed on the earlier construed artwork: the frameworks 
he mentions are those that developed out of continental thought and 
chiefly from literary theory. The type of relationship dependency here 
might be outlined as follows: surface interpretation is necessary for art-
works to emerge, but it is also prerequisite for deep interpretation giving 
us “the interpretanda for deep interpretation, the interpretaria for which 
are to be sought in the depths” (Danto 1986, 52). In other words, deep 
interpretation thrives on surface interpretation as it “supposes surface 
interpretation to have done its work so that we know what has been 
done and why” (Danto 1986, 66). But the whole of Danto’s argument is 
to restate the centrality of surface interpretation, the activity which his 
philosophical school is preoccupied with, and to dismiss deep interpreta-
tion. If surface interpretation is central, static, historically-anchored and 
essential to understanding art, deep interpretation is endless, redundant, 
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playful, dependent on the creativity of an interpreter and unilluminating 
when it comes to art as art.
I definitely agree that surface interpretation, which I believe is roughly 
equivalent to Bullot’s and Reber’s design stance/artistic understanding 
and my aesthetic/artistic level of literary ontology/experience, is central 
to the ontology of art and it is only with the emergence of this level of 
response that we can reasonably talk about art as art. Moreover, I agree 
that there is a relation of dependency between surface and deep inter-
pretations precisely of the nature Danto outlined. In fact, Danto’s belief 
about the existence of such dependency contrasts with the opinions of 
many literary theorists who outright deny any kind of underlying aes-
thetic component to textualist deep interpretations, or to Lamarque’s or 
Livingston’s treatment of Barthes and Foucault which I investigated in 
Chapter 2, both of which were convinced about the insurmountable par-
adigmatic differences and did not pursue a thesis concerning different 
ontological levels being addressed by analytic philosophy and textualism 
respectfully.
There are however certain points on which I strongly disagree with 
Danto and whose alteration would actually have brought his argument 
much closer to my own. First, Danto’s identification of surface interpre-
tation with a single authorial intention seems to be rather strict, and to 
be honest, quite radical when compared to most contemporary stances 
on intentionalism within analytic aesthetics. To restate my point, though 
intentionalism’s centrality to understanding art is undisputed, it comes 
in many flavors, most of which seem to be far milder and digestible than 
Danto’s. Danto’s stance is akin to radical or extreme actual intentional-
ism, where all the meanings of an artwork are set by the author and are 
thus fully determinable, the one labeled “intentional fallacy” and rightly 
banished from literary studies. Both literary theory and analytic aesthet-
ics managed to produce more nuanced and more adequate accounts of 
the role of intentions in interpretation, all of which acknowledge both 
the centrality of surface interpretation to art existence and experience, 
and consequently, some degree of anchoring of its meanings onto artist’s 
intentions. One might mention here Jerrold Levinson’s hypothetical in-
tentionalism (Levinson 1996), where informed audience is only required 
to make informed probable guesses about the work’s meanings, but 
they are not reduced to one single interpretation. Modest or moderate 
 actual intentionalism (Carroll 2000; Iseminger 1996;  Livingston 1996; 
Stecker 2006; Swirski 2010) holds that artist’s intention are relevant to 
appreciation and meaning but the latter is not necessarily exhausted 
by them. Perhaps an even more liberal theory (Davies 2006; Goldman 
1990) holds that interpretations should be value maximizing where 
they strive to present the work in the most favorable light. I believe that 
for the sake of my discussion it is not necessary to declare myself be-
ing strongly committed to modest actual intentionalism, hypothetical 
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intentionalism or value-maximizing theory of interpretation. It suffices 
to say that I am against extreme actual intentionalism and that all other 
theories are not in conflict with Danto’s outline of the aims and charac-
ter of surface interpretation.
The other of Danto’s points with which I do not agree is his dismissal 
of deep interpretation. Danto is rather hasty in denigrating what I call 
textualist approach to artworks, by claiming they are unnecessary for 
understanding art as art. This is true and perhaps we should not blame 
Danto for refusing to be involved in matters that go beyond philosophy 
of art, but if we reject Danto’s intentional fallacy and accept that at least 
some meanings and value of an artwork might not come from the artist’s 
conscious intentions, then a more careful look into the nature of the re-
lation between the two types of interpretation is necessary.
Brand and Brand offer one interesting discussion of Danto’s claims. 
First, they reconstruct and reject a strong dependency thesis between 
deep and surface interpretations, which apparently is the one Danto 
tried to defend but admitted to not having any serious arguments in 
favor of it, and which holds that “a deep interpretation of a work of art 
is correct only if the deep interpretation of the work is consistent with 
the surface interpretation and the deep interpretation is based on the 
artist’s theoretical or conceptual framework” (Brand and Brand 2012, 
76). Then, they proceed to investigate a weaker dependency thesis which 
says that “deep interpretation of a work of art is correct only id the deep 
interpretation of the work is consistent with the surface interpretation” 
(Brand and Brand 2012, 76) which they take as more promising. For 
instance, they claim, we know that Shakespeare had no access to Freud-
ian theory and did not use it as a theoretical framework for his works, 
but this does not mean that on principle we must reject this framework 
in analyzing the work, as it might be consistent with the content of the 
work or even with the artist’s own beliefs, yet verbalized differently. 
To look into this matter, and interestingly enough, Brand and Brand 
explore Danto’s own texts on art criticism that offer an insight into the 
very practice he speculates about in The Philosophical Disenfranchise-
ment of Art. One example they cite is Danto’s assessment of the paint-
ings of Anselm Kiefer, whose work sparked considerable controversy. 
Kiefer himself claims to be exploring themes of life and death, holo-
caust, nature of art and Nazi horrors of Germany, saying with reference 
to some of his works that he “attempts to become a fascist” (Brand and 
Brand 2012, 77) so as to reenact what Nazis did “in order to understand 
the madness” (Brand and Brand 2012, 76). In contrast, Danto believes 
that Kiefer’s work deludes his audience with a message of German na-
tionalism offering neither remorse, nor shame, calling it “farce of heavy 
symbolism” and a “visual lament for a shattered Vaterland” (Brand and 
Brand 2012, 76) that is “jejune and dishonest” (Brand and Brand 2012, 76). 
Quoting other similar examples, authors come to a conclusion that in 
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reality Danto often rejected author’s intentions delving into deep inter-
pretations. If that is true, the consequence, they claim, is that there is 
no dependency between surface and deep interpretations, of which the 
former they restate as accurate, best accounts of “artist’s intentions in 
creating the work” (Brand and Brand 2012, 81) and the latter as “read-
ings of the work within a theoretical or conceptual framework” whose 
reference to authorial intentions is at best secondary “if they refer to 
them at all” (Brand and Brand 2012, 81). Finally, they claim accurate 
surface interpretations may contradict correct deep interpretations, but 
this does not challenge either of the explanation types. It is just the case 
that criteria for deep interpretation correctness, of which they quote “in-
ternal consistency, grounding in a conceptual framework and others” 
(Brand and Brand 2012, 81), are independent of statements about artist’s 
intentions.
There are key differences between my stance and Brands’ develop-
ment of Danto’s thesis. I do agree that there cannot be any dependency 
between surface and deep interpretations understood in the above sense. 
But I believe a version of weak-dependency thesis is attainable after some 
revisions of their definitions. As pointed out earlier, surface interpreta-
tions need not be equivalent to artist’s intentions, though they should 
take them into consideration while evaluating artworks. Note my ref-
erences to value-maximizing theories or modest intentionalism. On this 
account, Danto’s going against artistic intentions is not an example of 
deep interpretation, but a reminder that interpretations are institution-
ally established. They are formed, accepted or rejected by a community 
of critics and other competent consumers. After all, authorial intentions 
might fail or be outright lies, as Danto’s own critical practice suggests, 
but the examples quoted by Brand and Brand do not go deep beyond 
basic constitution of an artwork. They chiefly rely on assessing author’s 
intentions (negatively) in their art-historical contexts, and do not make 
use of any Theoretical frameworks for deeper explorations of art. But if 
this is the case, then a weak-dependency thesis holds, though only when 
surface interpretation is not reduced to actual authorial intentions.
The fact that all interpretations of art, not only those of the surface 
kind, are institutionally determined has some significant bearing on the 
surface-deep issue. For one thing, it implies that critics have some degree 
of creative liberty even at the surface level, and that both interpreta-
tion types exist on a continuum, as setting clear boundaries between 
the two might not always be easy. Danto held that there is no limit to 
deep interpretations, but if a weak-dependency thesis holds, then surface 
interpretations must have some constraining power over deep interpre-
tations. We might not realize it from Danto’s account of the matter, 
however, who trivializes deep interpretation as exploring “Leonardo’s 
kinky unconscious, his economic locus, and […] the semiotics of embel-
lishment in Florentine culture” (Danto 1986, 66). Psychoanalytic and 
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Marxist criticism are multifaceted practices that might cover many types 
of relations, they indeed might explore author’s unconscious or his/her 
underlying economic interests, though they might also explore just the 
representational tissue of an artwork, or its relation to other works of 
a particular culture and times, or its relation to contemporary readers 
and their responses to art. To claim that deep interpretation investigates 
a literary work to diagnose an author and her motivations is precisely 
to confuse the work of art with some putative causes that brought it to 
existence. This is a vulgarized vision of textualist interpretations. Semi-
otics of embellishment in Florentine culture might, in spite of Danto’s 
quick dismissal, in fact contribute to the appreciation of Florentine art 
or might merely be part of background research one conducts in order 
to understand art. Danto gets bogged down in his false vision, conclud-
ing that critics who offer deep interpretations are just showing off their 
creativity by seeing in endless meanings in a play of critical invention, 
“the deep play of departments of literature and hermeneutics” (Danto 
1986, 67).
To restate my point, I believe that surface interpretation need not be 
radically tied to author’s intentions and that it is institutionally deter-
mined. Its ultimate point is explaining and evaluating an artifact or a 
performance as an artwork. Surface interpretation does not necessar-
ily need deep interpretations, though at times and in critical practice 
it might not be easy to distinguish between the two. Almost anything 
might be a candidate for a deep interpretation, but accurate, convincing 
deep interpretations rely on surface interpretations, that is on the rec-
ognition of art-historical contexts, range of possible intended meanings 
(regardless whether failed or successful), the recognition of the form and 
content, awareness of thematic orientation, etc. They should also be co-
herent, complete and unified, reliably use a given theoretical framework 
and draw abductive inferences about the work. This means that criteria 
for accurate, compelling deep interpretations are to a large extent simi-
lar to those of surface interpretations. Apart from that, deep interpreta-
tions use specific theoretical frameworks and are more sensitive to tacit 
ideological or psychological content, which perhaps makes them more 
illuminating when exploring larger bodies of works.
Deep interpretations belong to the textualist ontological level which 
is partly autonomous from the artistic one, but still partly constrained 
by it. I do not think we might easily delimit or foresee what theoretical 
frameworks are apt for textualist analysis and which are not. They are 
all subject to general criteria for accurate interpretations. Consequently, 
the question of deep interpretations’ admissibility ceases to be philo-
sophical and becomes a technical one. To illustrate one fairly obvious 
way in which this artistic constraint operates, some works will be more 
inviting toward specific theoretical frameworks and others not. Trying 
to formulate a structuralist analysis of Hunter S. Thompson’s Fear and 
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Loathing in Las Vegas might be a rather futile preoccupation, though 
in Danto’s vision it should not be, as the only limit is the critic’s own 
creativity when gazing at a meaningless spot of paint. Marxist analysis 
of the contents of Kerouac’s On the Road is surely possible, but is also 
hopelessly predictable and trivial, unveiling the economic consciousness 
and bohemian ideology of a group of New York college hipsters. In other 
words, tacit class-related behaviors are surely there and it is important 
to be sensitive to them, just as with any other ideological or psycholog-
ical latent content, and they might be rather quickly pointed out, but 
they are not prominent enough to be a basis for a comprehensive deep 
interpretation, as its formulation would unavoidably ignore large sec-
tions of the work. The same might be said about, say, Freudian reading 
of Gibson’s Neuromancer or a feminist reading of Neverending Story. 
Anytime a given work contains a representation of social life or gender 
roles it invites Marxist or feminist approaches. But this does not mean 
that the representational content will be sufficient to fuel a complete and 
compelling deep interpretation. There is a reason why Hamlet or Oe-
dipus Rex easily yield to psychoanalytic deep interpretations, whereas 
Piers Plowman probably does not and it has to do with proper surface 
interpretations of these works.
To further illustrate my point about the relation between the two 
types of interpretation and the technical nature of the question of ac-
cepting deep interpretations, take Slavoj Žižek, a prolific representative 
of Marxist-psychoanalytic theories. Žižek is notorious for using appar-
ently random bits of various cinematic and literary works as illustrations 
of his ideas concerning late capitalist manipulation of desire. However, 
it cannot be said on principle that all his readings are wrong or cor-
rect as each of them requires a separate treatment in terms of assess-
ing the  surface-deep levels attunement. Consider three cases of Žižek’s 
textualism.
In the first case, Žižek scrutinizes The Fountainhead, a best-selling 
novel by Ayn Rand, an author who promoted a rather ruthless phi-
losophy of so-called rational egoism and turbo-capitalism. The story 
explores the life of Howard Roark, a radically non-conformist archi-
tect, whose belief in his own design vision paired with rejection of both 
social norms and popular demands led him to being fired first from 
school and later from work, after which he starts an unsuccessful com-
pany and finally gets a menial job in a quarry though none of this has 
any influence on his unswayed will. Other important characters in the 
story are Ellsworth Toohey, a socialist columnist who starts a smear 
campaign against Roark, Gail Wynand, a newspaper owner, who se-
cretly admires Roark’s work, Dominique Francon, a columnist who also 
admires Roark and is strongly attracted to (and at one point is raped 
by) him, but rejects his radical attitude as leading to misery, and Peter 
Keating, a popular, yet seemingly talentless architect. When Wynand 
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commissions constructions of a building, Toohey manipulates Roark 
into anonymously helping him with the design, to which Roark agrees, 
on the condition that nothing in his design is changed. Upon realizing 
that the construction contains alterations he blows the whole building 
up with dynamite. Condemned and arrested, Roark delivers a lengthy 
speech about powerful individuals carried by vision who move the world 
forward and mindless, tasteless masses who just follow the ride and is 
found not guilty. In the end, Wynand commissions another building, 
directly from Roark, who is now happily married to Dominique. The 
surface interpretation of the story would probably point to it being a 
rather straightforward and unreflective glorification of extreme, egoist 
individualism and wild, uncontrolled capitalism, though questions of 
failed intentions and unwitting self-parody definitely should be taken 
into consideration. Žižek elaborates on the psychological dynamics of 
the key characters using Lacanian theory. Roark, he claims, is the “be-
ing of pure drive” (Žižek 1998, 103) who follows relentlessly his inner 
impulses and who is in “no need of symbolic recognition” (Žižek 1998, 
103), whereas others represent various ways of compromising one’s 
drive. Wynand is a “failed hero” (Žižek 1998, 102) who could have been 
a prime mover such as Roark, but ended up being manipulated by the 
masses. Keating is a “simple confomist” (Žižek 1998, 102) who is en-
tirely externalized and oriented toward the symbolic, the Other’s gaze. 
Toohey is Roark’s true nemesis, a character who would never be able to 
be a prime mover and is perfectly aware of this. Paradoxically, Toohey, 
who delivers ardent speeches about the formative role of society and the 
need to contain Roark’s destructive rampant individualism is the “point 
of self-consciousness” (Žižek 1998, 103), he is the only one fully aware 
of himself and the overall state of affairs. Only he really knows who is 
who and what is going on. According to Žižek, Dominique is the most 
complex character, trapped in a dialectic of the Other’s desire. She is 
tormented by the fact that the Other, the masses, are profanely able to 
stare at the achievement of pure drive, Roark’s work, and thus blemish 
its sublime quality. For her “the greatest sacrilege is to throw pearls to 
swines” (Žižek 1998, 104) and in order to escape from the sacrilegious 
creation of a precious object and exposing it to the gaze of others, she 
attempts to destroy it and by treating herself as one of such objects, she 
seeks utter self-humiliation, marrying first the man she despises, trying 
to ruin Roark’s career or paving the way for him to brutally seduce 
her. Dominique at the same time admires Roark’s creative autonomy 
and wishes to destroy it, as only then could she finally direct his de-
sire at her, “possess him” so as to constitute an ordinary couple. In the 
end, Žižek claims, the central conflict of Rand’s novel takes place not 
between prime movers and the masses, but between the prime movers 
themselves, the hypermasculinized being of pure drive and his hysterical 
sexual partner.
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I believe the above is an example of an accurate deep interpretation. 
Žižek grounds it in a theoretical framework that makes it complete and 
coherent by explaining the meaning of the whole work and, at the same 
time, he is aware of and utilizes the surface meaning of Rand’s novel 
and the intentions that pushed her to write it. His interpretation sheds 
new light on an earlier construed surface interpretation that unveils the 
general themes of the work, their developments, as well as character mo-
tivations, yet remains entirely congruent with it. It is the tissue of Rand’s 
novel itself that invites and rewards Žižek’s interpretation.
Consider two other short cases of Žižek’s psychoanalytic explorations 
of fiction. On one occasion, Žižek claimed that in Hitchcock’s Psycho, 
the three floors of the Bates estate represent spaces that are dominated 
by behaviors that seem to belong to three respective levels of the mind in 
psychoanalytic theory, and particularly in its Lacanian version. The top 
floor is the perverse sphere of superego occupied by Bates’ mother, the 
ground floor is the domain of his rational ego and the cellar is the dark 
cave of the unconscious (Fiennes 2006). Žižek was primarily interested 
in illustrating Lacan’s theory and his remark is clearly too brief to be in 
itself a deep interpretation, but, taking into consideration the themes 
of Psycho, the relation between sexuality and violence and a twisted 
relationship between a son and his dead mother, Žižek’s remark might 
serve as a promising foundation or a crucial element in a psychoanalytic 
deep interpretation of the whole work. On the other hand, when Žižek 
mentions that the three Marx brothers again represent the Lacanian ren-
dition of the superego, ego and id triad (Fiennes 2006), this surely is 
neither a good deep interpretation nor has the potential to become one. 
It rather arbitrarily picks a motif from Marx brothers’ ouevre for purely 
illustrative purposes which otherwise would probably have to be consid-
ered wrong when serving as a basis for deep interpretation.
I suppose that the three above examples again indicate that the ques-
tion of whether deep interpretations are good and acceptable remains 
technical and not a philosophical one. In the case of The Fountainhead, 
Hamlet or Oedipus, psychoanalysis or any other Theoretical framework 
is not necessary for appreciation that belongs to surface interpretations. 
But there is no need to reject these frameworks for deep interpretations 
on art-historical context grounds. Theories formed much after the days 
of the artists’ creation might reflect, clarify or extend ideas expressed 
by an artist in a different conceptual apparatus, but this remains to be 
addressed case by case. Moreover, interpretation is an institutionally de-
termined practice and we do not routinely or necessarily refer to actual 
author’s intentions even on the surface level. On a deep, textualist level 
we assume that attention to a work might reveal its susceptibility to 
some Theoretical frameworks.
I should also stress again that my outline is an abstract model and the 
respective levels do not necessarily reflect linearly progressing actions 
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stretched over recognizably separate time units, but it should be thought 
of as a structure of logical dependencies or layers of perceptual input, 
processed data, assumptions, predictions, background knowledge, etc. In 
practice, interpretation might jump from exposure to tracing hypothet-
ical deep patterns with the surface-level verification and art- historical 
context research as the final step. Moreover, we should not rule out the 
possibility of a feedback where deep interpretations also influence the 
surface-level assessment by enhancing semantic richness or a sense of 
ambiguity of the work, contributing to value judgments. Exposure will 
surely be affected too as gaining experience in forming surface/deep in-
terpretations and one’s personal store of art-historical knowledge will 
facilitate proper attention to the work, perception of patterns, tracing of 
references, etc. Finally, it should be kept in mind that surface and deep 
interpretations often remain difficult to distinguish not only temporally, 
but also in terms of their contents and in critic’s own actions. This hap-
pens in particular when experiencing art that is contemporary to us: 
knowledge provided by art-historical context is less revealing as we have 
more direct and tacit access to it. Consequently, surface interpretations 
tend to be minimalized to the point where we might not quite be aware 
of their operations. This is further reinforced by the fact that we do not 
obsessively consult authors’ intentions when attending to a work. Since 
interpretations are formed institutionally, following a certain practice 
involved in attending to a work is typically enough for us to ignite sur-
face and deep interpretations. Researching intentions and contexts is 
usually a secondary action.
It is true that textualist deep interpretations do not necessarily in-
volve appreciation, but my point here was to argue in favor of a weak- 
dependency thesis that claims proper deep interpretations depend on 
prior surface construals of literary works, or rather, I rejected Brand’s 
and Brand’s rendition of Danto’s thesis that claimed the opposite. But 
I do not deny that at times what seems to be a deep interpretation is 
in fact a creation incomplete in terms of its relation with the work and 
incongruent with surface interpretations. It makes the value of such 
 quasi-interpretations questionable, apart from the possible value of be-
ing cherry-picked witty illustrations of some philosophical concepts. 
This is most often the case when the centrality of surface interpretation 
is ignored and an analysis of the work is reductive either to a psycholog-
ical or textualist level. In the following section I wish to overview some 
famous cases of such reduction.
Naked Apes, Flocks of Seagulls, Procrustean Beds
In this section I am going to review several types of research which I 
believe ignore the multilevel nature of explanation regarding art/liter-
ature, and which adhere to some variants of reductionism, leading to 
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explanatory deficiencies. I will start with the type of naturalistic reduc-
tionism that sees literary studies as explainable in terms of evolutionary 
psychology, neuroscience, etc., and then move on to briefly review the 
textualist variant of reductionism.
One of the most vocal representatives of neopositivist reductionism in 
literary studies are perhaps the literary Darwinists. The movement, es-
tablished with the publication of Joseph Carroll’s Evolution and Literary 
Theory in 1995, has rapidly grown, publishing its own academic jour-
nals, producing numerous book-length works including both theoretical 
discussions and analyses of works, and drawing many fresh adherents 
of neo-Darwinism. The most important premise of the movement is that 
reliable knowledge in humanities should be consilient (reducible to) with 
knowledge produced in empirical sciences. The link between the two 
worlds is precisely evolutionary psychology, which is supposed to ade-
quately explain the mechanisms that make up the human mind, as well 
as whatever the human mind produces, that is, the whole of culture. In 
other words, in this crude Darwinian paradigm, whatever exists in cul-
ture must be somehow explainable in terms of human adaptive or mal-
adaptive relation with the environment. Needless to say, they reject all 
possibilities of the autonomy of the humanities. Whatever happens in art 
or whatever is about art should be directly explainable in terms of evo-
lutionary psychology. Whatever is beyond that is meaningless babble.
In this neopositivist outlook, indeterminacy of claims must be a log-
ical consequence of taking a textualist stance in literary and cultural 
studies. If one rejects the idea of the unity of knowledge where all of 
its branches are eventually reducible to empirical sciences, then one 
loses the only tool with which one can separate true knowledge from 
the unverifiable gibberish. Thus, without demarcation, all the produced 
“knowledge” must predictably fall into the category of the indetermi-
nate. According to the Darwinists, every study of culture and its creation 
(including art and literature) must be entirely congruent with physical-
ist theories, through gradual reduction of the total body of knowledge 
that it produces to empirical claims, or else it cannot produce reliable 
knowledge. It is clear that Carroll’s target is textualism itself, as the 
consequence of his assumptions is that indeterminacy is simply textu-
alism’s necessary, predictable conclusion. Of course, textualism, in the 
sense in which Carroll uses this term, is something much broader than 
any deliberations concerning the status of literary knowledge, and defi-
nitely something bigger than my idea of the cultural text. He seems to be 
suggesting that textualism is a form of linguistic idealism, in the sense 
of rejecting the possibility of accessing any empirical, non-linguistic re-
ality, which again reminds of the neopositivist attacks on traditional 
metaphysics. If Carroll defines textualism as the claim that the study of 
human creations is fundamentally separate and autonomous from the 
hard, natural sciences, then it is hardly surprising to note that what he 
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really attacks is the Diltheyan distinction into Naturwissenschaften and 
Geisteswissenschaften. Textualism, in this view, is merely a contempo-
rary restatement of the nineteenth-century claim about the humanities 
being methodologically separate from the natural sciences. The point 
is that Carroll’s idea of textualism could be perhaps attributed to some 
literary theorists, but it is far from being universal or the only constru-
able one. Likewise, there is no reason to believe that undermining the 
nineteenth-century Diltheyan vision of science must immediately lead us 
toward positivist reductionism.
Carroll enumerates four key biological concepts of the positive aspect 
of the Darwinist program, which he contrasts with post- structuralist 
denaturalization of literature. The first of them is the centrality of 
“the relationship between the organism and its [biological] environ-
ment” (Carroll 1995, 2). The second is that some “innate psychological 
 structures – perceptual, rational, affective – have evolved through an 
adaptive process of natural selection” (Carroll 1995, 2). Due to inter-
actions with the natural environment, consequently, they “regulate the 
mental and emotional life of all living organisms” (Carroll 1995, 2). The 
third point is that all “human motives are regulated by the principles of 
inclusive fitness as ‘ultimate cause’” (Carroll 1995, 3). The reproductive 
success which allowed the handing down of evolved mental traits also 
indicates that “reproductive success, in its twin aspects of sexual union 
and the production of offspring, is central to human concerns and thus 
to literary works” (Carroll 1995, 3). The last point is that literature, 
the “literary representation, is a form of ‘cognitive mapping’ […] rep-
resentation is an extension of the organism’s adaptive orientation to an 
environment […]” (Carroll 1995, 3). In other words, literature serves 
two purposes: it contains stories which eventually concern the central 
problems of human survival, prosperity and reproductive success, but 
those stories also have an adaptive function, as they are read to enhance 
our ability to understand and refer ourselves to the environment, thus 
potentially helping to increase our chances to survive and thrive.
The role of Darwinian literary criticism is twofold. On the one hand, it 
is supposed to illuminate the sometimes latent functioning of  Darwinian 
motives in literature, and on the other hand, to demonstrate how they 
can serve the educational purpose, increasing our understanding of the 
mechanisms of survival and successful reproduction. Both the results of 
such analyses and the evolutionary assumptions concerning the adap-
tive value of literature have been criticized and mocked in the academia 
(Goodheart 2008; Holland 2009, 2010) and I am not going to investigate 
them at length, interesting as they may be. Instead, I will concentrate on 
their theoretical implications in an attempt to identify the problems with 
reductionism as such.
First of all, the view that evolutionary psychology constitutes not only 
the successful link between humanities and sciences, but also the only 
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link possible is, of course, highly controversial and naïve in light of what 
I said earlier in this chapter about varieties of physicalism and levels of 
explanation. Such a link would have to be based on an incontrovertible 
evidence of solving the mind-body problem, but it is doubtful that this 
can ever be attained.
The second problem concerns the reduction of the contents of literary 
narratives to basic strategies for survival and reproduction, as if litera-
ture was a medium for the virtual testing of survival-related hypotheses 
about modes of behavior for real-life situations. As some examples of 
the Darwinian analyses show, this entails treating works like Homer’s 
Illiad as “a drama of naked apes strutting, preening, fighting, tattooing 
their chests and bellowing their power in fierce competition for social 
dominance, desirable mates and material resources” (Gottschall 2006) 
or treating Jane Austen’s novels as a simulation of mating and spouse 
selection strategies (Boyd 1998; Carroll 2011). I do not claim that one 
cannot or should not look for Darwinian themes in literary works. What 
is problematic is the assumption that, somehow, this is the only valid 
research into arts.
Furthermore, the debate about the status of the contents of literary 
narratives does not exhaust the list of methodological problems that 
Darwinists face. One can hardly believe that Carroll and others embrace 
the naïve perception that literature is a set of relatively separate stories 
which are simply waiting, one by one, to be explained by the naturalist. 
The way we construe, understand and evaluate literary narratives hardly 
ever depends on identifying their merits defined as communication of 
important survival-related features, but rather, among other things, it 
is based on the narratives’ mutual interrelatedness, their place in the 
 literary tradition and history, their relation to the canon and to artistic 
conventions. Literary texts do not exist in a vacuum, but can only exist 
in terms of certain institutions, in terms of sets of certain practices. That 
is to say, it is highly problematic to treat literature as a natural object that 
of itself manifests certain properties, for they can only be understood 
and appreciated by a reader who is familiar with the rules that govern 
the practice. As Peter Lamarque has put it, “the existence of literary 
works depends on a set of conventions concerning how they are created, 
appreciated and evaluated; in other words, on attitudes, expectations, 
and responses found in authors and readers” (Lamarque 2009, 62). 
Clearly, these cannot be reduced to purely mental creations or evolu-
tionarily established behaviors. Moreover, if there is a special role for 
literature in our lives, as the Darwinists suggest, this role must be due to 
the differences between the literary, artistic merits of narratives and the 
stories we normally include in everyday conversations, in newspapers, 
commercials, computer games, etc.
Consequently, what should really be significant for the long-term hu-
man survival, according to the Darwinist logic, is the artistic, rather 
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than purely thematic aspect of literature. To show this, one would have 
to demonstrate how the features that make up the artistic nature of liter-
ary institutions can be reduced to evolutionary psychology’s total body 
of knowledge. This, however, seems to be impossible. One can, no doubt, 
attempt to correlate the hypothetical increase in the chances of survival 
and reproduction with some posited rates of artistic value inherent in 
specific literary works, but then one would have to formulate a separate 
theory of aesthetic values for literature. Darwinists not only fail to spec-
ify what they mean by the idea of artistic literariness, but even if they 
did, that kind of definition would be insufficient, due to literature’s em-
beddedness in social institutions, and quite definitely non- evolutionary 
sets of material practices which shape how readers interpret and appre-
ciate art. Any explanation of the evolutionary value of literature would 
have to go beyond the notion of artistic “literariness” (whatever it may 
be) and also encompass many purely institutional rather than formal or 
thematic facts and procedures concerning literature.
As Patrick Colm Hogan has observed, even the most basic concepts 
germane to literary studies, such as a writer’s reputation, can in no way 
be accounted for on evolutionary grounds:
Consider, for example, something as central to literary study as rep-
utation. It seems clear that, say, Shakespeare’s reputation is the result 
of many factors. Some involve the possibility of making use of his 
work ideologically, as in the wartime cooptation of Henry V. Some 
involve the political economy of publication (e.g., the ownership of 
copyright—see Taylor). Some involve Shakespeare’s incorporation 
into the English education system and the spread of that system via 
colonialism. Some involve network factors, such that Shakespeare 
connections reached a tipping point, while those for other writers 
did not. The list could be extended almost indefinitely. None of 
these explanatory systems is evolutionary.
(Hogan 2008, 202)
Hogan’s argument is lucid and compelling, and the question he asks 
might easily be transposed to other issues. Would the Darwinists claim 
that Shakespeare’s position is entirely due to his touching upon some 
questions important for our survival? Would Joyce’s artistic merit lie 
solely in his skillful treatment of the issues concerning human reproduc-
tion? And how could that be measured or artistically vindicated when 
compared to treatment of such questions in popular fiction, romance or 
pornography? Art, just like literature, is clearly not reducible to evolu-
tionary psychology.
A related type of reductionist approach to art can sometimes be found 
in the work of celebrated neuroscientists, such as V.S. Ramachandran. 
Ramachandran, holds that neuroscience offers the proper methodology 
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to study art, forming what is now fashionably called a neuroaesthetic 
approach. He believes that humans are hard-wired to respond, to take 
interest in certain forms, shapes, patterns, images, themes, etc. (all of 
which I entirely agree with), but, quite disappointingly, he claims that 
this is all there really is to art. In his own words:
Let me put it somewhat differently. Let’s assume that 90 percent of 
the variance we see in art is driven by cultural diversity or—more 
cynically—by just the auctioneer’s hammer, and only 10 percent by 
universal laws that are common to all brains. The culturally driven 
90 percent is what most people already study—it’s called art history. 
As a scientist, I am interested in the 10 percent that is universal. 
The advantage that I and other scientists have today is that unlike 
philosophers, we can now test our conjectures by directly studying 
the brain empirically.
(Ramachandran 2005, 170)
As I see it, the above claims amount to the following: the cultural layer 
of art is just a matter of random, arbitrary actions driven by fads and 
showing off. The underlying structure directly addresses the human 
cognitive architecture and can be studied empirically. Now, the first 
claim is surprising, to say the least, as Ramachandran tacitly suggests 
that the study of culture is not only strictly autonomous from  natural 
sciences, but that it constitutes meaningless gibberish full of arbitrarily 
set fads, partisan agenda, etc. There is nothing to study there and 
 neuroscience somehow cannot penetrate into culture in any way, which 
is, again, a  repetition of the standard positivist fallacy. The  second 
claim about the  naturalistic dimension of art follows here immediately 
as  Ramachandran seems to  believe the only valid study of art is the 
empirical study of some instinctive response. The problem is that such 
responses are always  already infused with cultural-specific content. Not 
to mention that appreciation of art is hardly a matter of instinctual, 
immediate responses. 
Moreover, the positivist boasting that empirical sciences are the “true” 
sciences, whereas philosophers can only speculate inconclusively will not 
do, as every empirical study will need to address multiple philosophical 
questions about art. But Ramachandran remains in a state of blissful 
ignorance drawing analogies between the study of art and ethology. In 
his favorite example, it was demonstrated that seagull chicks are wired 
to peck at the red dot on their mother’s beak, begging for half-digested 
food, which the mother keeps there. Experiments showed that chicks re-
spond even more powerfully to a stick with larger dots painted on it, as it 
seems to activate their wiring more strongly, much like in Pinker’s theory 
of “art as cheesecake.” Ramachandran concludes that with humans it is 
exactly the same story:
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What I’m suggesting is that if those seagulls had an art gallery, they 
would hang the long stick with the three red stripes on the wall, 
worship it, pay millions of dollars for it, call it a Picasso, but not 
understand why.
(Ramachandran 2005, 176)
Ramachandran’s theory includes laws of artistic experience which are 
supposed to explain evolutionarily where the sources of aesthetic ap-
peal lie and provide a comprehensive framework for the development of 
 higher-order principles of art’s functioning. When Ramachandran com-
ments on the peak shift principle which traces hyperstimuli to which we 
are instinctively attracted, or why isolation, grouping and contrasting of 
elements provided evolutionary advantage to our ancestors, he is entirely 
right, but not even in synergetic combination can these laws provide the 
ultimate explanation of why certain artworks are more appealing or 
valuable. It ignores the role of competence, background knowledge and 
art-historical tradition. The value of Duchamp would be as mysterious 
to Ramachandran as to Ingarden, were it not for his quick dismissal 
of contemporary art as merely duping of rich patrons. It is clear that 
one cannot generalize about the whole of art that its appeal lies in its 
 hyperstimuli-like qualities, and thus it is false to claim that art functions 
like a caricature. John Hyman correctly notes that Ramachandran’s 
theory is not really about art, as the hyperstimulus argument does not 
really discriminate between artworks, Pamela Anderson or cheesecakes 
and that it is based on a very limited knowledge of art. Moreover, he 
claims, Ramachandran possibly misrepresents the very idea of peak 
shift ( Hyman 2010, 245–254). However, Hyman is not fundamentally 
against the possibility of reducing our understanding of art to natural-
istic scientific explanations. It is Ramachandran’s theory that is flawed 
and should be rejected, but we should not use this to generalize about 
scientific potential, Hyman seems to be suggesting. I do not agree and 
I believe that if we accept that our experience of art is modulated by 
historical and  cultural-specific considerations and our personal level of 
cultural competence, and thus, we accept that culture can produce both 
data and knowledge that is autonomous and entirely reducible to nat-
ural science, then purely naturalistic explanations of the workings of 
art, which are typical of virtually all neuroaestheticians, will always 
fail. Overall, Ramachandran’s theory would be potentially valuable and 
clearly subject to major revisions but only when incorporated into a 
broader psycho-historical framework, as without the art-historical com-
ponent it remains reductive to the point of uselessness.
Semir Zeki, a neurobiologist who actually coined the term neuroaes-
thetics, espouses views about the relation of neuroscience to aesthet-
ics that are vulnerable to similar criticism. Zeki holds that all human 
creativity is a product of our brains and subject to the laws of brain 
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functioning. Consequently, artistic creativity is subject to the laws of 
neuroscience and, finally, “no satisfactory theory of aesthetics that is 
not neurobiologically based” (Zeki 2001, 52) can exist. Though in other 
publications Zeki’s claim has been put forward with “profound” replac-
ing “satisfactory” (Zeki 1998, 90). There are several grave problems with 
Zeki’s stance as pointed out by David Davies and others (Hyman 2010; 
Noë 2015). First, it only addresses creativity, ignoring reception and ap-
preciation. Second, it is not really clear what “neurobiologically based” 
should mean. Likewise, “satisfactory” remains unexplained. Davies 
rightly points out that it is uncontentious that “at least some questions in 
aesthetics should be neurobiologically informed” (Davies 2014, 58) and 
hence, if not entirely redundant, Zeki’s argument should be interpreted 
in a strong form that suggests the “foundational explanatory role” 
( Davies 2014, 58) of neurobiology addressing core issues of aesthetics. 
It is definitely true that philosophy of art depends on empirical evidence 
and that there are philosophical questions and presuppositions that can 
be illuminated or revealed mistaken as a result of empirical research, and 
this is precisely where philosophical aesthetics can be enriched by cogni-
tive or neuroscience but, overall, crucial issues in aesthetics won’t be ad-
dressed by neuroscience (on the other hand, addressing crucial issues in 
empirical aesthetics should involve snatching a body of knowledge from 
philosophical aesthetics). There is no way one can significantly alter dis-
cussions of art’s definition, value, appreciation or hypothetical vs. actual 
intentionalist debate by recourse of neuroscience. Apart from that, Da-
vies is wary of what appear to be typical problems of empirical studies of 
aesthetics. In the studies of response to dance he overviews, among the 
problems he notes is the fact the responders are only “naïve” or that no 
neural correlates for complex aesthetic qualities tested, such as “simple/
complex” or “dull/interesting” were found (Davies 2014, 67). The type 
of empirical evidence that is salient for philosophy of art is that of the 
artistic practice “and the ends that it pursues” (Davies 2014, 74) along 
with the research carried out by “art historians, anthropologists and 
other scholars” (Davies 2014, 74). In other words, it is mostly empirical 
evidence about what goes on at the level of the artworld. Zeki’s strong 
claim, then, should be rejected. Alva Noë made a related point against 
such formulated neuroaesthetics, emphasizing that art is not just a thing 
or a stimulus, but it is “an act of communication” and transactions. 
Responding to it is not a matter of mere trigger- experience or just being 
affected but a complex procedure that takes place “in a landscape of 
shared ideas and understanding” ( Davies 2014, 97) and further, he cor-
rectly maintains, looking inside brains for art is like looking inside the 
minds of individual baseball players in order to understand the game. 
To put it in accordance with the typology proposed in this book, art 
as we understand it nowadays is a concept that emerges in relation to 
art-historical contexts and the practices of the artworld and, as such, its 
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workings are tied in with the level of philosophical aesthetics and this is 
where one should explore fundamental questions about art as art, and 
not at the level of human cognitive-emotive architecture.
John Hyman scrutinizes two other serious claims by Zeki, which 
might be called “artist as neurologist” and “neurobiological definition 
of art” (Hyman 2010, 254–261). The first one is, roughly, that artists 
 explore and manipulate the human visual system, and although, as 
 Hyman notes, the idea goes back at least to the nineteenth century, it can 
be updated by neuroscience thanks to which we can say more about how 
fauvism engages those areas of visual cortex that respond to colors while 
De Stijl activates those associated with responding to horizontal and ver-
tical lines. The second claim is that it is ambiguity, by which Zeki means 
art’s ability to represent multiple facets of reality and its ability to trigger 
numerous interpretations, that defines great art. Unfortunately again, 
standard objections to empirical aesthetics follow. Regarding the first 
claim, it is undeniable that we need vision to understand visual arts, but 
we learn little from Zeki’s theory about why certain artworks are valu-
able. There seems to be no discrimination between art and non-art, since 
Zeki’s claims could equally apply to hamburgers or ice cream, as Hyman 
correctly observes. Zeki apparently ignores the possibility of philosophi-
cal aesthetics, along with related historical or anthropological studies of 
art, producing a body of knowledge in its own right (which would deem 
them redundant), and thus his idea of neuroaesthetics which regards at 
art history, culture or consumer’s competence as entirely transparent 
and reducible to neuroscience. Zeki’s second claim is, disappointingly, 
another rendition of the defamiliarization fallacy against which I have 
been arguing through and through and which acknowledges neither that 
there can be multiple qualities contributing to overall judgment about 
artistic value with some type of ambiguity perhaps being one of them, 
but surely not the central one, nor that there are art-historical contexts 
to artworks which considerably affect their value. Regrettably, for Zeki 
as for many other neuroscientists, human response to art is straight-
forwardly biological and unmediated as if really responding to random 
stimuli or to clearly non-artistic artifacts.
Further forms of neuroscience abuse in humanities were pointed out 
by Reuven Tsur. Commenting on recent empirical research into the 
study of story comprehension and theory of mind, as well as some 
putative benefits of reading (improving one’s mindreading skills), Tsur 
acknowledges that the research is valuable, but apart from correla-
tion, there is little evidence that fiction actually improves one’s the-
ory of mind skills. Indeed, it might be impossible to demonstrate it. 
Moreover, it remains doubtful that such research will tell us some-
thing about the relationship between reading particular works and 
our empathy. Similarly, our current knowledge that words activate not 
only linguistic entries but traces of memories, sense impressions, etc., 
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does not mean that we should “read out lists of such words instead of 
muddling about Baudelaire’s complex poems that abound in olfactory 
imagery” (Tsur 2012, 430). In other words, neuroscience leaves the 
central questions of the experience of art open, which is perfectly un-
derstandable according to the model I propose.
The project of empirical studies of literature, which often makes 
extensive use of research carried out in neuroscience and related areas, 
is also prone to the type of reductionism outlined above. This is how 
authors of one famous empirical study of literary response summarize 
the aim of their experiment, “we invited 30 readers of two Coleridge 
poems to comment on the passages in these poems that they found 
striking” (Miall and Kuiken 1999, 122). The group studied consisted 
of undergraduate students, but only those who were unfamiliar with 
Coleridge were accepted. In many ways, such an approach is fairly 
common in empirical studies of literary response. What I find prob-
lematic here is the unclear status of the research: what does it really 
study apart from a momentary response to a short linguistic passage? 
Appreciation is not a matter of instinctive, unreflective response. 
Likewise, it is hard to understand why empirical studies refrain from 
studying more competent readers, reinforcing the erroneous belief that 
there is a deep divide between naïve responders and connoisseurs. The 
conclusion of the above study, which is, again, a leitmotif of many 
empirical researchers, is the repetition of formalist assumptions about 
literariness, defamiliarization/dehabituation, which are disputable 
owing to the dubious status of empirical research, and the philosoph-
ical problems that haunted formalist theories of art which I reviewed 
in Chapters 1 and 2.3
All of the abovementioned reductive flaws are also present in the 
work of Anjan Chatterjee (2004), another prominent neuroaesthetician. 
 Chatterjee proves to be an author of another sweeping and simplistic 
generalization about the nature of art. Drawing an analogy between the 
development of birdsong in domesticated Bengalese finches who were 
no longer under selective mating pressure, he claims human art grew 
and become more elaborate as a result of it losing practical functions. 
Stephen Davies, however, pointed out that it is quite probable finches’ 
song became more complex as a result of domestication and not reduced 
mating pressure (Davies 2016, 718–719). Moreover, the very idea of art 
as being detached from practical concerns can, at best, refer to some 
modern Western art forms, but in no way can this be true about art in 
general. Contemplation of art for its own sake is reminiscent of archaic 
Kantian aesthetics that remain oblivious to consideration of art catego-
ries and art-historical context which are, in fact, prerequisite for proper 
appreciation of artworks. There are severe flaws to neuroaesthetics as 
it functions right now, but, to concur with Stephen Davies’s view, the 
search for continuities between human creativity and the art behaviors 
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of other species is generally worth exploring (Davies 2016, 719). It must 
however be rid of the reductive tendencies of neuroscientists.
So far, I have discussed reductionism per se, that is, accounting for 
phenomena from a higher disciplinary level as entirely explicable in terms 
of a lower-level discipline. But one can also point to a type of explana-
tion that ignores lower-level constraints and attempts at self-contained 
higher-level explanations. What I specifically have in mind is a tendency 
within textualist literary and cultural studies that tries to reduce the cul-
tural artifact to an arbitrary symbolic/linguistic construct, diminishing 
the role of lower explanatory levels, in particular, the aesthetic level. I 
discussed some problems with this approach in Chapters 1 and 2, and I 
wish to illustrate it using some famous analyses of Poe’s “The Purloined 
Letter.” The choice is not accidental, as the story has frequently been 
the material of literary-theoretical analysis. Luminaries of literary the-
ory, such as Lacan and Derrida, argued about the story’s meaning. For 
Lacan, the letter’s contents are irrelevant as the story touches upon the 
displacement of the signifier in the symbolic structure. For Derrida, the 
letter is, in fact, a castration of the King by the Queen. Another scholar 
argued that the letter is a substitute for the phallus (Johnson 1977). And 
yet another analysis reached the following conclusion:
Lacan equates the possession of a letter-defined as a “lack” of 
 content-with “literal” as opposed to “symbolic” castration, hence 
the odor of the feminine. In other words the “possession” of the lack 
otherwise displaced by language identifies the possessor with the 
lack “she” thinks she possesses. So femininity exists as an “effect” 
of the delusion of possession of a lack otherwise displaced (as a mas-
culine effect?) by the endless purloining of the letter.
(Pease 1983, 19)
I consider the above interpretive conclusions as suffering precisely from 
the marginalizing of the underlying aesthetic level of existence of the 
studied artifact. What the above inquiries do is ignore both the relevant 
art-historical facts about the work, as well as treat interpretations rather 
light-heartedly, cherry-picking whatever they consider to be of interest, 
while leaving large portions of the text unexplained by their interpretive 
theses. Bo Pettersson likened the approach to the mythical Procrustes, 
a rogue who placed his victims on a bed and then chopped off those 
body parts that did not fit its size (Pettersson 2008, 19–33). The type of 
abuse resulting from ignoring the surface interpretation of the work is 
not necessarily a product of post-Saussurean textualism. Earlier scholars 
also fell victim to dubious deep interpretations rejecting the prior surface 
level. Take Marie Bonaparte’s vulgar Freudianism that equates Poe the 
author with the narrator and analyzes the story in terms of the author’s 
infantile sources (Pettersson 2008, 23). Indeed, the procedures involved 
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in the above explanations are incoherent: they use some assumptions 
about the work’s status and agency but ignore others, producing merely 
arbitrary illustrations of their authors’ idiosyncratic philosophical theo-
ries. Ironically, this is also exactly what literary Darwinists do: they put 
their neo-Darwinian matrix on the textual tissue of an artwork and, 
consequently, risk producing arbitrary results. I suppose that in order 
to produce a reliable body of knowledge about a given work, or about 
broader cultural phenomena (which textualist critics strive to do), one 
has to acknowledge the proper identity of the artifact’s status, includ-
ing understanding its aesthetic dimension along with everything that 
it entails. In other words, the aesthetic stratum must be somewhere in 
the total body of knowledge the theorist produces, for it to be valid. 
The idea that one already has a matrix, a skeleton key to read all texts 
(e.g., “the deferral of meaning” and “the phallus”) can give nothing more 
than an endless repetition of the original assumption. But then, there 
really is no research but just arbitrary cookie-cutting in an undifferen-
tiated textual dough. A proper identification of the artifact studied (for 
instance, an artwork) makes it possible that an application of a theory 
fails. This is important, as some universalizing tendencies within Theory 
seem to go against this possibility (as in, say, a crudely deconstructionist 
approach whose aim is to demonstrate that all stories are, in fact, about 
an infinite deferral of meaning). Pettersson makes a related point when 
he says what literary scholars typically do when focusing on disciplinary 
studies, rather than adapting foreign Theoretical frameworks. They:
not only imaginatively analyse the text but also go beyond it to place 
it in relation to Poe’s oeuvre, to the genre of detective fiction the three 
Dupin stories in some sense created, and to the relation of the story 
to subsequent developments in the genre, just as they should be able 
to contextualize Poe and analyse his diverse literary qualities.
(Pettersson 2008, 28)
Note that the above accounts what belongs to Danto’s level of surface 
 interpretation. However, Pettersson is not against the possibility of for-
mulating Theory-driven interpretations, Danto’s deep interpretations, 
though he makes a proviso that if borrowing a foreign Theoretical 
framework it “should be subject to as close an examination as any one 
in  literary studies” (Pettersson 2008, 29) and that no Theory “should be 
applied without heeding the literary qualities of the primary material […] 
and without letting that material lead to possible changes in the theories 
applied” (Pettersson 2008, 29). I take this plea to reflect my own claim 
about the primacy of surface interpretation and a weak dependency be-
tween it and its deep counterpart. As I argued in Chapter 2, we should 
be instrumental in choosing what Theories to apply in textualist research 
(choosing those which can really illuminate either something about the 
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work, or something about a broader cultural phenomenon), but this 
choice must depend on our prior understanding of the literary work as a 
literary work.
Moreover, I believe that textualist research yields more promising re-
sults when applied to a broader scope of artworks or artifacts in general, 
rather than single works, much less individual short stories. This is sim-
ply because research into cultural texts presupposes studying broader 
tendencies within culture. After all, the most celebrated works associ-
ated with studying cultural texts (Said’s Orientalism, Marxist analysis 
of realist novels, Gilbert and Gubar’s work on nineteenth-century fic-
tion, Hoggart’s cultural studies, etc.) usually focused on a large corpus 
of works in their research.
It is ironic how a proper appreciation of Poe’s story suggests that one 
of its themes actually reflects the textualist abuse. The story about the 
two different approaches to crime-solving, or rather, two approaches 
to drawing inferences (Prefect’s and Dupin’s) contains the following 
comment about the inadequacy of the Prefect’s method: that he uses 
his highly ingenious resources as “a sort of Procrustean bed, to which 
he forcibly adapts his designs” (Poe 2004, 128) The story’s epigraph, 
“Nil sapientiae odiosius acumine nimio,” “Nothing is more hateful to 
wisdom than excessive cleverness” is clearly something for a literary the-
orist to think about. What must be emphasized, though, is that literary 
theory-driven research is not necessarily flawed with the type of abuse 
outlined above. Flawed analyses can be found in all types of disciplines, 
and text-based inquiries are no different.
Reductionist explanations tend to overlook the importance of the hi-
erarchy of explanation and focus excessively on one level. Naturalist 
reductionism can mean ignoring the cultural and historical importance 
of the object in question. An excessively narrow approach to art can lead 
to high-brown aestheticism, emphasizing art’s special status or art for 
art’s sake attitude. Ignoring aesthetic and the cognitive aspect of art can 
lead to a radical cultural constructionist stance where individual texts 
are only illustrations for arbitrarily chosen philosophical theories. The 
existence and the cognition of the aesthetic dimension of artworks is not 
discontinuous from general human cognition. Seeing a given artifact as a 
cultural text is not discontinuous from identifying it as an artwork. The 
point is not to ignore the fact that one’s own respective field relies on 
certain assumptions derived from other areas of research. As the above 
discussion shows, this is not a trivial remark.
Notes
 1 This, of course, leads to broader considerations about the political potential 
of reading and analyzing texts, but I do not see a reason for exploring it here 
as it is not directly relevant to my discussion.
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 2 This also hints at my views about the canon which I partly discussed in the 
previous chapter. Following my general thesis, I do not believe the canon 
could have been formed in a radically different way (e.g. following the as-
sumption that criteria for artistic value are purely ideological and subject to 
major revisions or formulations of numerous different canon), granted that 
our factual, art-historical knowledge about literary works is mostly correct. 
In other words, the conditions under which an artwork is considered valu-
able or not are not fully conventional as it is not a matter of convention how 
and what we tend to value.
 3 The above are only illustrations of certain trends within empirical liter-
ary studies which I see as overreliance on untutored responses to art, 
and correspondingly, lack of concern for competent audience, along with 
uncritical use of formalist theories. But this should not be treated as an 
argument against empirical studies or reader-response studies as a whole. 
Needless to say, empirical studies of literature, largely inspired by Sieg-
fred J. Schimdt’s work, as well as various reader-response studies which 
adhere to psychoanalytic, cognitive or phenomenological theories, are an 
immense and heterogeneous research project. I voiced some objections 
about phenomenological theories, about strong constructionism and 
applications of formalism sometimes associated with various scholars 
within the fields, but all in all, due to their more complex relationship 
with psychology and cognitive science, empirical studies and reader- 
response theories would require a separate detailed analysis in order to 
place them within the scope of my discussion. I have not explored this 
topic partly because empirical/reader-response theories have little to do 
with the common understanding of Theory, and partly because both dis-
ciplines are already incorporated in various forms in cognitive literary 
studies and related areas of research.
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The book set out to demonstrate how the three seemingly disparate 
research outlooks in literary studies can be brought together and can 
be proven to be bound in a relation of continuity and hierarchical de-
pendence rather than being entirely incongruent with each other. Even 
though the disciplines do have different aims and different methods, 
one can liken their preoccupations to different levels of explanation in 
sciences. The only conceivable foundations for phenomena such as lan-
guage or literature is that they are rooted in human bio-psychological as 
well as socio-cultural frameworks. Broadly, textualist literary theories 
use the notion of the “cultural text” to investigate certain cultural phe-
nomena, tendencies, latent beliefs and structures which can be traced 
across artworks (and other artifacts), but which are not fully accountable 
by the patterns and conceptual systems generated by the aesthetic level 
of experience, or by philosophical investigation into art. Consequently, 
they constitute the top of my hierarchy, but they are not fully autono-
mous, as the simple fact is that in order to produce reliable knowledge 
about cultural artifacts, one must first identify and understand them 
properly. This means that in the case of verbal art, one must first recog-
nize a literary work as a literary work in order to carry on with further 
literary- theoretical investigations. Aesthetics is, then, one of the layers of 
knowledge that literary theory needs.
Likewise, investigations into the nature of art, or the experience of 
art, are not fully accountable on the purely autonomous level of philos-
ophy of art. This entails that art’s creation and reception is not, strictly 
speaking, a matter of convention or art-historical traditions. Art behav-
iors are traceable to the beginning of mankind and it is a brute fact that 
art engages human cognitive-emotional architecture. In the end, how art 
is created and experienced is partly explainable with reference to cogni-
tive science. The constitution of the human mind sets broad limits on the 
patterns of art that can emerge, but again, aesthetics forms a partially 
autonomous level.
Generally speaking, each of the disciplines introduces its own concep-
tual framework, as well as positing and accounting for the emergence 
of a new set of phenomena. The patterns, concepts, objects and laws 
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that apply to the study of human cognition cannot on their own account 
for everything that comes under the category of art. A mixture of non- 
aesthetic phenomena, standard human cognitive processes, as well as 
the development of human culture result in an emergence of the domain 
of art, whose main focus is, on the one hand, the creation and appre-
ciation of certain artifacts, and on the other hand, self-reflective inves-
tigation into the nature of the practice. Whatever patterns emerge on 
the aesthetic level, they are likewise unable to fully account for broader 
tendencies in a culture. The notion of the cultural text, when applied 
to the study of artworks, can account for the more complex emergent 
relationship between art, other cultural texts and the latent ideological 
beliefs of a given culture.
As it was indicated, depending on the specifics of a given literary re-
search, some other configurations are possible, just as other disciplines 
can be helpful in a given type of investigation into art and culture. The 
hierarchy proposed here is fundamental as it attempts to trace the con-
tinuity from natural cognitive processes, through fully developed art to 
broad cultural phenomena, indicating the gradual emergence of each 
partly autonomous object of study, along with the tools used for its 
analysis.
Simultaneously, my project outlines dependencies, continuities and 
breaks between three necessarily interrelated domains. One is the do-
main of the disciplines that define and investigate their respective areas 
of study, another one is the outline of the objects of their study and the 
last one concerns the types of responders or the types of procedures 
associated with the experience of these objects. So, to supplement the 
above sketch of the disciplines, the level dominated by cognitive psy-
chological approaches studies literature as a set of activators whose ex-
perience resembles pushing buttons, reacting instinctively to what we 
are hard-wired to do. At this level, literature is not differentiated from 
natural phenomena such as everyday storytelling or everyday language 
or semiotic forms, just as visual arts would not be separate from ap-
preciating the beauty of landscapes, animals or other people. The type 
of processes studied are the ones that make up our commonly shared 
cognitive-affective architecture and involve tracking of observable and 
representational features, pattern recognition, forming predictions and 
abductive inferences, implicit learning as well as basic acoustic, syn-
tactic and semantic processing, recognition of narrative structures and 
seeing metaphoric conceptualizations into the work. Various types of 
activations within short-term and long-term memory, such as full acti-
vation or priming within our semantic memory, are started along with 
the networks of personal associations and multimodal representations 
that trigger simulation. Theory of mind and empathy come into play, 
helping to navigate within fictional world and to ascribe mental states 
to speakers and characters. Basic affective responses are triggered, such 
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as enjoyment, sadness, fear or disgust. The experiencing subject at this 
stage might either be considered a universalized abstract of the common 
mental architecture or whatever is closest to the natural experience of 
art of untutored, ordinary audience.
All these actions trigger and are infused with considerations leading to 
the next stage, which marks the emergence of an artwork as an artwork, 
that is experienced with proper attention and understanding leading 
to its appreciation. At this stage, the readers, or audience, explore the 
art-historical contexts of the artifact’s creation within the scope of the 
institutionally determined practice of interpretation and appreciation. 
This is triggered by causal and abductive reasoning that traces the origin 
of the artifact, determining it as being designed in specific ways and be-
longing to a convention and tradition. Next, competent surface interpre-
tation and evaluation of the work takes place including considerations 
regarding form and content. Thus, the object at this stage is the artwork, 
its cognition is proper appreciation, and audience involves competent 
responders or critics.
Finally, surface interpretation and proper artistic recognition of the 
artwork may trigger deep interpretations where conceptual frame-
works from outside mere art-historical and formal approaches are bor-
rowed to explore tacit ideological, psychological or semiotic contents 
under the banner of textualist reading. The procedures involved in this 
type of analysis are not distinct from the ones involved in appreciation 
and subject to the same criteria, though appreciation is not necessarily 
key here, as critical readings or exposing what is hidden on the sur-
face begin to take hold. Their application might depend on the level of 
competence of the responders. At this stage, the object is the text, or 
cultural text, and the responder might also be a competent reader or 
a critic, though this type of reading is most common to professional 
scholars and academics.
Of course, the vast area of research to which I am alluding accounts 
for the fact that my considerations are merely scratching the surface, for 
just as lower-level explanations leave large portions of emergent struc-
tures indeterminate, my book leaves vast areas unexplored. Virtually 
every topic that I touched upon can be elaborated upon by bringing to-
gether various types of research in cognitive science or philosophical 
aesthetics. To name but a few, one can further explore the conditions 
under which a literary-theoretical analysis tends to be abusive toward 
the studied works, or one can investigate other possible components of 
artistic value and their relation to our cognitive architecture, along with 
the related questions of originality and creativity. Other areas might in-
clude a detailed account of the procedures involved in informed aesthetic 
appreciation and their relation to types of information processing, the 
status and scope of empirical research in literary studies, the types of 
inference and processing involved in interpretations, etc.
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The number of topics is vast, which I consider as a good sign for 
 developing research programs. I take no personal merit here, as any type 
of further explorations in the above require stronger interdisciplinary 
cooperation and involvement of multiple researchers. What I envisage as 
my role here is merely knocking on the doors of the numerous scholars 
that investigate related issues in literary studies using different methods.
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